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Abstract 
Managed fund ratings have become an increasingly available piece of 
infonnation to guide choice of inanaged funds. From the perspective of modem 
portfolio theory and specifo:iaUy within the efficient markets paradigm, the value of 
such infonnation is questionable. No profitable relationship should be able to be 
demonstrated between a fund rating and its subsequent perfonnance. This thesis 
investigates the relationship between fund ratings and subsequent perfonnar.ce usili'g 
Morningstar ratings, the most prominent Australian rating provider, for two of the 
largest and most important groups of managed funds. A positive relationship 
between a fund's star rating, its quantitative and qualitative components, or 
quantitative sub~components and subsequent perfonnance is the: least supported 
relationship. 
Four major rating companies compete for the attention of individual investors 
.and financial advisers, two key target markets of managed fund rating suppliers. A 
survey of a sample of infonned individual investors from the Australian Shareholder 
Association demonstrates that a consumer behaviour framework may better explain 
the role of ratings to individual investors. Ratings act as both an infonnation source 
and selection criteria, A survey of a sample of financial advisers from the Financial 
Planning Association confinns that ratings are used by advisers, primarily to help 
satisfy 'reasonable basis' tests imposed on financial advisers when making 
recommendations to investors. For groups in each sample a link between a rating 
and subsequent performance was the main purpose they used a rating. The largest 
group of both samples reported that they con:;idered the main purpose of a rating was 
to identify well managed/administered funds. 
The construction of ratings in Australia provides a contrast with overseas 
counterparts in the significance attached to qualitative or "forward-looking" 
components. Each rating company strongly promote their ability in making these 
qualitative assessments and seek to articulate the difference in their ratings to users. 
The importance attached to the range of possible inputs to ratings varies by 
identifiable clusters of individual investors and financial advisers. The largest cluster 
iii 
in each sample consider historical perfonnance inputs more importantly than the 
rating suppliers. The smallest cluster in each sample considers the forward-looking 
inputs as the most important. This is in contrast with the rating suppliers who 
emphasise these inputs. Further there appears to be a lack of discrimination in the 
choice of rating to rely on given the reported importance attached to various inputs 
and the corresponding importance given them by the various rating suppliers. 
iv 
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CHAPTERl 
THESIS OUTLINE 
Even if I did my negati've surreys every five years, or others continued 
them when I'm gone, it wouldn 't matter. People are still going to 
subscribe to these services. They want to believe that somebody really 
knows. A world in which nobody really !mows can be frightening. 
Alfred Cowles (Bernstein, 1992,p.38) 
My opmzon is that the first job of any investment manageinent 
organisation is to analyse its own techniques and results before 
pronouncing judgement on the ,:nanagerial abilities of the major 
corporate entities ... 
Warren Buffett (Buf!'::t, 1989) 
I. I . Introduction 
Ratings have become a seemingly ubiquitous piece of summary infonnation 
for an increasing range of goods and services. These include the energy efficiency 
ratings Of goods such as refrigerators and dishwashers (Australian Greenhouse 
Office, 2001), accommodation ratings (Department of Industry Science and 
Resources & Australian Automobiles Association, 1999), food nutritional ratings 
(Australia New Zealand Food Authority, 2001) and university education (Ashenden, 
2001). In the finance sector bond credit ratings have a long history and, more 
recently, the ethical merit of company management practices have been rated 
(Corporate Monitor, 2002). This thesis is interested in managed fund product 
ratings. 
In particular it is interested in two key aspects of the increased use of 
managed fund product ratings in Australia. The first is how they are interpreted, 
used and understood by individual investors and financial advisers. The second is 
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interested. in the ratings of Morningstar (Australia), a dominant provider, and whether 
their ratings contain any infontlation about future performance. 
In the US the pre-eminent rating is provided by Morningstar which has 
variously been labelled as the "best-known" or ''most-popular" by Sharpe (1998b), 
Morey (2000) and Blake & Morey (1999), Pozen (1998) has suggested that it has 
been Morningstar that emerged as the dominant brand of the 1990s. No academic 
evidence exists on the role of managed fund product ratings in Australia where 
managed fund ratings are an increasing component of the industry. 
Thi:; is a topic of importance as it has been·: argued that the information 
mandated or voluntarily provided by managed funds themselves is of little relevance 
in detennining fund performance (Pinnock, 1999). Australian investors are 
becoming more sophisticated in their investments and are increasingly using 
managed funds as a vehicle for their investment (Australian Stock Exchange, 2000). 
At the same time Australian employees are being given greater responsibility in 
where to direct their superannu,ition savings, an important type of managed fund. 
These groups require information in making managed fund choices and ratings are a 
convenient source. When Australian individual investors look to a professional for 
assistance, the most popular is a financial planner. The majority of investments 
placed by a financial planner are in managed funds. 
Managed fund ratings are somewhat of a curiosity insofar as choice of 
investm~ts has almost exclusively been considered in finance as being informed by 
expectation of risk and return. Ratings providers forcefully argue that their measures 
are not solely based on these inputs. The suite of managed fund ratings in Australia 
is different to their relations in the US who have tended to focus on quantitative 
inputs of historical performance. The range of current Australian ratings measures 
strongly emphasises a qualitative dimension. Further the dominant finance paradigm 
suggests that such publicly provided information cannot profitab1y be utilised. 
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A large body of academic and commercial research has been devoted to a 
range of issues concerning the perfonnance of managed funds. 1 This work follows 
in the steps of the pioneering work of Alfred Cowles in the 1930s. Cowles, through 
a mixture of personal interest and academic curiosity, surveyed the perfonnance of 
the recommendations financial advisers, insurance companies, proponents of Dow 
theory, and a group of professional financial newsletters as to whether they could 
successfully forecast stockmarket movements. He answered succinctly that "It is 
doubtful".2. Since this work the question of perfonnance has preoccupied many 
academic and commercial investment researchers and has now extended to cyber 
recommendations (Hirschey, Richardson, & Susan, 2000). 
This thesis is in the tradition of Cowles but its focus can be considered both 
narrower and broader. It is narrower in that it does not focus on recommendations 
per se but on a more indirect fonn of endors.ement, namely managed fund ratings. It 
is broader in that it also explores the motivations of the two major users of these 
ratings, namely individual investors and financial advisers. It is also broader in that 
both traditional finance frameworks of modem portfolio theory and the efficient 
market hypothesis are explored along.with a more traditional consumer behaviour 
framework. The fonner relies heavily on a wealth maximisation framework as a 
consequence of rational decision making, whereas the latter focuses on the decision 
process itself. 
I In AustraliB the preferred tenn is managed fund,whereas in the US the term used is mutual funds. I 
will use each term in respect of the literature for each country. . 
2 The story of Cowles and his pioneering work is summarised much more eloquently in BCmstein 
(1992). 
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1.2 Theoretical Framewoii< and Contribution 
This thesis is focussed on the individual investor (Brennan, 1995) as against 
the assumption of the representative investor (Rubinstein, 1974, 2000), which has 
dominated finance theory. It is framed by the pre-eminent place of modem portfolio 
theory and the capital asset pricing model in finance theory and the nonnative and 
positive theories of rational behaviour that they respectively employ. It is less 
concerned though with the question of aggregation that flows from the discussion of 
representative and individual investors and the associated questions of the efficient 
allocation of capital. It is more concerned in whether, at an individual level, 
individual investors have "an efficient outlet for their savings" (Brennan, 1995, 
p.60). Integral to this is the dissemination of infonnation that is accessible and 
useful to investors. Managed funds offer an ideal setting to investigate these issues, 
as they are increasingly attracting funds and increasingly attracting infonnation 
brokers and infonnation packagers. Managed fund ratings are an increasingly 
prevalent and convenient infom1ation package. Whether that convenience is 
associated with their understanding, use or usefulness are the questions that 
ultimately guide the thesis. 
:, 'i . 
The work in this thesis makes an original contributi'on to the literature in a 
number of ways both in content and method. It provides the first: 
examination of A~tralian managed fund ratings and perfonnan~ 
examination of ratings tha~ :involve a large qualitative component 
use of pooled time series techniques to examine ratings and performance 
survey of individual investors and financial advisers as to the use and 
importance ofratings in Australia 
examination of the hypothesis that managed funds are better considered 
as durable goods within a consumer behaviour framework rather than a 
financial asset that frames modem portfolio theory 
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1.3 Thesis Structure 
The areas covered within this thesis are related but quite unique. The 
literature review presented in Chapter 2 is therefore quite diverse but brings together 
two major themes of managed fund perfonnance and individual investment decision 
making. Investment through managed funds establishes a principal and agent 
relationship between the investor and fund rnanv.ger respectively and the financial 
perfonnance of the fund manager is of critical importance to this relationship. 
Understandably the m·anaged fund literature is heavily concentrated in issues 
associated with how best to measure performance, the characteristics, detenninants 
and relatedly persistence of that performance, and finally consequences of 
performance. These issues are addressed in the first part of Chapter 2. The use of 
ratings begs the question of the investment decision process and reasoning. Finance 
is a "broad church" which has devoted considerable effort to the notion of 
"rationality" which is central to much of what can be classed as mainstream finance. 
A review of this with an emphasis on the contribution of those who have come to be 
classed as belonging to behavioural finance is presented in the second half of Chapter 
2. The chapter finishes with the contribution from the consumer behaviour literature. 
Managed funds have enjoyed substantial growth as a sector within the 
Australian financial system. Chapter 3 presents an overview of the industry together 
with contrasts with related sectors overseas. Accompanying this has been the rise in 
the information market and the rise in the supply of managed fund ratings. The 
second part of the chapter examines this and outlines the methodology employed by 
Morningstar Australia in particular, who by far remain the most transparent of the 
ratings companies. 
Difforent market segments can be identified who use managed fund ratings 
for investment purposes. At present these include large institutional funds, financial 
advisers, individual investors for superannuation and non-superannuation 
investments, and the funds themselves. The ratings product provided by the various 
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companies does not differentiate between these groups. The motivations for using 
ratings may, however, vary between these groups. The two groups that are the focus 
of this thesis are individual investors and financial advisers. Both groups have been 
surveyed to establish which ratings are used, what the respondents believed the main 
purpose of the rating to be, why they are used the rating and what they believed 
should be inputs to the ratings measures. This is presented in Chapter 4. 
The need to measure perfonnance and the emergence of an industry and 
ratings designed to do just this has been previously mentioned. The question of 
whether the ratings have any relationship to relative future perfonnance is a natural 
one when considering the value of infonnation inputs to decision making. A 
discussion of the rationale of the provision of ratings and a methodology to examine 
the ratings and perfonnance link is provided in Chapter 5. This chapter also provides 
an overview of the pooled time series methodology employed. 
Two major groups of managed fund products have been chosen to examine 
empirically the rating and perfonnance relationship using Morningstar data: 
Australian Equity Trusts - General, and Superannuation Funds - Australian Equity. 
These results are presented in Chapter 6. In the final chapter, Chapter 7, the key 
findings of the thesis will be brought together, along with recommendations for 
future work. 
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CHAPTER2 
THE PURSUIT OF VALUABLE INFORMATION 
'Information is the principal thing; therefore get information: and with all thy 
getting, get understanding.' 
With apologies to the Book of Proverbs 
Managed fund ratings are a piece of infonnation that investors and advisers 
can use to guide investment decisions. This thesis is concerned with how these 
ratings are used and to what extent they may be considered a useful piece of 
infonnation. 
Information is critical to the workings of all markets, whether it is to assist in 
the purchase of goods and services, or in making investment decisions. The role of 
information and infonnation search is accordingly a central issue extensively 
examined in financej economics, and consumer behaviour literatures. Thankfully, 
however, many questions remain. In a review of both theoretical and empirical work 
in marketing on infonnation and in fonnation search it was noted that after such a 
long history "fundamental questions remain" {Moorthy, Ratchford, & Talukdar, 
1997, p.263). Stiglitz (2000) argued that infonnation economics has had a profound 
impact in how economists think, yet "leaves open huge areas of future work11 
(Stiglitz, 2000, p.1441). This chapter addresses the literature that can guide an 
examination of the use and usefulness of managed fund ratings as pieces of 
infonnation. 
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2.1 Chapter Overview 
Given the range of literatures that are presented in this chapter to guide the 
discussion of the use and usefulness of managed fund ratings, it is useful at the 
beginning to outline how they link together. This chapter is structured firstly by 
issue with a secondary breakdown, where appropriate, by each of the respective 
Jiteratures. In doing so it highlights the layers of analysis that the different areas can 
bring to a discussion of investments in managed funds. It is apparent that each 
literature has considered many of the same issues at various times though the degree 
to which each literature has been informed by each other is limited. This chapter will 
highlight the synergies that can be gained by considering the different emphasis and 
frameworks from these literatures. 
While issues guide the chapter, this thesis is most obviously grounded in the 
finance literature. Finance offers both a nonnative (modem portfolio theory) and 
positive (capital asset pricing model) foundation. Extending from both is the 
efficient market hypothesis (EMH). This framework has contributed much of the 
managed funds literature and invariably has focussed on managed fund perfonnance: 
how to measure it, whom it can be attributed to, whether it persists, and its 
consequences. This literature is consistent in its focus on expected return and risk 
being the exclusive infonnation inputs required to make investment decision in 
managed funds. 
The use of managed fund ratings can be reconciled in this literature to the 
extent to which they capture such expectations of return and risk or to the extent to 
which they are a measured reflection of historical perfonnance. The usefulness of 
the latter piece of information is seriously challenged both fundamentally by the: 
efficient market hypothesis and by the large body of empirical work. The empirical 
work has demonstrated both an inability of managed funds to match the performa·nce 
of appropriately constructed benchmarks and questioned the persistence of stich 
performance. This by no means can be regarded as a unanimous position and t'Oe 
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discussion in sections 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 highlight contrary evidence. It is more a 
reflection of the weight of evidence. 
In reflecting on his research into the ability of subscription senrices to make 
profitable equity recommendations, Alfred Cowles suggested that people "want to 
believe that somebody really knows. A world in which nobody really knows can be 
frightening" (Bernstein, 1992, p.38). It would no doubt not surprise Cowles that 
such services continue to thrive some 70 years after he concluded that the evidence 
suggested they were not particularly useful. Cowles was the first of a long line of 
researchers who have attempted to "Rate the Raters". While the main interest in this 
thesis is managed fund ratings. the evidence on the ability of such ratings to be of 
predictive value is very small and exclusively U.S. based. Therefore it is instructive 
to examine what similar research into more general equity recommendations can 
provide in addition to the related literature of bond ratings. In both cases the 
literature is, like Cowles, largely negative. The bond ratings literature is also 
instructive in tenns of how bond ratings have been used by regulatory institutions 
and the paradox of the increased use and importance of such ratings at times where 
their information value has been consistently chaHenged. 
The remaining sections of the chapter, sections 2.7, 2.8 and 2.9, broaden the 
discussion from solely a focus on the usefulness of managed fund ratings to a 
discussion of how they may be used. The comment of Alfred Cowles' that began this 
thesis included a reflection on the motivations of users of analytical services. This 
discussion is again grounded in the contribution of what can be regarded as 
traditional finance and its normative (modem portfolio theory) and positive (capital 
asset pricing model) foundation. 
The adequacy of this individual investor behaviour framework that has 
dominated finance has been progressively cha11enged from within. Criticisms of the 
expected utility maxim and the rational behaviour model have existed for as long as 
they have been central to the building blocks of modem finance. Behavioural 
finance has been the umbrella tenn given to this literature that has presented 
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confounding empirical evidence and, to a lesser extent, alternative behaviour models. 
Such models present an alternative role for managed fund ratings and are therefore 
considered in some detail in section 2. 7. The exchanges between opponents and 
proponents of the various behavioural finance models have been colourful and 
uncompromising. This is perhaps a reflection of the degree of difference or 
challenge that each presents. 
Finance has been less concerned with how individuals select and process 
infonnation such as managed fund ratings at an individual level. This is where the 
economics and consumer behaviour literatures can enrich the discussion of the use 
and usefulness of ratings. This is, notwithstanding the arguably consumer behaviour 
framework that wa.\'I proposed within the modem portfolio theory, articulated by 
Markowitz (I 952a, 1959). Perhaps the best way to highlight the distinction between 
the two is that in finance the focus has been on managed fund investment decisions 
whereas in consumer behaviour it is more likely regarded as a managed fund 
purchase decision. A notable exception to this is the work ofSirri & Tufano (1998). 
A consumer behaviour framework provides constructs of infonnation 
sources, selection criteria, and purchase. The consumer behaviour framework does 
not appear to be encumbered with the overriding uneasiness with ratings that the 
finance literature displays. Evidence discussed in these sections points to such 
information being used by investors and of its potential utility to investors not solely 
linked to expectations of return and risk. The economics literature, from which both 
the finance and consumer behaviour literatures are drawn, provides a natural 
complement. It has focussed on the cost and benefit aspects of ratings use through 
information source and search, aspects traditionally downplayed in the consumer 
behaviour literature. Tnis discussion concludes section 2.8. 
The final section of this chapter examines the issue of use and usefulness 
from the practitioner and managed fund industry viewpoint. Financial advisers are 
an important target market of ratings providers. The discussion of how they make 
investment decisions and recommendations to clients reflects a potential role of 
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ratings. This discussion is dominated by adviser decision making in respect of 
individual securities but is instructive in the wide range of attributes that have been 
employed. At an industry level, ratings have enjoyed a degree of hostility when first 
introduced in Australia. However, the expansion of the ratings industry has seen a 
degree of acceptance emerge of them coupled with a broadening of t.'l.e issues that 
have been discussed, notably issues of accountability. This issue of lack of 
accountability complements the similar discussion in respect of bond ratings 
presented in section 2.6 and concludes section 2.8. At the conclusion of the chapter a 
summary is presented which brings together the overlapping literatures discussed. 
29 
2.2 Terminology 
The variation in financial asset terminology across the globe is true in relation 
to what are commonly referred to as managed funds in Australia. The managed fund 
'term has become the umbrella tenn covering a range of institutions and funds. These 
funds "arrange for the 'pooling' of funds from a number of investors .. (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, 2002c, p.27) and include public unit trusts, cash management 
trusts, common funds, friendly societies, superannuation funds, and life insurance 
offices. The three dominant types of managed funds are superannuation, life 
insurance offices and public unit trusts, which are treated separately at law. While 
the managed fund term continues to enjoy widespread use, the tenninology varies 
with the respective legislation. 
The Companies and securities Advisory Committee (1993, p.l) rc::ferred to 
collective investments as involving "a number of investors handing over-their.money 
or some assets to a professional manager who manages the total fund or collec'tion · of 
assets tO produce a return which is shared by the investors". 
The Managed Investment Schemes Act 1998 that flowed from . the 
recommendations of the Law Reform Commission (The Companies and Securities 
Advisory Committee, 1993), provided for amendments to -Corporations Law that 
covered these investments. The Corporations Act 2001 (s.9, si92) now defines a 
"managed investment scheme" as a scheme where people contribute to, acquire 
rights (interests) to benefits produced by the scheme, and where these contributions 
are pooled and the members do not have day-to-day control over the operation of the 
scheme. This definition specifically excludes statutory funds maintained under the 
Life Insurance Act 1995 and superannuatio·n funds that are defined under the 
Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993. 
The Australian Bureau of Statistics.has recognised that the "managed fund"-
term has been 11used loosely in the financial community" (Australian Bureau ·of 
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Statistics, 2002b, para. I) to cover two institution types: collective investment 
institutions (Cll) and investment or fund managers. The Clls- include retail 
superannuation funds, life insurance companies and. public unit trusts. The 
investment managers, or fund managers, act as agents for the Clls. 
The tenn preferred throughout this dissertation is managed funds, as the focus · 
is on ratings of public unit trusts, superannuation funds, and life office products. 
These are in keeping with what the Australian Bureau of Statistics (2002b) refers to 
as the products of the Clls. The literature referred to in Chapter 2 is largely U.S. 
based and, in tum, largely refers to mutual funds. A mutual fund, or more correctly 
open-ended investment company, is structured such that investors are shareholders 
and therefore have the rights ofa shareholder in a company. An Australian investor 
in a managed fund acquires a beneficial interest usually in the fonn of units in a trust, 
but is not a shareholder of the scheme.3 In the UK, there are three similar investment 
vehicles: the Unit Trust is most like the public unit trust in Australia; Investment 
Trusts are comparable to the closed-ended investment companies in the US; and 
more recently the Open Ended Investment Company, which is the equivalent of a 
mutual fund in the US (Association of Unit Trusts and Investment Funds, 2001). 
The managed fund tennis often used to refer to both the company that offers 
the particular managed fund product as well as the product itself. This is cause for 
some possible confusion when discussing ratings because both the comp8.0y and 
product may receive separate ratings as discussed in section 3.7. This thesis 'is 
concerned with the ratings of individual products. When the term managed Jund or 
the abbreviation Jund is used in this thesis, it refers specifically to the individual 
product offered by the backing or sponsor company, which in tum is referred to as 
the managed fund company or abbreviated tof:md company. 
~ A proposal has been put forward by the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) to list all retail managed 
funds on the ASX (Seeder, 2001), though the nature of the investment will remain unchanged. 
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2.3 Managed Fund Performance Measurement and History 
The evaluation of perfonnance is important for any investment, but is 
accentuated when an agent-principal relationship is involved. Such a relationship 
exists for investments made through managed funds. The desire to assess the 
perfonnance of professional fund managers in managing their client's funds has led 
to a range of competing and compl~entary measures of past perfonnance. This 
section provides an overview of these measures. 
Measures of the perfonnance of managed funds invariably involve 
comparison. This comparison involves the use of an asset-pricing model that in turn 
requires the estimation of appropriate benchmarks. This section discusses the range 
of techniques available to measure perfonnance that can be contrasted with the rating 
methodology outlined in section 3.7. The ratings measures would seem to have 
developed independently of these measures. The discussion of performance 
measures also informs the examination of the ratings and subsequent performance 
relationship discussed in section 5.4. 
2.3.1 First Generation Performance Measures - CAPM Extensions 
The impetus for performance measures and the development of benchmarks, 
primarily emerged with the development of portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1952a, 
1959) and the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) (Lintner 1965; Mossin, 1966; 
Sharpe, 1964). From this foundation a series of measures developed which, at first, 
were natural applications of the CAPM framework, with successive generations of 
measures responding to criticisms of the CAPM and expanding and adapting them. 
2.3.1.1 Treynor Index 
Treynor (1965) introduced a perfonnance measure based on systematic risk 
and the CAPM framework and is estimated with equation 2.1. 
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R1 -R1 Treynor=-'--'-
P, 
equation 2.1 
where R1 is the return of fund i, R1 is the return on a risk-free asset and B, is 
the beta estimate of the fund. Risk averse investors will prefer as large a measure as 
possible for this index as this would indicate the highest return per unit of risk. As 
the risk measure used is systematic risk, the index provides relevant infonnation 
within the context of a fully diversified portfolio. 
2.3.1.2 Reward-to-variability ratio-Sharpe Ratio 
The reward-to-variability ratio proposed by ShalJ)e (1966), and later accepted 
as the Sharpe Ratio by ShalJ)e (1994), is based on the work of Markowitz (1952a, 
1959) and the extension by Tobin (1958). Given an assumption of investor risk 
avetsion, the measure is a ratio of the difference in return on the portfolio less a 
riskless return to the total risk of the portfolio as measured by the standard deviation 
of returns. The benchmark for this measure is the slope of the capital market line or 
the Sharpe ratio for the market. The Sharpe Ratio is estimated with equation 2.2. 
Sharpe Ratio= (R, -Ri) 
a, 
equation 2.2 
· .where R1 is the return on fund i, Riis the risk-free rate and a1 is the standard 
deviation of the excess returns of fund i. As with the Treynor index, the higher this 
measure the better. As the Sharpe Ratio utilises total risk it also reflects the 
diversification level of a fund. A fund may have a superior Treynor index ranking 
but inferior Sharpe Ratio measure, which could reflect a less than fully diversified 
fund. 
Extensions of the Sharpe Ratio have been proposed but not generally 
accepted. One extension of the Sharpe Ratio common at a practitioner level is the 
Information Ratio (IR). The IR uses the return on a benchmark rather than the risk-
free rate. Sharpe (1994) has identified situations where such a measure can lead to 
wrong decisions. Treynor & Black (1973) proposed a measure that is the square of 
the Sharpe Ratio. Sharpe ( 1994) has suggested that such a measure, as it is always 
positive, "obscures important information concerning performance" (Sharpe,. 1994, 
33 
p.52). Modigliani & Modigliani (1998) provided the risk-adjusted perfonnance 
measure that provided the same ranking as aipha but did so in "basis points that is 
readily understanable by non-experts" (Modigliani & Modigliani, 1998, p.48). It did 
so by levering the return to the risk level of the benchmark, that is. a market portfolio 
in the case of the Sharpe Ratio. 
2.3.1.3 Jensen's Alpha 
Jensen (1968) proposed a measure based also on the CAPM framework. The 
measure is estimated with equation 2.3 and is most often referred to as Jensen's 
alpha. 
equation 2.3 
where R11 is the return on fund i in time t, Rft is the risk-free in time t, /Jds the 
systematic risk of fund i, £11 is the error term and «i is interpreted as the perfonnance 
of the fund i. If CAPM is true. a1 is expected to be zero as an adjustment is made to 
the portfolio perfonnance for the return that should be expected based on CAPM 
given the systematic risk. A positive a, could be interpreted as superior 
perfonnance, which in tum can be broken into asset selection ability and timing 
ability. Extensions of Jensen's alpha have lead to this measure being referred to as a 
one-factor alpha. referring to its adjustment for exposure to one factor, namely the 
market portfolio as per CAPM. Measures that adjust for multiple factors are 
explored in section 2.3.2. 
2.J.1.4 Timing models 
The previous measures do·not capture the ability of the portfolio .to time the 
market. Treynor & Mazuy ( l 966) proposed a timing model, estimated using 
equation 2.4, that incorporated a quadratic term to capture volatility loadings or 
reductions in anticipation of market movements. The regression equation they 
proposed was 
equation 2.4 
where the tenns are as described previously and ri is the indicator of timing 
ability, with a positive coefficient reflecting an ability to time the market. 
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Merton (1981) and Henriksson & Merton (1981) extended the market timing 
method by developing a model based on option pricing. The estimation presented in 
equation 2.5, used by Henriksson & Merton (1981) is 
where rJt and r 111, represent the excess return on fund j and the market portfolio 
respectively. The distinguishing feature of their regression was the inclusion of the 
put term, defined as put(rmJ - max((-rmJ,O), which is the payoff for a put option on 
the market portfolio with an exerci~e price of the risk-free asset. A positive value for 
r, indicates timing ability for fund i. Connor & Korajczyk (1991) extended the 
Henriksson & Merton (1981) model to an arbitrage pricing theory framework. 
2.3.2 Second Generation Performance Measures - CAPM Criticisms 
Roll (1977) provided a potentially lethal blow to attempts to test CAPM and 
by extension the perfonnance measures previously outlined. He demonstrated that if 
an ex-po:Jt efficient portfolio was chosen as the market portfolio, and beta estimated 
from this, the return on an asset would appear as an exact linear function of the beta. 
This was not as a consequence of the equilibrium relationship, but as a consequence 
of the assumptions of the model itself. Roll (1978) elaborated on the problems this 
posed for perfonnance measures. Mayers & Rice (1979) provided a theoretical basis 
for using the alpha measure, by allowing for superior perfonnance in a model with 
heterogeneous expectations of asset returns. Grinblatt & Titman (1989b) suggested 
that a mean-variance efficient benchmark, from the perspective of the uninfonned 
investor, as per Mayers & Rice (1979), could be constructed which was suitable for 
use as a benchmark. 
In response to Roll's work, performance measures were also developed 
without reference to a benchmark or equilibrium model. Cornell (1979) suggested a 
perfonnance measu-·e that utilised an event study methodology to examine the 
difference in the expected return generated from a holding period and a realised 
return from a sample outside that holding period. The major assumption of the 
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estimation was that the process generating the data was stationary over the period, an 
inherent assumption of CAPM as well. 
Grinblatt & Tibnan (1993) produced the portfolio change measure, which 
incorporated changes in portfolio weights and subsl' 1~L1ent returns and is thus a 
benchmark free measure. They posited that for an uninfonned investor, portfolio 
holdings could not be correlated with future returns whereas an infonned manager 
"will exhibit a positive unconditional covariance between the proportional holdings 
of a particular asset and the subsequent returns of that asset" (Grinblatt & Titman, 
1993, p.49). 
2.3.3 Third Generation Performance Measures - Conditional Measures and 
Multlfactor Models 
The third generation of perfonnance measures incorporated publicly available 
information on the funds as the basis of determining fund performance. The first and 
second generation measures previously discussed measured performance relative to 
unconditional expected returns. Ferson & Schadt ( 1996) argued that such an 
approach can attribute abnormal performance to publicly available information, 
which was not consistent with semi-strong form market efficiency as classified by 
Fama (1970, 1991). Forson & Schadt (1996) incorporated lagged variables for 
dividend yield, term structure, one month Treasury bill yield, the month of January, 
and quality spread in the corporate bond market, and then estimated alpha. They 
found that risk exposures changed in response to public infonnation and using this 
infonnation was economically and statistica1ly significant. They also found that it 
resulted in shifting the distribution of alphas to the right and centering it at zero. 
They thus inferred that the traditional unconditional methods understated the 
perfonnance of funds. 
The original Jensen's alpha model was based on a single index model, or one-
factor model. Multifactor benchmark models have emerged following the criticisms 
of benchmark inefficiency as discussed previously. These multifactor models can be 
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distinguished by the methods employed to determine the factors, namely 
characteristics-based and asset-class factor models. 
The characteristics-based approach had its origins in Fama & French (1992) 
who suggested a multifactor extension the single-factor pricing model in response to 
their comprehensive study of share returns. Their analysis suggested exposure to a 
size effect and style effect in addition to an overall market exposure. The size effect 
was captured by exposure to a portfolio long on large capitalisation equity and short 
on small capitalisation equity. The style effect was captured by a portfolio short on 
low book-to-market ratio and long on high book-to-market ratio. Four-factor models 
were suggested by Gruber (1996), who added fixed interest security sensitivity, and 
Carhart (1997), who suggested a momentum sensitivity factor. Eight-factor models 
have been used by Grinblatt & Titman (I 989a), ten-factor models by Lehmann & 
Modest (1988), and a IS-factor model by Sharpe (1995). 
The asset-class factor models can be traced to Sharpe (1988, 1992, 1995) who 
compared the perfonnance of a fund given the estimated relative risk exposure of the 
fund to various asset classes. By regressing the returns of a fund against a selection 
of passive indices, the effective "style" or exposure to various asset classes could be 
determined. The effective asset exposures fonn the benchmark to be used in a 
subsequent time period to which the actual fund's return is compared. The inherent 
logic of the approach is that a passive position with the estimated exposure weights 
can be created which duplicates the effective fund position. Any return above the 
passive position can be attributed to the fund. This can be compared with an ''under 
the hood',4 composition approach, where reported asset class exposures fonn the 
basis of the benchmark comparison . 
. While the factor models appeared to have 'had success in explaining return 
variability, the adoption of multi-factor models based largely on empirical 
regularities bas been criticised. MacKinlay (1995) argued against the use of the 
"Sharpe used this term in Sharpe (1998a) 
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multi-factor model suggesting that ex-post,. a collection of factors can always be 
found which will explain the ex-ante approach adopted. 
Some papers have proposed measures that incorporate further the assumed 
objective of the investor. Muralidhar (2000) assumed that individuals knew their 
asset allocation requirement, and hence searched for the best perfonnance within the 
asset class. He suggested that measuring perfonnance with the Sharpe ratio, 
information ratio or the M-2 measure may be incorrect. He proposed an M-3 
measure, which incorporated the correlation of the fund and the benchmark to ensure 
that not only the volatility was comparable, but also the expected tracking errors. 
2.3.4 Industry Justification 
Before examining the question ofperfonnance history, it is interesting to note 
the question of industry structure. Whilst Cabot ( 1929) referred to the justification of 
funds in tenns of perfonnance and hence the discussion of the evolution of 
perfonnance measures, it is worth noting the question of the justification in tenns of 
the vast number and variety of funds. Gruber (1996) has considered the puzzle of the 
thousands of actively managed funds, where theory would suggest a more limited 
number. 
In response Mamaysky & Spiegel (2001) developed a model seeking to 
justify the fund industry observed as well as testing further predictions. Their model 
justified the large number of funds within fund families as they sought to satisfy the 
demand for trading strategies of investors. Their evidence supported a prediction of 
decreasing correlations in fund product returns between fund families as the number 
of funds increased in each family. Further, their results supported the prediction of 
higher correlation of the time varying betas within a family as against between fund 
families. Finally evidence supported an increasing beta correlation between funds of 
different families as an increasing number of funds were added to each family. 
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Nanda, Narayanan, & Warther (2000) also examined a model of the structure 
of tl1e mutual fund industry, however their focus "look[ ed] at the agency problem to 
be solved" (Mamaysky & Spiegel (2001, p.34). They examined the choice of fund 
structure by management in view of the liquidity constraints and sophistication of 
investors, and the possibility of investor clienteles, whereas Mamaysky & Spiegel 
(200 I) assumed the agency problem solved. 
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2.4 Managed Fund Performance Empirical History 
,- Writings on the expected and actual perfonnance of managed funds have a 
long history. Cabot (1929) attributed the development of investment-trusts, the 
forerunner of modem mutual funds and managed funds, to Great Britain where they 
had an established profile by 1880. The profits enjoyed by the trusts were large in 
the 1880s and led to a 'trust mania', which unfortunately led to considerable 
problems for their investors as noted by the Economist in I 893. 
Week after week evidence accumulates proving only too forcibly that 
those responsible for the management of these trusts have based no 
inconsiderable part of their operations upon false principles, with the 
inevitable result that, after a more or less brief period of apparent 
prosperity, losses and difficulties have arisen (Cabot, 1929, p.12). 
Choong (1997) summarised the early history of mutual funds in the US. This 
history identified the closure of many funds as a consequence of the 1929 crash and 
the exposure of many irregularities, including insider trading, in their operations in 
the 1930s. This led to the first 'perfonnance' study by the U.S. Securities Exchange 
Commission into the problems in the industry, at which the previously cited Cabot 
appeared. Having outlined effectively a 'best practice' management structure it was 
concluded that 
With conservative capitalisation, sound policies, and able 
management, the investment trusts will make more money than the 
average investor in good times and lose less in poor times. Such a 
perfonnance not only justifies but ensures their existence and growth 
(Caho~ I 929, p.13). 
2.4.1 Early U.S. Performance History 
As explored previously, in the finance literature 'perfonnance' is measured in 
terms of risk adjusted returns. In this respect the ability of managed funds and their 
management to deliver superior perfonnance has been subjected to a considerable 
level of examination. A major motivation of these studies has been the concept of 
market efficiency proposed in the efficient market hypothesis (EMH). Given an 
informationally efficient market, as defined by Fama (1970), funds should not be 
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expected to generate excess returns for investors. The increasing size of funds under 
management, particularly of actively managed funds, seemingly confounds such a 
notion of efficiency, as expending resources on infonnation gathering, such as 
ratings, should prove futile. Grossman & Stiglitz (1980) redefined a less strict 
definition of efficient market such that "those who expend resources to obtain 
infonnation do receive compensation" (Grossman & Stig1itz, 1980, p.393). 
The literature on performance is now extensive but not conclusive. A 
summary of earlier studies can be found in Ippolito ( 1993) and Shukla & Trzinka 
(1995). The latter study identified more than 200 studies related to performance. 
Proponents of either superior or inferior perfonnance by managed funds could find 
support in the literature. Given the various models, benchmarks, time periods and 
samples of funds used in these studies, it is not surprising that conflicting 
conclusions have been found regarding fund perfonnance. 
The original perfonnance measure proponents did not find comforting results 
for fund manager. Sharpe (1966), Jensen (1968) and Treynor & Mazuy (1966) all 
found fund performance to be worse than their respective benchmarks. Better news 
for fund managers was presented by Carlson (1970) and McDonald (1974) who 
found positive alphas. 
Carlson (1970) and Mains (1977) questioned the problems associated with 
benchmark efficiency and methodological issues respectively. Carlson (1970) 
provided evidence that the choice of benchmark changed the conclusion of 
performance reached by Jensen (1968). Mains (1977) suggested that the calculation 
of returns employed by Jensen (1968) were not consistent and when this was 
corrected, together with better beta estimates, neutral perfonnance of managers could 
be supported. 
At the same time, Ellis (1975) was painting a none-to-pretty picture of the 
likely perfonnance of professional fund managers, describing ~em as being involved 
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in a .. loser's game". Using examples borrowed from tennis, golf, professional 
football, and the military, Ellis defined the essence of a loser's game. Ellis cited 
Simon Ramo's book, Extraordinary Tennis for the Ordinary Tennis Player, where 
professional tennis was contrasted with tennis as played by the ordinary player. 
Ramo compared the number of points won by the player's good play as against 
points won due to errors of the competitor. In professional tennis (winner's game) 
the ratio was 80/20 so that to succeed meant winning more points, whereas in 
ordinary tennis (loser's game) the ratio was 20/80, meaning that the winner was more 
likely to be the player who made fewer errors. Trying to win a loser's game with an 
activist strategy was doomed. The only successful approach was to win "by losing 
less" (Ellis, 1975, p.529), Ellis (1975) asserted that the money game, or professional 
investing, was originally a winner's game but had become a loser's game. More 
recently Treynor (1999) has used the game analogy. He has suggested that given the 
adversarial nature of investment management, a focus on defence, that is trading 
costs, was advisable. 
2.4.2 More Recent U.S. Research 
The empirical perfonnance literature is now vast and remains predominantly 
U.S. based. The works follow closely the _criticisms and developments. of the 
performance models discussed previously. 
The issue of benchmark efficiency and performance can be found in many 
subsequent performance papers. Lehmann & Modest (1987) employed factor 
analysis to construct benchmarks of various sizes, in addition to equal and value-
market indices of NYSE and AMEX shares. Their results supported negative 
r ·'normal performance and variation between some of the benchmarks. At the same 
time, Chen, Copeland, & Mayers (1987) also found no evidence for positive 
performance using either a single or five-factor model. 
Grinblatt & Titman ( l 989a) employed a range of benchmarks, includi,g the 
ten-factor model of L<hmann & Modest (1987) and their own eight-factor 
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benchmark, and found considerable variation in perfonnance measures. In a similar 
vein, Elton, Gruber, Das, & Hlavka (1993) argued that the superior perfonnance 
finding of Ippolito (1989) could be explained by benchmark inefficiency. Ippolito 
(1989) was critical of Jensen's EMH interpretation and framed his analysis using the 
costly infonnation access extension of Grossman & Stiglitz (1980). He ·round 
evidence supporting the existence of infonned managers. 
The emergence of multifactor models did not stop the use of one-factor 
models, or the criticism of the multi-factor mOdels. Malkiel (1995) used a 
comprehensive sample of funds between 1971 and 1991. He found perfonnance, 
measured with a one-factor alpha, was not significantly different from zero, either 
before or after fees were considered. Gruber (1996) used both a one-factor and a 
four~factor measure of alpha for a sample of equity funds over the period 1984-1994. 
While he found that there was value before fees, the funds charged more than the 
apparent value they uncovered. 
Ferson & Harvey (1999) questio.ned the· use of the three--factor Fama and 
French and four-factor Carhart (1997) benchmark to measure performance when 
conditional returns were considered. They provided evidence that "hypothetical, 
mechanically constructed portfolios ... have non-zero alphas" (Ferson & Harvey, 
1999, p.1347) and therefore were not suitable in measuring perfonnance when 
returns were conditioned on lagged publicly available information. 
Davis (2001) used the Fama-French 'three-factor model to sort and assess 
fund performance between 1965-1998. He concluded that "the results of this study 
are not good news for investors who purchas·e actively managed mutual funds .. No 
investment style in the study generated positive abnonnal returns" (Davis .. ·2001, 
p.25). 
· The testing of timing models started with its first promoter Treynor.& Mazuy 
(1966) who found no such evidence.· i.;,hm..;, & Modest (1987)'found a similar 
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result using a multi-factor benchmark. A number of papers found support for 
perverse negative timing coefficients (Henriksson, 1984; Chang & LeweJlen, 1984) 
using the method of Henriksson & Merton (1981). Ferson & Schadt (1996) 
employed their conditioned measure and found evidence for reduced negative-timing 
coefficients. Jagannathan & Korajczyk ( 1986) also suggested that the existence of 
negative timing coefficients could be attributed to leverage differences in the sample 
of funds and the benchmarks employed. 
Kothari & Warner (200 I) investigated the power of a number of perfonnance 
measures and found that t'tey were unreliable using simulated fund returns. In 
particular they found it difficult to detect large abnormal performance. Perhaps the 
most serious conclusion was that false inferences could be made regarding the 
relative performance of funds. 
2.4.3 European and Australian Literature 
The Australian managed funds investment structure has more in common 
with the structure of funds in the UK. This section discusses European5 and 
Australian evidence, which, while limited relative to the US, has expanded 
considerably recently. Some limited evidence is presented of other European studies. 
2.4.3.1 European Performance Evidence 
An early study into the perfonnance of U.K. unit trust performance was Ward 
& Saunders (1976). They found, using a one-factor alpha for a sample of funds 
between 1964 and 1972, that they had performed poorly compared with the market. 
Black, Fraser, & Power ( 1992) used a small sample of 30 funds over the period 1980 
to 1989 and also measured performance also with a one-factor alpha, though they 
allowed for both constant and dynamic systematic risk exposures, or beta, over the 
period. When performance was estimated using constant beta, 30 percent of the 
s Of the U.K. evidence it has been said, "Suprisingly, the performance of managed UK portfolios has 
received very _little treatment" (Leger, 1997). 
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trusts had positive alphas. When systematic risk was allowed to vary, the proportion 
of positive alphas increased to 70 percent. Bal & Leger (1996) used a larger sample 
of 90 funds between 1975 and 1993 and measured performance using both the 
Sharpe and Treynor Ratios and a one-factor alpha. Contrary to Black et al. (1992), 
they did not find positive performance using either gross or net returns. 
Leger (1997) examined both selectivity and timing measures but found little 
evidence to support positive abnormal performance. They also found a large 
proportion of negative timing coefficients. Blake & Timmennan (1998) used a much 
larger sample of2300 funds, not solely restricted to domestic equity funds, and found 
under-performance for the average fund, though results were varied by fund type. 
Quigley & Sinquefield (2000) used domestic equity funds between 1978 and 1997 
and again found underperformance using a three-factor alpha. With the exception of 
Black et al. ( 1992), who used a small sample, much of the evidence supported 
underperfonnance. 
Blake, Lehmann, & Timmennan (2001) examined the fee incentive structure 
in the U.K. pension fund industry. They attributed, in part, the narrow distribution of 
fund returns around the median fund and the underperformance of the median fund, 
to incentive effects of the fee structure. They also supported the size effect and 
performance relationship of lndro, Jiang, Hu, & Lee (1999). Fletcher & Forbes 
(2001) used U.K. data and provided evidence of bias in five different benchmarks 
using conditional and unconditional alpha measures. 
Stehle & Grewe (2000) evaluated German mutual funds with a domestic 
focus and found significant underperformance. They argued that the traditional use 
of the Sharpe and Jensen measures had a bias against the long-tenn investor, as the 
performance measures used arithmetic returns whereas geometric returns were more 
appropriate for the long-tenn investor. Secondly they criticised the use of the Sharpe 
Ratio's ex-post perspective and suggested an ex-ante measure where the funds 
returns were levered to match the risk level of the chosen benchmark. Whilst the 
equally weighted returns of alt products in ~cir sample were negative, the weighted 
45 
average performance was zero. They also found a size effect, where the large firms 
perfonned better than small companies using a one-factor alpha. Lhabitant (2001) 
evaluated Swiss-equity funds and found no evidence of superior stock selection or 
timing. Cesari & Panetta (forthcoming) provided evidence that Italian equity funds 
supported the Grossman & Stiglitz (1980) r:arket efficiency definition. Net of fees, 
the one-factor alpha of the funds was approximately zero whereas, using gross 
returns, they were positive and significant. 
2.4.3.2 Australian Performance Studies 
Australian studies have been much fewer than the predominant U.S. studies, 
but have extended quickly more recently. Of the early studies, Bird, Chin, & 
McCrae (1983) and Robson (1986) suggested poor perfonnance of retail managed 
funds using one-factor alpha estimates. 
Sinclair ( 1990) examined a small sample of superannuation funds and found 
positive security selection, but this was outweighed by perverse timing ability. 
Benson, Pope, & Faff (1999) examined a sample of 54 Australian equity funds 
between 1986 and 1991 for evidence of timing ability. They found little evidence of 
positive timing ability (one fund) and comparatively more with perverse timing 
ability (thirteen funds). When the timing abilities were compared with the allocation 
policy of the fund, being either active or passive, no significant relationship was 
supported. Hallahan & Faff(l999) also found little evidence of timing ability for a 
sample of Australian equity funds between 1988 and 1997. 
Sawicki & Ong (1999) used conditional models to test for fund performance 
in retail managed funds. They found improved perfonnance relative to 
unconditioned results, with a smaller number of perverse timing coefficients with 
conditioned models. Holmes & Faff (2000) assessed the perfonnance of a sample of 
Australian equity funds, using a number of selection and timing perfonnance 
measures. The focus of their paper, however, was the detenninants of fund 
perfonnance and risk, which included fund category, status, age, size and expense 
ratio. Of most relevance to the current ·study, they found that age was not 
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significantly related to a fund's risk exposure or its perfonnance. As discussed in 
section 3.7, age is often considered an important input of a fund's rating. 
Allen & Soucik (2000) and Joye, Da Silva Rosa, Jarnecic, & Walter (2000) 
are similarly comprehensive in sample size, perfonnance measures and the 
benclunarks used compared with previous studies. Allen & Soucik (2000) examined 
three five year periods between 1985 and 1999. They estimated perfonnance alphas 
with and without timing estimation using unconditioned one, three, four and eight-
factor benchmarks and conditioned returns based on Ferson & Schadt (1996) and 
Sawicki & Ong (1999). Allen & Soucik (2000) found that the choice of model, 
benclunark and time .period influenced the assessment of perfonnance. They 
estimated the correlation of the range of performance estimates and found that they 
were not generally high, and in some instances negative. 
Joye et al. (2000) examined both retail Australian equity funds and 
institutional superannuation funds between 1988 and 1998. They claimed they used 
"the most complete set of retail funds (viz., mutual) fund data ever compiled" and 
had "the first survivorship-bias free sample of institutional investment vehicles" 
(Joye et al., 2000, p.8) respectively. They also estimated perfonnance alphas with 
and without timing estimation and employed one and four-factor benchmarks, using 
conditioned and unconditioned returns. For the retail funds sample, one-factor 
alphas were significantly negative, whereas using a four-factor benclunark rendered 
the alphas indistinguishable from zero. The one-factor estimates they suggested 
were biased and, relying on the four-factor benchmark, they concluded that the 
evidence supported efficiency in the Grossman & Stiglitz (1980) sense. For the 
institutional sample they found abnonnal selection ability on a post-fee basis, which 
confounded "conventional interpretations of the efficient markets paradigm" (Joye et 
al., 2000, p.38). 
Drew & Stanford (200la) found evidence of under-perfonnance of 
superannuation funds using a four-factor Jensen's alpha. A key feature of their 
methodology was the use and construction of a fee-adjusted passive benchmark 
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suggested by Jacob (1998, p.359) as the basis to assess relative market efficiency. 
The work by Frino & Gallagher (2001) examined similar issues related to the 
appropriateness of an index as a benchmark. More speciflca1ly they found that 
Australian equity index funds had significant and varied tracking errors when 
compared with the performance of the All Ordinaries Accumulation Index. There 
was not evidence however of bias in performance of the funds relative to the index. 
Their results were interpreted "as evidence that passive funds are not necessarily an 
unambiguous alternative to active funds" (Frino & Gallagher, 2001, p.19). 
Bird & Gallagher (2002) provided an extensive examination of the return 
distributions of active investment managers for a range of asset classes in Australia, 
Canada, Japan, UK, and the US. Their results supported non-normal distributions for 
most funds that, in contrast, displayed .both positive skewness and leptokurtosis. 
Given the results, they suggested that alternative perfonnance methods that reflected 
the higher distribution moments would be appropriate. They also suggested that the 
significantly different perfonnance in an up and down market also be taken into 
account when assessing perfonnance. 
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2.5 Performance Related Issues 
Much of the literature discussed thus far has focussed on perfonnance of 
funds on average. As the literature on fund performance has grown in number so it 
has in breadth; away from a focus on average performance to include the 
characteristics of performance, performance persistence and consequences of 
performance. 
2.5.1 Performance Characteristics 
A large amount of work, almost exclusively U.S. based, has examined the 
extent to which managed fund performance could be related to fund characteristics, 
much in the same vein as undertaken for ordinary equity. Not surprisingly a large 
component of this work has focussed on the relationship between fees and 
performance. This literature has been referred to in section 2.4.2 with the work of 
Ippolito (1989). He used the broader market efficiency interpretation of Grossman & 
Stiglitz (1980) where useful infonnation was available at a cost. 
Subsequent evidence seems to have supported the conclusion that costs of 
investment were not recovered by management through superior perfonnance (Elton 
et al., 1993; Gruber, 1996) and that a negative relationship existed between expenses 
and performance (Carhart (1997). A contrary position can be found in Grinblatt & 
Titman (1994). Morey (2001) found evidence that load funds, that is, those that 
charged an entry or exit fee to new investors, under-performed no-load funds. 
Further, when load funds were considered in isolation, there was no significant 
difference in out-of-sample performance of high-load funds compared with no-load 
funds. 
Another characteristic in relation to performance that has been explored is the 
size of the fund. The early works of Sharpe (1966) and Carlson (1970) found no 
relationship between fund size and performance. More recently, Indro et al. (1999) 
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found that fund size had an impact on perfonnance, even if the funds had the same 
expense ratios and turnover. This finding supports an optimal size for a fund given 
its style. 
Manager specific characteristics have also been examined for a possible 
relationship with fund perfonnance. Chevalier & Ellison (1999a) found that 
manager characteristics, such as age, having an MBA, and education institution, were 
related to performance. 
The impact of fees has also been examined from the point of view of strategic 
investment behaviour of managers. Nanda, Narayanan et at. (2000) examined the 
role of fee structures in the development of the fund industry. The most 
comprehensive and recent study is Elton, Gruber, & Blake (2001) who examined the 
use of incentive fees in the US. Key to the setting of the incentive fee was the choice 
of benchmark and time period. In their sample, Elton et al. (2001) found that time 
periods used in incentive fee determination were generally short. Only two of 108 
funds had performance periods for calculation of a benchmark of five years, 45 funds 
had a one-year and 59 had a three-year period. Further they found that "We could 
find no funds where the fund return is calculated in a disadvantageous way relative to 
a benchmark" (Elton et al., 2001, p.8). Two examples were specifying the incentive 
benchmark as the average of other funds. This reduced the benchmark by the 
average management fee, or specifying a share price index as the benchmark, thereby 
making the funds return likely to be higher as it included reinvestment of returns. 
Notably however, Elton et al. (2001) found that where funds had been using 
incentive fees, managers had not been able to earn positive fees. Further, funds with 
incentive fees that had outperformed (underperformed) the benchmark in the early 
part of the evaluation period, reduced (increased) their risk exposure in the later part 
of the period. 
Chevalier & Ellison (1999b) examined non-fee related strategic behaviour by 
fund managers. They found evidence that younger managers who deviated from the 
industry norm were punished, in a financial sense, and were accordingly less likely to 
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deviate from their peer's behaviour. The apparent obsession with tracking error, the 
minimisation of the variance of returns relative to a nominated benchmark, in the 
managed fund industry can be seen as supportive of this. However Elton et al. 
(2001) found that managers that used incentive fees "pursue[d] non-benchmark 
strategies in an attempt to earn excess returns and higher fees" (Elton et al., 2001, 
p.36). Das & Sundaram (1998, 2001) have argued that whilst the conventional 
wisdom suggested in the presence of asymmetric incentive fees, a higher variance or 
tracking error policy would be pursued, "it is not apparent that admitting incentive 
fees structures will lead to increased levels of risk in equilibrium" or "make the 
investor worse off' (Das & Sundaram, 1998, p.1 ). 
2.5.2 Performance Persistence _.." 
The interest in fund performance has extended to whether performance in any 
time period could be a predictor of future performance, more commonly referred to 
as performance persistence, Many of the previously cited papers on performance 
also examined persistence as a secondary focus though more studies have examined 
explicitly the question of persistence. 
As per the discussion on the average performance of funds the early pioneers 
of pennormance measurement, discussed in section 2.4.1, found no evidence of 
persistence of performance. As the volume of work on performance increased 
however, evidence did emerge of persistence. It has however been characterised by 
conflicting evidence and several claims of induced persist~ce. 
2.S.2.1 U.S. Evidence 
Grinblatt & Titman (1992) arguabled reignited the interest in persistence with 
their study of funds between 1974 and 1984 and their evidence that supported 
persistence. Hendricks, Patel, & Zechhauser (1993) was stronger in their evidence 
for "icy hands", that is those funds that had performed poorly continued to do so 
subsequently. They did find some evidence that supported persistence for the top 
j>erfonning funds relative to the average, but this was more restricted to a particular 
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type of fund in their sample. Another notable feature of their study was that the 
evidence of persistence was strongest for a one-year history. 
Goetzmann & Ibbotson ( 1994) examined persistence over a long-term 
horizon (two years) and a short-tenn horizon (one month) using raw returns and a 
one.factor alpha. They constructed winner/Joser two·way tables for the five non-
overlapping two-year periods between 1976 and 1988 and found supporting evidence 
of persistence in three of the five sub·periods and for the overall period. 
Further studies found evidence that supported persistence. Elton, Gruber, & 
Blake (1996) supported the finding of Hendricks et al. (1993) that one-year 
perfonnance history carried more infonnation than three·year history, though both 
remained infonnative, 
Some studies were however more equivocal such as Kahn & Rudd (1995) 
whn only found persistence for fixed income funds but not equity funds. Malkiel 
(1995) found some evidence but it was restricted to particular time periods. Carhart 
(1997) suggested that the one-year persistence evidence was driven by momentum 
which once accounted for eliminated the persistence. 
As suggested, a number of studies suggested that the results were spuriously 
produced, or induced, through survivorship bias. Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson, & 
Ross (1992) identified that survivorship bias could make persistence appear when 
none existed. This had been noted in some previous studies Hendricks et al. (1993) 
though they had argued that survivorship bias was not severe. Other studies such as 
Elton et al. (1996) questioned the method of risk adjustment used in earlier studies 
that had tested for persistence. 
More recently Davis (2001, p.25) found persistence for superior perfonnance 
but this was restricted to growth funds and only for a one-year period, while they 
also found persistence for poorly perfonning small-capitalisation funds. 
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Of the U.K. literature Bal & Leger (1996) found evidence of persisteoce 
using rank order correlations though the evidence was not strong. Allen & Tan 
(1998) provided evidence of persistence in the long-run but not the very short run. 
Blake & Timmennan (1998) provided evidence supporting persistence in the best 
and worst performing funds whereas Quigley & Sinquefield (2000) fouod evideoce 
for persistence of the worst performing but none for the best performing funds. 
In Australia Vos, Brown, & Christie (1995) examined a small sample of 
Australian and New Zealand equity funds and found no evidence of perfonnance 
persistence. Hallahan (2000) examined performance persistence of a sample of 
rollover funds. He found that raw returns were not associated with persistence and 
risk-adjusted returns failed to "unambiguously establish persistence in performance" 
(Hallahan, 1999, p.28). The impact of survivorship bias has been addressed with 
Australian data, Hal1ahan & Faff (2001) examined Australian rollover funds and 
found in favour of the Grinblatt & Titman {1992) conjecture of performance reversal 
as a consequence of survivorship bias. Drew & Stanford {2001b) also provided 
Australian evidence of survivorship bias, using a database similar to that used in this 
thesis. Their .evidence supported a survivorship bias and premium of 23 basis points 
per annum. 
2,5.3 Performance consequences 
The consequence of fund perfonnance in tenns of investor reaction, measured 
by the flow of money to the funds, has attracted what can be characterised a broader 
view within the literature. By its nature a number of correlated factors can explain 
flows of money in and out of funds, with perfonnance just one such measure. An 
inherent problem of this work has been isolating which of a number of possible 
perfonnance measures was related to the subsequent flow of money. 
Much of the work has supported a positive relationship between perfonnance 
and the subsequeot flow of funds. Spitz (1970) was one of the first to study the 
relationship and found a positive linear relationship between perfonnance and 
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subsequent money flow. Patel, Zeckhauser, & Hendricks (1991) found persistence in 
the flow of money to funds, a positive relationship between perfonnance and 
subsequent inflows and the importance of rank measures relative to risk-adjusted 
perfonnance measures using a sample of 96 open-ended mutual funds. They also 
supported a threshold eff,ct such that funds flow was significant beyond a certain 
large threshold perfonnance level. These relationships were grouped into a "barn 
door closing" effect. To explain the flow of funds Patel et al. (I 991, p.233) 
suggested that individuals relied on perceived perfonnance patterns or engaged in 
"personal window dressing". The window dressing behaviour was suggested as a 
means of individuals aiming to reduce regret by removing "reminders of their past 
errors" (Patel et al., 1991, p.233). The use of regret as a possible factor in explaining 
individual behaviour had been suggested much earlier by Bell (1982) and Loomes & 
Sugden (1982) and is discussed in section 2.7.2. 
Ippolito (1992) used a substantial database of 143 open-ended U.S. mutual 
funds over the period 1965 to 1984. The model employed by Ippolito (1992) 
assumed a Grossman & Stiglitz (1980) definition of market efficiency where 
infonned investors spent money to earn higher gross returns though an equilibrium 
prevailed between informed (active) and uninformed (passive) investors. They used 
a one-factor alpha and raw returns as signals of fund quality. Similar to Patel et al. 
(1991), Ippolito (1992) implied a threshold limit in performance level before an 
individual moved funds, proxied by the level of transaction costs. Ippolito (1992) 
examined the relationship between fund perfonnance and funds flow or growth of 
143 open-ended U.S. funds between 1965 and 1984. He found a positive 
relationship between perfonnance, using both lagged one-factor alpha and 
unadjusted raw returns and subsequent new6 funds flow. The most recent one-year 
perfonnance was more important, though it was unclear whether this was due to 
consumers using unadjusted or risk-adjusted returns as the quality measure. Further 
there was an asymmetry in the response rates with poor perfonnance having a lower 
6 The definition or new funds used the "extreme assumption that all earnings arc reinvested in the 
fund and that these automatic reinvestments do not reflect conscious consumer dccisionsn (Ippolito, 
1992, p.58). 
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funds flow consequence. Gruber (1996) also found a positive relationship between 
performance and flow of money. Of relevance to the choice of performance 
measures in this thesis, discussed further in section 5.4, was the finding of Gruber 
( 1996, p.11) that "raw returns do have a separate impact on flows besides that of 
risk-adjusted returns". 
Goetzmann & Peles (1997) found a positive relationship between total returns 
and the subsequent flow of money but only for the top quartile of performing funds, 
using a database of U.S. open-end common stock mutual funds between 1976 and 
1988. There was no support however for a difference in the flow of funds for the 
bottom three quartiles. As discussed further in section 2.7.1, Goetzmann & Peles 
(1997) also conducted a survey of investors which suggested that the asymmetry in 
money flow, suggested by previous studies, could be explained by a propensity by 
investors to inflate their memory of historical perfonnance. 
Sirri & Tufano (1998) examined money flows given a cost1ess-search model 
and costly-search model using money flow regressed on performance measures 
guided by those considered commonly available to consumers over the sample 
period. These included rankings based on total raw returns, one-factor alpha, and the 
standard deviation of raw returns. Controls were included for fees, fund size and 
sectoral flows. They found money flow was sensitive to performance, though as 
noted in previous work, it was not linear with only the top quintile of perfonning 
funds having a positive and significant relationship and the lowest quintile having no 
relationship. Given a compensation package that rewarded fund size, and given that 
flows followed highest but were not related to lower perfonnance, Sirri & Tufano 
(1998) suggested that these option-like characteristics could induce funds and 
managers to increase volatility. The work of Sirri & Tufano (1998) was broader than 
perfonnance and flows per se and is discussed further in section 2.8.3. 
Goriaev, Nijman, .& Worker (2001) examined the flow of money in the spirit 
of Ippolito (1992) but differed with the previous flow literature in that they did not 
find flow asymmetry between good and poor performers but rather a linear 
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perfonnance and flow relationship. Perfonnance was measured using both a one-
factor alpha and raw returns over the previous two-year period. Similar to Gruber 
(1996) raw returns were found to have a separate impact on funds flow when 
included with the one-factor alpha. Further aspects of their paper are discussed in 
section 2.8.3. 
A problem of the performance-flow literature is the inherent difficulty in 
disentangling the correlation between the vwious perfonnance measures, where each 
individually or together may carry infonnation for investors. Del Guerico & Tkac 
(2001) sidestepped this problem by using actual Morningstar fund ratings in the 
funds flow analysis. This did not totally eliminate the problem of isolating the 
information attached to correlated perfonnance measures as the ratings are also 
correlated with the perfonnance measures, which will be demonstrated in section 6.2 
for Australian funds. 
Goetzmann, Massa, & Rouwenhorst (2000) analysed money flow as a means 
of establishing factors relevant for the arbitrage pricing theory. They suggested a 
common behavioural motivation could be supported in the negative correlation 
between flows to equity funds and both money market funds and precious metal 
funds. They found correlated behaviour across investors and suggested the major 
behavioural factor related to expectations of the equity premium. 
Jain & Wu (2000) provided a novel approach to the question of persistence, 
money flow and the use of perfonnance measures by funds by considering the 
question of "fruth in Mutual Fund Advertising". They identified U.S. funds that 
advertised in Barron's or Money magazine between July 1994 and June 1996 to test 
two hypotheses. The first hypothesis was that advertising was a signal by fund 
sponsors of superior manager skills. They examined the fund's pre-advertisement 
and post-advertisement excess returns and found that the funds that advertised had 
higher pre-advertisement excess returns but lower post-advertisement excess returns. 
They utilised four benchmarks: the average return of all other mutual funds with the 
same objective; the S&P500; a one-factor alpha and a four-factor alpha. Their 
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finding was valid for· a range 1(}f fund types, .sub-periods and consistent when 
" 
manager_ turnover was <XJnsidered. 
The second hypothesis examined was whether advertising was used to a~act 
riioney to the funds. They used a regression of money flow against prior-p#iod 
'perfonnance, prior-period money flows, and fund size with up to three lags and a 
dummy variable for advertising. These were compared these to a control gt'O~P of 
similar funds. They found that those funds that had advertised attracted more miney. 
Jain & Wu {2000) concluded, "the emphasis on past perfonnance in advertisements 
is misplaced" and further 
it is possible that the mutual fund operators are well aware of the · 
possibility that past perfonnance is indeed not a good predictor of future. 
performance .... Yet the fund operators choose to advertise funds with 
superior perfonnance (Jain & Wu, 2000, p.957). 
To. extend this one could also suggest that because the managers were aware 
of firstly, the difficulty of achieving persistent good performance and secondly, the 
importance of prior-perfonnancc to investors when makiµg their investment 
decision, they acted as soon as persistence was evident to "strike while the iron· was " 
hot". This changes the implied causality link of Jain & Wu (2000) and suggests the 
hypothesis that a fund is more likely to advertise when it achieves a period of good 
performance. 
This leads to ari ;amination of the role of fund i,t;fonnance it~· the fund 
. \' ' 
,, · company and existing fund- investors: From th~- fund company .P_oint · of view)t is 
,_-" ', :. -" 
assumed that they are interested primarily in maximising the Wealth ;of. their 
shareholders. Wh"~l_St go.~d relative performance ~~Y ~·ntriblll~\to.. thi~ by 
maintaining the Si~'rit· funds undef control and fees generat~d_fro~ thi~~- 'alternatiVe 
.. ,, 
strategies may achieve this. __ , 
The fund comi,"any· may use· the history -of good relative performance to 
inCl'ease the level -of fund fees. The success of such a strategy would be depen~ant 
on the · price elasticity of the_ funds, which will in tum depend oll. the range o~ 
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competing and complementary fund products that investors can choose from. Elton 
et al. (1993) in fact showed that past performance success was not associated with a 
subsequent change in the level of fund fees. Attracting new external money into the 
funds and then encouraging switching by investors within a fund company's stable of 
products may be a more productive means of maximising returns to shareholders in 
such a competitive environment.. 
It could also be suggested that it was not important that a specific. fund 
product per se achieved good relative persistent performance, rather that a minimum 
number of the products offered by the fund company do so to enable performance 
based advertising to attract funds. The spillover effects of good performance has 
been explored for Morningstar ratings in the US by Nanda, Wang, & Zheng (2000) 
who provided indirect support for this spillover view. Sirri & Tufano (1998) 
examined the relationship between fees and flOw and found that fee increases were, 
not associated with flows, controlling for prior performance, but fee decreases were':. 
and i~creased money.flow. Sirri & Tufa~o (1998) also identified that the flow to·: 
funds that had performed well was enhanced by high fee-funds as a large component 
of· the high fee was marketing expenses that "in tum highlighted .the good 
performance. 
2.53.1 Australian Performance Consequence Studies .. 
In tenns of consequences of p~rformance, Sawicki (2000) reporte<t:evi~ence 
' 
supporting a s.ignificant l'elationship between fund performance, measured relative to · 
' 
the average return for the fund's style group, and investment floWs in the Australian 
wholesale managed funds. She noted that this relationship could be interpreted as , 
either efficient or opportunistic behaviour by_ contracting managers. Efficient in the:, 
sense that managers chose furids where they had the greatest chance of maximising 
-. returns, and opportunistic in that choice of a fund may have been based on the need , 
for the manager to display defensible behaviour. Joye, da Silva Rosa, Jamecic, & , 
Walter (2000b) have ongoing work exainining perfonnaflce persistence and funds 
flow. The performance literature on Australian funds ·is small arid there is no 
p~blishe4 literature on ratings based fund flow. 
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Allen & Paiwada (2001) examined the impact of fund mergers on fund flows 
and found that investors "do not reward funds for being part of merger transactions" 
(Allen & Paiwada, 2001, p.18). 
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2.6 Who Rates the Raters? 
A major motivation of this thesis is contained in the question "Who Rates the 
Raters?"7• Warren Buffet (1989) has suggested that if your business is to make 
pronouncements on the likely perfonnance of others, you should also reflect on your 
own perfonnance. This section reviews the literature that has examined the 
perfonnance of general share recommendations that started with Cowles, in addition 
to the more limited literature concerning ratings. 
2.6.l Equity Recommendations and Performance 
There is no shortage of those who make a Jiving from recommendations to 
buy and sell shares. The literature that has explored the predictive value of these 
recommendations reflects the diversity of media through which the recommendations 
are made. Mathur & Waheed (1995) and Barber & Loeffler (1993) have investigated 
recommendations of the print media using columns in Business Week and the Walt 
Street Journal respectively. They both found significant abnonnal returns for the 
surrounding period of the recommendations. A contrasting position can be found in 
Jaffe & Mahoney (1999) who found that investment newsletters did not offer 
significant superior performance. Metrick (1999) also found no significant abnonnal 
perfonnance using an extensive database of equity recommendations contained in 
153 newsletters. Cullen (1998) identified the pitfalls of using Charles Schwab & 
Co.s Select List of U.S. stock and bond funds as a buy list, indicating that top 
perfonners were more likely to end up in the bottom half or quarter of funds in future 
years. 
Studies have also explored the recommendations of television programmes. 
Griffin, Jones, & Zmijewski ( 1995) found significant abnonna1 returns of shal'es on 
7 A number of articles related to credit ratings have used such a question, or similar, in their articles 
Anonymous (1995, 1998b) 
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the first trading day after the television recommendation, though smaller than the 
print media. Hirschey et al. {2000) extended the literature to internet sites by 
investigating the buy announcements of The Motley Fool's Rule Breaker Port/oUo. 
This was an interesting study in two respects. Firstly it was the first research of 
internet services though the site only reported its own buy and sell positions rather 
than making recommendations. Secondly a major activity of the website8 is to 
disparage the analysts who do make recommendations and ridicule the investors who 
follow them.9 The website specifically encourages investors to make their own 
decisions based on their own beliefs. The study found statistically significant 
abnonnal returns and trading volume on announcement day of a share position and 
the surrounding three-day period. This was larger in magnitude than the previously 
reported print media or television recommendation returns. Hirschey et al. {2000) 
concluded 
If it is indeed foolish to mindlessly follow the stock-picking advice of 
other investors, one can only describe The Motley Fool's own followers 
as foolish ralher than Foolish (Hirschey et al., 2000, p.69), 
In Australia Sawicki & Thomson (2000) investigated the perfonnance of 
managed funds on an approved list of an unidentified leading Australian research 
company between 1988 and 1994. The study only had data available for the funds 
that had survived and relied on perfonnance measures unadjusted for risk. They 
found no evidence to reject the hypothesis that there was no difference in 
perfonnance between funds on the approved list and those not approved. 
2.6.2 Ratings and Performance 
Fewer studies have investigated the perfonnance of managed fund ratings, 
though this is largely explained by the lack of available data. With the notable 
exception of Morningstar (US) the various agencies have not appeared to heed 
I 
www.fool.com 
9 Hirschey et al. (2000) provided a brief history of the site. The "Motley Fool" term is taken from 
Shakespeare's "As You Like 11". A Fool entertained the king and queen and were the only people 
allowed to really tell the truth through their self-effacing humour. A Fool was therefore the wise one 
as against the self proclaimed wise who were indeed foolish. 
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Warren Buffet's advice either by reporting their own performance or by making their 
data available. No Australian research is published on the performance of managed 
fund ratings though a small number of U.S. studies have examined fund rating and 
subsequent fund performance however, not surprisingly all were based on 
Morningstar ratings. 
Khorana & Neiling (1998) examined the determinants and predictive ability 
of Morningstar (US) ratings for the period July 1992 to June 1995. They sorted 
funds by investment objective and used a probit regression of rating against 
management characteristics and performance measures. Not surprisingly, given the 
construction of the ratings, they found: a significant positive relationship between 
risk-adjusted performance and rating; mixed results for the level of beta of a fund 
and its rating; a negative relationship for corporate bond, government bond and 
domestic equity funds; and a positive relationship for international and specialty 
funds. Asset size had a positive and significant relationship for all funds and expense 
ratio had a significant negative relationship. These results are not surprising given 
what is known of the method used by Morningstar ratings construction, as discussed 
by Sharpe (l 998b). Of more interest for this thesis was that the authors did not find a 
relationship between the fund manager's tenure and the rating of the fund, with the 
exception of a significant positive relationship for domestic equity funds. 
The predictive ability of the fund rating was tested indirectly by Khorana & 
Neiling (1998). Rather than examine the relationship between ratings and future 
risk-adjusted perfonnance, they tested the relationship between a fund's rating in 
June 1995 and its corresponding rating in December 1992 using contingency tables 
of the rating level in each time period. They found that 61 percent of four or five-
star funds maintained their rating and zero, 1.7 and 5.3 percent of one, two and three 
star funds were able to improve their rating to a five-star. They argued that this was 
similar to Hendricks et al. (I 993) who suggested that persistence peaked at around 
six to eight quarters. Whether such a test provided useful infonnation about the 
usefulness of ratings is questionable. It , was more a possible indication of the 
consistency of the Morningstar ratings system itself rather than a test of predictive 
ability. In tenns of predictive ability it only tested the ability of Momingstar's 
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ratings. to predict Momingstar's subsequent ratings which is of limited value to 
inv~stors if the ratings have no relationship to future performance. 
, They also employed a second test of predictive ability that examined the 
average annua1ised return and standard deviation of all funds .at each rating level for 
the three-year post-rating period. Whilst the test indicated an increasing (decreasing) 
average return (standard deviation) trend for higher rated funds, these were averages 
and therefore could mask much of the information for individual funds and be 
strongly influenced by outliers. Further these were not true risk-adjusted 
performance measures and finally, in terms of use to an individual investor, it \\'.Ould 
have required them to purchase all funds in the rating category. Interestingly there 
have been attempts to construct such ·an 'index' fund. In 1992, Vanguard in the US 
constructed a fund on the basis of matching the holdings of a pool of fifty of the 
'largest growth funds (Oliver, 1992). 
Detzel & Gagne ( 1999) examined the predictability of Morningstar ratings of 
U.S. equity funds between 1992 to 1997. They tested the six separate year-end fund 
rating with the following one-year total returns, unadjusted for risk, fees or loads. 
For each of the five Morningstar ratings categories, the following year performance 
was classified as above or below the median total return for alt diversified, domestic 
equity funds, producing six, five by two contingency tables. Chi-square tests of 
expected counts in each cell of the cross-tabulation supported a conclusion that 
future relative one-year performance varied by rating. The same tests were also 
conducted with controls for fund size by ranking the fund's portfolio market 
capitalisation, and for fund style using the mean of the funds price-to-book ratio and 
price-to-earnings ratio. This produced small growth, small value, large growth and 
large value groupinga. These tests found no support for the predictability of the 
ratings. No support was also found when two and three-year perfonnance windows 
were used. They concluded 
Altogether, the results in this study send a message to asset allocators 
who are looking for guidance to future top-performing funds: 
enlightenment does not come from the stars (Detzel & Gagne, 1999, 
p.26). 
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By not adjusting returns for risk however, the study was open to the criticism 
that it was not making a fair comparison .. Tha~ is, the.U.S. Morningstar ra,ting are 
based on risk-adjusted returp.s, not total annual returns and therefore the contingency 
tables may be an unfair comparison. 
Loviscek & Jordan (2000) examined the perfonnance of Momingstar's 
ratings in the US in a somewhat indirect manner. They examined the top five 
holdings of all ten-year, five-star funds at the beginning of each year between 1989 
to 1994. From these holdings they constructed portfolios following Elton & Gruber 
(1995, chapter 9) and Elton, Gruber & Blake (1996). They in tum compared the 
geometric average of the risk adjusted excess returns of the constructed portfolio 
against the risk adjusted excess returns of the S&PSOO for the various whole-year 
holding periods between 1990-1994. Only two of the five constructed portfolios beat 
the S&P 500 and they concluded "that the evidence is not strong enough for us to 
reject the nult hypothesis; namely, that the portfolios will not outperfonn the S&P 
500" (Loviscek & Jordan, 2000, p.155). Whether such a test informed of the 
usefulness of the ratings themselves though is debatable. As the authors themselves 
noted, most of the funds they examined were large-capitalisation funds which had 
large holdings in the companies that accounted for a large component of the S&PSOO 
index - the very basis of the comparison. Given the emphasis of large capitalisation 
shares in both the constructed portfolios and the benchmark it could also be argued 
that the test was more a test in the construction of the portfolios and respective 
weightings thfill of the ratings themselves. 
Blake & Morey (1999) also assesse<I the predictability of Morningstar ratings 
' 
using two different samples. The first sample covered the calendar years 1992 to 
1997 and included all beginning·ofthe year open domestic equity funds that in tum 
were classified as aggressive growth, equity income, growth, growth and income, 
and smaII company.10 Further, these funds needed at least ten years of return data. 11 
10 As per Morningstar (U.S.) classifications. · 
II Blake & Morey (1999) noted that the ten year criteria was in part due to the importance given by 
Morningstar to ten year returns in their weighted rating and part due to the "onerous" data collection 
·constraints they would have faced by including all aged funds. 
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The number of funds that matched these criteria grew from 263 in 1992 to 408 in 
1997. The second sample included alt 635 open aggressive growth, equity income, 
growth, growth and income, and small company funds open at the beginnng of 1993. 
They compared the predictive ability of the ratings compared with four 
alternative predictors: in sample: average monthly returns, Sharpe Ratio, Jensen's 
single index alpha and Jensen's four index alpha. The in-sample period was the time 
prior to the rating and covered ten years for the first sample and three years for the 
second. Out of sample perfonnance, that is the period following the rating, was 
measured using: excess mean monthly return, Sharpe Ratio, and the one and four-
factor Jensen alpha, using one, three and five-year time periods. 
Two tests were used to check for the relative predictive ability of the ratings. 
_The first used a cross-sectional dummy variable regression analysis using each of the 
four out of sample perfonnance measures, presented in equation 2.6, and was 
estimated for 15 different samples. 
S1 =ro +y1D41 +y2D3, +y3D2, +y4Dl1 + µ1 equation 2.6 
where 
Si = out of sample perfonnance measure 
D4 = 1 if a four star fund orif in 'naive' predictor group four, 0 if not 
D3 = 1 if a three star fund or if in 'naive' predictor group three, 0 if not 
D2 = 1 if a two star fund or if in 'naive' predictor group two, 0 if not 
,. p J = 1 if a one star fund or if in 'nai've' predictor group one, 0 if not 
The "(o represented the expected out of perfonnance measure when all dummy 
variables were zero and the remaining coefficients represented the difference 
between the reference group, the five star funds, and the dummy variables. Each 
dummy coefficient therefore represented the performance of the respective star rated 
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fund relative to the five star fund. If the five star rating provided predictive 
·- infonnation on subsequent perfonnance the coefficients should be negative and 
become larger as the rating level reduced, 
The second test employed used a Spearman-Rho rank correlation test of the 
ratings, or naive predictor measures, with out of sample perfonnance using the same 
four out-of-sample performance measures discussed previously. 
Their results suggested that, consistent with the perfonnance persistence 
literature, whilst the Morningstar stars had ability to predict poorly perfonning funds, 
there was only weak evidence to support an ability of five-star funds to out-perfonn 
four or three-star funds. Further, the Morningstar ratings "at best, do only sJightJy 
better, than alternative predictors" (Blake & Morey, 1999, p.31). 
2.6.3 Related Literature - Bond Ratings 
A related literature can be found covering bond credit ratings, that predate 
managed fund ratings, and is instructive in particular in its discussion of the 
regu]atory use of credit ratings and the issue of accountability of credit rating 
agencies. 
Bond ratings emerged from the mercantile credit rating agencies of the mid-
1800s.12 Of the dominant agencies, which are in tum predominant]y US, Standard 
and Poor's and Moody's can trace their origins to 1859, 1909 and 1916 respectively. 
Moody's can in tum trace a history to 1859 through the separate finns of Robert Dun 
and John Bradstreet. The bond rating expressed 
. 
an opinion on the ability and legal ob1igation of an issuer to make timely 
payments of interest and repayment of principal of a security when they 
12 This summary is from Cantor & Packer (1994) and Partnoy (1999) w~' both discussed the history 
of U.S. credit ratings. Pammy (1999) was more detailed and also discllSsed the role of mercantile 
· ·credit agencies, the forerunners of the modem credit rating agencies. 
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fall due. A rating also entails a ranking of the relative risk of debt issues 
within a consistent classification" (Juttner & Hawtrey, 1997, p.579) .. 
The relative risk ranking aspect of the bond rating is similar to the managed 
fund risk adjusted return ranking. The range of bond ratings provided is large 
relative to the managed fund star ratings of Morningstar, Assirt and InvestorWeb in 
Australia. Juttner & Hawtrey (1997) summarised definitions for ten different rating 
classifications that could be supplemented to show relative position within the bond 
category. 
Bond ratings are different to managed fund ratings in that the question of 
market efficiency and the associated question of the relevance of the rating as a piece 
of information may be relevant to both bond holders and shareholders of the rated 
company. The predictive ability of bond ratings from the point of view of 
bondholders was examined by West (1970) using Moodys' ratings. West (1970) 
found support for the relative riskiness categorisation that ratings produced. Cantor 
& Packer (1994) examined the reliability of bond ratings in terms of absolute credit 
risks, again using Moody's data between 1970 and 1994. They concluded "that the 
correspondence of ratings to default probabilities was subject to considerable change 
over time" (Cantor & Packer, 1994, p.10). 
Goh & Ederington (1993) examined the impact on share returns for bond 
rating changes. They argued that whereas there was evidence of a negative impact of 
bond downgrades, it was "inappropriate to assume, as extant studies generally do, 
that a downgrade has a negative implications for stockholders" (Goh & Ederington, 
1993, p.2002) as it was dependent upon the type of information provided. For 
example, if the downgrade was due to new information regarding sales that the rating 
agency had, it may well have a negative impact for shareholders. However, if the 
downgrade was due to a view by the rating agency that the company was going to 
engage in behaviour that transferred wealth from the bondholders to the 
shareholders, that should be good news for shareholders. Further they argued that all 
rating changes might not be new information, merely reflecting publicly available 
information. They therefore looked at the impact of rating changes having ciassified 
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the reason for the change, which was generally provided by the rating agency when 
the change was announced. They found that on1y rating downgrades, which could be 
classified as being based on changes to the performance of the company, had 
significant negative consequences. Further the market did not anticipate these 
changes, as pre-announcement returns were not significantly different to post-
announcement. Rating downgrades due to bankruptcies or lawsuits had significant 
pre-announcement negative returns that reflected the public nature of the information 
used. In summary "rating .changes cannot be treat~d as homogenous; the cause must 
be considered" (Goh & Ederington, 1993, p.2007). 
Hite & Warga (1997) also examined the impact of rating changes but from 
the viewpoint of the bond investor through bond price impacts. Similar to Goh & 
Ederington (1993, p.2007) they found significant announcement and pre-
announcement effects of downgrades and upgrades at certain rating levels. 
Hseuh & Kidwell (1988) and Thompson & Vaz (1990) examined bond issues 
where two ratings were provided by different agencies and both found value for bond 
issuers in having an additional rating. Jewel & Livingston (1998) found that a third 
rating could provide value for the bond issuer. They further found a difference in 
impact of multiple ratings between investment and non-investment grade bonds, with 
(he impact greater for the latter. Kish, Hogan, & Olson (1999) found that bond 
ratings were a significantly important variable in explaining yields but were not able 
to find evidence to support the hypothesis that one rating agency was valued over 
another. 
Brooks, Faff, Hillier, & Hillier (2001) took both a broader and more 
extensive interest in ratings in that they considered the impact of sovereign rating 
changes from Standard and Poors on aggregate stock market movements over a 
thirty-year period. This is distinct from most cifthe literature that has examined bond 
ratings that has focussed on consequences at the individual company level. Similar 
to the individual company level literature they found that whilst downgrades had a 
significant downward impact, upward movements had no significant movement. 
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Their analysis also indicated a significant differentia1 impact between four rating 
providers in total, additionally Moodys, Fitch IBCA, and Thompson. 
2.6.3.1 The Increasing Influence and Role of Bond Ratings 
A notable feature of bond ratings has been firstly their increasing role as 
components of financial market legislation that has been "swiftly expanding 
worldwide" (Schwarcz, 2001, p.5), particularly in the US. Second has been their 
increasingly global role in financial markets. In terms of the second role, Sassen 
suggested that credit ratings and their agencies had become agents that had 
"absorbed some of the international functions carried out by states in the recent past" 
(Saskia Sassen as cited in Schwarcz, 2001, p.2). At the same time these credit rating 
agencies remained "largely unregulated private entities" (Schwarcz, 2001, p.2). This 
has relevance given the increased role attributed to managed fund ratings, 
particularly in Australia. 
Partnoy (2001) provided a detailed review of the development of credit 
ratings in the US. He suggested that the dominant view of bond ratings was that they 
were provided by reputation based agencies that operated in competitive markets that 
served to ensure the infonnational value of ratings. Partnoy (2001) argued however 
that a "regulatory licenses" view better explained the rise in prominence of the credit 
rating agencies. Regulatory licences referred to "the valuable property rights granted 
to credit ratings by virtue of ratings-dependent regulation" (Partnoy, 2001, p.3). 
Partnoy (2001) chronicled the rise in the prominence of ratings in the 1930s which he 
attributed to the use of ratings by the U.S. Federal Reserve and most importantly the 
declaration in 1936 by the Comptroller of the Currency to provide a definitbn of 
invesbnent securities linked explicitly to rating levels. Partnoy (2001) suggested a 
paradox given that at the same time the role of ratings increased, studies suggested 
that the ratings "generated ]ittle or no infonnational value" (Partnoy, 2001, p.8). A 
more recent example of the paradox can be seen in the criticisms of credit rating 
agencies in the wake of the Asia financial crises (Anonymous, 1997) while at the 
same time demand for their services boomed (Anonymous, 1999). It was suggested 
that this paradox could be reconciled as the problems were not with assessing 
companies but rather assessing countries. 
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While the theory is useful in explaining the rise of agencies it does not 
explain the decline in importance of the ratings in the 1960s that Partnoy (2001) also 
identified. The rise in ratings since the 1970s was also attributed to the creation of 
more "regulatory licenses". In particular the adoption in 1973 by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission of nationally recognised statistical rating organisations 
(NRSROs) that were limited to Standard and Poors, Moodys, Duff and Phelps, and 
Fitch (Partnoy, 2001, p.13). 
Schwarcz (2001) also examined the alleged paradox of increased credit 
ratings importance at a time when numerous studies had identified Jittle 
infonnational value. His view was however at a global level rather than being 
exclusively U.S. based and also more closely interested in the issue of whether the 
agencies should be regulated. Kerwer (2001) provided an examination of the role of 
credit ratings as standards and the rating agency influence in global credit markets. 
He also argued that an accountability gap existed, as the agencies infrequently had to 
justify their actions yet the consequences of their actions could be large and 
damaging. He similarly concluded that it had been the incorporation of ratings in 
regulation that had led to this accountability gap. 
In Australia credit ratings have not received the same level of regulatory use 
as in the US. The Reserve Bank of Australia, until recently, had been the chief 
supervisory body of financial institutions in Australia and had acknowledged the role 
and potential problems in use of credit ratings in the prudential supervision of 
financial institutions (Reserve Bank of Australia, 1996). The Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority (APRA), assumed the peak regulatory supervision of banks, 
non-bank financial institutions, superannuation funds, insurance companies in 1998 
and has appeared enthusiastic as to the potential role of credit ratings. Ratings are 
currently used, for example, in the supervision of capital adequacy of banks in 
respect of market risk through Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (1998a, 
p.9) and Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (1999). Credit ratings have also 
been proposed for assessing capital adequacy in respect of liquidity (Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority, n.d.). The influence of credit rating agencies on 
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banks has also been suggested through their desire to "aim to hold sufficient capital 
to· sustain a AA or AA+ rating" (Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, 1998b)._ 
Australia through its membership of the Bank of International Settlements, 
whose arguably most important task has been the setting of common international 
capital adequacy requirements for adoption by central banks through its Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, is set to see the role of credit rating agencies 
increase markedly. The proposals by the committee to update the 1988 Basel Capital 
Accord have incorporated the inclusion of credit ratings by suitably accredited 
agencies as a basis for determining capital adequacy. Arguably they have centralised 
the use of these ratings. The first point made by APRA in its submission of response 
to the draft proposals has pointedly been to support "measures such as the use of 
credit ratings (internal and external)" (Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, 
2001, p.l). Further, APRA has expressed a preference for private sector agency 
ratings compared with a new rating system that incoporated criteria agreed to by the 
members to the Basel Committee (Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, 2001, 
p.8). It has been suggested that the 11ratings agencies will love it" (Hand, 2002). 
Reservations as to the influence of credit rating agencies and questions of "do 
rating agencies, in fact, have any accountability?" (Australian Prudential Regulation 
Authority, 1998b, p.37) have also been expressed in Australia. APRA, in its 
submission to the Basel committee, also expressed similar views in highlighting the 
potential negative influence on "market disciplines" given a mandated role for 
ratings and the preference of banks to receive high ratings (Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority, 2001, p.9). The difficulties of accountability or "validation" 
were also raised {Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, 2001, p.9). 
The experience of bond ratings becoming part of regulatory regimes in the 
US appears to be being followed in a number of other countries in addition to other 
financial markets notably managed fund markets. In Taiwan and Mexico, 
government authorities have examined requiring funds to obtain independent ratings 
for their products and in Argentina there have been moves to require pension ~nds 
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to invest only in funds with a rating (Anonymous, 1998). Given the enthuSiasm for 
" the use of credit ratings expressed by APRA and given that APR.A i~1 the peak 
regulatorY.. authority for superannuation funds, which is arguably o'ne .4f the most 
,· . !i 
important category of managed funds, a future regulatory role for ratings is 
coriceivable in Australia as well. Any such- role should consider the.-;~ond ratil1gs 
experien_ce·'a~d ~)so the percej,tiofls of those rated by the credirfating ~~encies': The 
. ' ' ~ 
Jl\iter is discussed iO · the next section . 
.. ; 
2.6.3.2 Perceptions of.bond ratings 
' ' 
A number of su;eys have b~en conducted to .obtain pc::iCeptions of bond 
credit ratings. Anon;~us (1995) Provided a survey of U.S. chi~ffinancial officers 
(CFOs) which examin_Ccf their view~ of the vari~us ct'edit rating ~·gencies, though the 
' 
sample size was not disclosed. Only 23 percent of CFOs '·expressed satisfaction with 
the ra~ing agencies i~ general. However a rating from either Moody's or Standard 
and Poors Was con_sidered indisperisable by 36 percent and desirable by 35 percent of 
,' ~ .. , 
re~pondents. , The CFOs indicated a strong preference fOr Standard arid Poors 
compared with Moody's in tenns of service. The majQrity of.CFOs had multiple 
ratings with only seven percent with only one rating. 
Ellis ( 1995) sought the views of the credit ratings through a survey of a 
sample of agency suppliers (isSuers) 13 •'and consumers (institutional investors). The 
survey hig~ligl)ted differences in the opinions of the majority of issu.ers who 
preferred ~ultiple ratings against the majority of investors who were content with 
one. There were also differences in opinion between the groups in regards the 
timetines~ of rating changes. Ellis ( 1995) highlighted the inherent conflict due to the 
·indirect costs of the rating process borne by the issuers. Investors preferred greater 
timelines.s that nee_essarily meant greater assessments by agencies and greater costs 
for issuers, who accordingly were less concerned with the timeliness of ratings. The 
survey also identified differences in opinion as to the criteria that should be used 
when ratings are assessed. 
11 The kample o-f issuers.~~ ,restricted to utility compani'es. 
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Baker & Mansi (forthcoming) also surveyed a sample of U.S. issuers and 
investors to compare views of the credit rating agencies. 14 They con finned many of 
the findings of Ellis (1995) in tenns of differences of opinion of number of ratings 
necessary and the importance of rating timeliness. Unlike Ellis (1995) though they 
found little difference between the samples as to what was considered important in 
forming the rating. 
Baker & Mansi (2002) surveyed a U.S. sample of issuers of bonds but 
differed from previous work as they analysed both investment and non-investment 
grade debt issuers. They found that overall, debt issuers were satisfied with the 
performance of the credit rating agencies, though the level of satisfaction varied by 
agency. They also found that there were significant differences between issuers of 
investment and non-investment grade debt in relation to their assessment of the 
importance of a rating per se, and a rating from a particular rating agency when 
.. issuing debt. 
14 The issuer sample of Baker was wider than Ellis but invCStor sample was restricted to mutual funds 
only which was identified as "a potential liY3italion" of the survey Baker & Mansi (forthcomin.S:, ~·?), 
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2. 7 Individual Investors and Managed Funds, Ratings 
The managed fund perfonnance literature has almost exclusively focused on 
performance in the tradition of modem portfolio theory and the prescription of 
investor rationality identified by return and risk parameters. The focus on risk and 
return, in the context of risk aversion. and the presumption of rationality has been 
challenged for as long as it has been the main accepted building block in finance. 
Since the late J970s, however, the alternative theoretical and empirical work has 
been labelled as bt:.havioural finance. Outside of finance the marketing and 
consumer behaviour literatures offer alternative frameworks for examining the 
possible role of ratings. 
2. 7 .t Managed Fund Investor Literature - Individual Behaviour 
Inferences on individual behaviour in respect of managed funds hitve largely 
' been based on aggregate fund flow in(onnation which has been discusSed in the 
perfonnance consequences section in section 2.5.3. This section focuses on studies 
that have examined individual level cons~Uences. \ 
Goetzmann & Peles (1997) surveyed two samples of U,S, mutual fund 
investors to explore the psychological motives of investing and specifically the 
· question of why investors stayed with poorly J)erfonning funds. The first sample of 
.. educated" investors was collected from. a chaptt..'1' of the American Association of 
Individual Investors and the second, a sample of "casual" investors, was collected 
from a group of professional architects. 
The survey found that investors in both samples overestimated both their 
fund's previous year performance and performance relative to a fund benchmark. In 
tenns of fund ''poor" performance, investors indicated that they would switch from a 
"poorly performing" fund after just 2.15 years for the educated sample and 2.39 for 
the casual sample. Given the low estimate of switching-time Goetzmann & Peles 
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(1997) suggested a lower relative importance of transaction costs, otherwise the time 
before switching would be longer, in favour of psychological motives for investors 
staying with underperfonning funds. Specifically, the biased belief of prior 
performance was consistent with an endowment effect and a cognitive dissonance 
effect. Adjusting beliefs as a means of justifying past actions is an example of what 
Festinger (1957) labeHed. cognitive dissonance. An endowment effect is present 
where "people are more likely to believe something they own is better than 
something they do not own" (Goetzmann & Peles, 1997, p.146). 
In Australia, Gerrans & Clark-Murphy (2000) and Clark-Murphy & Gerrans 
(2001) and have examined the individual investor in the context. of an important type 
'' 
of managed fund, namely superannuation funds. Their focus was the resources used 
by fund members in making choices between alternative investment options as well 
as examining systematic gender differences in resource usage. 
2.7 .2 Individual Investor Behaviour Theory and Rationality 
Individual investors in managed funds face a decision similar to · any other 
financial asset, according to the traditional portfolio theory of Markowitz (1952a, 
1959). This leads to the paramount factors of risk and return. This focus has guided 
much of the managed fund literature discussed previously which has largely been to 
the exclusion of an alternative consumer behaviour framework, which is arguably 
more consistent with the process of how managed funds are offered. The pioneers of 
modem finance developed their models on the basis of a rational wealth maximising 
investor. As Sharpe noted "many models of capital market equilibrium are derived 
from assumptions about the preferences of a so-called representative investor" 
(Sharpe, 2001). 
Brennan (1995) examined the notion of the . ., individual investor as distinct 
from the representative investor paradigm. The representative investor 
is assumed to understand the economy and the process determining 
asset prices ... [and] As economists, we tend to impute to the rational 
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individuals who populate our models the detailed technical knowledge 
that has taken us years to acquire (Brennan, 1995, p.61). 
Others have questioned the assumptions more bluntly stating "It is part of 
Wall Street folklore that small individual investors are 'dumb"' (De Bandt, 1998, 
p.832). 
Soon after Markowitz produced his seminal work on portfolio theory 
Markowitz (1952a) criticisms of the "rational economic man" were aired. Maurice 
Allais first presented "four classes of facts" that he suggested were not consistent 
with the "behavior of men who are considered rational by public opinion" (Al1ais, 
1953, p.505). These violations he contrasted with the "American school" and its 
view of a rational man, which in tum was based on the principles of Daniel 
Bernoulli. It was also suggested that "economic man - is very unlike a real man" 
(Edwards, 1954, p.382). Similarly Simon (1955) questioned the requirements of the 
· individuals assumed by economists, specifically their computational capacities, 
information acces~ and even the stability of their preferences. 
~arkowitz discussed at length the expected utility maxim and the "recent 
criticisms" that it was "not the essence of rational behavior" (Markowitz, 1970, 
p.209) (italics in original). Not all of the empirical work suggested less than rational 
behaviour of individuals however. Baker, Hargrove, & Haslem (1977) found that 
investors behaved rationally, with positive ex-ante risk-return tradeoff. More 
recently Sharpe, Goldstein, & Blythe (2000) developed an interactive tool to 
detennine investor references designed for both practitioners and academics. They 
used the tool and found that using a small survey sample the results "by and large" 
supported the assumption of an individual maximising the expected value of a utility 
function that exhibited constant relative risk aversion. However, they also fowid a 
substantial minority that did not confonn to the widely used assumption. 
The body of work from within the broad finance discipline that has emerged 
·on individual behaviour that has challenged the assumption of investor rationality, as 
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assumed with the expected utility framework, has been Jabelled as behavioural 
finance. This area has distinguished itself by the influence it has taken from 
psychology and the alternative models of individual behaviour. The degree to which 
this Jiterature has challenged the traditional approach though has varied in degree. A 
comprehensive review of this literature is provided by Hirshleifer (2001) and a 
further review with consideration of policy implications is provided by Daniel, 
Hirshleifer, & Teoh (forthcoming). 
Kahn em an & Tversky ( 1979) in their seminal work identified several 
violations of the expected utility framework based on the results from problems 
·presented to groups of students and university faculty reiterating much of the work of 
· ,. Allais (1953). Bell (1982) summarised these into three main violations: 
'··. 
1. The certainty effect where "people overweight outcomes that are considered 
certain, relative to outcomes that a considered probable11 (Kahneman & 
Tversky, p.265). This can be demonstrated with the following example 
where the figures are as in the original. A majority of respondents chose 
$300015 with certainty over $4000 with probability of 0.8 whilst at the same 
time chose $4000 with probability 0.2 over $3000 with probaility 0.25. A 
reverse effect Was also demonstrated for negative consequences or what 
Kahneman & Tversky (I 979) labelled the reflection effect. 
2. A common consequences effect which confinned the previously identified 
Allais Paradox.16 A majority of respondents chose a certain $2400 over a 
lottery with three outcome.s: $2500 with probability 0.33, $2400 with 
P[Obability 0.66 and nothing with probability 0.01. 
.3. An isolation effect in two-stage games. In the first problem a majority of. 
respondents chose $4000 with probability020 over $3000 with probability 
0.25. In the second problem a two-stage game involved a first-stage where 
there was a 0. 75 probability of winning nothing and a 0.25 probability of 
progressing to the second-stage. In the second stage there was a 0.80 of 
winning $4000 or a certain $3000. The choice had to be made before the· 
,,: 
_;, 
!.' 
15 These values are the same as those used in the problems presented by Kahneman & Tve~ky (19?°9). 
16 After Maurice Allais (Allais, 1953). ' 
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outcome of the first-stage was known and the majority chose the certain 
$3000 which when considering the joint probabilities, was a reversal of the 
first problem . 
. The majority of models that have emerged in a bid to better explain the 
empirical and experimental data have employed some fonn of irrationality in 
individual behaviour (Dodonova, 2001). Others have attempte.d to extend the basic 
expected utility framework by broadening the source of utility and its fonn whilst 
retaining its essential rational framework. 
An example of the latter was the proposal of prospect theory that proposed 
·''that the carriers of value are changes in wealth or welfare, rather than final states .. 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p.277). They noted fiuther that the value function of 
prospect theory was "generally concave for gains and commonly convex for losses" 
and "steeper for losses than for gains" (Kahne~~., & Tversky, 1979, p.279). As 
Kahneman & Tversky (1979) emphasised, their "" 'ion was in contrast to that of 
Markowitz (1952b) who had first proposed that gains and losses could be the 
reference for utility. His function they noted was a much shallower function in the 
reference point region. Tversky & Kahneman (1992) extended prospect theory by 
including a cumulative functional fonn for the decision weights, in preference to 
separable decision weights as used in the earlier version. More recently· 
Bhattacharyya (2001) has proposed a utility function where wealth above (below) the 
current level was convex (concave) with the resulting implication that it was not the 
variance of wealth that detennined the expected utility, but rather the skewness. This 
point was made by Bird & Gallagher (2002) in their analysis of the appropriateness 
of performance measures, presented in section 2.4.3.2. 
Others have extended the expected utility framework by including relative 
performance and risk measures. Franks (1992) presented a framework with an 
institutional client in mind where excess-of-benchmark returns were employed. 
These were defined "as the incremental return by which the client portfolio is 
expected to exceed the benchmark" (Franks, I 992, p.6). Similarly risk was defined 
78 
as the variation of excess benchmark returns, a measure of the tracking error. Chow 
(1995) presented a model that included both the absolute risk measure of Markowitz 
(1952a) as well as a relative risk measure. More fonnally this was expressed as 
M. . . U"'' Ex R 'P" [ExpRisk(P)]1 [ExpTE(P)]1 ax1m1se 1£ 1 = p et 1, 1 - -
rt tet 
where 
ExpRet(P) = percent expected return of the portfolio 
ExpRisk(P) = percent expected standard deviation of portfolio returns 
ExpTE(P) = percent expected tracking error of portfolio returns 
rt= risk tolerance 
let= tracking-error tolerance 
P1 = proportion of the portfolio allocated to asset i 
For individuals who ignored tracking error, tet was set to infinity and the 
problems was the standard mean-variance one of Markowitz. Zeikel (1995) has 
suggested such approaches were not worthwhile as "you cannot eat relative 
perfonnance" and therefore an investor should "measure results on a total return, 
portfolio basis against your own objectives, not someone else's'' (Zeikel, 1995, p.7). 
In both cases, and even though Markowitz (1952b) canvassed reference points and 
risk seeking behaviour, they each retained the expectation principle that prospect 
theory rejected. 
A further example of an extensioO to the expected utility framework, of 
particular relevance in exploring the use of ratings, is regret theory proposed by both 
Bell (1982) and Loomes & Sugdeo (1982). Regret theory sought to explain the 
identified anomalies by introducing the utility associated with consequences from 
actions that could have been chosen but were not. Whilst introducing a more 
expansive psychological base the theory retained the desire to build on "rational'' 
decision making. As Loomes & Sugden (1982, p.819, 820) suggested 
our inclination as economists is to explain as much human behavior as 
we can in tenns of assumptions about rational and undeceived 
individuals" but added that it is no less rational to act in accordance with 
regret theory, and that conventional expected utility theory therefore 
represents an unnecessarily restrictive notion of rationality 
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Regret theory, as proposed by Loomes & Sugden (1982), did however 
suggest that transitivity and equivalence were not necessary conditions for rational 
choice. Patel et al. (1991, p.233) used "regret avoidance" as a possible factor to 
explain the perfomance and funds flow relationship. Patel et al. (1991) however used 
ex-post regret rather than anticipated regret as used by Bell (1982) and Loomes & 
Sugden (1982). 
As previously mentioned in this section, the majority of responses to the 
anomalous empirical and experimental work explicitly have called upon irrationality 
in behaviour. Shefiin (2000) identified three themes of behavioural finance: 
heuristic·driven bias (eg. past perfonners are the best predictors of future 
perfonners), frame dependence (how decisions are framed) and inefficient markets 
(the previous two themes cause prices to deviate from fundamental value). De Bondt 
(1998) outlined four classes of anomalies examined in the behavioural finance 
literature: investors' perceptions of the stochastic process of asset prices, for example 
the predisposition to see patterns when there are none or extrapolation bias as per De 
Bondt (1993) and De Bandt (1998), investors' perceptions of value, the management 
of risk and return and trading practices. 
These have in tum been used to explain what have been labelled as 
"'anomalies" of traditional finance. For example, Benartzi & Thaler (1995) provided 
myopic loss aversion (MLA) as an explanation of the equity premium puzzle, 
suggested by Mehra & Prescott ( 1985), which referred to the large size of the return 
premium of equity over bonds. MLA argued that investors were myopic when 
evaluating performance over time and were more sensitive to losses. It was based on 
the behavioural concepts known as mental accounting (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984) 
and loss aversion (Kahnernan & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahnernan, 1992). 
Gneezy & Potters (1997) have presented experimental evidence to support MLA. 
The growing number of explanations for so-called anomalies has caused quite 
heated discussion in the literature. Prominent among them has been Rubinstein 
(2000, p.1) who has suggested that the research supporting market irrationality bad 
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become "respectable" since 1978. His frustration with the expanding literature was 
best captured by the statement: 
One has the feeling from the burgeoning behavioralist literature that it 
has lost all the constraints of this directive - that whatever anomalies are 
discovered, illusory or not, behavioralists will come up with an 
explanation grounded in irrational systematic behavior ... The explanation 
also has too much of a flavor of being concocted to explain ex-post 
observations - much like the medievalists used to suppose there were a 
different angel providing the motive power for each planet (Rubinstein, 
2000, p.5). 
This hss been acknowledged by Hirshleifer (200 I, p.29) who suggested that 
"In a specific investment setting, it can be hard to judge which documented 
psychological bias is relevant. This creates an extra degree of freedom for model-
mining not present in the purely rational approach". 
There does appear consensus that though markets may or may not be rational, 
all individual investors cannot be assumed to act rationally, as based on the axioms 
of Savage (1951) and von Neumann & Morgentstem (1947). 17 Rubinstein (2000) 
has suggested three levels of rationality. The first is a "maximally rational" market 
where all investors are rational. Rubinstein has suggested though that "I don't think 
financial economists really take it seriously. Indeed, they need only talk to their 
spouses or to their brokers to know it cannot be true" (Rubinstein, 2000, p.3). 18 The 
second is where the marbt is rational, where "asset prices are set as if all investors 
are rational" (Rubinstein, 2000, p.3 underlining in original). In such a market 
individuals may not be fully diversified, or they may trade too much. The third level 
is a market, which is ''minimally rational". In such a market whilst prices are not 
even set as if all investors were rational, there remain no abnonnal profits available 
for the rational investors to exploit. 
17 An agreement between two key 'gatekeepers' of the respective rationaJity viewpoints agreed to 
interpret rational in this way (Rubinstein, 2000). Rubinstein (2000) also noted that the extension 
contributed by Savage was to justify the use of subjective probabilities in calculating expected utility. 
18 The "talk to their spouse" anecdotal reference as a basis for rejection of maximally rational markets 
is strongly rejected in this thesis for very strong spouse related behavioural reasons. 
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In support of at least a minimally efficient market, Rubinstein suggested the 
strongest of support could be found in the managed fund perfonnance literature. He 
used the original finding of Jensen (1968) that the average fund did not outperfonn 
the market index, and the substantial research since which he argued provided even 
stronger evidence, was the strongest argument against the behaviourists. As he put it 
more eloquently "In fact, piling upon the metaphors, the behavioralists have nothing 
in their arsenal to match it; it is a nuclear bomb against their puny sticks" 
(Rubinstein, 2000, p.13). 
In direct response to this, however, Daniel et al. (forthcoming) argued that 
such evidence was interesting but not supportive of market efficiency. · They 
suggested that it was not ju.!it perfonnance that dictated the attraction of investors to 
managed funds rather that "under free choice the funds that attract investors will be 
those that appeal to investors' emotions and beliefs, however biased" (Daniel et al., 
forthcoming, p.32). This hypothesis is of interest in this thesis and specifically 
whether the rating of a fund is one such factor that appeals to investors' emotions and 
beliefs. This is explored in section 4.7. 
Roll, Chordia, & Subrahmanyam (2001) stated that in traditional finance, in 
reconciling the apparent foolishness of investors 
we usually resort to flurry of hand waving and invoke the mantra of 
aggregation. Somehow, from within the blizzard of behavioral 
proclivities, the 'market' becomes efficient , .. But exactly how does 
this happen and how long does it take? (Roll et al., 2001, p.2). 
Rashes (2001) provided evidence of apparent confusion in the trading of 
stocks with similar ticker symbols which " stand in stark contrast to the traditional 
assmnptions of rationality" (Rashes, 2001, p.1925). Grinblatt & Keloharju (2000) 
used a database of transactions of Finnish investors to examine the determinants of 
trading and provided evidence of sophisticated investors tending to give less weight 
to past returns whereas the less sophisticated tended to be contrarian. 
For individual investors, the discussion of whether the aggregate market is 
rational or minimally rational, to use the classification of Rubinstein (2000), might 
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not cowit for much. Perhaps someone might learn frrJm 1..'1eir experience, if they 
have the opportunity. It may be of little comfort to them if the irrational behaviour of 
individuals cancelled each other out and the aggregate market was efficient. The 
individual must live with their decision, which can have far reaching consequences 
for them. It is in this context that this thesis examines the use and usefulness of 
ratings. 
The ongoing debate between what can be regarded as the traditional school of 
finance and the behaviouralist school can be seen in a wider context as that between 
modernism and postmodemism respectively. The traditional school of finance has at 
its core the rational, risk averse, utility maximising investor, with over-arching asset 
pricing models and efficient market outcomes. The behaviouralists call on heuristics 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), mental frames, and prospect theory Kahneman & 
Tversky (1979) that do not necessarily propose consistent behaviour at the individual 
or the aggregate level and in contrast do not present unifying models of asset pricing 
or efficient market outcomes. Tversky & Kahneman (1992) however, has argued 
that human choices are orderly "if not always rational in the traditional sense of the 
word" (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992, p.317). 
The few asset-pricing models that have emerged have tended to be aggregate 
market behaviour models. Benartzi & Thaler (1995) and Barberis, Huang, & Santos 
(2001) proposed prospect theory based models that they suggested could explain the 
high mean, or equity-premium puzzle, and high volatility of market returns. Barberis 
& Huang (2001) produced a model which they argued could also explain the high 
mean, volati1ity and negative long-run correlation of returns for an individual asset, 
based on prospect theory, the house-money effect and separate mental accounting as 
demonstrated by Thaler (1985). As Dodonova (2001) noted, the conclusion of 
Barberis et al. (2001) applied to aggregate market returns but not individual shares 
due to its basis in prospect theory which "does not distinguish sources of gains and 
losses" (Dodonova, 2001, p.7). In contrast regret theory does allow for envy, greed 
and regret which are more influenced by the source of income and are state 
dependent, could be used for describing individual asset returns. 
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2. 7 .2,1 Gender Based Risk Differences 
An issue that while not specifically related to rationaility but which does 
warrant discussion is the literature on gender based differences in the level of risk 
aversion. Sunden & Surette (1998); Bajtelsmit, Bemasek, & Jianakoplos (1999) 
Jianakoplos & Bemasek (1998) each used data from The Surveys of Consumer 
Finances conducted by the U.S. Federal Reserve and each provided evidence 
supporting a greater degree of risk aversion amongst women. Jianakoplos & 
Bemasek (1998) and Sunden & Surette (1998) further suggested that a combination 
of gender and marital status was more important than gender in isolation. Barber & 
Odean (2001) also used U.S. data and found that men were more aggressive investors 
than women, which as predicted led to excessive trading and a reduction in 
perfonnance. In Australia Gallery, Gallery, & Brown (2000) did not find gender 
differences in superannuation investment choice decisions. 
At a more general level Clark & Pitts ( 1999) did not find any gender 
differences in the decision to enrol in U.S. pension plans. Schubert, Brown, Gysler, 
& Brachinger (1999) presented further U.S. evidence that did not support greater 
risk-averse decisions for women on the basis of experimental evidence, where they 
examined investment and insurance decisions as well as abstract gambling decisions. 
2. 7.3 Consumer Behaviour Framework 
The study of consumer behaviour has been defined as ''the study of the 
processes involved when individual or groups select, purchase, use, or dispose of 
products, services, ideas, or experiences to satisfy needs and desires" (Solomon, 
1999, p.5). The vast majority of consumer behaviour work has focussed on 
consumable and durable goods. Warren, Steven~ & McConkey (1990) identified 
that the little research that had been completed on individual investment behaviour, 
in contrast to the large amount on consumer expenditures, was largely non-
quantitative and usually essay based descriptions of experiences of investors. 
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Capon, Fizsimons, & Prince (1996, p.62) suggested that in the focus on 
individual pmchase decisions, "three of the more ubiquitous" constructs developed 
and tested have been infonnation sources, selection criteria, and purchase. They 
examined the use of fund rankings and performance within such a framework and 
constructs and will be discussed further in this section. The surveys presented in 
Chapter 4 adopt this framework. 
In his nonriative work Markowitz (1970) identified portfolio analysis in much 
the same way as a traditional consumer behaviour framework. He argued 
A portfolio analysis was characterized by the 
1) infonnation concerning securities upon which it is based 
2) criteria for better and worse portfolios which set the objectives of 
the analysis; and 
3) computing procedures by which portfolios meeting the criteria in 
(2) are derived from the inputs in (1) (Markowitz, 1970, p.205 italics 
in original). 
Lifestyle analysis or a lifestyle marketing perspective recognised that 
individuals "sort themselves into groups on the basis of the things they like to do, 
how they like to spend their leisure time, and how they choose to spend their 
disposable income." (Solomon, 1999, p.174-175). It was the choices made that 
allowed segmentation of the market and examination of the influence that lifestyle 
had on products and services purchased. More typically this analysis has been 
restricted to consumer goods however a lifestyle analysis of affluent individual 
investors can be found in Bamewall (1987). She classified investors as either active 
or passive based on their lifestyle characteristics, investment orientation and 
occupational characteristics through the use of a series of focus-group interviews. 
Warren et al. (1990) found that investor demographics and lifestyle 
characteristics wer~ a useful means of predicting the level of investment, when the 
investment level was categorically defined as high or low. Of 29 lifestyle 
characteristics, only one was useful in predicting the level of investments. The more 
dress conscious investor was, rather curiously, more likely to have invested less. 
Demographic variables were useful in discriminating between investors who tended 
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to have invested in shares and bonds than those that didn't, however no lifestyle 
characteristics were found useful. In terms of the level of investment in shares and 
bonds, household income, marital status, employment status was useful in 
discriminating between investor groups. Of the lifestyle dimensions, dress conscious 
investors and volunteers were less likely to have had a higher level of inveshnent. 
They concluded, "Investors in the same age or income categories may have totally 
different investment needs, which can be more fully analysed with the help of 
lifestyle analysis" (Warren et al., 1990, p.76). 
The patte.m of ownership of financial assets has been considered by Soutar & 
Comish-Ward (1997) using the same methodology used to examine the ownership 
pattern of durable goods. That is, patterns and sequences in the own~rship of shares, 
property, superannuation, and other assets that were found to be unifonn across 
survey respondents. This type of analysis can be contrasted with the analysis of,the 
choice of a particular asset within a competing class Of investments, managed funds 
for example, which is of interest here. 
In an attempt to predict risk attitudes LeBaron, Farrelly,,& G1;1la (1989)_ used 
a sample of institutional clients and administered a questionnaire of 72 risk based 
phrases. Respondents chose 20 of the phrases that they were interested in. From 
these choices the author's contended that a preliminary indication of client's. risk 
attitudes could be made, on a relative basis. Riley & Chow (1992) calculated a 
relative risk aversion index using data from the U.S. ·survey of Income and Program 
Protection. They found that the degree of risk aversion declined as income increased 
above the poverty line, decreased significantly for the wealthy and with age, though 
the age relationship reversed after an age of 65. The age relationship was different to 
Lewellen, Lease, & Schlarbaum (1977) who found a positive relationship that was 
more pronounced for those over 55, though the relationship with wealth was similar. 
' More broadly, the marketing of financial services to individual investors has 
' 
been examined in the US by Dickinson & Kirzner (1986), in Canada by Furlong & 
Ritchie (1986) and in Australia by Soutar & De Souza (1989). In determining 
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market segments for services Soutar & De Souza (1989) examined the importance of 
·. a range Of factors, including ease of withdrawal, flexibility, return and safety of 
' 
c~pital _ in the choice of investments. The first two could be classified as non-
. j>erfonnance related although it could also be argued that they could also be factored 
into return. Choong (1997) examined the channel of purchase or equivalently the 
choice of how individuals invested in mutual funds in the US. That is, whether they 
invested directly with the fund, or through a financial adviser, bank or other channel. 
They found a range of demographics that influenced the decision ofho\1/ to invest. 
Studies have been conducted which explicitly focus on individu~I behaviour 
in managed funds investments. Capon et al. (1996) examined the investment choice 
•' . 
of individuals in U.S: mutual funds, in particular the use of non-perfonnance related 
variables in making fund choice using a consumer behaviour framework. That is 
using constructs of information source, selection criteria and purchase. 1brough a 
survey of mutual fund investors, published performance rankings were identified as 
the most important infonnation source used by investors, followed by fund 
advertising. The performance track record was the most important selection criteria 
used by investors and the manager's reputation and the number of funds within the 
fund group were of above average importance. They were much more important 
than inquiry responsiveness and management fees in terms of selection. 
Management style and fund confidentiality was considered unimportant. By and 
large these results supported the focus on performance related measures in previous 
research. However, through cluster analysis they identified the importance of the 
information sources and selection criteria to specific groups that suggested a 
"financial perfonnance is only one of several factors considered by investors in 
making investment decisions for mutual funds" (Capon et al., 1996, p. 77). In effect, 
the ratings attempt to capture these parameters by incorporating assessments of 
administrative and distribution capabilities of the fund products as well as mobility 
and liquidity assessments. The existence of. similar groups will be examined for 
A uStralian investors in section 4.11. 
Choong (199'7) conducted a nationwide survey of U.S. mutual fund inve~·tor:-J 
,_ . ., 
and found evidence of the importance of perform~ce . and non-performance 
87 
measures including service, access and self-service, broadly in support of Capon _et 
al. (1996). It was suggested that 
this behavior is not indicative of consumers demanding less than 
maximum returns. Rather, consumers are found to maximise returns 
net of costs to themselves ... In effect, they trade-off their own costs 
for "purchased" services (Choong, 1997, p.96). 
The Investment Financial SCI'Vices Association of Australia (IFSA), the 
managed fund industry body, found that only two percent of individual investors 
ranked fees as the most important factor when selecting a managed fund. Only five 
percent ranked the financial planner's advice as the most important and star ratings 
were listed as the most important by a smaller proportion. Less than half of those 
surveyed suggested that ratings were important in their investment decision (Engel, 
2001a). 
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2.8 The Getting of Information - The Role of Managed Fund Product 
Ratings 
More specific than the process of decision making and the question of 
rationality amongst individual investors is the literature on infonnation use. The 
treatment of infonnation and infonnation search has been examined differently by 
the economics, finance and consumer behaviour literatures. For an investor who has 
a predilection to contract out investment responsibility via a managed fund, it could 
be argued that there is also a strong bias to contract out performance assessment. 
Ratings are a convenient source of infonnation for individual investors in that they 
attempt to encapsulate a variety of quantitative and qualitative inputs, as well as 
being a convenient selection criteria. This section focuses on information and how 
the respective literatures have treated its role and consequences in various markets. 
2.8.1 Information Source 
Pinnuck (1999) has examined the legislative requirements on Australian 
unlisted retail managed funds to disclose financial infonnation and suggested "that 
conventional financial statements of the type mandated by Corporations Law provide 
.no relevant perfonnance infonnation to investors" (Pinnuck, 1999, p.78). Pinnuck 
·also suggested that given the separation of ownership and control in managed funds 
and the generally smaller amounts invested by retail investors, there arose an 
infonnation asymmetry "between fund managers who knows their true performance 
and the unit holder who does not." (Pinnuck, 1999, p.76). Jain & Wu (2000), 
discussed in section 2.5.3,.reviewed the use of advertising by U.S. mutual funds and 
implied that this infonnation asymmetry may be used with less than honourable 
motives. 
Bowen & Statman (1997) examined the use of ratings by institutional and 
retail investors and characterised it as a game involving the fund managers, fund 
companies and investors. They suggested that only the first two won the game and, 
with tongue tinnly in cheek, added "two out of three ain't bad" (Bowen & Statman, 
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1997). Such similar misgivings forced.,an examination of the use of bond ratings. 
Investment Company Institute (1999) reviewed a survey that had examined the use 
and misuse of bond fund ratings in response to the NASO Regulation Inc. 
consideration of whether the ratings could be used in fund sales literature. 
Apart from information relating to perfonnance Potter (2001) argued that 
"Objective tracking error" was significant in the typical set of U.S. fund categories. 
That is, there have been significant differences in the range of returns within 
categories, which changed over time. Using category averages is therefore as 
infonnation inputs for asset allocation '"will not achieve what their models predicted" 
(Potter, 2001, p.l). Hence the title of his paper "What you see is not what you get". 
Given the lack of relevant perfonnance infonnation available from the 
managed funds themselves, third party sources must be relied upon. These can be 
chaTacterised as impersonal or personal, or equivalently indirect and direct. The 
impersonal or indirect infonnation sources are available through media including 
television, radio, magazines, newspapers, newsletters, and increasingly on1ine. The 
personal or direct sources are available through professional financial advisers, or 
family and friends. Each of these can source infonnation from the managed fund, 
conduct their own analysis and repackage or they can utilise one of the research 
houses such as Morningstar, Assirt, van Eyk or lntech, reviewed in Chapter 3. 
Individual investors are not professionals and therefore are unlikely to access 
the data available from the managed fund, aside from the value of this infonnation 
noted by Pinnuck (1999), and therefore are more likely to rely on third-party 
infonnation sources. There is likely to be a wide range of financial knowledge and 
ability amongst these investors. Various government agencies have a role in the 
supervision of investment sectors incorporating managed funds. Principal among 
these is the Australian Securities and Investments Commission who have noted 
While many investors are keenly aware of what they are doing, 
others do not have the experience or expertise to appreciate fully the 
risks associated with investing. Many investors in these schemes 
choose them because they enable investors to pass responsibility for 
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the day-to-day management of their savings to someone else (The 
Companies and Securities Advisory Committee, 1993, p.1 ). 
In a national survey of Australian individual investors, Vanguard found that 
eighty percent of the investors in the sample couJd not correctly define a managed 
fund. In reviewing the survey the question posed concerning Australian individual 
investors was "are we truly a nation of share investors or rather just buyers of 
shares?" (Bowerman, 2000, p.51). 
The director of Commonwealth Securities, the largest Australian online 
broking service, suggested that simplifying managed fund infonnation was the key to 
increased invesbnent in them. It was further suggested that a set of selected criteria 
of the top perfonning funds would be most useful means of achieving this (Spits, 
2000). 
2.8.2 Economics 
Product infonnation has been defined as "infonnation on the levels of 
attributes per unit of the commodity and on the actual amount contained in the 
nominal quantity" (Barzel, 1982, p.28). Stiglitz (2000) provided an excellent review 
of the contribution of the economics of infonnation to nineteen and twentieth century 
economics. He argued that whilst information had been discussed by nineteen 
century economists it had been as "obiter dicta, caveats at the end of the analysis" 
(Stiglitz, 2000, p.1441). It was only the "fundamental breakthrough" that 
"infonnation was different from other 'commodities"' that signalled the intellectual 
revolution in the twentieth century (Stiglitz, 2000, p.1448). Of greatest interest to the 
discussion of ratings use, is the literature Stiglitz (2000) identified that focussed on 
costly screening and verification search, due to the work of Akerlof (1970). 
The focus of Barzel ( 1982, p.28) was the "market arrangements that emerge" 
as a consequence of measurement problems for product attributes. Using Barzel's 
framework, the existence of rating companies is a demonstration that the costs of 
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measuring the quality of managed fund products are positive. The size and 
dispersion of management fees and entry and exit fees can also be seen as reflecting 
an underlying measurement problem. In his seminal work on infonnation Stigler 
argued that "price dispersion is a manifestation-and, indeed, it is the measure-of 
ignorance in the market" (Stigler, 1961, p.214). It would also appear that Stigler's 
lament "the search for knowledge on the quality of goods . . . is perhaps no more 
important [than infonnation search itself] but, certainly, analytically more difficult" 
(Stigler, 1961, p.224) (italics added) remains true. 
The choice of managed fund fits within any choice considered in economics. 
"People will exchange only if they perceive what they get to be more valuable than 
what they give" (Barze!, 1982, p.27). In the case of managed fund ratings, there are 
three measurement problems that are associated with fonning perceptions of the 
value of the investment. The first is what reflects a 'quality' managed fund product. 
The second is identifying what attribute is related to quality and the third is error in 
measurement of these attributes; 
Ratchford (1982) argued that using an economic framework to examine 
information search offered at least two benefits. The first was the measurement 
benefits that it provided and with it a basis f0r policy makers to measure the benefits 
of programs. Secondly,.its focus on incentives allowed a study of the consumer's 
rationale and behaviour. 
The conceptual model Ratchford (1982) presented involved a tradeoff in the 
quality of a choice and the cost of information search. The consumer has a choice of 
either choosing an optimal amount of information or choosing the least-cost method 
of acquiring the information. Some propositions, of relevance here, flow from the 
models. The first is that because educated investors use information more efficiently 
their marginal costs of acquisition are lower and hence they engage in more 
information search. Secondly, high-income consumers would be expected to engage 
in less time consuming information search. Ratchford (1982) provided a summary of 
empirical evidence in support of the first but conflicting for the second. 
92 
Ratchford & Srinivasan (1993) also identified one of the major problems with 
the previous marketing and consumer behaviour literature was that it considered the 
detenninants of infonnation search effort such as education, knowledge and time 
pressures without also considering the outcome of the search. This is perhaps one of 
the major contributions that the economics literature has provided. Hauser, Urban, & 
Weinberg (1993) used a cosVbenefit framework which emphasised the role of time 
and suggested that its contribution was that it "frames many issues" (Hauser et al., 
1993, p.464). They however found that simple infonnation search heuristics did not 
work badly in comparison. 
The measurement problem associated with use of ratings is dependent on 
what infonnation is sought from them. In their rating process, a rating company can 
provide a range of services apart from the end rating itself. They can verify the 
sector and style of a fund or help screen management that employs poor 
diversification practices, for example. They can identify funds that are expensive in 
transacting their business or those that have sloppy administrative practices. From 
this framework it is clear that it is necessary to determine what is the expected 
outcome of using ratings. To do this requires an examination of what investors are 
using ratings for. This will be addressed in the survey of a sample of individual 
investors presented in Chapter 4. 
Jt may well be that the rating company does extract valuable infonnation but 
the infonnation has no net value to the ultimate users given the price that has been 
extracted for the infonnation by the rating company. This may be at an individual 
level where the managed fund having paid its explicit cost to the rating company and 
ab:Sorbed the myriad implicit compliance costs to be rated, passes this on to investors 
through entry fees or ongoing management fees. 
Stiglitz (2000) noted that in assessing equilibrium, where limited infonnation 
prevailed, Akerlof (1970) provided the first attempt at using a partial equilibrium 
approach in which he argued there may be little or no trade, though he did not allow 
for the desire to acquire more information. Importantly the literature that had 
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consequently focussed on costly information search highlighted the appropriability of 
returns to search (Stiglitz. 2000). Returning to the issue of the value of rating 
information, the equilibrium outcomes that emerged in the literature suggested that a 
dual equilibria may exist where "more information screening, seems unambiguously 
to lower welfare" (Stiglitz, 2000, p.1452). 
In assessing the value of the information provided by a rating, one inherent 
difficulty is the time horizon over which value is to be recognised. If value is more 
narrowly defined as the ability to provide predictive future relative performance 
information the question of over what time period must be resolved. The rating 
companies are silent on the specifics of time horizons. Guidance can be taken 
indirectly from the investment holding periods of investors or directly by asking 
investors what they consider to be a reasonable period to assess performance. In this 
analysis both have been considered though this is problematic given that ratings are a 
relatively recent phenomena and the analysis is restricted to time periods of up to 
five years, depending on rating type. 
2.8.3 Finance 
In the finance literature the focus on information has predominantly been 
linked to issues of market efficiency. The paradigm of efficient markets has been 
discussed in section 2.4.1 as the framework that guided the investigation of 
performance of managed funds and represents the most obvious framework that this 
the~is sits within. Whether it is the market efficiency of Fama (1970, 1991) or 
Grossman & Stiglitz (1980), they were not specifically interested in what the 
information was, how it was used or who in particular used it. They were interested 
in whether any information could be used to earn consistent abnormal returns. Fama 
( 1970) provided the structure of three tiers of information. Information contained in 
past prices, all publicly available information and finally private infonnation. 
The managed fund perfonnancc literature, previously discussed, has 
demonstrated that modem portfolio theory and asset pricing theory have also been 
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beset with the same measurement problems identified by Stigler (1961). From this 
literature it is clear that the attribute that has clearly been considered valuable has 
been expected risk adjusted returns, the first of the measurement problems. 
Associated with this has been the measurement of historical risk-adjusted returns and 
whether this was a useful proxy for expected risk-adjusted returns. Which risk-
adjusted measure was the most appropriate has evolved but not been resolved as 
issues of competing benchmarks and models attests, which reflects the second 
measurement problem. The third measurement problem has been addressed, for 
example, in the literature that has focussed on survivorship bias. 
Ratings providers have been grappling with each measurement problem as 
well. It is clear that collectively they have cast the net of valued attributes much 
wider than finance theory. As discussed in Chapter 3, ratings are based on 
qualitative assessments, promoted as forward looking, as well as quantitative 
measures of historical perfonnance. The qualitative inputs include assessments of 
the individual fund manager, the backing company, the stated objective· of the 
managed fund product and the administrative processes of the fund. Either these 
inputs are seen to be valued in their own right by the rating provider, presumably 
based on what their users value, or because they are believed to be proxies for future 
perfonnance. It is not necessarily clear that perfonnance here is eX:pected risk-
adjusted return. 
Obtaining infonnation that enables measurement of historical perfonnance, 
Jet alone forecasting performance, of managed fund products is difficult. An 
Australian managed fund investor can obtain information on fund perfonnance from 
two main sources. The first is from the growing number of media outlets, which 
provide investor infonnation. These cover the full range of the media including 
television, radio, magazines, newspaper, newsletter and increasingly onHne. The 
infonnation source behind many of these is commonly one of the research houses 
such as Morningstar, Assirt, van Eyk or lntcch reviewed in Chapter 3. 
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There is a large literature in finance, which has sought the role and source of 
information in the selection of individual shares. Baker & Haslem (1973) surveyed a 
sample of U.S. individual investors and investigated their infonnation requirements. 
They found expectational factors dominated and that investors found limited 
usefulness in financial statements. They also foun4 ~at the brokers were the most 
used source of infonnation. Baker & Haslem (1974) surveyed a sample of 
Washington D.C. residents to investigate the variables that may cause investors to 
vary in their "perceptions of the desirability of specific common stocks" (Baker & 
Haslem, 1974, p.1256) and also to develop what they tenned an investor profile 
based on behavioural and demographic infonnation. They found three factors that 
accounted for the greatest variation in investors' perception of value. In declining 
order these were dividends, future expectations and financial stability. In tenns of 
investor profiles, they identified two distinct groups: a dividend im:ome group and a 
capital appreciation group. The fonner was characterised by investors who were 
older, female and more risk averse. They concluded, "investigation of investor 
socioeconomic and behavioral characteristics should prove worthwhik in providing a 
greater understanding of the factors influencing individual bchaviour11 (Baker & 
Haslem, 1974, p.1261). 
In Australia De Souza (1988) fourid that banks and accountants were much 
more important source of advice. A distinction can be drawn however between 
sources of information for the selection of shares as against the sourcing of advice, 
which the latter study investigated. Again focussing on the advice aspect, Roy 
Morgan Research (2000) found a greater reliance en financial planners amongst 
Australian investors. 
The usefulness of financial statements has been examined in Australia by 
Anderson & Epstein (1995) who found the contrary position, namely that 
shareholders valued them as a source of infonnation. Baker & Haslem (l 974) used 
factor analysis to detennine decision variables used by individual investors in the US 
when investing in ordinary shares. They found dividends, future expectations, and 
financial stability as the three most important factors. 
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As part of a much more comprehensive analysis of the perfonnance of 
individual investors and their portfolio holdings, Lease, Lewellen, & Schlarbaum 
(1974) surveyed the clients ofa New York broking finn. Nagy & Obenberger (1994) 
used a list of 34 financial and "contemporary concern" variables to explore what 
variables influenced the investment decisions of individuals also in the US. Whilst 
what could be classified as classical wealth-maximisation variables were significant, 
no one variable was significant for more than half the respondents. They concluded 
"investors employ diverse criteria when choosing stocks" (Nagy & Obenberger, 
1994, p.64). The recommendation of a brokerage house or investment advisory 
service was ranked as the most (least) significant by 9.8 (38.3) and 13.5 (26.3) 
percent respectively in the survey. 
Some of the perfonnance-flow literature, discussed in section 2.5.3, examined 
perfonnance within the wider framework of infonnation search. Notable amongst 
these is Sirri & Tufano (1998) who presented a costly search model that also 
incorporated the impact of fund marketing to examine money flow, not typical of this 
literature. They argued that "collecting and processing infonnation are costly 
activities" (Sirri & Tufano, 1998, p.1607) and hypothesised that individuals would be 
more likely to purchase a fund which reduced these costs. For example, larger better 
known funds, those funds that had used extensive marketing or had been given 
increased attention. The choicC of terminology is important, as investment in a fund 
is the nonn within the finance literature rather than purchas11 which is the nonn for 
consumer behaviour. It immediately implied a broader framework beyond 
perfonnance as information in isolation, to consideration of perfonnance as a salient 
attribute enmeshed in a costly search. An attribute is defined as salient if"consumers 
consider it to be important, react to it almost automatically, recall it easily, and assign 
it disproportionate amounts of attention" (Sirri & Tufano, 1998, p.1607). 
Sirri & Tufano ( 1998) identified the limitation in obtaining measures of 
search costs and used the size of the company from which the fund was offered, 
marketing and distribution costs, and media attention as proxies. Whilst larger 
companies did receive larger flows overall, the perfonnance-tlow was not stronger 
for them. Increased marketing costs increased the flow asscoiated with high 
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performance funds. Sirri & Tufano (1998, p.1613) suggested that ''To the extent that 
marketing makes perfonnance salient, it does so selectively", that is emphasising 
performance for high performing funds and other fund features for lower performing 
funds. 
Goriaev et al. (2001) also adopted an information search cost model in 
examining the performance-flow relationship discussed in section 2.5.3. They found 
that marketing efforts of the fund influenced funds flow and the sensitivity of the 
perfonnance-flow sensitivity. It must be noted though that due to lack of data, 
marketing efforts were proxied by fund size and age in the study. These may be less 
than perfect measures as Sirri & Tufano (1998, p.1613) indicated in their costly 
search model, fund company size and fund size may reduce search costs due to their 
likely prominence in the market. 
In section 2.7.1 Australian work by Gerrans & Clark-Murphy (2000) and 
Clark-Murphy & Gerrans (2001) was discussed which related to individual 
information search and gender differences in the search. They found that men were 
less likely to consult others in accessing information in making a investment 
deicision and had a relative p;eference for print and internet provided materials when 
compared with women. 
Gender based information processing differences have been examined in 
accounting. Chung & Monroe (1998) found that male students were more selective 
when processing information and employed a hypothesis-confirming strategy when 
studying accounting. Females were more likely to incorporate both confirming and 
non-confirming information and were more detailed in their information processing. 
Continuing in accounting the same authors found evidence of gender based 
infonnation processing differences in audit judgements by Chung & Monroe (2001). 
In more complex tasks females were more accurate than males, while for less 
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complex tasks the reverse was true. 19 A selectivity hypothesis, discussed in section 
2.8.4, was used in both instances to explain their evidence. 
2.8.4 Consumer Behaviour 
The modelling of the role of information search in consumer behaviour can 
be traced to Engel, Kollat, & Blackwell (1968) and Howard & Sheth (1969) in the 
marketing literature. Moorthy et al. (1997) noted that consumer behaviour and 
economics literatures have tended to follow distinct streams with the former having a 
behavioural focus, using psychological models and the latter focussing on the 
economic incentives to information search. They further argued that they shou!d not 
however be seen as distinct as 
The behavioral theory can be given an economic interpretation, and 
the economic theory can be enriched by relating it to empirical 
findings in the behavioral literature (Moorthy et al., 1997, p.264). 
This work has covered both how much time is devoted to and the pattern of 
information search as well as the returns to information search. In a review of earlier 
work in the marketing literature Newman (1977) suggested that a common empirical 
finding was the limited amount of pre-purchase information sought by consumers. 
Moore & Lehmann (1980) grouped the detenninants into seven categories: market 
environment, situational variables, potential product importance, knowledge and 
experience, individual differences, personality variables, and conflict and conflict 
resolution strategies. Beatty & Smith (1987) in their review identified approximately 
60 variables that had been empirically examined as determinants of search. Beatty & 
Smith (1987) suggested that the work prior to 1977 was deficient in methodology 
and theoretical base as the studies invariably focussed on single measures and 
products that severely limited their generality. 
19 The authors qualified their conclusion given the nature of the complexity C'lf the case-study 
pre.'ienled lo research participanL-. who were attending a national audit-training program, The research 
dOCS not reconcile however the fact that males dominate the accounting proression with 83 percent of 
the positions (Smith, 1999). What hope is there for accounting standards? 
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The level of infonnation search is moderated by the level of experience of the 
consumer and the level of involvement of the consumer (Newman, 1977). Johnson 
& Rusw (1984) suggested that the relativnship between search and experience could 
be characterised by an inverted·U shape. The costly·search models of Goriacv et.al. 
(2001) and Sirri & Tufano (1998, p.1613) discussed in section 2.8.3 can be traced to 
these consumer based models. 
Graham, Stendardi, Myers, & Graham (2002) suggested that gender based 
infonnation processing differences may account for the evidence supporting gender 
based investment risk aversion differences discussed in section 2.7.2.1. Meyers· 
Levy (1989) identified that while a number of gender based differences in 
infonnation processing and judgement had emerged, there was also contradictory 
evidence and a degree of skepticism as to their validity in view of alternate 
hpothcses. 
In view of the contradictory evidence Meyers.Levy (1989) proposed the 
selectivity model i1s a means of providing "a unifying framework from which a broad 
array of observed gender differences can be interpreted" (Meyers.Levy, 1989, 
p.222). The selectivity model related to the strategies that were employed by males 
and females when processing infonnation. Specifically it proposed that males did 
not use all information cues available and instead used heuristics in place of more 
thorugh infonnation processing. Females in contrast were suggested to be more 
comprehensive in processing information with a greater ability to also use more 
subtle cues. 
Meyers-Levy & Stemthal (1991) and Meyers-Levy & Maheswaran (1991) 
provided expenniental evide.,ce supporting the selectivity model, though they also 
provided evidence of threshold effects, that is circumstances where the differences 
were not evident. In the context of investment Graham et al. (2002) argued that the 
selectivity model suggested that males were more likely to pay attention to expected 
return when it was hig;1 and reject infonnation on risk which did not confinn a single 
inference. In contrast females were implied to be more comprehensive and process 
100 
all investment cues, including inconsistent ones which would be accorded greater 
weight and hence the greater degree of risk aversion for females {Graham et al., 
2002). 
IOI 
2.9 Financial Analyst, Advisers and Industry 
There is a large literature, wi1ich has examined both the process employed by 
financial analysts when screening and choosing investments and the particular pieces 
ofinforrnatiol! employed. The focus of these studies has invariably been investments 
in direct equity and as a result the infonnation examined has included the company 
annual report, specific financial ratios and market information. None of these studies 
focus on the process of managed fund investment or the specific pieces of 
information relevant to managed funds. 
The literature that exists 011 how financial advisers form and make investment 
recommendations to their clients is small and that which ex.amines information 
sources such as ratings when making managed fund recommendations is smJl!er 
again. The latter is understandable, as ratings are only recent phenomena. "the 
literature that does exist, as with the analyst literature, has had a focus on the 
decision process for selection of individual shares, and in tum the attributes of 
individual companies that arc used by advisers. At the practitioner level, the 
investment management industry has debated the role of ratings. This final section 
reviews each of these literatures. 
2.9.1 Analysts, Advisers and Information 
Mear & Firth ( 1990) identified three generic judgement tasks that had been 
investigated in the financial analyst literature: bankruptcy prediction and loan 
default, stock price changes, and stock recommendations. It is the stock 
recommendation literature that is of most interest here. Specifically the process of 
fanning choices and the infonnation used by the analyst and the importance attached 
to each. 
The earliest and perhaps most comprehensive analysis of the decision making 
process of investment managers was made by Clarkson (1962). Clarkson's focus 
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was on the selection of sha1-es by a trust investment officer of a bank. He developed 
a computer programme to simulate the portfolio selection for a client by an 
investment officer. Inputs to the programme were company attributes, market and 
industry indicators as well as client features. 
Slovic (1969) and Siovic, Fleissner, & Bauman (1972) used a sample of 
brokers and students to investigate both the processes employed in analysing a 
company and the importance of a range of accounting and market data. They 
suggested that their model fonned "a nice compromise between the complex 
'computer model' of Clarkson and the relatively naive approaches of the 
precompuler era" (Slovic et al., 1972, p.284). Slovic et al. (1972) also emphasised 
the role of configural relationships where .. the analyst's interpretation of an item of 
infonnation varies, depending upon the nature of other available information" 
(Slavic et al., 1972, p.286) as against the models where predictions or choices were 
modelled as linear function of variables. 
Porcano (1981) compared the information requirements of moderately 
sophisticated and moderately unsophisticated investors, using a survey of financial 
analysts, shareholderJ and the ubiquitous sample of students. He found that they 
differed very little and also concluded that the financial statements provided useful 
information to the investor. 
Mear & Firth (1987) surveyed New Zealand analysts, brokers and portfolio 
managers to determine return and risk estimates given a set of company, industry and 
market cues, which were a mixture of what can be considered traditional accounting 
and market-based ratios. They found low to moderate levels of consensus between 
the analysts and a high degree of judgmental disagreement. They found conflicting 
perfonnance of predictions of the analysts dependant upon the measurement 
procedure. Using the same data Mear & Firth (1988) also concluded that accounting 
reports conveyed infonnation that was useful in assessing ex-ante risk. 
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Bouwman (1987) used protocol analysis and examined the process used by a 
sample of U.S. analysts. Analysts were asked to "think aloud" when processing a 
package of materials including the company annual report, a stock and industry 
report from Standard and Poors, and market information from the Wall Street 
Journal. The analysts were also asked what additional information they would have 
accessed. Interestingly, the majority of respondents indicated that they would be 
interested in more external research reports on the company. 
Much of the adviser/analyst literature has examined how adviser or analyst 
incorporated various forms of information, what weights were given to each, and 
whether this reconciled with their choices. Ratings are in a way a pre-packaged 
assessment of this as they use inputs that are assigned weights and packaged into a 
rating scale. This study has more of a focus on reconciling whether the ratings do 
indeed match up with what is used. The ratings are a bit of a black box, with the 
exception of Morningstar. It is not clear whether it can be taken for granted that 
users such as advisers do know the techniques employed. This will be examined in 
section 4.7. 
2.9.2 Industry 
At the practitioner level, the funds management industry has expressed a 
mixture of skepticism and guarded optimism as to the role of ratings. As the industry 
has matured so have the issues under consideration. The prevalence of ratings in the 
Australian financial services industry has been described as an obsession which 
"opens up a can of worms for consumers and the industry" (Anonymous, 2000a, 
para. I). Apart from ratings for fund products and the fund company, ratings exist for 
advisers (Kachor, 2000), margin lending products (Wilkinson, 2001) and has raised 
questions about "ratings mania" {Anonymous, 2000a, para.4). 
The increasing number and awareness, but perhaps not full understanding of 
the available ratings in Australia is evidenced by the inaugural guide to the major 
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research houses ratings schemes having only just appeared in 2001 (Anonymous, 
200lc). 
Much of the initial discussion following the introduction of managed fund 
product ratings in Australia focussed on who should pay for the ratings and whether 
they were in the fund manager's best interest (Gleeson, 1994; Greenwood, 1994). 
The decision by Assirt to charge fund managers to be rated, which had been resisted 
by each of the other research companies who have instead preferred to charge the 
users of the research, prompted much of this initial discussion on cost (Effrat, 1999; 
Thomley, 1999). Thomley (1999) also highlighted the growing importance of a 
rating and the non-comparability of rating categories between providers. 
The adoption by Assirt of a star rating system, where they had previously 
used an alphabetic based system, prompted claim and counter-claim as to the merits 
of each system and the assertion by Morningstar that it would create confusion 
having a second rating for a fund (Walker, 1999). This view has also been expressed 
within the wider investment and adviser industry. With the entry of further star 
ratings research houses by 2001, which brought the total number to four different 
systems20, it was suggested that "each new entrant into the star rating market 
increases confusion in the mind of consumers" (Engel, 2001b, para.9; Walker, 1999). 
It is easier to reconcile this view as a consequence of a company facing competition 
for the first time rather than a view that more research or ratings per se decreased the 
quality of information. 
On the contrary, Keavney (2001) suggested that more ratings would allow for 
greater competition and suggested that the range in competence in rating would be 
similar to the range of competency in financial advisers. As a positive consequence, 
this would also not encourage a narrower flow of funds following the ratings. Other 
research houses have been more sanguine about the number of different rating brands 
20 Morningstar, Assirt, lnvestorSource and InvestorWeb. 
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and have expressed the view that "We are different things in the first place. And, 
there is place for everyone" (Stephen van Eyk in Effiat. 1999, para.36). InvestorWeb 
were the most recent star rating entrant and chose a six star system uto provide a 
distinction between InvestorWeb and other research houses" (Szollos, 2001). 
More recently, whilst there has been acceptance for a role for ratings, 
questions as to the motivations of providers and the ''value" of ratings have emerged. 
For example whilst Keavney (2001) stated that "Star ratings are becoming a major 
force in our industry" he also noted that "Planners need to form careful assessments 
about potential conflicts of interest of research houses and should ask about their 
revenue streams" (Keavney, 2001, para.1). 
The potential bias or conflict inherent in ratings systems arises as the research 
houses earn their money by charging the managed funds to be rated in the first place 
or charging the managed fund when they use the rating in advertising. In the former 
case it was suggested that funds that had received low ratings would be unlikely to 
continue to ask for a rating and in the latter where a fund received a low rating for its 
product it would be unlikely to use it in advertisements (Keavney, 2001). Such 
issues of bias or conflicts of interest issues have also been raised for credit rating 
agencies (Anonymous, 2001 b) and discussed further in section 2.6.3.1. 
The head of Assirt, one of the two top ratings companies, has confirmed that 
there is a bias in the products that will be rated as ''This is because our client base 
consists of the bigger, mainstream fund managers, ... the serious players out there. 
Those that are more dodgy will not use us." (Patrick Bennett in Effrat, 1999, 
para.21). 
Apart frmn investors or advisers, the role of ratings for funds themselves has 
also been suggested. A former director of managed fund ratings a:t Standard and 
Poors suggested that "Clearly, the fund business is becoming more competitive. And 
a rating is one way in which a fund can further differentiate itself from its unrated 
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competitors" (Drexhage, 1997, p.60). The usefulness of ratings to the fund 
themselves has been acknowledged in the US as "although funds have typically been 
sold on name recognition and historical return, investment management firms are 
now realising the value a solid rating can provide" (Drexhage, 1997, p.60). 
The influence of ratings in Australia can be seen not only by the increased 
use of high ratings in fund advertisements but also in the willingness of the 
management of downgraded funds to publicly question the ability and motivations of 
the research houses. For example, the chief investment officer of BT Funds 
Management who had received a downgrade of some of its products by InvestorWeb 
responded with "I contest the report absolutely, and quite frankly I see it as 
unprofessional ... I just look at this and think it is contemptuous" (Liondis, 2001a, 
para.11). Similarly in response to a down-grading by Morningstar the Chainnan of 
County Investment Management suggested that "perhaps the time has come to 
recognise the enonnous responsibility such organisations have" and further that 
"arguably their influence is greater than a prospectus." (Macek, 2000, para.5). 
A guide to the use of the U.S. ratings can be found in Rowland (2000) who in 
the tone more of a confessional suggested that 
I remember - with shame - writing a column advising investors to gather 
a list of funds with five stars and to pick from that. Those are among the 
words I'd like to eat for breakfast. I was nai've, although not young, and 
like other investors, I believed that the star ratings measured a lot more 
than they really do; that they gave a stamp of approval to a particular 
fund (Rowland, 2000, para.2). 
In the US, broader issues surrounding analyst recommendations and potential 
conflicts of interest resulted in an investigation by the Attorney General's Office in 
New York It has also led to the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission issuing an 
infonnation piece for investors explaining the basics of the recommendations as well 
as outlining the potential conflicts of interest that should be borne in mind (U.S. 
Securities Exchange Commission, 2001 ). 
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In Australia, the Australian Securities & Investments Commission (ASIC) 
received an undertaking from a leading broker concerning newsletter 
recommendations. ASIC was "concerned that the failure to disclose dealings which 
were contrary to the recommendations ... [made in the newsletter] had the potential 
to , mislead or deceive subscribers" (Australian Securities & Investments 
Commission, 2000a, p.1 ). 
Several cases have been brought in relation to recommendations of financial 
analysts in the US. An analyst with Morgan Stanley was the subject of a class-suit 
by investors concerning recommendations, which were alleged to have been linked 
to securing banking business (Bloomberg News, 2001) though the case was 
subsequently dismissed (Reuters, 200 I). Merrill Lynch settled out of court following 
a case involving recommendations of an analyst and failure to disclose a conflict of 
interest Lahar! (2001). In the UK a subsidiary of Merrill Lynch was sued for 
negligence on the basis of the underperfonnance of their pension fund (Anonymous, 
2000b ). The case was settled out of court without admission of guilt though it has 
been suggested that other clients of the manager would also proceed with cases 
(Anonymous, 200la). 
The apparent propensity to use the courts has also been raised in Australia in 
the ratings industry. In response to the introduction of star ratings by Assirt, the 
fonner Managing Director of Morningstar was reported to have pursued possible 
contraventions of the Trade Practices Act (Walker, 1999). Keavney (2001) has 
asked ''Who will be the first to sue a research house for its star rating - an investor or 
adviser? Will the grounds be negligence or conflicts of interest?" (Keavney, 2001, 
para.I). It may in fact be from the research company themselves. In response to 
questioning of the specific downgrading a fund product, one research house 
reportedly considered legal action against the fund (Liondis, 2001b). Amore recent 
public dispute emerged following the questioning of the value of the Morningstar 
ratings by research competitor Frank Russell (Hayes, 2001 ), which also prompted the 
tlueat of legal action that was later dropped (Liondis, 2001c). 
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2.10 Summary 
This , chapter has reviewed the quite broad literatures that the use and 
usefulness of managed fund product ratings can be considered within. Within the 
traditional finance literature, managed funds have attracted considerable interest 
primarily in relation to their perfonnance a:nd issues arising from perfonnance in 
aggregate across the funds and individually. Much of this is framed by the theory of 
market efficiency. Ratings have invariably been linked to either historical or 
expected performance, which this literature extensively haw-e(}nsMered. 
The assumptions of individual behaviour that underpin traditional finance 
have increasingly been challenged by what has been labelled as behavioural finance. 
The debate has focussed on the rationality of the decision making of individuals. 
The extent to which ratings use can be reconciled with rational behaviour is 
determined by the quality of infonnation they provide. This is therefore linked to the 
managed fund performance literature. The use of ratings within the behavioural 
finance literature can be reconciled for example with the motivation that underpins 
the theory of regret. 
The consumer behaviour literature has offered a wider framework to consider 
the role of ratings with constructs of information source, decision criteria and 
purchase. Most of the literature in this area has focussed on consumable and durable 
goods. The literature that has examined investments has focussed on the use of 
services provided by financial advisers and the process of investment in shares. The 
latter has suggested that investors do consider factors other than risk and return as 
important in investment selection, including their historical perfonnance ranking and 
management capabilities, something captured by ratings. 
The specific modelling of infonnation search has also been considered within 
finance, economics and consumer behaviour frameworks. The focus in finance has 
tended to relate to questions of market efficiency whereas in consumer behaviour the 
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focus has been on the amour.t of infonnation search and the pattern in its collection. 
The benefit of the economic approach has been the focus on the outcomes within the 
traditional cost-benefit framework. A distinct stream within both the consumer 
behaviour and finance literatures has examined how financial analysts use a range of 
infonnation sources. This has exclusively been relating to direct share investment 
rather than managed funds. Examining the role of ratings for managed fund 
investors and advisers and assessing its relationship with future perfonnance, which 
is the focus l)f this thesis, will add to each of these literatures. 
The final area examined was at the practitioner level, primarily in the 
investments management industry in Australia. At this level ratings have been 
accepted, with caution, with an increased awareness of the potentially positive and 
negative role they can have. The industry is increasingly questioning the "value" of 
these ratings and the results of examining the ratings-perfonnance relationship in this 
thesis will add to this discussion. 
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CHAPTER3 
THE AUSTRALIAN MANAGED FUND AND RESEARCH 
INDUSTRY 
The desire to pool together resources for the purposes of investment is not a 
recent phenomenon. Cabot (1929) attributed the development of investment·trusts, 
the forerunner of modem mutual funds and managed funds, to Great Britain where 
they had an established profile by 1880. It has however been comparatively recently 
that managed funds have attained a high public profile in Australia though as early as 
1988, the industry was described as being in a boom (Shaffer, 1988). 
The increased profile and relevance of managed funds to investors has been 
associated with an increase in demand and supply of managed fund research to guide 
investors. Of particular interest here is the information presented as ratings and 
provided by a number of research companies and in particular Morningstar. This 
chapter has two interrelated components. The first profiles the managed fund 
industry in Australia and the second the research industry that exists for investors and 
advisers, The chapter finishes with a detailed view of the construction of 
Morningstar ratings in Australia. 
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3. 1 Australian Industry Development 
At the tum of the twentieth century, the managed fund industry was 
comprised solely of life offices and pension (superannuation) funds who collectively 
accounted for 12.4% of the total assets of financial institutions in Australia (Lewis & 
Wallace, 1993, p.3). Table 3.1 reports the size of the major financial institution types 
and indicates that by March 2002 the managed fund industry, including 
superannuation and life offices, accounted for 33.4 percent of the total assets of 
financial institutions in Australia. This overstates the position given that not aJI life 
office assets can be classified as being for speci fie managed fund products. 
Table 3.1 Total Assets of Australian Financial Institutions: March 2002 
Banks 
Superannuation Funds 
Life Offices 
Other Managed Fundsa 
Sccuritisation Vehicles 
Money Market Corporations 
General Insurance Offices 
Reserve Bank Australia 
Finance Companies 
Other authorised dcposiMaking institutions 
General Financiers 
Pastoral Finance Companies 
Total 
$billion 
856.4 
303.9 
176.7 
175.0 
106.4 
82.0 
79.7 
59.5 
44.8 
37.8 
28.6 
12.3 
1963.0 
~ercent 
43.6 
I 5.5 
9.0 
8.9 
5.4 
4.2 
4.1 
3.0 
2.3 
1.9 
1.5 
0.6 
JOO 
• Includes Public Unit Tru.-.ts, Cash Management Trusts, Common Fund, and Friendly Societies. 
Breakdown of a.•,set"' in Table 3.2. 
Source: Reserve Bank Australia 811/lctin Table BI (2002}. 
The breakdown in Table 3.2 reveals the dominant sector within the-, managed 
funds industry is now superannuation funds who account for 46.4 \-.ercent of 
consolidated assets followed by life offices and public unit trusts with 27 ,0 percent 
and 20.2 percent respectively. 
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Table 3.2 Managed Fund Consolidated Assets: March 2002 
Unconsolidated Assets Consolidated Assets 
$billion Proportion% $billion Proportion % 
Superannuation 
Life Offices 
Public Unit Trusts 
Cash Management Trusts 
Common Funds 
Friendly Societies 
Total 
369 48.0 
202 26.3 
154 20.0 
29 3.9 
8 3.8 
5 0.6 
769 100.0 
304 
177 
132 
29 
8 
5 
655 
46.4 
27.0 
20.2 
4.4 
1.2 
0.7 
100.0 
Many im11itu1ions invesl in each odter's products, For example Superannuation Funds invest in 
Public Unit Trusts. The consolidated asselll nel the cross-investments out. 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (2002c) 
A further feature of this industry has been the use of professional investment 
managers, particularly in the superannuation and life insurance sectors. Funds 
invested by investment managers remain the clients and the client ultimately bears 
the responsibility for their investment perfonnance. More than 73 percent of 
consolidated assets of managed funds was invested through investment managers in 
March 2002 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2002b). 
3.1.1 Development Phases in Australian Managed Funds 
Three distinct phases can be identified in the growth of the managed fund 
industry in Australia over the past two decades, which has increased the need for 
pcrfonnance infonnation for investors. The first phase commenced with the 
introduction of compulsory superannuation by the federal government in 1992. A 
key objective of compulsory superannuation was to move the provision and 
dependence for retirement funds from government to individuals. This has led to 
more than 92 percent of the full-time Australian workforce having superannuation 
cover and 75 percent of the total pre-retired population with some superannuation 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2001, p.5). 
The second and overlapping phase has seen the 'sophistication' in the savings 
pattern of Australian savers. There has been a shift from the practice of putting 
excess funds with deposit institutions to making direct investments in equity or 
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collective investment vehicles, including managed funds. In part this can be 
associated firstly with the government's compulsory superannuation and the 
consequent rise in size and profile of superannuation funds, and secondly the desire 
by the government for more direct equity investment. This in tum has facilitated the 
privatisation of a number of government assets, inc1uding Qantas, the 
Commonwealth Bank and Telstra (part privatisation)21 • 
The Australian Stock Exchange (2000) identified that over 40 percent of 
Australian adults had direct ownership of shares, though 62 percent of these had 
three or less shares, and 42 percent of investors had less than $IO 000 invested. 
Including indirect ownership through managed fund products increased the 
proportion of share ownerrship to over 53 percent. Excluding superannuation, 22 
percent of adults have invested in managed funds. 
Australian Stock Exchange (2000) also suggested that the increase in growth 
of direct and indirect equity investment could be attributed to the increased 
awareness through the media of investment opportunities and the easier access to 
investing through a wider range of broking services facilitated by lower costs. 
The third phase can be identified with the proposed introduction of legislation 
by the federal government of compulsory choice for superannuation members. The 
move to greater choice for superannuation members was an election policy of the 
federal Coalition in 1996 and was subsequently endorsed by the Wallis Inquiry into 
the Australian Financial System in 1997. In the 1997/98 Treasurer's Budget Speech, 
choice was promoted as a means for Australian employees to 'Jnake their saving 
work harder for them as providers compete to enhance their performance" 
(Australian Treasury, 1998, p.4). While choice has been on the agenda since 1996 it 
was most recently rejected by the senate in 2001. The 2002 federal budget again 
raised the prospects of the legislation by allocating funds to employee education on 
choice. 
21 For example, more than one in ten Australian adults invested in Telstra 2 (Australian Stock 
Exchange, 2000), 
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In advance of potentially compulsory choice being offered many employers 
have already moved to offer choice to their employees as to where they.can direct 
superannuation contributions. At the same time., superannuation funds have 
introduced investment choice options for members. This has generally involved the 
broad choice of remaining with an existing defined benefit plan, where final payment 
is a specified multiple of ending salary and fund membership, or a shifting to one of 
a combination of a variety of accumulation funds where the final payout is linked to 
the perfonnance of the particular asset mix. 
There has been a clear shift in responsibility for retirement funds from 
government, to the superannuation funds and finally to the individual in the sense 
that their decisions will ultimately detennine their available retirement funds. This 
continuing responsibility shift in superannuation funds wi11 provide for further 
opportunities for more sophisticated savings patterns. Aside from the motivations 
and justifications for this shift, the infonnation that investors rely upon to make these 
decisions, such as ratings, is of considerable interest. 
3.1.2 Public Unit Trusts 
Public Unit Trusts (PUT) have a history in Australia since 1936 (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, 2000). These first trusts "were small concerns whose holdings 
included 20 to 30 stocks which offered income and capital growth returns to 
investors" (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2000, p.21). As a market sector, 
however, PUTs did not experience significant growth until the 1970s and 1980s. 
Figures for the size of the industry are available in a unifonn and continuous series 
from 1988. Between June 1988 and March 2002, total listed and unlisted assets of 
PUTs have grown from $23.7 to $161.4 billion (Australian Bureau of Ststistics, 
2002a, Table la).22 
22 This includes Cash Management Trust'I which are accounted separately to Public Unit Trusts in 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2002c, Table la). 
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Figure 3.1 identifies that the mainstay of the PUT industry has been listed 
property trusts, though their relative share of assets has declined significantly over 
the 1990s. In 1992 35.8 percent of assets were invested in listed property trusts 
making it the largest category. By March 2002, listed property trusts accounted for 
24 .4 percent of assets, second to unlisted equity trusts that accounted for 3 7.4 percent 
of assets. The relative decline in property trusts has been matched by the rise in 
unlisted equity trusts. Another feature of the PUT industry is the unlisted property 
trusts who accounted for 22.2 percent of all assets of PUTs in June 1990, yet 
accounted for only 1.1 percent in March 2002. Their decline in 1990s can be 
attributed to a major property slump and subsequent redemption problems faced by 
unitholders. Cash Management Trusts (CMTs) have mainained a relatively constant 
proportion of the sector with an average 16 percent over the time period. 
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Figure 3.1 Consolidated assets of public unit trust type: 1988-2002 
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(Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (2002d) for all PUTs excluding Cash Management Trusts 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2002a) 
The assets held by PUTs, presented in Figure 3.2, reflect the increased share 
of unlisted equity trusts and decline of property trusts. As an example, in June 1988 
equities and units in trusts made up 13.6 percent of all the assets of PUTs whereas 
property comprised 41.9 percent. By March 2002 the share of equities and units in 
PUTs had grown to 60.2 percent and property decreased to 26.4 percent. The asset 
breakdown includes data reported by Australian Bureau of Statistics (2002d, Table 
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1 b) that excludes the assets of cash management trusts, which are reported separately 
in Australian Bureau of Statistics (2002a, Table 3). The categories in both reports do 
not reconcile and cannot be aggregated satisfactorily. If CMTs could be included the 
trends previously described remain, as the largest and largely constant component of 
CMTs is cash, deposits and other short-term securities. 
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Figure 3.2 Asset holdings of public unit trusts: 1988-2002 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (2002d, Table lb) 
3.1.3 Life Offices and Superannuation Funds 
• Property 
DUnlisted 
Equity 
•Listed 
Equity 
D Listed 
Property 
DL/Term 
Debt 
•s/Term 
Securities 
0) 0 ...... N 
O> 0 0 0 DCash & O> 0 0 0 
...... N N N Deposits c: c c ..: 
:, :, :, co 
-, -, -, ~ 
The largest proportion of funds invested in managed funds is through life 
offices and superannuation funds. The discussion in section 3 .1.1 has highlighted the 
role of the federal government in increasing the flow of funds to this sector. An 
extensive discussion of the history behind this policy can be found in Bateman, 
Kingston, & Piggott (2001). In Table 3.1 it was reported that these institutions 
acounted for more than 24 percent of total financial assets, and in Table 3.2 that they 
account for more than 73 percent of the consolidated assets of managed funds. Of 
the two, superannuation funds have become the more dominant over the past three 
decades. To illustrate the change that has occurred, in July 1988, life offices and 
supperannuation funds shared equal proportions of managed fund assets. By March 
2002, assets in superannuation funds were 72 percent larger than those in life offices. 
The portfolio of assets for both are very similar as detailed in Figure 3 .3 and Figure 
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3.4. The dominant feature of both has been the increase in investments in equity and 
overseas assets. 
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Figure 3.3 Life office unconsolidated assets: 1988-2002 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (2002c, Table 2) 
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Figure 3.4 Superannuation funds unconsolidated assets: 1988-2002 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (2002c, Table 3) 
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3.2 Managed Fund Products 
There has been a proliferation in the number and range of managed fund 
products on offer from each group of managed fund types. Products can be 
categorised by objective or asset allocation. Fund objectives can be grouped into 
growth, income or capital stable though in classification they often vary more by 
degree. A growth fund aims to achieve capital growth through reinvestment of 
earnings, Income funds aim to produce a consistent earnings stream to distribute to 
investors. Capital stable funds have the main aim of tong-tenn capital stability and 
growth (Brailsford & Heaney, 1998, p.811). These funds in turn invest in a mixture 
of assets, primarily equity, debt, and property. 
Details on the value of assets under management of these funds is easier to 
obtain than on the number of funds. This is partly due to the number of agencies 
who are responsible for the collection of data for the different products and the 
overlap in definitions that have been applied. The Australian Bureau of Statistics 
(ABS), Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA), Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC), and the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) all 
publish and/or collate data on various types of managed funds. For example ASIC 
has a register of managed investment schemes, which doesn't include regulated 
superannuation products. The ABS publishes data on managed funds, which include 
public unit trusts, superannuation funds and life insurance funds. They use a 
combination of their own survey data as well as information from APRA, who 
regulate superannuation funds. None of them however, report details on the number 
of products. 
The most definitive list of funds is held by APIR Systems Pty. Ltd. who 
provide a Product Indentification Code (PIC), an alpha-numeric code that provides a 
standardised method of identification for unlisted investment products in Australia 
and New Zealand. The Investment Financial Services Association of Australia has 
recommended as standard, the use of the PIC since 1999 (APIR Systems Pty. Ltd., 
120 
20'J2). Unfortunately, at present, their listing of over 10,500 products includes non-
public offer managed funds such as corporate superannuation funds, which are 
outside the scope of this thesis. 
A variety. of typologies can be applied to the range of funds. As the 
Morningstar database, contained on the TotalAccess CD, will be u~ed in this thesis, 
their classification frameweork provides a useful means of highlighting the range of 
funds available. Morningtsar have effectively three levels of classification: legal 
type, category and subcategory. The Morningstar database has details on 7,216 
funds. Excluding finaJised and supressed funds there are 5,200 funds on the database 
and the foliowing section is a summary of these at March 2002. 
3.2,1 Legal Type 
The legal type classification is similar to the classification used by Australian Bureau 
of Statistics (2002c) and is presented in Table 3.3. While there are 17 listed legal 
types, .Morningstar has 11 matched to existing funds. Legal types are assigned to 
each subcategory rather than individual funds and therefore alI fwtds in the same 
subcategory have the same legal type (C. Read, personal communication, 
14/10/2001). 
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Table 3.3 Morningstar funds by Investment Group Legal Type 
This table provides a breakdown of the broadest classification used by Morningstar of its funds as at 
March 2002. The breakdown excludes finalised funds and suppressed funds. Suppressed funds are 
those that were created in error by Morningstar or a fund that "has outstanding issues with data" 
(Momin~star, 2002a}, 
Fund Status 
Closed Open Suppressed Total Percent 
Superannuation Funds 964 1041 2005 38.6 
Super Funds - Exempt 232 700 932 17.9 
Investment Trusts 103 707 I 811 15.6 
Wholesale NTP 31 667 11 709 13.6 
Insurance Bonds 290 58 348 6.7 
Wholesale Funds 46 189 235 4.5 
Friendly Society Bonds 33 31 64 1.2 
Administration Facilities 3 22 12 37 0.7 
Other Investments 2 28 30 0.6 
Immediate Annuities 8 18 l 27 0.5 
Superannuation Pensions 1 1 2 0.0 
Total 1712 3462 26 5200 100.0 
3.2.2 Category 
The category classification groups funds with comparable taxation treatment 
and comparable sector exposure. For example Australian Equity Trusts, 
International Equity Trusts and Multisector Trusts are three category classifications 
that fall under the broader legal type classifications of Investment Trusts. Appendix 
V provides the full list of categories of the 5200 funds as at March 2002 on the 
database. There are 62 categories, including 23 that have 20 or fewer funds in them. 
The larger categories reflect the asset value breakdowns contained in Table 3.2. Of 
the top 20 categories that account for 83 percent of the funds, only seven categories 
or 27 .6 percent of all funds a:e non.super or life office product related. 
3.2.3 Subcategory 
The subcategory classification is the most specific grouping and is of most 
interest here as ratings are assigned relative to the subcategory of funds by 
Morningstar that will be discussed further in section 3.7.5. In making the 
classification Morningstar seeks to ensure that the funds in a subcategory: 
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1. have the same taxation treatment, 
2. have comparable asset exposures objectives or actual exposures, 
3. be considered alternatives in constructing a client's portfolio, 
4. can be justifiably compared in tenns of performance data, Q2, market share, 
inflows and other statistics (Morningstar, 2002).23 
There are 132 subcategories in the database, presented in Appendix VI. For 
example, Australian Equity Trusts - General and Australian Equity Trusts - Property 
are two subcategory classifications that are in tum classified as Australian Equity 
Trusts at the category level that are in tum classified as Investment Trusts at the 
broadest legal type level. Of the top 20, which account for 56 percent of all funds by 
number, only seven are non-super or life product related. 
2l Discussed further in section 3.7.5.3. 
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3.3 Managed Fund Research 
Accompanying the increase in size of the managed fund industry in Australia, 
and perhaps more accurately because of it, has been an increasing number of 
companies providing managed fund research and ratings, easily accessible by the 
general public. This section identifies the information available for use by research 
companies. 
3.3.1 Use and provision of ratings 
Research companies collate and analyse existing public infonnation as well 
as generating their own information, which together are repackaged and provided to 
advisers, investors, and the fund company themselves. Managed fund ratings are a 
component of this information package for a sub-group of research companies. 
Three somewhat overlapping information input sets can be identified that research 
companies can use: performance inputs, quantitative inputs, and qualitative inputs. 
Perfonnance inputs refer to the various measures identified within the 
academic literature such as the Sharpe Ratio or Jensen's alpha. These largely are 
drawn from a theoretical base and have competing claims of suitability both from a 
theoretical and empirical basis. They are however freely applicable given available 
data. The performance measures discussed in section 2.3 can he distinguished, in 
intent at least, from the ratings measures provided by the various ratings agencies. 
Ratings may have a perfonnance measure input, but they must offer something 
different to these textbook measures to distinguish themselves. This is what the 
rating agencies trade on and this is what makes them different. 
Quantitative inputs include the required inputs of the performance measures, 
for example fund return and standard deviation, as well as inputs uniquely applied by 
the ratings company. These can include age and size of fund, and other tailored 
measures such as a 'downside risk' measure. The rating companies may have a 
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common set of quantitative inputs yet may weight each differently in detennining 
their quantitative assessment. The ratings companies also differ as to the importance 
given to the overall quantitative assessment. 
Qualitative inputs are the infonnation inputs generated by the ratings 
company, largely in consultation with the fund that is rated. These can include, for 
example, an assessment of the fund manager's experience or the strength of the 
backing company. The rating companies may again have a common set of 
qualitative inputs, but less so than the quantitative components. It is largely through 
the qualitative assessment that a company distinguishes itse1f from competitors. The 
qualitative inputs are stand-alone components and these give rise to proprietary 
claims and the view that through this assessment they can "recapture the art of 
investment". 24 
The existence of the various perfonnance inputs, quantitative inputs and 
qualitative inputs, provide for eight competing relationships, summarised in Figure 
3.5, in respect of the usefulness of these inputs to add value for investors. It is 
possible that all of the inputs add value, none of the inputs add value, each input in 
isolation add value or pairing of inputs add value. 
Not Useful 
Performance 
Inputs 
Useful 
/ / 
/ / 
/ 6 / 7 
/ 5 / 8 
/ 2 / 3 
/ I / 4 
Useful Not Useful 
Qualitative inputs 
/ 
/ 
I/ 
/ 
I/ Not Useful Quantitative 
/ Use ful inputs 
Figure 3.5 Performance, quantitative and qualitative inputs relationships 
24 Roger Urwin of Watson Wyatt, for example, has said that focussing on the bottom line. of 
investment perfonnance misses the "art" in investment (Dunstan, 1999,45). 
us 
Area one identifies where the perfonnance inputs, quantitative and qualitative 
inputs are all measurably beneficial to the user. At the opposite extreme is area 
seven where none of the inputs add value. The remaining areas have a mixture of 
inputs that are useful and those that are not. In area three, six and eight. only one 
input is valuable being the perfonnance, qualitative and quantitative inputs 
respectively. In area two, perfonnance and qualitative inputs add value but the 
quantitative analysis does not. In area four perfonnance and quantitative analysis 
add value but qualitative analysis does not and in area five quantitative and 
qualitative analysis add value but perfonnance inputs do not. 
The perfonnance persistence literature, discussed in section 2.5.2, has 
addressed the issue of the value of the perfonnance history of a fund. This thesis 
does not focus on the usefulnsess of the alternative perfonnance measures, but rather 
focuses on the qualitative and quantitative measures. The question of what is useful 
is a crucial component of testing the various hypotheses suggested by Figure 3.5. 
Such an assessment must be linked both to the motive in their provision, that is the 
rating company motive, as well as the motivation for their use, by investors, advisers 
and the managed fund cornpany.25 The motivations of investors, financial advisers 
and managed fund companies are discussed in section 3.5 and examined empirically 
in section 4.7.4. 
2$ Potential future users include regulatory agencies - as discussed in Section 2.6.3 relating to bond 
ratings. 
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3.4 Australia Ratings Providers 
The publicly available ratings complement the research generated in-house by 
larger commercial fund investors. The major ratings providers in Australia are 
Morningstar (fonnerly FPG), Assirt, van Eyk and InvestorWeb. The major point of 
difference between the range of Australian ratings providers and their U.S. 
counterparts is the emphasis on a qualitative assessment provided by each of the 
Australian providers. This is notably different to U.S. providers such as 
Morningstar, ValueLine and Weiss Ratings Inc. In the UK, ratings providers also do 
not appear to share the enthusiasm for the qualitative component. TrustNet's risk 
ratings and Morningstar UK for example arc solely historically based. There is no 
clear reason as to why the Australian system has devloped so differently. It may 
reflect the relatively small size of the market in New Zealand where FPG Research 
first started their rating system that has remained in place following the joint venture 
with Morinngstar in Australia. Assirt and van Eyk have matched the qualitative 
focus and in fact include higher weighting to the qualitative assessment. 
Morningstar established its presence in Australia in 1999 through a joint 
venture with FPG Research Holdings who were established in 1982. FPG were the 
first company to provide star ratings for managed funds in Australia and New 
Zealand. Morningstar Australia is fundamentally different in the construction of its 
ratings when compared with its parent company in the US. Most strikingly is its 
commitment to a qualitative component to its ratings, a continuation of the influence 
of FPG that has subsequently been reinforced in changes made to the qualitative 
components by Morningstar (2002b), discussed further in section 3.7.5.1. 
van Eyk have provided research since 1989 but have only recently made their 
ratings available to individual investors. van Eyk have claimed that "chances are that 
6 out of 10 people visit an adviser who is advised by van Eyk Research with regard 
to strategy" (van Eyk Research, 2001, Welcome, para. I). 
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Assirt26 have also claimed the title of "Australia's No. 1 Managed Fund 
Research house" with a 14-year history and the producer of more ratings than any 
other provider (WealthPoint Ltd., 2002, para. I). Assirt changed its ratings system in 
1999 from separate ratings for management and the specific fund. Each rating was 
on a four-step scale thus pennitting up to sixteen different pennutations. The new 
system uses a six level rating system which combine management and fund 
assessments into one. These consist of a five star system, the same as its main 
competitor Morningstar, and an "on hold" rating. Assirt justified the change on the 
basis that the ''market had evolved substantially and stars are probably preferable to 
rankings in tenns of investor understanding" (Bowennan, 1999, para.IS). 
Morningstar contended that the change was merely cashing in on their own system 
and would likely cause confusion for investors (Hoyle, 1999). In 1998 FPG 
Research, latterly Morningstar, faced a similar competition from IPAC Securities 
(McCalister, 1998) with similar claims made. To add to a growing suite of ratings 
agencies, Standard and Poors has announced that they will be entering the managed 
funds ratings market in late 2001 (Spits, 2001) though they have more recently 
postponed their entry until late 2002 (Smith, 2002). 
Smaller providers include lnvestorweb and Lonsdale. InvestorWeb27 began 
in 1997, and offer an online "Fund Picker" facility to sort funds on the basis of 
quantitative perfonnance measures and ''the View" which is the investment 
recommendation (InvestorWeb, 1999). 
Each company was approached for historical ratings infonnation. The only 
company that makes their dataset available is Morningstar through the purchase of its 
TotalAccess CD. Morningstar is by far the most open of all the ratings agencies in 
that they provide historical perfonnance and ratings infonnation in addition to the 
construction of the ratings. 
26 Assirt Ply. Ltd. is a subsidiary of WealthPoint Limited, a wholly owned subsidiary of St. George 
Bank Ltd. 
27 JnvestorWeb.com.au is a division of IWL Ltd who began in 1995. The 2001 Annual Report of 
IWL Limited notes that they adopted a 15111 Century trinity symbol as their corporate logo. The logo 
sygnifies "wealth, work and tuck". It is unclear whether luck plays any role in the detennination of 
their ratings. 
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Morningstar have stated: 
For us to assist you invest smarter, you have to be able to see how we 
drew our conclusions, so you can match our information to your 
circumstances, needs, goals and attitudes. There's no secret 'black box' 
from which our data, ratings and commentary appear. (Morningstar, 
2000, p.1.2) 
In Chapter 4 the use of each of these providers is examined infonned by a 
survey of advisers and investors. As a guide to the availaibility of Morningstar and 
Assirt ratings, who have been the most prominent ratings providers, Table 3.4 lists a 
variety of newspaper, magazine and online sources through which investors and 
advisers can source them. 
Table3A Australian Managed Funds Ratings Secondary Sources 
Morningstar 
Newspaper Australian Financial Review 
The Australian 
The West Australian 
Courier Mail 
Newcastle Herald 
Magazines Money Magazine 
Shares 
Independent Financial Advisor 
Online www.momingstar.com.aµ 
www .yourprosperity.com.au 
www.ninemsn.com.aµ 
www.sanford.com.11u 
www.etrade.com.au 
www.guicken.com.au 
Assirt 
Australian Financial Review 
Sunday Telegraph 
Canberra Times 
The Age 
Personal Investor 
Money Management 
www.assirt.com.au 
www.tradingroom.cgm.au 
www.personalinvestor.com.au 
www.comsec.com.au 
www.moneymangcment.com au 
www.moneymanager.com.au 
www.myfinance.com.au 
www.2020funds,com.au 
www.2 b.com.au 
Source: Australian Financial Review (2000, p.32) 5-6 Feb 2000. 
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3.5 Motives for Use of Managed Fund Ratings 
A range of managed fund ratings user groups have been alluded to. Their 
motivations are important to explore when a consideration of the usefulness of 
ratings is made. This section reviews the motivations of the both the providers and 
users of ratings. 
3.5.1 Ratings Providers 
The clearest motivation can be seen for the ratings company themselves, as 
they are in the business for providing research and ratings for a profit. It is in their 
interests to clearly differentiate themselves from the purely perfonnance based inputs 
as well as the methods used by competing research companies. Whilst there is an 
academic and practitioner debate as to the best perfonnance measure, they are not 
proprietary. Through the collection and weighting of the quantitative and qualitative 
inputs a distinguishable product is possible. The advertising of the companies clearly 
identifies their wish to brand their ratings and the idea that they can help with the 
process of choosing a fund. The immediate question is therefore how do ratings 
assist the choice and investment decision and what do the providers say! 
Morningstar in Australia state that their Star ratings 
Are independent quality assurance ratings of managed funds and the 
companies that offer them. They are a summary of Momingstar's in· 
depth and objective qualitative and quantitative research on funds 
(Morningstar, 1999a, frontpage). 
van Eyk have claimed .. a van Eyk investor maximises returns by having the 
research, information and tools to make quality choices" (van Eyk Research, 2001, 
Showcase, para.3). Their view on ratings is similar to the other providers in their 
"belief that a focussed independent investment research group is capable of 
producing superior long term investment returns as well as service" (van Eyk 
Research, 2001, Showcase, para.2). 
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More recently InvestorWeb have stated that their ratings 
focus more on qualitative assessment of asset management and less on 
either quantitative perfonnance or issues of company strength or 
administration. As far as possible they are intended to be forward looking 
rather than simply rewarding the best perfonners over the past twelve 
months (]nvestorWeb, 2002a, para.I). 
InvestorWeb is more unequivocal in what a higher star rating means for an 
investor. They have stated for example 
A SIX ST AR rating is the highest rating assigned to a fund and indicates 
that the fund rates exceptionally well on all criteria assessed and should 
provide returns well above that of the sector average over time 
(InvestorWeb, 2002b, para.3). 
3.5.2 Ratings Users - Managed Funds 
From a fund marketing perspective it may be argued that the use of ratings is 
part of the commodification of managed funds. That is, the marketing of funds as a 
complete product versus funds as a financial asset. As a product, managed funds 
offer a return, risk and a management structure and investment approach. Financial 
assets have been characterised predominantly by return and risk parameters in the 
finance literature when considering investor utility. Fund companies have an interest 
in broadening their perfonnance base from the two variables, which may fluctuate in 
the shorMenn. It could be argued that the inclusion of ratings that are based in part 
on assessments of maMgement structures and 'abi1ity' increases the range of 
measures that a fund can choose to promote their perfonnance or abi1ity. 
In much the same way as Jain & Wu (2000) found that funds may selectively 
use their perfonnance history, discussed in section 2.8.1, there is no obligation on a 
fund to include a rating, but given a high rating they would obviously be more 
inclined to use it. There is also a potential bias in the types of funds who invite the 
more detailed qualitative analysis, which has been discussed in section 2.9.2. It may 
also be advantageous for funds to have a number of ratings companies, which has 
been the experience for bond ratings as discussed in section 2.6.3. Individual 
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investor magazines have highlighted the difference in ratings that have arisen. For 
example in 200 I Colonial First State Managed Invesbnent Conservative Fund was 
rated a five-star by Morningstar but a three-star by Assirt (Zabos, 2001 ). 
3.5.3 Ratings Users - Investment Advisers 
From an agency perspective, ratings can be seen as a means of external 
justification. The use of perfonnance ratings may be based on ensuring that 
fiduciary obligations are most likely to be achieved or as a means of defending the 
actions and decisions of fund trustees when allocating funds and financial advisers 
when making recommendations. For example in Australia, section 851 of 
Corporations Law establishes a 'reasonable basis' test for financial advisers when 
making recommendations. Section 51 A of the Trade Practices Act similarly imposes 
a ''reasonable grounds" test when making representations. At common law, a duty to 
take care similarly imposes a "reasonable man" test on the basis of providing advice 
or making investments. These motivations are explored in greater detail in Chapter 4 
through a survey of financial advisers. 
3.5.4 Ratings Users - Individual Investors 
For individual investors ratings may be used as a complementary or sole 
source of managed fund infonnation. It could also be argued that the 'justification' 
reasoning applied to investment advisers could be extended to individual investors 
where perhaps a need for 'internal' justification can be argued. Even if this could be 
established it seems unreasonable to suggest that this would be the only reason for 
using rankings or ratings and further that this is independent of an expectation of 
increasing the likelihood of better performance by using them. To suggest otherwise 
is to imply it is better to have no expectation ofbetterperfonnance as long as there is 
some justification means for the investment decision. These motivations will be 
explored in further detail in Chapter 4 through the survey of a sample of individual 
investors. 
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3.S.S Ratings Paradox 
The apparent paradox in the role of credit rating agencies has been discussed 
in section 2.6.3.1. In the case of credit ratings Schwarcz (2001) suggested "rating 
agencies prosper based on their ability to acquire and retain reputational capital" 
(P•rtnoy, 2001, p.4). This reputation-based rationale was challenged by Partnoy 
(20fJI) who instead argued that the use of ratings by various regulations and 
authorities, a regulatory-licenses view. better explained the apparent importance of 
Cf{jdi"~ ratings. 
It is difficult to sustain a 11regulatory-licenses11 argument for the role that 
ratings play in Australia given that the have not played a role in legislation or 
prudential regulation. The role of ratings has however been advanced by their use in 
fund advertisements. Fund companies have been willing to incorporate good ratings 
from at least one company in advertisements. In tenns of this role it has been 
suggested that the willingness to use ratings in this manner has created 
a delightful opportunity for any business to build its profile at no cost -
adopt the tenn 'research house', ascribe high ratings to various fund 
managers, and find its brand featured in advertisements as an 
authoritative arbiter of quality investments (Keavney, 200 I, para. I I). 
There appear no substantial barriers to entry for a potential ratings entrant, a 
necessary condition for the "regulatory-licenses11 view. In the instance of credit 
ratings Partnoy (2001) has suggested that in the US various regulatory bodies have 
created barriers, with the most prominent being the creation of Nationally 
Recognised Statistical Ratings Organisations by the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission. 
The reputation-based argument is also difficult to sustain, as the ratings are 
recent phenomena in Australia. For example, Morningstar is in only its sixth year of 
quantitative ratings and fourth year for the broader qualitative ratings. Assirt 
commenced its ratings in 1994, though they have only become prominent in the 
media in the late 1990s, and lnvestorWeb only began in 1999. It is interesting to 
consider what will assist the ratings companies to accrue reputational capital. 
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The reputation that ratings companies seek to cultivate is somewhat 
ambiguous. On the one hand they are keen to promote themselves as the arbiter of 
good selection while at the same time they specifically disclaim any responsibility as 
to the consequences of poor performance should an investor use that information. 
For example, Assirt have claimed "the Stars measure ASSIRT's opinion of" the 
overall quality of a managed investment and the likelihood that the fund will achieve 
its investment objectives11 (ASSIRT, 2002b, para.2). At the sanie their disclaimer 
states that in respect of the data used, Assirt "has not verified it for currency or 
accuracy11 and further 11except to the extent required by law Assirt makes no 
representations or warranties as to its accuracy, timeliness [ emphasis added] or 
completeness" (ASSIRT, 2002a, para.1 ). Morningstar similarly provide the 
disclaimer 
Morningstar gives neither guarantee nor warranty nor makes any 
representation as to the correctness or completeness of the Morningstar 
infobase. Morningstar bases its data, ratings and commentary on 
infonnation disclosed to it by investment product providers and on past 
performance of products. Past performance is no guarantee of future 
perfonnance (Morningstar, 2000, p.2.1 ). 
Keavney (200 I) suggested that the growing importance of ratings could in 
part be explained by their simplicity. A large amount of infonnation distilled into a 
simple number of stars - simple indeed. It could be argued that the simpler the 
quality measurement, the greater its potential use for a wider market. The "keep it 
simple" approach appears the maxim focussed on when developing the ratings. 
It could also be suggested that the ratings companies have enjoyed a 
honeymoon period where equity markets have overall been positive. For example 
since Morningstar commenced its quantitative ratings the All Ordinaries Share Price 
Index has risen from 2230 in August 1996 to 3032 in July 2002.28 It must be readily 
acknowledged that over this time period there has also been considerable volatility 
with market falls of 294, 238 and 230 points in individual months.29 If ro1ling one, 
28 Source of all inde1t data is Datastream. 
29 October 1997, August 1998 and September 2001 respectively. 
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two and three-year windows are examined over this interval the honeymcon may be 
soon over. The largest one-year period fall, the only two-year period fall and the 
smallest three-year rise over this almost six-year period have all occurred in June and 
July 2002.30 It could be argued that users of ratings have been less concerned with 
the relativities of ratings and perfonnance in such rising markets. However if 
markets continue downwards, and over what are commonly used time periods in the 
industry when advertising performance, namely one, two and three-year periods, the 
focus may sharpen on the ratings and their providers. 
The issue of the cost of ratings has been raised as an industry issue in section 2.9.2. 
Morningstar charge the user of the rating, for example the fund oompany that uses a 
rating in advertisements. Assirt and InvestorWeb charge the fund company that asks 
for its funds to be rated and van Eyk does not charge the fund company to be rated. 
30 For the time period August 1996 to July 2002, the one-year period ended June 2002 had the largest 
drop in the All Ordinaries index of 262 points, The two-year period ended July 2002 had the only 
drop in the index of 181 points and the three-year period ended July 2002 also had the lowest rise in 
the index of96 points, 
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3.6 Ratings and Performance Link 
Ass~ have claimed their system would "help give some guidance as to which 
funds were likely to be among the better perfonners going forward, rather than 
leaving them to rely almost entirely on past perfonnance as a guide" (Hoyle, 1999, 
p.45), Morningstar stated that 0 It is Momingstar's conviction that a blend of 
qualitative and quantitative research is crucial in identifying quality [emphasis 
added] funds and fund managers" (Morningstar, 2000, p.1.1). 
If the fundamental motive for the provision of managed fund ratings is that 
they provide a guide to quality and the future perfonnance of the set of rated funds, 
they must enhance, or at least not detract from, the infonnation that is contained in 
the various perfonnance measures. Othetwise, why pay the money for them when 
perfonnance measures are much easier and cheaper to produce? As discussed in 
section 2.5.2, such a motive is not consistent with the definition of an efficient 
market by Fama (1970, 1991) but may be consistent with the less restrictive 
definition of Grossman & Stigli!z ( 1980). 
The question remains as to what is consistent with quality. Is a quality fund 
one that is highly rated because it is considered wel1 managed, with appropriate 
administration, decision processes and sector or industry experience but also one 
which continually underperforms appropriate benchmarks? The inference of the 
rating is an expectation of a positive correlation with future performance. As noted 
however in section 3.5.1 every ratings provider speCifically provides disclaimers 
against such an expectation. Morningstar does not claim suCh predictive information 
for ratings in its definition of quality. It is difficult to reconcile this view given the 
co11struction of the ratings, discussed in section 3.7.5. It is also difficult to reconcile 
given the increasing role of ratings in fund advertisements. At the financial adviser 
industry level this use has been alluded to 
Yet it can't be denied that much ofMorningstar's success has come from 
fund companies and investors misinterpreting or miscasting the stars as 
the·imprimatur, of quality and virtue ... Yet the industry is at least guilty, 
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for making high star ratings a staple of its ads, and for splashing their 
Web sites with copy noting the percentage of a fund's products have 
been "awarded" four or five stars. (Santoli, 2001~ p.FS). 
The Australian industry also appears to make the rating performance link. 
Following the introduction of their new six·star rating system, the chief executive of 
·lnvestorWeb stated that their ratings will "define the actual leaders, and the best 
funds" (Szollos, 2001, para.7). Commentators have suggested that "the star ratings 
supposedly give some insight into the future performance of the fund manager'' 
(Engel, 200Ib, para.3). Other commentators have made nonnative statements such 
as "quality research should be of predictive value, not merely a reporting of history." 
(Keavney, 2001, para.17). 
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3. 7 Ratings Construction and Meaning . 
Each of the four main ratings companies in Australia emphasise a 
quantitative/qualitative or backward/forward dichotomy in their rating process. As 
discussed in section 3.4, the qualitative emphasis is almost uniquely Australian. This 
section outlines the methodology employed by Morning.star, van Eyk, Assirt, and 
InvestorWeb with a particular emphasis on Morningstar who provide the greatest 
detail on the components and weightings used in determining a rating. It could be 
argued that van Eyk best articulate a distinctive philosophy in respect of constructing 
its rating however Morningstar remain the only ratings provider that readily provide 
a database of rating history, complete with the components to the overall rating. 
3.7.1 Generic Assessments and Rating Overview 
In section 3.5. l it was argued that the rating companies strongly attempt to 
differentiate and brand their ratings as much as possible in attempt to isolate their 
analysis methodology and create a proprietary claim to a rating. There are however 
generic elements to the various providers. At the broadest level this can be seen in 
the quantitative/qualitative or backward/forward components each employ. Within 
these broad components a range of generic sub-components can be identified which 
are invariably labelled distinctively by each company but in effect have many 
similarities. Each rating company combines three broad areas: investment 
management capability, historical perfonnance. and fund company capability. Table 
3.5 provides an overview of the major sub-components used by each of the four 
rating providers. It does not attempt to capture the intracies of each provider but 
rather an impression of the similarities and differences in ratings construction. Each 
rating company is then discussed with a fu1ler explanation of the methodology and 
construction. The order of discussion is in order of infonnation, lnvestorWeb 
provides the least amount and van Eyk and Morningstar with arguably the most 
detail. 
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Table 35 Overview of Rating Methodology and Process of Four Main Australian Ratings Providers 
This table provides an overview of the common factors considered by Australian rating companies as published by the rating company (Investor Web, n.d; ASSIRT, 2000b; 
van Eyk Research. 2001 b; Morningstar, l 999b ). The classifications aPPlied are subjective and kept to one generic factor though there are cases where a factor is suited to 
more th . " an one !.!enenc actor. 
Generic InvestorW eb Assut vanEyk Morningstar 
Component Factor Explanation Factor Explanation Factor Explanation Factor Explanation 
Investment Sector expertise Manager Decision making process, Expertise, experience, 
Expe,tise Capability research., investment Investment investment philosophy 
team & their risk Leadership and experience, Mana!.!ement and consisten-· 
management, investment =h. Specific sector 
process & its consistency Sector expertise 
Fund product ability to add value Stren~• 
&Fund Fund Costs MER and other Fund Issues Disclosure statements Fund product options 
Manager costs relative to Product Features 
Issues com.,..titors People and 
Performance Ability to meet Process Return Average quarterly 
Performance objective relative retums 
to competitors 
After fund interview and 
Average risk Average quarterly 
PMt Compared with standard deviation 
Risk/Return risk/retwn relative Performance benchmaxkof"likc assessment, performance is Downside risk Lowest average 
to competitors funds" considered in regards lauarterlv returns Implementation of Risk/Return Return for risk relative investment process to com,,,.titors 
Ago Restriction is age of 
fund less than 5 years 
Fund Size don't rate if fund Corporate Commercial strength 
Fund assets <$2m Assessment of Profitability, client service, Stren~th and structure of Parent 
Company Investment fund company Business staff retention. Information Administration Operational procedures, 
Issues Manager financial strength, system and DistnOUtion technology 
Strength administration 
Non-Generic Efficiency of Investment philosophy, 
Value Added aggressiveness of style, in 
context of expected 
investment climate 
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3.7.2 InvestorWeb 
The published infonnation on the methodology employed by InvestorWeb is 
descriptive rather than detailed. InvestWeb promote their approach as the 
lnvestorWeb Investment Research System ('AIRS') (lnvestorWeb, n.d.), a system 
that enables 'behind~the~scenes' research for investment professionals and 'front-end' 
output for retail investors. In rating a managed fund six factors are considered: 
investment management strength, investment expertise, perfonnance, risk/return, 
fund costs, and fund size. The fo11owing discussion of these factors is taken from 
(lnvestorWeb, n.d.). 
Investment management strength relates to the fund company and_ issues of 
financial stability, administrative capabilities as well as the fund manager(s) in tenns 
of overall qualifications and expertise. Investment expertise is more specifically the 
fund manager in charge of the individual fund rated and considers the ability to 
invest in the particular sector or asset classes. The perfonnance and risk/return 
factors are historical components. The perfonnance factor considers three-year 
perfonnance (returns) in view of the investment objective. The risk/return 
component is a relative consideration of fund return and risk considering average 
risks and return. The fund cost factor considers the management expense ratio and 
associated costs of investment for and investor. The fund size is in effect a threshold 
effect as only funds that have greater than $2 million of assets are considered by 
InvestorWeb. 
The assessment leads to six star ratings, one to six, though curiously there are 
two half ratings in the categories, as presented in Table 3.6. The rating categories 
explicitly identify a prediction in tenns of the level of returns that are expected to 
accrue to each rating level over time. 
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Table 3.6 InvestorWeb Ratings 
Rating Comment 
****** A SIX STAR rating is the highest rating assigned to a fund and indicates 
that the fund rates exceptionally well on all criteria assessed and should 
provide returns well above that of the sector average over time. 
***** A FIVE ST AR rating is the second highest rating assigned to a fund and 
indicates that the fund rates highly on all or most criteria assessed and 
should provide returns well above that of the sector average over time . 
A FOUR STAR rating indicates a superior fund that rates well in the •••• 
***Yl 
• 
majority of criteria assessed and is likely to outperfonn the sector average 
in the medium to longer tenn. 
A THREE AND A HALF STAR rating is given to a fund that does not 
have the required full 3 year perfonnance history necessary for a higher 
rating but rates well on all or most of the remaining criteria assessed. This 
rating is designed to identify those newer funds that show strong potential 
to outperform in the future. 
A TWO AND A HALF STAR rating indicates a fund that is rated in the 
median range either for the manager's strength, expertise or likely future 
perfonnance of the fund by lnvestorWeb's investment team. 
A ONE STAR rating indicates to investors that they should AVOID or 
REDEEM this fund as it rates poorly on all or most of lnvestorWeb's 
assessment criteria and as a result is not regarded as a sound investment. 
Source: InvestorWeb (2002h) 
3. 7.3 Asslrt 
Assirt attempt to help investors identify quality managers and provide, in 
respect of the fund, an assessment of "the likelihood that it will achieve its 
investment objectives" (Assirt, 2000b). The Assirt fund rating is comprised of three 
broad factors: manager capability. past performance and fund issues. The following 
discussion of these factors is taken from (Assirt, 2000b). 
Assirt identify investment management capability as the single most 
important factor and it is accordingly given a 55 percent weighting in the overall 
fund rating. It is assessed through the decision making process and its consistency. 
research, investment team and ability to "add value" (Assirt, 2000b). The 
performance component contributes 25 percent to the overall rating and is assessed 
over a five-year period relative to "like funds" factoring in both fees and taxes. The 
chosen benchmark relies on the actual asset allocation of the fund over a three- year 
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period, and also include fees and taxes. The third factor, with the lowest weighting 
of 20 percent, considers issues that overlap somewhat with the first factor. It 
examines both the suitability of the fund's disclosure statements and its continued 
adherence to them. For example the appropriateness of a fund's stated objective is 
considered in tenns of its measurability and adequacy in view of the stated decision 
process to achieve it. Further an assessment is l11ade of how well the _fund has 
adhered to its stated asset allocation. 
As discussed in section 3.4, Assirt adopted a star-based system of ratings in 
1999. The system has five stars plus a sixth "on-hold" category and is presented in 
Table 3.7. The ratings are less specific than InvestorWeb and van Eyk in terms of 
identifying expected returns of the various rated funds. 
Table 3.7 Assirt Ratings 
Rating 
••••• 
•••• 
... 
•• 
• 
Comment 
An excellent fund with very strong management, a comprehensive 
investment strategy and strong past performance. 
A very good fund with strong management, a sound invesbnent strategy 
and solid past perfonnance. 
A competently managed fund, but with either an unimpressive or limited 
perfonnance track record. Potential to improve exists. 
A fund with a weak investment management capability or strategy~ _and/or 
a poor or very limited performance track record. 
A poor quality fund with major weaknesses and/or issues affe'cting the 
funds management and perfonnance. 
On hold Issues potentially affecting the management of the fund have emerged. 
The rating is temporarily suspended, pending clarification. 
Source: ASSIRT {20001!) 
3.7.4 van Eyk Research 
van Eyk Research articulate a ratings philosophy that contains, quite 
appropriately given the importance of backward looking and forward looking 
components in the overall ratings industry; an underlying historical view of what 
they perceive ratings users have wanted and a judgement of what these users will 
require in ~he future. In respect of what users have wanted they argue 
Our clients look to us to provide them with a definitive view about 
manager's abilities, their comparative advantage and whether they: offer 
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investors value for money through their product pricing and after sales 
service (van Eyk Research, 2001a, Fund Manager Research, para.2). 
In respect of where they believe the industry is heading, they argue 
advisers/trustees and even retail investors will be increasingly looking for 
direct advice that is tailored to the investment climate ... This implies that 
fund managers will increasingly become subject to decisionwmaking 
processess similar to 'stock selection' decisions, with the 
consultants/advisers being the portfolio managers (van Eyk Research, 
2001a, para.12). 
The component that sets van Eyk apart from the other rating companies is the 
"efficiency of value added". They assess the expected return of a fund given the risk 
where the risk is not solely absolute risk but also relative risk. van Eyk identify six 
sector categories: cash, Australian fixed interest, international fixed interest, listed 
property, Australian equities, and international equities. Each sector category has a 
matching benchmark and level of absolute risk. The sector category is then assessed 
and matched to one of five activity categories: indexed, enhanced index, ]ow "alpha", 
high "alpha", specialist.31 This matrix of activity category and sectors has an 
estimate of expected returns before fees that is compared to the fees applicable to the 
particular sector. This in tum provides an assessment of which activity category is 
likely to cover the expected fees in the respective sectors. Thus the rating and 
recommendation considers not only the particular fund manager and fund company 
but also "the phases of the economic cyde that are ahead in the next one to five 
years" (van Eyk Research, 2001b). 
The van Eyk ratings process yield six categories presented in Table 3.8. 
These categories can be considered much more of a recommendation, than the other 
rating companies. The top AA rating was added in September 2000. van Eyk 
publish what they suggest is evidence that their "investment grade managers (AA & 
A rated) have typically delivered 24%pa better than the median manager, a top 
quartile outcome" (van Eyk Research, 2002a). In van Eyk Research (2002b) 
evidence is presented in support of their superior perfonnance claim. It must be 
31 An explanation of each sector and activity categories are provided in APPENDIX VII together with 
a explanation of benchmarks employed and absolute risk assessments. The use of alpha does not refer 
to any of the performance measures derived from Jensen {1968). 
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noted that superior performance was defined relative to the median fund in the 
universe of Australian Equity funds, and the S&P/ASX300 Accumulation Index. 
The perfonnance measures are therefore not risk-adjusted measures. The report 
identified that the A-rated funds had in fact a higher tracking error than the universe 
of funds which implies different risk exposures. It is commendable that van Eyk do 
acknowledge the issue of accountability and publish their results though better risk· 
adjusted measures, discussed in section 2.3, would be more meaningful. 
Table 3.8 van Eyk Ratings 
Rating 
AA 
A 
B 
H 
FW 
NR 
Comment 
Very high confidence of the manager adding value relative to competitors 
over a ful1 investment cycle (usually 3 - 5 years) within the guidelines 
specified by their investment style. Tracking error is actively controlled 
and the style should add value in most market conditions. Recommended 
Manager. 
High confidence of the manager adding value relative to competitors over a 
full investment cycle (usually 3 - 5 years) within the guidelines specified 
by their investment style. Tracking error is actively controlled, however, on 
a comparative basis there are some weakness in the process, people or 
organisation. Recommended Manager. 
There is less certainty that the manager would add some value over the full 
investment cycle. Alternatively, in our opinion this manager is not in the 
top quartile of managers due to a lower rating of some key aspects of their 
organisation. Average Manager. 
A manager under aspects of change. Keep under review, but do not add 
further funds. Hold. 
The fund has a poor risk return trade off and the ability to add value 
relative to competitors is difficult to discern. Alternatively there are 
problems, disruptions or uncertainties that could lead to poor investment 
returns in the future. Withdraw funds subject to review of costs of doing 
so. FundWatch. 
Not rated. 
Source: van Eyk Research (2001b) 
3.7.S Morningstar Ratings 
Morningstar promote strongly the requirement for both a qualitative (QL) and 
quantitative (QT) assessment of a fund, with an equal weight given to each. The QT 
rating uses historical return and risk inputs whereas the QL rating requires 
assessments of the fund company and individual fund managers. The QT rating 
requires relatively little infonnation from the fund company other than unit prices 
whereas the QL rating can only be detennined with the greater involvement and 
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commitment of the fund manager who may be invited to participate. Each managed 
fund can have a Star rating which in tum detennines the overall fund company 
rating. Given the role of Morningstar ratings in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, this section 
discusses in detail the components and construction of Morningstar ratings. 
3.7.5,1 QL Components 
Within the qualitative assessment there are five components that in tum have 
subcomponents and trend ratings. The following description of the components is 
takeo from the inside page of Morningstar (1999b), a pamphlet supplied with the 
TotalAccess CD. 
Corporate Strength contributes 25 percent of the QL rating and assesses the 
"commercial strength of a fund manager, its parent and marketing and distribution 
subsidiaries. and the quality of organisational structures and planning". 
Administration and Distribution contributes 22.5 percent and examines the 
"administration including technology, operational procedures, and investor and 
adviser services.". The Investment Management component also has a 22.5 percent 
weighting, and assesses '"the expertise, experience and stability of the fund 
manager's investment team, including whether there is a well-defined, consistently-
applied investment philosophy, style and process". The Sector Strength component 
contributes 20 percent and assesses effectively the same as for the Investment 
Management component but specifically in relation to the fund sector. The Product 
Features component contributes 10 percent and compares the product's features 
compared to standard practice in the subcategory 
In March 2002 Morningstar announced a change to their process of how they 
compile the rating. Morningstar will "switch from a vertical 'top down' analysis of a 
company's business and funds, to a horizontal approach across companies and funds" 
(Chee, 2002). Further the five QL componeots will now be reduced to two. The 
same five components will be examined but they will be now only be reported as two 
components. 
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3.7.5.2 QT Rating 
The QT rating is also comprised of five components, which have more 
objective inputs, relative to the QL components, which are in tum combined in a 
subjective weighting mix. Morningstar itself labels the process complex which 
perhaps understates the system. 
3. 7.5.2.1 Return Rating 
The Return Rating component rates '"the average quarterly returns of the fund 
over time compared to similar funds over the same time period" over a maximum 
period of five years. It uses rolling quarterly returns of up to, what it labels, 20 
Variable Length Reporting Periods (VLRP). For example the return rating for June 
2002 would use data from as far back as the quarter ended June 1997. VLRP-1 is the 
three months ending 30th June 2002 that involves one individual quarter. VLRP-2 is 
the six months ending 301h June 2002 contains 4 rolling quarters. That is, the three 
months ending 301h June 2002, the three months ending 31st May 2002, the three 
months ending 301h April 2002, and the three months ending 31 51 March 2002. 
Similarly VLRP-3 contains seven rolling quarters and VLRP-20 contains 58. The 
arithmetic average of these rolling quarterly returns is calculated for each VLRP and 
a decile ranking assigned for the fund within all funds in the Morningstar 
subcategory. For subcategories of ten or less products, the decile interval is 
determined by the spread of returns. For example, if the total range within the 
subcategory is 20 percentage points the first decile is zero to two percent and so on. 
With subcategories of more than ten products, the highest and lowest returns are not 
included when determining the decile intervals. There is not necessarily an equal 
number of funds in each decile. 
3. 7.5.2.2 Average Risk Rating 
The Average Risk Rating compares the standard deviation of the rolling 
quarterly returns over time of the fund compared with funds within the same 
subcategory for each VLRP. The same VLRPs are used as with the return rating. 
For VLRP-1 the standard deviation is calculated based on monthly return as there is 
only the one quarter. For each VLRP the arithmetic average of the standard 
deviations is used to assign a decile ranking as previously described. 
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3. 7.5.2.3 Downside Risk Rating 
A second risk component, the Downside Risk Rating, compares "average 
minimum returns of a fund over time'~ to other similar subcategory funds. This 
rating uses the average quarterly returns as calculated in the Return Rating. For each 
product within a subcategory, their lowest VLRP average quarterly return is taken. 
The lowest returns are then combined into one group and ranked into deciles. The 
Downside Risk Rating is equal to the deci1e ranking. 
3. 7.5.2.4 Risk Return Rating 
The Risk/Return Rating compares the risk and return trade-off of the fund 
relative to its peers. To detennine this rating, a risk/return calculation is perfonned 
for every VLRP by 
VLRP Risk Return= VLRP Average Return 
VLRP Standard Deviation 
As previously each VLRP number is then compared to others within a 
subcategory and ranked into deciles, the arithmetic average of the decile ranking is 
taken and the rounded number is the Risk Return Rating. 
3. 7.5.2.5 Age Rating 
The final, and absolute, component is an Age Rating. Older funds receive a 
higher rating due to "the more robust and reliable any statistical analysis on that 
fund's perfonnance". For each ha1f-year of operation the fund is awarded one point 
so that after five years in operation a maximum rating of ten can be achieved. A 
rating of ten means that a product's QT rating is not restricted. 
3. 7.5.2.6 Overall QT Rating Calculation 
The overall QT is determined by calculating the arithmetic average of the 
Return Rating, Average Risk Rating, Downside Risk Rating and Risk/Return Rating 
and comparing it with the Age Rating. If the Age Rating is lower this is the QT 
Rating though there is one final hurdle before a rating is assigned. 
The final check is a funds flow assessment. A fund will be classified as 
meeting a Stable Funds Flow criterion if: 
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I) inflows are positive over all of the most recent eight quarters ( calendar not 
rolling), or 
2) outflows are less than five percent of the product's net assets in at least six of the 
last eight quarters ( calendar not rolling). 
For funds with a history of less than two years the criteria must be met over 
the smaller time period which translates to a 66% benchmark being used for the 
second criterion above. If a fund does not meet these criteria the average of the four 
QT components excluding the Age Rating is reduced by one point. 
There is one final restriction for the QT rating applying to the Risk Rating. If 
the Return Rating is greater than seven and the Risk rating is lower than the Return 
rating, the Risk rating is removed from the final calculation. This is done " ... on the 
basis that the product has good performance relative to other products in the 
subcategory and any risk taken has resulted in upside performance (Morningstar, 
1999a). 
3.7.5.3 Product Q1 and Star Rating 
The Q2 Rating is dctennined by multiplying the QT by the QL rating. The 
maximum Q2 Rating is I 00. This number is then applied to a normal distribution to 
detennine the product Star Rating. The current bands are presented in Table 3.9. 
Table 3.9 Morningstar Star Ratings and Q2 Score 
Morningstar assign individual fund product ratings on the basis of the fund's Q2 rating which is the 
product of the QL and QT rating. This table presents the Q2 scores that corresponded with the star 
cateoories that a--lied as at AU"U.'-t 2000. 
Stars o.: score rPlluired 
••••• ;>; 62 
**** >49and<62 
••• ;>;36and<49 
•• > 23 and< 36 
• <23 
Source: Mommgstar (1999a) 
3. 7 .5.4 Company Star Rating 
The Company is also provided with an overall rating by averaging the <i 
rating of all the funds under control of the company, weighted by the fund size. In 
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section 6.1 and 6.2 a breakdown of the number of funds who have received the full 
star rating for the two major subcategories is presented. 
3.7.5.5 Rating Levels 
Morningstar employ five star rating levels, presented in Table 3.10, plus a 
rating temporarily suspended and not yet rated category. The definition of the 
category is most similar to that of Assirt presented in Table 3.7. However the key 
term used is 'quality' which remains undefined. The implication of the term will be 
addressed in section.4. 7. 
Table 3.10 Morningstar Rating Levels 
Stars Comment 
••••• An excellent 
•••• 
••• A 
•• A 
• 
RTS 
NR Not et rated 
Source: Morningstar (1999b). 
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3.8 Summary 
This chapter has summarised the growing importance of the managed fund 
sector of the Australian financial market, an experience similar to a number of 
overseas markets. A feature of the assets under management of this sector has b_een 
the increased importance of equity, both domestic and overseas. The three m3jor 
managed fund types are superannuation funds, life offices, and public unit trusts. A 
varlet}' of typologies can be used to examine the various managed fund products 
offered by these institutions. The Morningstar system of classification was used to 
outline the range and concentration of products. 
Accompanying this growth has been the growth of a managed fund research 
industry and in particular the growing prominence of managed fund ratings from four 
companies: Morningstar, van Eyk, Assirt and InvestorWeb. A review of the 
motivations of the providers and users of these ratings was discussed. In terms of the 
users of ratings, the importance of a future performance link with ratings was 
established within the financial adviser practitioner industry. 
The construction of ratings and the philosophies they reflect was discussed 
for the four rating companies. Notable in the review was a range of generic factors 
used to form ratings by each provider but inevitably with an attempt at some level of 
branding or identification made to particular companies. van Eyk ratings can be 
contrasted from the three other providers in that their ratings explicitly are made with 
a expeCtation of the future investment climate. 
The chapter concluded with the classifications of the major rating suppliers. 
These classifications differ in how explicit each is in terms of the recommendation or 
link with future perfonnance they contain. van Eyk and to a lesser degree 
InvestorWeb are explicit in their ratings as to an expectation of higher rated funds to 
outperfonn in the future. Assirt's rating definitions provide the weakest endorsement 
in tenns of future perfonnance. Morningstar's rating definitions are predictive but 
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use the term "quality" which remains undefined. Independent of how each company 
choose to portray their ratings is the question of how they are perceived by their 
users. This question wilt now be addressed in Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER4 
INVESTOR AND ADVISER SURVEY 
The rise of the Australian managed fund industry and the parallel 
deVelopment of a managed fund research industry, in particular its ratings output, has 
been chronicled in Chapter 3. The motivations of ratings providers and ratings users 
have been discussed in section 3.5. Managed fund investors and those who provide 
advice concerning managed fund investments are two clear target markets of 
research companies and ratings providers. 
The use, understanding, and role of managed fund ratings for these individual 
investors and financial advisers is however an unexplored area. This chapter 
presents an analysis of a survey. of a sample of these two groups. Individual 
investors are considered withi.n a wider consumer behaviour framework where the 
role of ratings can be assessed within infonnation source, selection criteria, and 
purchase constructs. Cluster analysis has been utilised to identify groups of investors 
in tenns of their information sources, what they employ as selection criteria, and 
what they consider should be included as ratings inputs. The hypothesis that 
investors value attributes other than expected risk and return when investing in a 
managed fund is evaluated with a particular focus on the utility investors of the 
rating that a managed fund product is awarded. 
Cluster analysis has also been used to identify groups of advisers in terms of 
the ratings inputs. Ratings use is considered in view of the inputs used by rating 
suppliers, discussed in section 3.7. Where possible, similar scales have been adopted 
to allow comparison with the limited U.S. evidence. The analysis here is more 
focussed on the role of ratings and is more extensive in examining performance 
criteria attributes that have been used as selection criteria. The analysis also extends 
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the previous work by examining the role of these performance criteria attributes in 
the use of the competing managed fund product ratings. 
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4.1 Hypotheses 
The increasing role of managed fund ratings, discussed in section 3.3, can 
been contrasted with their questionable value when considered within the modem 
portfolio theory and efficient finance markets paradigms offered by finance, 
discussed in section 2.8.3. In view of the wider consumer behaviour framework that 
suggests a potential role of mam1ged fund ratings, discussed in section 2. 7 .3, this 
chapter explores the following hypotheses through a survey of a sample of two of the 
major rating user groups. 
4.1.t Ratings Use 
Before the motivations or understanding of managed fund ratings can be 
explored it must first be established that the two major user groups use managed fund 
ratings. The increased use of ratings by managed funds and investment publications 
suggests that this is the case. Evidence on use will be obtained by asking 
respondents in both samples what ratings they had used and which rating brand they 
consider they rely on the most. Having identified the use of a particular rating brand 
the motivation for ratings use will be explored. Within the traditional finance 
framework, use of a fund rating can be reconciled to the extent that the rating is a 
proxy for expected return and risk. 
For individual investors, the Jiscussion in section 2.7, 2.8 and 3.5.4 suggested 
that a consumer behaviour framework where managed fund choice can be classified 
as a purchase, rather than an investment decision as in the traditional finance 
framework, may better explain the role of managed fund ratings. The first 
hypothesis to be explored in respect of individual use of managed fund ratings is 
Ho1: Fund ratings use can be explained within source, selection criteria 
and decision constructs. 
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Evidence will be obtained from the importance scores respondents place on a 
range of infonnation sources and possible selection criteria in respect of managed 
funds. Where possible the structure of these questions is informed by the survey 
employed by Capon et al. (1996) so as to facilitate comparison. Cluster analysis will 
be employed to examine the existence of specific groups of individual investors who 
differ in respect of their information source and selection criteria. In respect of a 
decision construct, respondents will be asked if they employ a minimum rating level 
when choosing a fund. 
For financial advisers the primary reason for using managed fund ratings, 
discussed in section 2.9.l and 3.5.3, was suggested to be the satisfaction of legislated 
and common law responsibilities. The hypothesis to be explored for financial 
advisers in tenns of managed fund rating use is 
Ho2: Financial advisers use managed fund ratings primarily to help 
satisfy external legal requirements 
Evidence will be obtained from a series of questions that ask respondents the 
main reason they use a rating, what they consider to be its main purpose and to what 
extent the rating is a component of their recommendations to clients. 
4.1.2 Ratings Understanding 
Use of a managed fund rating is guided by a level of expectation as to the 
information it provides. Given the number of rating suppliers, outlined in section 
3.4, who provide ratings with different emphasis and intent, some level of 
understanding must exist by a rating user to assist choice of which rating measure to 
rely on. Determining the level of understanding does not lend it itself to direct 
questioning as that can only be achieved by either relying on a self-assessment of 
respondent understanding or through questions which directly quiz information on 
rating construction which may appear more as a test of respondents. The following 
series of hypotheses will b~ used to examine rating understanding. 
155 
At a broad level, Australian rating _provid_ers have emphasised the overall 
qualitative and quantitative split in their ratings, which is largely absent in overse·as 
markets. In tenns of the us~rs of ratings it is again expected that ~ey undel'stand this 
split and choose a rating based on the ~phasis given to each component by ·the· 
respective rating suppliers. This suggests a supplementary hypotheSiS. tliat __ cari-be 
stated as 
Ho3: Users of each respective rating have a significant difference·in the 
overall quantitative and qualitative weighting they consider appropriate 
in a rating. 
Evidence will be obtained from the overall split respondents indicate that they 
consider appropriate and cross-tabulating this with the ratings respondents have used 
and the rating they rely on. 
Related to the previous hypothesis is the emphasis rating supplier's place on 
what they tenn as the forward-looking components of their rating. In respect of this 
Ho-,: The emphasis on forward-looking rating sub-·cornponents by rating 
suppliers is matched. by the impOrtance placed. on these siJb-components 
by rating users. 
Evidence will be obtained from the importance score given by respondents to 
a number of the identifiable forward-looking. sub-components, cross-tabulated with 
each rating measure. Understanding of ratings can also be exa'mined using· all rating 
sub-components used in rating construction. It is· again expected that- users of 
particular ratings have in·common the importance attached to these sub-components. 
The supplementary hypothesis in respect of these sub-components can be expressed 
as 
Hos: Choice of rating measure to rely on is guided by ·the importance 
attached to the rating sub-components. 
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Evidence will be obtained from cluster analysis of all sub-component 
importance scores to examine if distinguishable respondent clusters can be identified 
which in tum will be cross-tabulated with the rating that respondeitts rely on the 
most. 
The n~ll hypothesis in each of the hypotheses presented has argua.bly an 
optimistic bias . in that the expectation is of infonned use and· understanding. It is 
however nO more optimistic than the assumptions of the rational economic man 
discussed in section 2. 7 .2. 
4.2 Individual Investors and Financial Adviser Populations and Samples 
This section describes the individual investor and financial adviser 
populations from which the survey samples were drawn as a discussion of response 
rates. 
4.2.1 Individual Investors 
The population of individual managed fund investors covers 22 percent of 
Australian adults, excluding superannuation (Australian Stock Exchange, 2000). It 
reprtsents a difficult group to survey as the only available database of such investors 
includes current investors as well as those who have illdicated an intention to invest 
in a managed fund. The primary objective of the current survey was to examine the 
role of ratings in Previous investments and therefore this database was not suitable. 
A secondary objective of the survey was to target a group of investors who 
were more likely to be a better infonned or educated investor, similar to the educated 
group used by Goctzmann & Peles ( 1997), as it could be argued that this group 
would have a better understanding of the managed fund ratings. While no managed 
fund investor association exists in Australia, shareholder groups do and the peak 
shareholder body in Australia is the Australian Shareholder Association (ASA). 
While not all members of the Association could ·be assumed to invest in managed 
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funds, those that did would more likely represent a more active and informed 
investor to survey. The ASA was approached and agreed to distribute a survey. The 
covering letter of the survey specifically asked the member to complete the survey 
only if they had current managed fund investments or had previously invested in 
managed funds. 
The investor survey was distributed to 2,400 members of the ASA and 
attracted 270 responses. Six surveys were returned with covering letters indicating 
that the survey did not apply to them and a further six surveys were not useable 
leaving 258 useable surveys. It is difficult to detennine a response rate for the 
available sample of managed fund investors given that a proportion of those who 
received the surv·-~ d were not eligible to complete it. As a guide the survey 
conducted by Australian Stock Exchange (2000) indicated that 40.6 percent of 
Australian adults owned shares directly. Of those who owned shares directly, 61.8 
percent also owned shares indirectly through managed funds and superannuation. If 
this proportion is mirrored in the ASA, the returned surveys represent an 18.2 percent 
response rate. It could be argued that members of the ASA are more likely to have 
direct investments and therefore the estimated response rate is understated. 
Throughout this chapter this sample is referred to as the Investor sample. 
4.2.2 Financial Advisers 
Apart from individual investors, the other main target-market for managed 
fund ratings is those providing financial advice or guidance. The dominant providers 
of financial advice in Australia, and the dominant intended source for those seeking 
financial advice, are financial planners (Roy Morgan Research, 2000). The main 
indu-stry body for financial planners in Australia is the Financial Planning 
Association (FPA) who have over 12,000 members (Financial Planning Association, 
2000). The FPA was approached and agreed to provide a mailing list to enable a 
survey of their members. Throughout this chapter this sample will be referred to as 
the Adviser sample. 
\,.' 
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The clients of financial advisers potentially provide a quite different sample 
of investors to the arguably more "infonned" group of ASA members and as an 
indirect means of assessing how these investors viewed ratincs, the advisers wer~ 
questioned as to their perceptions of their clients familiarity of the ratings. The 
clieitts of financial advisers represent a distinct group of individual investors who 
have indicated a requirement for professional assistance. Given the nature of 
available databases, as discussed, this group also represents a difficult group to 
survey. Obtaining client lists of a single financial adviser, let alone a representative 
sample of financial advisers, raised client confidentiality and commercial issues that 
were not able to be resolved. 
As an indirect means of assessing the use of ratings by this group of 
investors, the financial advisers were asked a series of questions about their clients. 
Such an approach is open to the valid criticism that it obtains the financial adviser's 
perceptions of their client's behaviour or reported attitudes. While accepting this 
criticism, these perceptions are still of interest to examine in their own right. 
Throughout this chapter this group will be referred to as Clients. 
The survey was mailed to a random sample of 1,940 FPA members, 
excluding student and affiliate members, as they were not practising advisers. Six 
surveys were returned due to wrong address and four were returned indicating that 
the survey instrument could not be completed, which reduced the sample size to· 
1930. A total of 441 surveys were returned completed, however four were not 
useable. This represents an excellent response rate of22.8 percent. 
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4.3 Survey Construction 
The survey distributed to the Investor sample and Adviser sample had a 
common core of que5tions on the role of ratings in the investment and 
recommendation decision processes respectively. This section provides an overview 
of the construction of both surveys. 
4.3.1 Investor 
The Investor sutvey, presented in Appendix I, contained five sections. The 
first section sought infonnation on the role of managed investments within the 
investment portfolio of the respondent. It also sought infonnation on the managed 
fund most recently invested in by the respondent, the infonnation sources used and 
the selection criteria employed. This section relates directly to hypothesis one of 
rating use by individual investors. The section allows comparisons to be made with 
the wider Australian adult investor population. 
The second section focussed on how the respondents assessed the 
perfonnance of managed funds and specifically how risks and overall perfonnance 
were measured. This section was primarily exploratory in terms of identifying how 
individual investors defined and assessed performance, that is in tenns of return and 
risk, of a managed fund. This infonnation also aUows comparison with the 
perfonnance measures used in rating construction. 
The third section focussed specifically on managed fund ratings, the role they 
played for respondents and what inputs were considered import8llt in their 
construction. This section relates specifically to hypotheses three, four and five. 
The fourth section was both exploratory and arguably the most innovative as 
it sought to quantify the tradeoffs that may be made when investing in managed 
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funds, outside of the expected risk and return tradeoff. This section specifically 
attempted to quantify the value an individual investor may place on a managed fund 
attribute including a managed fund rating. The final section sought respondent 
demographics that, as with the first section, allows comparisons with the wider 
Australian adult investor population. 
The Investor survey was piloted with both a small sample of individual 
investors plus the Executive Officer of the Australian Shareholder Association 
(ASA) given that the members of the ASA comprised the sample. The pilot survey 
raised two key areas that required clarification in the final survey. 
The first area concerned questions that required an indication of a primary 
motivation or purpose and hence only one response. It was considered that the 
wording was not clear enough to avoid multiple responses and therefore both the 
wording and appearance of these questions were changed in the final survey. 
The second area was a requirement for further clarification between rankings 
and ratings. That is the difference between solely perfonnance based measures such 
as the top quartile ranking based on three-year returns as against the broader star 
ratings or component ratings. A specific example was constructed, trialed, and then 
included in the final survey to highlight the difference. This example precedes 
question 20 of the survey that is presented in Appendix I. The final survey was 
distributed in July 2001. 
4.3.2 Adviser 
The Adviser survey instrument, present~ in Appendix II, contained five 
sections. The first section sought information as to the current employment of the 
adviser, the size of investments that they managed, and the type of investments that 
they placed for clients. This data allows for a comparison with industry data to 
ensure the representativeness of the sample. The second section sought infonnation 
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on what research companies the adviser utilised and an assessment of the importance 
of ratings in their decision making. This section specifically provides evidence to 
examine hypothesis two relating to ratings use. 
The third section focussed on managed fund ratings only and assessments of 
the range of inputs used in their construction. This section provides evidence for the 
hypothesis three, four and five concerning rating understanding. The fourth section 
sought adviser's impressions of how their clients made investment decisions and of 
their clients use of ratings. This section complements the Investor survey 
information. The final section sought various adviser demographics. 
The survey was constructed and piloted in January 2001 with six individual 
advisers who were sent the survey and then agreed to interviews to discuss areas of 
the survey that required clarification. The survey was also submitted to the CEO of 
the Financial Planning Association (FPA) as the association had agreed to distribute 
the survey to their members. Two areas were raised that were addressed in the final 
survey. 
Neither area of concern related to the content of the questions but rather their 
pr".sentation. The first was the distinction between rankings and ratings. as discussed 
for the Investor survey. This was similarly resolved through the inclusion of a 
specific example that demonstrated the difference between the two.· This example 
precedes question 12 of the survey that is presented in APPENDIX II. 
The second area was the grouping of questions relatihg to adviser's clients. It 
was felt that separating the questions into sections that solely related to themselves, 
that is the adviser, and solely to the financial adviser's clients best resolved any 
confusion over whom the questions related to. The final survey was distributed in 
May 2001 complete with a self-addressed reply envelope. 
162 
4.4 Overview of Samples 
This section compares the profile of respondents compared with the broader 
investor population, for the Investor sample, and the professional body, for the 
Adviser sample. 
4.4.1 Investors 
The Investor sample mean (median) investment in managed funds was $273,254 
($145,000), invested in 5.4 (4) separate fund products. These investments 
represented a mean (median) 28.9 (25.0) percent of respondent total investments of 
which the mean (median) component related to superannuation was 41.9 (30.0) 
percent. The mean (median) sum most recently invested in a managed fund was 
$46,986 ($20,000). The Australian Stock Exchange (2000) survey reported that 
superannuation and managed funds represented 40 percent of total investments with 
superannuation accounting for 87 .5 percent of this, for the Australian adult 
population. The taxable income of the sample is skewed with a mean range of 
$60,001 to $80,000 with more than 17 percent having taxable incomes greater than 
$120,000. Males (82.5 percent) and more mature investors with a mean (median) 
age of 63 (64) years dominate the sample. Table 4.1 indicates that the sample is a 
welt educated group with 44.9 percent having completed a University degree. The 
survey by Australian Stock Exchange (2000) does not allow direct comparisons of 
education for general shareholders as it reports incidence of investment ownership by 
individual demographic rather than across their sample. 
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Table 4.1 Investor Respondents Highest Education Level 
This table reports the highest education level obtained by respondents in the Investor sample. 
Investors were asked to indicate one only. 
Secondary 
University([ AFE Diploma 
Undergraduate Degree 
Postgraduate Degree 
Total answered 
Not answered 
Frequency 
56 (22.9) 
79 (32.2) 
44 (18.0) 
66 (26.9) 
245 (100.0) 
13 
258 
Consistent with the argument that members of associations such as the ASA 
are more financially aware, 31.6 percent of respondents assessed themselves to have 
above average ability to make financial decisions with 62.5 percent considering their 
ability average. Only 5.9 percent considered themselves to have below average 
ability. It is difficult to obtain comparative statistics for the wider investor or 
potential investor community. The Australian Securities & Investments Commission 
(2000b) discussion paper of the education requirements of consumers for financial 
services noted that a number of imperfections existed for individual investors 
including "inadequate investor infonnation and an imbalance of knowledge between 
investors and advisers" (Australian Securities & Investments CommisSion, 2000b, 
p.7). The paper also reported on a literacy skills survey conducted )>y the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics in 1996. The survey did not directly survey financial literacy, but 
it did include quantitative literacy skills. The survey found that 48 percent of 
Australians aged 15-74 had poor to very poor literacy skills. 
In summary the respondents of the Investor survey would appear to be the 
better informed investor group intended. By size of investments, the sample is 
,-
different to the general population with considerably more invested and higher 
income levels. 
To explore the motivations for investing in managed funds a series of 
questions were presented with reference to the managed fund product that the 
respondent most recently invested in. Table 4.2 indicates that the majority of these 
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were in equity, growth fund products split approximately equally between domestic 
and overseas and predominantly in non-superannuation products. 
Table 4.2 Most recent managed fund product invesied in - Investors 
This table indicates the main characteristics of the managed fund that the individual investor had 
invested in. Investors were given each of the categories and asked to select one of each that described 
their last managed fund. The purpose of the question was to examine the familiarity of respondents 
with their managed fund investments and to allow a comparison to the respondents Ul Capon et al. 
1996. 
Asset Class n(%) Style n(%) Investment n(%) Tax n(%) 
Sector Cate o 
Cash.!Fixed Interest 5 (2.1) Growth 133 (57.6) Domestic 97 (40.8) Super 70 (29.9) 
Equity 156 (65.S) Value 32 (13.9) Overseas 87 (36.6) Non-Super 155 (66.2) 
Property 13 (5.5) Balanced 56 (24.2) Balanced 56 (24.2) Don't know 9 (3.8) 
Diversified 61 (25.6) Don'! know IO (4.3) Don't know IO (4.3) 
Don't know 3 (1.3) 
Total Answered 238 (100) 231(100) 238 (100) 234 (100) 
Not answered 20 27 20 24 
Total 258 258 258 258 
The low proportion of respondents answering .. don't know", even allowing 
for those not answering the question at all, again confinns the suggestion of a well-
infonned group. This contrasts with the sample of Capon et al. (1996) where a large 
proportion of investors were reported as uninfonned about their investments. In that 
survey 39 percent did not know the type of fund they were invested in, 72 percent did 
not know the fund investment objective, and 75 percent did not know of the 
management style. As the current survey was however a mailout. it was possible for 
respondents to consult their records, which was not readily available for the phone 
survey of Capon et al. (1996). 
Investments in a managed fund provide services beyond those an investor can 
obtain through direct investment in equity. The major focus of the analysis in 
Chapter '5 and Chapter 6 is in the relationship between ratings and subsequent 
performance. The extent to which investors may be purchasing non-return based 
services needs to be assessed particularly if the ratings may attempt to capture these. 
Respondents were asked to score the importance32 of six factors, which may attract 
indirect rather than direct investment. Table 4.3 suggests that the two most important 
motivations for investing in a managed fund, rather than a direct investment, were 
n All questions requiring an importance score indicated on a five-step scale of one (five) for low 
(high) importance. 
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those unique to fund products ~ the investment skill of management and the exposure 
to a greater number of investments. The latter relates to the ability through pooling 
of investment dollars through a managed fund that allows exposure to a larger 
number of investments rather than direct diversification benefits. 
Table4.3 Importance of Factors: Managed Fund versus Direct Shares 
Respondents scored importance of each of the factors on a one (low) to five (high) scale in response to 
the question "When you chose your last managed fund product how important were the following in 
choosing a managed fund rather than making a direct investment yourself!", The table below 
indicates the percentage of respondents indicating each score as well as the overall mean score. 
Access to management skill (n=245) 
Exposure to greater number of investments (n=246) 
Higher possible return (n=237) 
Ease of administration (n=241) 
Lower possible risk (n=238) 
Cost of investing (n=239) 
Low 2 3 4 High Mean 
1 5 
1.6 3.3 13.1 32.7 49.4 
4.5 3.7 12.2 35.4 44.3 
3.0 6.3 24.5 32.5 33.8 
11.6 11.6 21.2 30.3 25.3 
10.1 18.9 32.4 22.3 16.4 
19.7 18.4 22.6 20.1 19.2 
4.3 
4.1 
3.9 
3.5 
3.2 
3.0 
The return and risk, which are the classic attributes of financial assets, can be 
considered direct performance measures. Access to skill and the cost of investing can 
be considered indirect perfonnance measures. Ease of administration could also be 
viewed as an indirect perfonnance attribute as return for an investor includes the cost 
of administrating their investments. 
4.4.2 Financial Advisers 
Table 4.4 presents a breakdown of the sample respondents and the 
corresponding population of the FP A. The sample breakdown is comparable to that 
of the FPA membership though there is a higher representation of Senior Associates 
and lower representation of Certified Financial Planners. 
Table4.4 Sample and FPA Membership Profile 
Advisers were asked to identify their FPA membership level which is reported in the second column. 
The first column represents the membership breakdown reported in Financial Planning Association 
(2000). The Associate level is the lowest level and is open to individuals who had completed at least 
one unit of the Diploma of Financial Planning. Each subsequent level is detennined by education 
level and experience in the industry. 
Membership Level FPA (percent) 
Associate 1551 (31.6) 
Senior Associate 169 (3.4) 
Certified Financial Planner 2670 (54.5) 
Principal 513 (10.5) 
Survey (percent) 
142 (33.2) 
33 (7.7) 
202 (48.2) 
49(11.4) 
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Males heavily dominate the financial planning industry and the survey 
reflects this with only 8.3 percent of respondents female. The average adviser in the 
sample was 48 yews of age and had approximately 14 years of financial advice 
experience. The financial planning industry is undergoing a major change in 
education and the sample profile reflects this. More than 31 percent of the sample's 
highest education level, reported in Table 4.5, was at least one unit of the Diploma of 
Financial Planning (DFP) offered through the FPA, or equivalent. The minimum 
requirement for an adviser to act as an Authorised Represente.thre of a licensed 
Principal. as the time of the survey was completion of the first unit of the DFP. 
However the passage of the Financial Services Reform Act 2001, which commenced 
on 11 1h March 2002, has increased the generic and specific education requirements of 
Authorised representatives. 
The average adviser had $45 miUion funds under management and had placed 
over $8.6 million funds in the 2000 calendar year, Managed funds were the 
dominant vehicle through which advisers placed investments for their clients, 
representing over 76 percent of investments placed. Only eight percent of 
investments in the 2000 calendar year were direct investments in shares, with half of 
the advisers investing less than four percent directly in shares. More than 66 percent 
of investments were placed for superannuation or allocated pension purposes. A 
summary of these statistics is presented in 
Table 4.6. 
Table4.5 Adviser Highest Educational Level 
The table summarises the highest education level obtained by an Adviser. The Financial Services 
Reform Act 2001 that commenced in March 2002 introduced greater fonnal education requirements 
for individuals wanting to be classified a.'I an authorised representative provide The DFP 1-8 refers to 
the eight units in the Diploma ofFinancia! Planning which is one the primary 
Diploma 
Some, but not all ofDFP 1-8 
Undergraduate Degree 
Postgraduate Degree 
Total answered 
Not answered 
Total 
Frequency (percent) 
t55 (35.6) 
135 (31.0) 
78 (17.9) 
67 (t5.4) 
435 (100.0) 
6 
441 
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Table4.6 Adviser Characteristics 
This table presents a summary of the size and main area of investment activity of the Adviser sample. 
The purpose of obtaining this infonnation was to establish the level of use of managed funds and 
familiarit . 
How many years have you been employed providing financial advice 
(n=419) 
What were your individual funds under management for the year ended 
30/12/2000? ($millions, n=399) 
What were your individual, total investments placed for clients for the year 
ended 30/12/2000? ($millions, n=384) 
For the year ended 30/12/2000 what proportion (percent) of investments 
placed went to: (n=419) 
Direct Shares 
Managed Funds 
Direct Property 
Short Term Fixed Interest 
Other 
For the year ended 30/12/2000 what proportion of investments placed went 
to: (n=414) 
Superannuation & Rollover 
Allocated Pension 
Non-superannuation 
Mean Median 
13.75 14.00 
45.72 28.00 
8.63 5.00 
8.81 3.50 
76.44 80.00 
1.21 0.00 
10.37 10.00 
3.38 0.00 
42.40 40.00 
23.43 20.00 
34.05 30.00 
The Adviser sample was evenly split between those who either themselves or 
their principal could offer 'independent' advice (52.8 percent), as defined by ASIC PS 
116, and those who could not (47.2 percent). The majority of advisers (69.1 percent) 
were restricted in the rrfanaged fund products that they could recommend to their 
clients. Of this group the majority (73.1 percent) were restricted to a list of funds 
that were nominated by their employer, with the remainder restricted to the products 
of their employi~/dealer group. 
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4.5 Information Sources and Selection Criteria 
A consumer behaviour framewllrk for analysing durable good purchase 
decisions, that has also been used for the managed fund investme.nt decision as 
discussed in section 2.7.2 and section 2.8.4, identifies three major constructs: 
information sources, selection criteria, and purchase. This section reviews these 
constructs for individual investors in managed funds. 
4.5.t Investor Information Sources 
Given the lack of quality infonnation available from the fund themselves 
relating to performance, as discussed in section 2.8.1, respondents were asked the 
importance of a range of third-party information sources in addition to fund 
advertisements. Table 4. 7 presents the results together with a comparison to mean 
scores from Capon et al. {1996). The results are broadly consistent in that published 
ratings/rankings had the highest score and each other infonnation source was scored 
less than three, except the importance of advertisements which have a much lower 
importance score in the current survey. While ratings/rankings had the highest score 
it was much lower than Capon et al. (1996). 
Table 4.7 Information Source Importance For Investors 
Respondents scored importance of each of the following infonnation sources on a one (low) to five 
{high) scale in the context of the managed fund they most recently invested in. The table below 
indicates the percentage of respondents indicating each score as well as the overall mean score. The 
bracketed mean values, in the final column, are the corresponding scores from Capon et al. (1996) 
survey where the same five-step scale was used with one "not at all important" and five "extremely 
important". "I" and "P'' represent impersonal and personal source classifications respectively from 
the same survey. All mean values are sigpificantly different at least at a 95% confidence level from a 
score ofthree. 
Low 2 3 4 High Mean 
1 5 
Published fund ratings/rankings (I) (n=240) 15.4 5.8 25.8 30.0 22.9 3.4 (4.57) 
Magazine/paper investment articles (1) (n=240) 30.4 10.0 24.2 21.7 13.8 2.8 
Financial adviser recommendation (P) (n=239) 42.7 6.3 10.5 16.7 23.8 2.7 (I.34) 
Investment books (I) (n=232) 51.3 12.1 19 12.5 5.2 2.1 (1.17) 
Fund advertisements (I) (n=234) 61.l 17.9 11.1 5.6 4.3 1.7 (3.13) 
Recommendations of family/friends (P) (n=230) 74.3 9.6 7.8 5.7 2.6 1.5 (1.74) 
Investment 2rogramme on television {Q !n=230} 78.3 8.3 8.7 3.9 0.9 1.4 
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4.5.2 Investor Selection Criteria. 
Table 4.8 prciSents the importance scores for a range of specific selection 
·criteria that individual investors could-use for a managed fuil.d investment decision. 
' . . ' ... 
When it came to choosing a particular fund product, the rating or ranking of the fund 
product was important but the reputation of the backing fund or coffipany and the 
investment objective were clearly the most important factors, with almost half of 
respondents indicating these the highest importan~e score. The role of finance 
professionals as infonnation sources generally and in making the. choice of fund 
product were somewhat bi-modal. Whilst overall they both rated Significantly less 
than a score of three, 23.8 percent and 25.3 percent scored their recommendation 
with the highest importance as a source of infonnation and in the actual choice of the 
fund product respectively. 
Overall, the results are comparable with Capon et al. (1996) except for the 
increased importance of management fees in the current survey. Whilst .the 
importance of features of the fund product are significantly different between the 
surveys, the criteria may be better compared with the "scope of fund" criteria in the 
Capon et al. (1996) survey which has a similar score. 
The emI)hasis on reputation is interesting given the findings of Shefrin & 
Statman (1997) who, using the annual survey of U.S. company reputation published 
by Fortune Magazine, found that reputation was inversely related to the book-to-
market ratio. Given the predictive power of book-to-market values, this suggests that 
the high (low) reputation ranked companies were over,(under)-priced. De Bandt 
(1998) used this as an example of one of four behav!,oural anomalies "perception of 
value", outlined in section 2. 7 .2, where perceptions of valu~ depend on popular 
models such as the reputation survey. 
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Table 4.8 Importance of Selection Criteria to Investors 
Respondents scored importance of each of the following selection criteria when they made their most 
recent managed fund investment on a one (low) to five (high) scale. The table below indicates the 
percentage of respondents indicating each score as well as the overall mean score. The bracketed 
mean values in the final column are the corresponding scores from Capon et al. (1996) survey where 
the same five.step scale was used with one "not at all important" and five "e:dremely important". All 
mean values are significantly different at the 95% confidence level from a score of three except 
professional recommendation. 
Low 2 3 4 High Mean 
I 5 
Reputation of backing company/fund (n=239) 1.2 1.7 6.6 40.9 49.6 4.4 (4.62) 
Investment objective of fund product (n=242) 0.4 1.2 9.4 41.4 47.5 4.3 
The specific manager(s) of the fund (n=244) 8.8 7.1 13.0 31.0 40.2 3.9 
Fund product perfonnance history (n=238) 6.3 5.5 18.1 34.9 35.3 3.9 (4.00) 
Features or fund product (n=235) 6.7 7.1 22.7 37.4 26.1 3.7 (1.38)' 
Fund product ratings/rankings (n=237) 7.7 9.0 21.8 34.6 26.9 3.6 
The level of entry/exit fees (n=239} 8.9 17.3 23.2 22.8 27.8 3.4 
The annual management foes (n=241) 10.0 15.9 20.9 29.3 23.8 3.4 (2.28) 
Professional recommendation (n=238) 33.2 12.0 12.4 17.0 25.3 2.9 
Fund ,eroduct customer relations (n=234) 21.3 23.0 29.8 14.9 I I.I 2.7 (2.30)' 
• Capon et al. {J 996) had an extra criteria "scope, number of funds in family" that had a 3.94 score 
b Capon et al. { 1996) used the expression "responsivenes.~ to enquiries" 
4.5.3 Financial Adviser Information Sources 
In terms of the managed fund research that advisers used, Table 4.9, indicates 
that less than seven percent of advisers relied on research produced solely in-house 
by their employer/dealer group. More than 27 percent of advisers relied solely on 
external research groups, whether they accessed this themselves or through their 
employer/dealer group. The majority of advisers relied on a mixture of external 
research groups and their employer/dealer group for the research. 
Table 4.9 Managed Fund Research Used by Advisers 
This table summarises where the Adviser sample received their managed fund research. The survey 
asked the respondent which of the list of source types did they rely on for their research. Respondents 
indicated onC source only and were able to indicate other source types than on the list. 
Your employer/dealer group, produced in-house and external research companies 
Your employer/dealer group, accessed solely from external research companies 
Yourself, using a number of research companies 
Your employer/dealer group, produced solely in-house 
Don't know 
Other 
Total Answered 
Not Answered 
Frequency 
278 (64.5) 
86 (20.0) 
32 (7.4) 
29 (6.7) 
2 (0.5) 
4 (0.9) 
431 (100.0) 
10 
441 
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Table 4.10 provides a summary of which research groups were utilised by 
advisers when they did use external research sources, as well as which research they 
considered they relied on the most. In the current sample, Morningstar is clearly the 
most widely used research group as well as the most relied on. The 33.2 percent of 
advisers who indicated that they relied on Morningstar research the most is almost 
twice the next two groups, Assirt and van Eyk, combined. 
Table 4.10 Research Companies Used by Advisers 
This table examines the specific company that the respondent obtained managed fund research from. 
The first column in this table identifies all sources of research that respondenL'I used and more than 
one response was allowed and therefore the column does not add to 100 percent. The second column 
identifies the research source most relied on. and totals to 100 percenL 
Morningstar 
van Eyk 
Assirt 
FPI 
Investor Web 
Lonsdale 
In tech 
Other 
Total answered 
Not answered 
Total 
Use (percent) Relied on most \percent) 
266(63.9) 120(33.2) 
235(56.6) 64(17.7) 
221(53.3) 64(17.7) 
111(26.7) 48(13.3) 
61(14.7) 11(3.0) 
56(13.5) 26(7.2) 
30(7.2) 2(0.6) 
47(11.3) 26(7.2) 
415 361 (100.0) 
26 54 
441 415 
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4.6 Risk and Return Balance and Definitions 
The various ratings incorporate wider definitions of risk than traditional 
finance has employed. The use of standard deviation as a measure of risk is 
identified strongly with Markowitz. though Markowitz had discussed six measures of 
risk which he assessed on the basis of a single stage utility function (Markowitz, 
1970, p.294). The specific utility function he argued. of itself ruled out a maximum 
loss measure of risk, and further concluded that •"portfolios selected on the basis of 
expected loss, expected absolute deviate, or probability of loss are not to be trusted" 
(Markowitz, 1970, p.297). In section 2.7.2 a range of utility functions were 
considered that included relative perfonnance or relative risk measures. 
The construction of ratings includes a similarly wide range of risk measures. 
Apart from the individual measure5t the context of perfonnance assessment for 
assigning ratings is a key distinguishing feature of each ratings measure. The top four 
ratings groups are quite different in their choice of perfonnance comparison, as 
discussed in section 3.7. This section explores how the Investor and Client groups 
measured perfonnance. 
4.6.1 Individual Investors - Performance Measurement 
The Investor sample was asked to score the importance of three measures 
when they assessed the risk of a fund product. Table 4.11 indicates that the overall 
variability of retum5t consistent with the standard deviation measure of risk, 
achieved the lowest rating score. The two highest scores were for the downside risk 
measure of the likelihood of losing money and the likelihood of not meeting the 
investment objectives of the respondent. The latter measure is a 'dependant' 
measure of risk as it is assessed within the context of the investor's objectives 
whereas the other two measures depend only on the perfonnance of the managed 
fund itself, independent of the investor. The demographics of the sample must be 
borne in mind when considering these results, in partic;ular that the median age of the 
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respondents was 64 and for half of the respondents, thirty percent of their investment 
in managed funds was for superannuation. 
Table 4.11 Importance of Factors to Inveliiltors When Assessing Risk 
The Investor sample was asked to score the importance of each of the following potential risk factors 
on a one (low) to five (high) scale. The table below indicates the percentage ofr~pondents indicating 
each score as well as the overall mean score. All mean values are significantly different at a 95% 
confidence level from a score of three. 
Factor (n-number responding) 
Likelihood of losing money on investment (n-248) 
Likelihood of meeting/not meeting your investment 
objectives (n=251) 
Variability of returns (n=252) 
Mean 
4.2 
4.1 
3.3 
Std.Dev 
1.04 
0.93 
1.16 
When considering perfonnance more broadly, Table 4.12 indicates that the 
highest importance was again attached to the objectives of the respondents. The 
importances of the other factors reported in the table are broadly consistent with the 
ratings procedure. Managed fund ratings are determined within the context of related 
funds and therefore the perfonnance inputs are relative to similar funds, where the 
similarity is largely determined by the stated objective of the fund. However while 
the stated objective of the fund is the basis for how the funds are grouped, it is not 
considered explicitly in assessment of perfonnance thereafter. If funds do have 
comparable objectives, the relative perfonnance assessment by the ratings companies 
implicitly provides consideration of the relative achievement of the stated objective 
of the fund. The extent to which a fund's classification itself can be relied on 
however has been questioned, most recently by Potter (2001 ). 
Table 4.12 Importance of Factors to Investors in Assessing Performance 
The Investor sample was asked to score the importance of each of the following factors when they 
considered the overall perfonnance of a managed fund. Respondents indicated the importance of each 
factor on a one (low importance) to five (high importance) scale. All mean values are significantly 
different al a 95% confidence level from a score of three. 
Factor (n=number responding) 
Your own investment objectives (n-249) 
The stated objectives of the fund (n=245) 
Perfonnance of similar funds (n=248) 
Perfonnance of the whole market (n=252) 
Mean 
4.31 
4.12 
3.80 
3.80 
Std.Dev 
0.79 
0.91 
I.IO 
1.13 
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4.6.2 Adviser's CUents - Performance 
At a broad level, the Adviser sample was asked how their Clients balanced 
risk and return when assessing performance of a managed fund prc,duct. A five-step 
scale was used with one representing return ot'liy,'three representing an equal balance 
of risk and return and five representing risk only. The mean score of 2.76 suggests a 
marginal focus towards return, and is significantly different from a score of three, 
which represents a balance of return and risk. 
Looking more closely at return, and the choice of return comparisons, three 
questions were presented requiring an assessment of importance of possible 
reference points when considering the return of a managed fund product. Table 4.13 
indicates that meeting the objectives of their own investment plan was the most 
important factor for Clients with the return of similar funds also considered 
important. The return on the All Ordinaries Index, was on average considered of 
lower importance. This is surprising considering the important role this index has in 
fund product advertisements. 
Table 4,13 · Importance of Factors to Clients When Considering Return 
The Adviser sample was asked a series of questions that required an assessment of the importance that 
they believed their Clients placed on a series of factors when the Client considered the return of a 
managed fund. This table presents their responses on a five-point scale with one (five) for low (high) 
importance. All mean values arc significantly different, at a 95% confidence level, from a score of 
three. 
Factor (n-=nurnber responding) 
Client's fund meeting the objectives within their own investment 
plan (n=437) 
Return of other similar funds (n=430) 
All Ordinaries Index return (n::<430) 
Mean 
4.12 
3.47 
2.59 
Std.Dev. 
0.95 
0.95 
1.08 
In terms of risk measures considered by individual investors, Table 4.14 
indicates that the most important risk factor for Clients, on average, was under-
performance compared to similar funds, with similar comparisons to a low risk 
alternative and the long-tenn average of the fund also important. The spread· of 
returns above and below the average of the fund, synonymous with the standard 
deviation, was not significantly greater than a score of three. For both the Investor 
and Client group, this "staple" measure of risk is considered of relatively lower 
importance. 
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Table 4.14 Importance of Factors to Clients When Considering Risk 
The Adviser sample was asked a series of questions that required an assessment of the importance that 
their clients placed on a series of factors when the client considered the return of a managed fund. 
This table presents their responses on a five-point scale with one (five} for low (high importance). All 
mean values are significantly different, at a 95% confidence level, from a score of three except the 
''Spread of returns above and below the average of lhe fund". 
Factor (n-number responding) 
Under-perfonnance compared to similar funds (n=427) 
Under-performance compared to a low risk investment, eg. bank deposit 
(n=423) 
Returns below the long tenn average of the fund (n=425) 
Spread of returns above anrl below the average of the fund (n=427) 
4.6.3 Performance Assessment - Time Period 
Mean 
3.82 
3.54 
3.35 
3.03 
Std.Dev. 
0.95 
1.22 
1.06 
0.99 
The time period used to assess the performance of funds is a key determinant 
of a fund rating. Respondents were asked what they considered was an appropriate 
time period to assess the perfonnance of a fund. For the Investor sample, 49 percent 
of respondents indicated three years or less, with a mean of 3.8 years, For the 
Adviser sample the mean time period was 4.2 years with a median of four years and 
a mode of five years. This is largely consistent with the ratings companies discussed 
in section 3.4 and in particular the age cap that Morningstar imposes on their 
quantitative rating. Advisers considered that their Clients had a shorter time horizon 
when considering the perfonnance of managed funds, with a mean time period of 
2.64 years with fifty percent indicating three years. A one-way ANOVA test of the 
equality of the mean minimum performance time period, supports a significant 
difference between the groups. 
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4.7 Ratings Usage 
A key component of both surveys was to detennine how the various groups 
used ratings, the importance of ratings in decision making process and how they 
viewed the construction of ratings. This section addresses these issues. 
4.7.1 Ratings and Rankings- Investors, Advisers and Clients 
Respondents were first questioned as to whether they used ratings or rankings 
the most. This question was included to serve two purposes. The first was to clarify 
the tenninology of ratings and rankings to be ·used in the questions to follow, as the 
pilot survey raised this as an issue requiring further clarification. This was achieved 
by providing a brief overview of how rankings and nitings are constructed as well as 
providing an example using Colonial First State's, Count First Australian Share Fund 
and Morningstar data on the fund. The second was to determine the importance 
attached to each rating and ranking individually. 
The results presented in ·Table 4.15,. are very similar for the Investor and 
Adviser samples. For the Investor (Adviser) sample, 75.7 (75.7) percent of 
respondents used ratings either b)' themselves or in combination with ·i"ank.ings. 
Ratings only were used by 25.9 (27 .6) percent of respondents and rankings only were 
used by 6.3 (5.1) percent. Only 18.0 (19.2) percent of respondents indicated that 
they didn't use either ratings or rankings. A chi-square test of expected counts 
confinns no significant differences between the two samples. 
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Table 4.15 Usage of Rankings and Ratings by Advisers and Investors 
This table presents a cross-tabulation of usage of ratings or performance rankings by the Investor and 
Adviser sample. In each survey respondents were presented with an example that clarified the 
distinction between rating which have a qualitative dimension and performance rankings which are 
based solely on quantitative inputs. A Pearson chi-square test statistic of expected counts in each cell 
is presented at the ba...e of the table. 
Both 
Ratings 
Neither 
Rankings 
Total answered 
Not answered 
Total 
Investors 
Frequency (percent) 
119 (49.8) 
62 (25.9) 
43 (18.0) 
15(6.3) 
239 (100.0) 
19 
258 
12 0.706 df3 p-value 0.872. 
4.7.2 Ratings 
Advisers 
Frequency (percent) 
206 (48.1) 
118 (27.6) 
82 (19.2) 
22 (5.1) 
428 (100.0) 
13 
441 
Having clarified the distinction between ratings and. rankings, the remainder 
of the surveys focussed solely on ratings. The first question sought the range of 
ratings used and the rating most relied on. The two most widely used ratings by. the 
Investor and Adviser samples and Client group was provided by Morningstar and 
Assirt. A significant difference between the two samples is the use of van Eyk, with 
the proportion. of the Adviser sample using them three times that of the Investor 
sample. Rather than being a reflection of relative preferences between the grollps, it 
is more of reflection that individual investors have only recently had access to van 
Eyk ratings. 
Morningstar clearly dominates as the most relied on rating by Advisers, 
Investors and Clients. For Investors the proportion indicating Morningstar is more 
than double that .of Assirt. the second most relied on rating. The reliance on 
Morningstar by Advisers and Clients is of similar magnitude. For Advisers, the use 
of and preference for specific research groups ratings, reported in Table 4.16, largely 
mirrors that for the use and preference for general research discussed in section 4.5.3. 
A distinguishing feature of Clients is the 2t.2·percent of advisers who indicated that 
they believed thaf they were unaware of any ratings. 
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Table 4,16 Ratings Used and Ratings Most Relied On 
This table compares the usage of rating brand.-; by the Adviser and Investor samples in addition to the 
rating relied on by the Investor and Adviser samples and the Clients of the Adviser sample. More 
than one rating was able to be used and therefore the two columns in the left panel do not add to 100 
percent whereas only one rating was relied on and therefore the three columns in the right panel do 
add to 100 ercent. 
Morningstar 
Assirt 
VanEyk 
Other 
None- not aware 
Investor Adviser 
Used (percent) 
138 (53.S) 252 (57.l) 
\07 (41.S) \93 (43.8) 
38 (14.7) 189 (42.9) 
\8 (7.0) 6\ (13.7)' 
Total answered 188 (72.9) 395 (89.6) 
Not arowered 70 (27.l) 46 (10.4) 
Total 258 100.0 441 100.0) 
Investor Adviser Adviser's Clients 
Relied on most (percent) 
92 (57.9) 152 (41.S) 142 (41.9) 
43 (27.0) 85 (23.2) 82 (24.2) 
IS (9.4) 76 (20.8) 41 (12.1) 
9 (S.7) 53 (14.S)' 2 (0.4) 
159 (\00.0) 
29 
188 
366 (100.0) 
75 
441 
72 (21.2) 
339 (100.0) 
102 
441 
• Other includes 9 (2.0 percent) who indicated lnvestorWeb 
bother includes 8 (2.4 percent) who indicated InvestorWeb 
4.7.3 Importance of Ratings 
Respondents to both surveys were asked what importance they gave to ratings 
in either their investment decision (Investors) or in making their recommendation to 
Clients (Advisers). Advisers were also asked the importance of ratings to their 
Clients. The responses indicate that not only does a large proportion of each group 
use the ratings, they are also considered important by a large proportion of each 
sample. 
The mean score for the Investor sample was 3.6 with 65.2 percent scoring 
four or five. For Advisers the mean importance score was 3.1 with 41 percent 
scoring four or five. The mean score for ratings for Clients of 2.58 was the lowest of 
the three groups. Advisers were also asked the importance their Clients placed on 
rankings. The mean score for rankings was also low at 2.76. One-way ANOVA 
tests of the three groups mean scores, supports a significant difference between the 
groups. Tukey's honestly significant difference (HSD) test suggests that there are 
significant differences between each group pairing. 
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4.7.4 Ratings Purpose 
Given their importance, it is interesting to explore what respondents believed 
the primary purpose of the ratings they relied on was. As discussed in section 3.5.1, 
the various providers of ratings have attempted to differentiate themselves by the 
particular construction of ratings they employ and the purpose of the rating they 
supply. 
Table 4.17 reports that for both the Investor and Adviser samples 
identification of well managed/administered funds was seen as the primary purpose 
by the majority of respondents. Rating historical performance was seen as the 
primary purpose by 26.4 percent of Investors compared with 16.4 percent of 
Advisers. The proportion of respondents that considered the primary purpose of a 
rating was to identify better-performing funds in the future was lower for Investors 
(8.8 percent) than Advisers (16.4 percent). 
The identification of well managed/administered funds and value for money 
funds can be grouped as indirectly related to perfonnance whereas identifying funds 
that should outperfonn and have historically perfonned well can be grouped as 
directly related to perfonnance. Using this dichotomy, 64.8 (63.5) percent of 
Investors (Advisers) viewed the primary purpose of a rating as indirectly related .to 
perfonnance. 
A cross-tabulation of the reported primary purpose by the Adviser and 
Investor samples, supports a significant difference in perceived primary purpose. 
The main difference appears in the historical/future focus. A larger proportion of 
Investors viewed the primary purpose was to identify historically well perfonned 
funds, whereas a larger proportion of Advisers viewed the primary purpose was to 
identify funds that should outperfonn lower rated funds in the future. A chi-squared 
test of expected counts of the top four primary purpose responses, supports a 
significant difference for the two samples. 
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Table 4.17 Primary Purpose of Ratings - Investor.. and Advisers 
This table presents a cross.tabulation of what was considered to be the primary purpose of a managed 
fund rating by each sample. A Pearson chi·square test statistic of expected counts in each cell is 
presented at the base of the table using the top four primary purpose responses. 
Primary Purpose Investors 
Well managed/administered funds 
Historically well performed funds 
Funds that should outperfonn lower rated funds 
Value for money funds 
Other 
Total answered 
Not amwered 
Total 
x2 18.96 df3 p·value .000 using top four purposes. 
number (percent) 
125 (55.1) 
60 (26.4) 
20 (8.8) 
22 (9.7) 
0 (0.0) 
227 (100.0) 
31 
258 
Advisers 
Number (percent) 
222 (58.7) 
62 (16.4) 
62 (16.4) 
17 (4.5) 
15 (4.0) 
378 (100.0) 
63 
441 
Given these differences and given the strong attempts by the ratings providers 
to highlight distinctions between themselves, for example in tenns of being forward 
or backward looking as discussed in section 3.4, it could be expected that patterns 
should emerge in use of particular ratings. The expectation of such a pattern assumes 
that the ratings providers can successfu11y articulate these differences to their users 
and/or that the users accept these differences. To examine this the primary purpose 
responses were cross-tabulated with the top three most relied on rating for each 
sample. 
Chi-square tests of expected counts do not support any significant differences 
for Investors, in use of particular ratings and the various primacy purposes. 
However, for Advisers Table 4.18 reports significant differences in the expected 
count of the assessed main purpose of the ratings when grouped by the top three 
ratings providers. A lower proportion of Morningstar users indicated that they 
considered the main purpose of a rating was to indicate well managed/administered 
funds. A higher proportion indicated the main purpose was to identify historically 
well perfonned funds. Those who indicated that they relied on van Eyk were the 
opposite to this as well as having a larger proportion indicating the main purpose was 
to identify funds that should outperfonn lower rated funds in the future. This 
provides some evidence of Advisers making a more informed choice of rating 
measure. Morningstar does have the highest weighting given to historical 
perfonnance and van Eyk does emphasise the qualitative and 'forward looking' 
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nature of their rating. These are both consistent with the over and under-
representations. It may also ~e taken to provide some evidence that individual 
investors do not discriminate beiween the ratings brands. 
Table 4.18 Ratings Purpose and Ratings Used - Advisers 
This table presents a cross-tabulation of which rating the respondent considered they relied on by what 
respondents considered was the main purpose for a rating, presented in Table 4.16 and Table 4.17 
respectively. A Pearson chi-square test statistic of expected counts in each cell is presented at the base 
of the table. 
Well managed/administered funds 
Historically well performed funds 
Funds that should outperfonn 
lower rated funds in the future 
Value for money funds' 
Total 
x2 13.945 df 6 p-vatue (.030) 
Morningstar Assirt van Eyk 
count (expected count) 
85 (90.2) 57 (53.8) 50(48.0) 
25 (20.7) 14 (12.3) 5 (11.0) 
21 (24.0) 11 (14.3) 19 (12.8) 
IO (6.1) 
141 
2 (3.6) 
84 
1 (3.3) 
75 
Total 
192 
44 
51 
13 
300 
This raises the related question of what specific components are used in these 
ratings and whether these are consistent with what Investors or Advisers consider to 
be measures of historical perfonnance or well managed funds, for example. These 
questions are addressed in section 4.8. 
A specific question for Advisers given their relationship with Clients is why 
they use the ratings in their role as finance professionals. Table 4.19 reports that the 
main reason (40.6 percent) respondents in the Adviser sample used the ratings was to 
help satisfy external requirements placed on them, a possible motivation prompted 
by Corporations Law, Trade Practices Act and common law discussed in section 
3.5.3. A large ivoup of Advisers (21.6 percent) however, used ratings to increase the 
tikCtihood of selecting better ~'erfonning funds. Whi1e some ratings companies 
specifically provide disclaimers 'On the ratings and future perfonnance linkage, this is 
specifically seen as their main ,;purpose by significant groups of Advisers and to a 
lesser extent Investors. Further, for a significant proportion of Advisers that is 
specifically why they use them. It needs to be emphasised here that these questions 
only asked for the main purpose of the rating or main reason for their use and 
therefore one motivation does not exclude the other. 
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Table 4.19 Main Reason For Adviser Use of Managed Fund Ratings 
This table summarises responses to the question "What is the main reason you use managed fund 
ratings'?" presented to the Adviser sample. One response only was allowed. 
Help satisfy 'reasonable basis' or 'reasonable grounds 
requirements' 
Increase the likelihood of selecting a better perfonning funds 
Complement your own research 
Provide an external justification for your recommendations 
Other 
Total answered 
Not answered 
Total 
4.7.S Ratings as Decision Criteria 
Frequency (percent) 
154 (40.6) 
82 (21.6) 
68 (17.9) 
54 (14.2) 
21 (5.5) 
379 (100.0) 
62 
441 
Both samples were questioned whether they employed a minimum rating 
criteria when recommending a managed fund (Adviser) or investing (Investor). For 
Investors who used ratings, 48.9 percent reported that they had a minimum rating 
criteria that they employed when investing in a managed fund. Table 4.20 indicates 
that while the range of minima covered the full range of Star ratings for Morningstar 
and Assirt, the mean minimum rating were comparable. This provides evidence that 
not only are ratings an infonnation source but they also do act as a selection criteria 
for Investors. 
While more than 75 percent of Advisers indicated that they used ratings, 45.2 
percent indicated that they never referred to them in the recommendation made to a 
client. At the other extreme, 15.7 percent of Advisers reported that they always 
referred to ratings in their recommendations to clients. For those that used ratings, 
'31.9 percent of the Adviser sample reported that they had a minimum rating level 
criteria before they made a recommendation on a managed fund. Table 4.20 
indicates that for Morningstar and Assirt ratings, the minimum rating levels for both 
Investors and Advisers average over three stars. Advisers were willing to employ a 
lower rating, on average, than lnvestors. 
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Table 4.20 Minimum Rating Level Criteria - Investors and Advisers 
Both the Adviser and Investor sample respondents were asked "Does a managed fund have to have a 
minimum rating before you will invest in it? If yes what is the lowest rating you would recommend?". 
At-test of equality of mean rating score is presented at the base of the table for both the minimum and 
maximum rating informed by a Levene test for equality of variance of group scores. 
.What is the lowest Morningstar rating Investor (n-88) 
you would recommend" Adviser (n=81) 
What is the lowest Assirt rating you Investor (n=37) 
would recommendh Adviser (n=47) 
a T-test of group means -2.28 p-value .023 
bT-test of group means -1.76 p-value .083 
Min. Max. 
I 5 
I 5 
I 5 
2 4 
Mean 
3.59 
3.33 
3.41 
3.13 
4.7 .6 Advisers and Clients Ratings Usage and Performance Definitions 
Std. Dev. 
0.78 
0.67 
0.83 
0.54 
Before examining the components of ihe ratings in greater detail, it is 
interesting to examine usage and popularity of the various ratings for Advisers and 
their Clients, given the broader return and risk perceptions Of Clients. 
In section 4.6 the importance scores were discussed for various risk and 
return measures. Given the noted difference by the ratings companies in their choice 
of perfonnance assessment, two separate cross-tabulations are pre~-~nted. The first 
compares the top three ratings relied on by the Adviser given their perception of the 
importance placed on __ a. number of alternative return and risk definitions by.their 
Clients. The second compares the top three ratings relied on by Clients rather than 
Advisers. The interest here is whether these perceived differences are associated 
with difference in.rating use. 
The results presented in Table 4.21 and 
Table 4.22 suggest that there are no significant.differences in the rating relied 
on by Advisers given the importance attached to alternative risk and return 
definitions by their Clients. For Clients, significant differences can be supported for 
the most relied on rating and the assessment of return relative to the Client's 
invesbnent objectives. Clients that rely on Morningstar have the lowest impo~ce 
score of 3.86 and van Eyk the highest at 4.29. A cross-tabulation of the importance 
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of each risk definition and the top three ratings do not support any significant 
difference for both the Adviser and Client samples. 
Table 4.21 Clien.t Return Comparisons and Rating They Relied On 
The Adviser sample was questioned as to the importance they considered th~ir Clients placed on a 
range of possible return comparisons and what rating the Adviser considered their Clients relied on. 
This table present .. one-way ANOV A lest statistics of thC mean importance scores of each possible 
return comparison for the three top ratings relied on {Morningstar. A .. sirt and van Eyk). The test is 
infonned by the Levene test for homogeneity of variance of importance scores. The homogeneity of 
variance is not rejected for any of return comparison scores .. 
__!etum Comparison F-ratio 
Client's fund meeting the objectives within their own 2.428 
investment plan (n=304) 
Return of other similar fund. .. (n=297) 
All Ordinaries lnde:it return (n=299) 
0.023 
2.158 
p-value .· 
.120 
.879 
.143 
Table (.22 Client Risk Comparisons and Top Three Adviser and Clients 
Ratings Used 
This table present'> one-way ANOVA test statistics of mean importance score of each possible risk 
cnmparison between the three top ratings (Morningstar, A .. sirt and van Eyk) relied on by the Clienl .. 
of Advisers. The test is informed by the Levene test for homogeneity of variance of importance scores 
between samp-les. The homogeneity ofvariane:.e assumption is rejected once as noted. 
Risk comparison n=299 
Returns below the long term average of the fund? 
Spread of returns above and below the avera8c of the 
fund? 
Under-performance compared to similar funds? 
Under-performance compared to a low risk 
investment, eg. bank deposit'! 
F 
0.442 
6.632 
3.328 
3.498 
p-value· 
.507 
.OIO 
.073" 
.062 
• Levene test rejects homogeneity of variance {7.477, dfl 2, ~f297 p-value .00 I) 
4.7.7 Summary Ratings Usage 
In summary, these statistics suggest that a large proportion of financial 
advisers and individual investors uses ratings, with Morningstar the most widely 
used and relied on measure. The largest proportion of both groups viewed the main 
purpose of ratings was to identify well managed/administered funds, though· there 
were differences in this main purpose across users of different ratings. The .main 
reason why respondents in the Adviser sample used ratings was to help satisfy legal 
requirements, supporting hypothesis two. Significant proportions of b.oth groups 
indicated that a performance expectation element is present in their use of ratings. 
While Advisers may use a rating to form their recommendation, the largest group did 
not then refer to them when making a recommendation to their client. 
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There is evidence that not only do individual investors use ratings as an 
information source, but they also use them as specific selection criteria. Advisers do 
not c~nsider their clients to place as much importance on ratings as they themselves 
do. More than 20 percent of Advisers considered their Clients unaware of ratings. 
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4.8 Ratings Construction 
The rating providers attempt to brand and differentiate themselves in order to 
attract users of ratings. As discussed in section 3.4, the overRll balance of 
quantitative and qualitative inputs appears important to ·ratings companies·· in 
achieving this. Further, the sub~components of the quantitative and qualitative inputs 
and their respective weightings are also important. AdviSers were questioned as to 
their view on each of these and the Investors were questioned on the importance of 
the sub-components only. 
4.8.1 Adviser Quantitative/Qualitative Split 
In terms of the overall quantitative/qualitative split, Advisers indicated that 
qualitative inputs should be weighted marginally higher (54.6 percent) than 
quantitative inputs (45.4 percent)., however the mode and median proportions were 
both 50 percent. A cross-tabulation of the top three most relied on ratings, with the 
mean proportion presented in Table 4.23, indicates some variation in these 
proportions. A comparison of the means using one-way ANOV A does not support 
any significant difference. This is surprising given that Morningstar and 
InvestorWeb use equal proportions of quantitative and qualitative inputs while Assirt 
and van Eyk each have 75 percent for qualitative and ·25 percent for quantitative 
components, based .on past performance. 
Table 4.23 Adviser Allocation to Rating Components (percent) 
Respondents in the Adviser sample were asked, "In your view, when a rating is compiled on a fund 
product, whilt weighting should be plciced on the quantitative and qualitative components'?" This table 
presents· the mean proportir,n broken down by each of the top three ratings relied on. A one.-way 
ANOV A test of differences in mean proportions for each of the three main ratings groups is presented 
at the base of the table. The test is infonned by the Levene test for homogeneity of variance of 
quantitative arid qualitative proportions. Homogeneity of variance is not rejected for either sample 
proµortions. 
Momingstar (n-143) 
Assirt(n=Bl) 
Van Eyk (n=72) 
Total 
Quantitative 
46.7 
45.0 
44.4 
45.7 
Qualitative 
52.6 
55.0 
55.6 
53.9 
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4.8.2 Ratings Sub-Components 
Both surveys asked respondents for an importance score for each of the sub-
components that could be used as a basis of the quantitative and qualitative 
components. The sub-components used were based on those used by Morningstar 
given that they have the finest breakdown of components. As shown in Table 3.5 
these COmcJonents are compa~ble across the rating companies. What differs· across 
the ratings companies is the weighting each is given and how they assess each 
component. The score of each sub-component is presented in Table 4.24. Apart 
from the information that these scores provide in their own right, they will also 
provide a focus to the discussion of ratings and performance presented in Chapter 6. 
For both groups the qualitative sub-components are rated more important. Of 
the quantitative sub-components, Advisers assessed historical return, return 
variability and age as equally important, on average, with the lowest importance 
score for the lowest return received by the fund. Investors scored the historical 
return as the highest importance with the historical variability less so. The fee 
structure of a fund had the second highest score for Investors, with the lowest score 
for the lowest return of the fund, similar to the Advisers. Apart from the mean scores 
for the fund product's age, all other quantitative sub-components are significantly 
different between Advisers and Investors. 
The relatively low score for the age of the fund product is interesting given.its 
important role in most ratings construction. For example, the Morningstar ratings, 
detailed in section 3.7, have an absolute age cap for the fund product's quantitative 
rating. For each six-months a fund product has been in operation, one point is 
awarde.d to a maximum possible of a ten rating. The quantitative rating of the fund 
product cannot be higher than this. Where the age rating is exceeded, the arithmetic 
average of the four other components is used. 
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Table 4.24 Mean Importance Scores for Ratings Sub-Components for Investors and Advisers 
Respondents in each sample were asked ''Now consider the possible components of these quantitative and qualitative analyses. In your view how important are each of the 
following?" A five-step scale was used with one (five) indicating low (high) importance. T-tests of equality of sub-component mean scores informed by a Levene test for 
equality of variance of importance scores are presented in the table. One sample t-test supports a difference in each of the sub-components mean score from three. The 
Morningstar column indicates the proportion that each sub-componenl comprises of the quantitative and qualitative components in their rating construction. 
Quantitative components 
(n = Investors, Advisers) 
Historical return of fund product (n::=:232,411) 
Historical variability of fund product (n::=:223,412) 
Lowest return achieved by fund product (n=219,407) 
Term the fund product has been offered (n=226,41 l) 
Fee structure of fund product (n::=:227,412} 
Qualitative components 
Overall strength of fund manager and parent company (n=234,413} 
Fund product features (n=226,412} 
Overall experience, ability of fund product's investment team (n=233,413} 
Experience and ability in the particular sector of the fund (n=225,41 l) 
Administrative capability of the fund (n=228,411) 
Investors Advisers 
Mean (cr) Mean (cr) 
3.91 (0.97) 3.63 (0.89) 
3.39 (1.01) 3.63 (0.87) 
3.08 (1.17) 2.55 (1.05) 
3.46 (l.13) 3.62 (0.97) 
3.69 (1.22) 3.38 (l.06) 
4.33 (0.69) 4.45 (0.70) 
3.68 (1.00) 3.52 (0.86) 
4.36(0.78) 4.56 (0.61) 
4.24 (0.81) 4.28 (0.72) 
3.94 (0.95) 3.96 (0.86) 
Momin star 
T-test (p-value} percent 
-3.691 (.000) 
2.978 (.003) 
-5.700 (.000) 
1. 779 (.076) 0-100 
-3.19 (.002) 
2.174 (.030) 25.0 
-2.086 (.038) 10.0 
3.409 (.000) 22.5 
.527 (.598) 22.0 
.178 (.859) 22.5 
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For the qualitative sub-components, the ranking of importance scores is the 
same for Advisers and Investors, though there are significant 8ifferences in the mean 
scores for three ~f the five sub-components. For both groups fund product features 
have the lowest average importance score, though in each case is greater than three. 
This sub-component has the lowest weighting in the Morningstar qualitative rating 
measure with a weighting of IO percent. The highest weighted sub-component for 
Morningstar is the overall strength of fund manager parent company that achieved 
t~e second highest mean importance score for· both groups. It must be noted that the 
difference in Morningstar weighting is marginal for all but the age rating and the 
difference in importance and weighting is also marginal. 
4.8.3 Rating Construction and Rating Relied on Most 
It iS expected that for both the Investor and Adviser samples, the choice of 
rating measure they rely on is closely related to what they believe to be important 
when each company construct their rating. A comparison of the mean importance 
scores for each sub-component should reveal differences between respondents based 
on the rating they rely on the most. 
However for Investors, one-way ANOVA tests of differences in mean scores 
by the top three ratings relied on does not support any significant difference for any 
of the sub-components for Investors. For Advisers, the same test supports a 
significant difference only for the mean scores for the historical variability of returns 
sub-component. Using post-hoc tests and Tukey's HSD the diffe'rence in this 
instance can he isolated between Morningstar and van Eyk. 
These results are surprising in view of the prominence the rating companies 
give to articulate differences between themselves. In both samples reliance on a 
particular rating does not appear to be related to differences in importance of the 
range of sub-components. The assertion made in section 3. 7.1, that the various rating 
sub-components can be viewed as generic would apear to be supported by these 
results, at least by the two important user groups. 
190 
4.8.4 Summary Ratings Construction 
The emphasis given to the components used in the construction of their 
respective ratings by research companies does not appear to be matched by the 
choice of ratings by their users. At the broad level of the importance of quantitative 
and qualitative inputs, Advisers do not appear to rely on the ratings that appear to be 
constructed, as per how they believe they should be. While there are difff:rences 
between Advisers and Investors in tenns of the importance of quantitative and 
qualitative sub-components, they are relatively minor. The importance scores for the 
sub-components are not significantly different by the top three ratings used by 
Investors. For Advisers, there is a difference for only one sub-component. This 
evidence may be taken as not supporting hypothesis four and five. In section "4.11 
the choice of rating relied on by both samples will be further investigated using 
identified clusters of rating sub-components. 
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4.9 Investor Utility Maximisation and Attribute Tradeoffs 
As has been noted in section 2.7.3, Choong (1997, p.96) has suggested that 
individual investors ,seek to trade-off net .performance by factoring in the services 
~d attributes of managed funds. She adopted the utility framework of Rosen (1974) 
tO explore this ,and set the decision within the theol"Y of economic choice of Lancaster 
(1966). The focus of Choong (1997) was the role of alternative channels such as 
"direct marketing or retailers such as full service brokers, to "~ell" mutual funds in 
view of consumer knowledge and time constraints. The approach here is consistent 
with this theoretical construct but the focus is on the role of ratings as an attribute. 
To further examine whether ratings can be viewed as an attribute valued by 
individual investors and if so whether this can be quantified, Investors were asked if 
they would be willing to accept a lower expected return if a fund product had specific 
characteristics. If respondents indicated that they would be willing to trade off 
expected return, respondents were asked to specify what proportion of the expected 
annual return they would be willing to give up to gain the improvement. 
The ·question seeks to detennine whether inves,tors gain utility from what is 
known about the managed fund product in terms of its historical return, risk or 
current rating when they invest in the managed fund product, by asking directly 
whether respondents would be witling to trade-off expected return. This could be for 
one of two reasons. The first is that investors gain utility from the knowledge or 
COmfort that they are investing in a fund which has a goad· prior performance or a 
better rating, in itself. This sits within the notiori ofChoong (1997) that-managed 
funds can be viewed as durable goods and these factors are seen as ·quality attributes. 
Alteniatively each could be viewed as being signals of future performance. Managed 
funds clearly trade on both, disclaimers not withstanding, as their advertisements 
trade heavily on prior performance and. the ratings they have achieved, of course only 
if either is favourable in its own right or relative to a benchmark which allows it to be 
viewed favourably. 
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An alternative explanation of why these pieces of infonnation could be 
valued can be found in regret theory, which has been discussed in section 2. 7 .2. 
Shefiin (2000, p.130) suggested that "Having a financial adviser enabled the investor 
to carry a psychological call option". The an-a1ogy can be drawn with ratings in two 
alternative ways. Choosing a fund with a high rating· which subsequently perfonns 
well allows the investor to take the credit. If the fund performed poorly, the potential 
regret is reduced as the rating can be blamed. Alternatively the investor who chooses 
to ignore a highly rated fund could' be described as having written a psychological 
call option which is exercised if the fund subsequently perfonned well. The better 
the fund perfonns the greater the regret and "cost" to the investor. 
Investors were asked whether they would be willing to accept a lower 
expected return if a fund had an improved level of three separate characteristics. 
Each characteristic was ordered but not specifically quantified in terms of their 
magnitude. An improvement in the characteristic was more broadly defined as being 
"above average". 
The results reported in Table 4.25 suggest that a proportion of respondents 
were willing to trade-off each characteristic. The largest proportion (51.9 percent) of 
respondents were willing to trade-off expected return for a product that had above 
average historical returns, whereas 36.8 percent of respondents indicated that they 
were willing to trade-off expected return for a managed fund product that had below 
average historical risk. Of most interest here is the 40.7 percent of respondents who 
indicated that they were willing to trade-off expected returns for a managed fund 
product with an above average rating. 
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Table 4.25 Investor Characteristic Trade-off 
The introduction lo this question stated ''The information you may have about a managed fund 
product, or the features a managed fund product offers, can vary. With this in mind:" Respondents 
were then asked, "When you invest in a managed fund would you be willing to accept a lower renun 
if a fund product had the following characteristics?" If the respondents answered yes they were then 
asked "Please indicate what proportion of the e:tpected annual return you would be willing to give up 
to gain the improvement." 
Above average historical returns (n=218) 
Below average historical risk (n=210) 
Above average rating from research company (11=210) 
Total answered 
Not answered 
Total 
Yes (percent) 
134 (51.9) 
95 (36.8) 
105 (40.7) 
218 
40 
258 
Percentage reduction 
n mean median 
123 13.8 IO 
85 12.1 IO 
94 12.3 IO 
As a means of exploring whether this wi1lingness to trade-off expected return 
for the various attributes was for the ~ttribute itself or as an indirect signal of future 
perfonnance, respondents were questioned about possible relationships between prior 
and future perfonnance. Specifically, respondents were ~sked whether, in their 
experienc·e, ·an above average performance in one year was more likely to result in 
perfonnance in the_next year _bCing above average, below average, average or any of 
these. A cross-tabulation of thes·e responses with the responses to willingness to 
trade-off expected return if a fund had a higher rating from a research conij,any, 
presented in Table 4.26, does not support any Significant differences. There was also 
no significant difference when the characteristic was above average historical return 
or below average historical risk. That is, those willing to trade-off expected return 
were not _over-represented in expecting above average future perfonnance, ,given 
prior good performance. This may be taken as evidence to support the utility of.a 
high rating in itself, independent of any expectation of future perfonnance. 
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Table 4.26 Willingness of Investors to Trade-Off Expected Return for Above 
Average Rating 
Cross-tabulation of responses by Investor sample to the questions "When you invest in a managed 
fund would you be willing to accept a lower return if a fund product had above average rating from a 
research company" and "In your experience if a fund has performed above average in one year then in 
the following year it is more likely to perform: above average, average, below average or none of 
these?". The cross-tabulation explores whether the willingness to trade-off expected return was based 
on an expectation of expected future performance. A Pearson chi-square test statistic of expected 
counts in each cell is presented at the base of the table. 
Expected future performance 
Willing to accept lower return Above Average Below 
No (expected) 
Yes (expected) 
Total 
x2 3.719 (df3) p-value .293 
average 
12 (13.9) 
16 (14.1) 
28 
30 (33.8) 
38 (34.2) 
68 
average 
15 (15.9) 
17(16.1) 
32 
Any of 
these 
47 (40.3) 
34 (40.7) 
81 
Total 
104 
105 
209 
A second set of questions was included to further explore a wider multi-
attribute framework for investing in managed funds. The previously examined 
characteristics of historical perfonnance or fund rating are quantifiable and. certain 
whereas the services/features respondents were presented with of: responsiven'ess to 
queries, improved social responsibility practices and ability ·to switch between 
managed fund products, were less so. To allow some context for respondents and 
some idea of the level of each service/feature, the· question. indicated that each 
service/feature would be increased "from average to above average". The results are 
presented in.Table 4.27. 
Across the three services/features the proportion respondents were wilting to 
trade--0ffwere lower than for.the three characteristics and the average red.uction that 
these respondents were willing to give up was also lower .. Ii could be argued ~his is 
to be expected given that the services/features are · uncert8in whel'eas the 
characteristics or attributes of historical perfonnance had been quantified and known. 
That aside, there are clearly investors who were willing to trade~off features or 
' 
attributes for expected· return consistent with an objective of mciXimising utility 
through maximisation of net returns. 
195 
Table 4.27 Willingness of Investors to Accept Lower Return for Improved 
Features 
The introduction to this question stated ''The infonnation you may have about a managed fund 
product, or the features a managed fund product offers, can vary. With this in mind when you invest 
in a managed fund would you be willing to accept a lower return to improve the following features 
from average to above average, when compared with similar fund!!?" If respondents answered yes 
they were then a'>ked "Please indicate what proportion of the expected annual return you would be 
willing to give up to gain the improvement." 
Improved responsiveness to your queries (n=215) 
More socially responsible investment practices (n=219) 
Easier ability to switch to other funds in company (n=222) 
Total answered 
Not answered 
Total 
4.9.1 Summary of multi-attribute examination 
Yes (percent) 
42(16.3) 
60 (27.4) 
92 (41.4) 
194 
64 
258 
Percentage reduction 
n mean median 
38 5.8 5 
56 9.7 5 
80 7.8 5 
The results support an important role for ratings for a· significant number 
managed fund investors. The evidence suggests that for Investors, ratings are more 
likely viewed as an attribute of the managed fund product, which does not 
necessarily play a role due to an expected link with any likelihood about the fund's 
future perfonnance. This supports the arguments of Capon et al. (1996) and Nagy& 
Obenberger (I 994) of investors having a wider framework when investing in. 
managed funds than solely historical or expected risk and return. 
This is evidence in support of hypothesis one for Investors. A conSumer 
behaviour framework is arguably more useful in explaining choice of managed 
.. 
funds. Generaiiy the scores and magnitudes are consistent with the Capon et al. 
(1996) study. _That said, a group·oflnvestors do believe that the primary purpose· of 
.ratings was to identify better future perfunners. 
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4.10 Investor Information Source and Selection Criteria Clusters 
· To further explore the. infonnation sources and selection criteria beyond the 
average:;, cluster analysis was used to identify common groupings and preferences in 
the Investor sample. Cluster analysis is '"the name for a · group of multivariate 
techniques whose primary purpose is to group objects based on the characteristics 
they possess" (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998, p.473). Cluster analysis was 
employed to detennine whether similar groups of investors to those rel)orted by 
Capon et al. (1996) could be identified in tenns of infonnation sources and selection 
criteria. A hierarchical procedure was employed using the squared euclidean 
distance to measure similarity or proximity between and within clusters. To confirm 
the reliability of the clusters, multiple discriminant analysis was used. 
4.10.1 Information Source Clusters 
Using the infonnation sources discussed in section 4.5.1 three ,infonnation 
source clusters can be identified with distinctive patterns in the level and ranking of 
information sources. These groups can. be labelled Information Dependent, 
Impersonal, and Information Independent. 
Respondeilts in thC- Infonnation· Dependent cluster rated each infonnation 
source higher -than the other two _clusters and rated at least three sources above a 
score of three, being in decreasing order: financial adviser, ratings/rankings, and 
magazine/newspaper articles. For this duster the financial adviser was rated much 
higher than the other two clusters. Cluster two is labelled ·as Impersonal as the two 
personal sources have the lowest score with the financial adviser the least important 
and ratings/rankings ihe most important. Cluster three is labelled· Infonnation 
Independent_as no information source has a mean score greater than three. For this 
cluster, ·in decreasing order of importance, the top three. sources were: financial 
advisers, ratings/rankings and fund advertisements. Another key feature of this 
clusteds that it has ·the lowest score for ratings/rankings. 
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Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA).was used to confinn the significant 
differences in importance attached to the various infonnation sources between the 
groups. The statistics presented in Table 4.28 suggest that significant differences 
exist for all infonnation source scores between the groups, except fund 
advertisements. A stepwise procedure was used to detennine two discriminant 
functions. Two infonnation sources were not useful in discriminating' between the 
groups: fund. advertisements and television programmes. These sources were also 
not useful in identifying the groups, in establishing the initial clusters. ·The & .. atistics 
should be.viewed with caution as Box's M'statistic is significant and thus rejects the 
assumption of homogeneity of variance and covariance of the independent variables 
across the three groups. Hair et al. (1998, p.259) however suggests that the evidence 
is mixed as to the sensitivity of MDA to this assumption violation. The prediction,<;! 
based on the discriminant. functions, which do not rely on the assumptions, indicate 
that the differences in the infonnation sources can predict group membership in 97. 7 
percent of cases. Therefore three distinct infonnation source clusters can be 
identified and the importance attached to the range of sources can accurately classify 
respondents in these clusters. 
4.10.2_ Selec'tion Criteria Clusters 
The ten selection criteria, discussed in section 4.5.2, were also analysed and four 
distinctive clusters were identified. These can be labelled as Fund F.ocus/Cost 
Sensitive, Fund Focus/Cost Insensitive, Portfolio Perfonners and Endorsement. 
These clusters are presented in Table 4.29. While four clusters can be identified i.t is 
.clear that reputation ·of the backing company/fund and fund product investment 
objective are clearly important- for all clusteni. The Fund Focus/Cost Sensitive 
cluster rated the reputation of the backing company the highest and also rated fees as 
impo~ant, Whereas the Fund FoCus/Cost Insensitive cluster rates the fees as the least 
important and has a higher score for the features of the fund product. The Portfolio 
Perfonners· were labelled so as the highest score in this cluster .was given to ·the 
investment objective of the fund and the third highest score was for performance 
history of the fund. The Eridorsement cluster rated each criteria above three but most 
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distinctively rated the external endorsements of a professional adviser 
recommendation and the fund product's rating/ranking the highest of all clusters. 
Using the same MDA for the Selection Criteria clusters also confinns the reliability 
of these groups. All selection criteria have significantly different group mean scores. 
Three discriminant functions were produced which enabled 95.4% of respondents to 
be correctly classified into the four clusters. 
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Table 4.28 Information Source Clusters- Investors 
This table reports the mean importance scores of infonnation sources for the identified clusters of Investors. The overall mean importance scores for infonnation sources arc 
presented in Table 4.7. Clusters were identified using a hierarchical procedure using the squared euclidean distance to measure similarity or proximity between and within 
clusters. Multiple discriminant analysis was used to confirm the reliability of the clusters. Wilks' lambda statistic indicates the similarity or difference between the clusters 
and ranges between zero to one. A value closer to zero indicates the means are different. The F-value also is a measure of similarity between mean scores between clusters 
with large values supporting significant differences. Box's M statistic is presented at the bottom of the table and rejects the assumption of homogeneity of variance and 
covariance of the independent variables across the three groups. 
Cluster Information Impersonal Information Total (n-213) 
dependent (n=85) inde,endent 
(n=61) (n=67) 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Fund advertisements (I) 1.79 l.07 1.72 1.04 1.48 1.02 
Familylfriends(P) 1.77 1.15 1.29 0.78 1.43 0.92 
Investment books (I) 2.62 l.17 2.12 1.39 1.33 0.77 
Financial adviser (P) 4.28 0.76 l.15 0.39 2.97 1.71 
Ratings/rankings (n 4.07 0.77 3.85 1.12 2.09 1.12 
Magazine/paper(!) 3.25 1.12 3.44 1.29 1.25 0.53 
T.V. pro~es (I) 1.79 1.1 1.33 0.81 1.07 0.4 
• dfl 2, df2210 Box's M 262.107, F-test (approx) 8.432 p-value .000. 
Mean 
1.66 
1.47 
2.01 
2.62 
3.36 
2.69 
1.38 
SD 
1.05 
0.96 
126 
1.68 
1.34 
l.44 
0.85 
Wilks').. 
0.985 
0.958 
0.838 
0.400 
0.586 
0.533 
0.893 
1.607 
4.622 
20.351 
157.571 
74.306 
92.097 
12.637 
p-value6 
0.203 
0.011 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
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Table4.29 Selection Criteria Clesters - Investors 
This table reports the mean importance scores of selection criteria for clusters of Investors. The overall mean imponance scores for selection criteria are presented in Table 
4.8. Clusters were identified using a hierarchical procedure using the squared euclidean distance to measure similarity or proximity between and within clusters. Multiple 
discriminant analysis was used to confirm the reliability of the clusters. Willes' lambda statistic indicates the similarity or difference between the clusters and ranges between 
zero to one. A value closer 10 zero indicates the means are different. The F-value also is a measure of similarity between mean scores between clusters with large values 
supponing significant differences. Box's M statistic is presented at the bot!om of the table which rejects the assumption of homogeneity of variance and covariance of the 
ind:P,:!:ndent variables across the three (l:''Olll!:S· 
Cluster Fund Focus/Cost Fund Focus/Cost Portfolio Performers Endorsement Total (n=217) 
Sensitive {n=76} Insensitive {n=52! (n=29) (n=60) 
Criteria Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Wilks',- F" Sig6 
Specific manager(s) 4.14 0.96 4.42 0.70 1.55 0.74 4.22 0.87 3.88 1.25 0.454 85.439 0.000 
Reputation company 4.38 0.82 4.46 0.61 3.66 1.08 4.57 0.56 4.35 0.80 0.873 J0.363 0.000 
Fund investment objective 4.36 0.69 4.44 0.61 3.93 1.03 4.35 0.68 4.32 0.74 0.955 3.376 0.019 
Features of fund product 3.74 1.08 3.77 1.04 2.48 1.24 3.97 0.97 3.64 1.15 0.837 13.786 0.000 
Customer relations 2.53 1.22 2.37 1.19 2.14 1.03 3.45 1.13 2.69 1.25 0.849 12.606 0.000 
Entry/exit fees 3.99 0.99 2.13 0.91 2.69 1.04 4.22 0.90 3.43 1.29 0.541 60.140 0.000 
Annual management fees 3.82 0.92 1.98 0.87 2.83 1.20 4.32 0.81 3.38 1.29 0.505 69.517 0.000 
Professional 1.39 0.59 3.13 1.53 3.10 1.57 4.35 0.78 2.86 1.60 0.453 85.583 O.GOO 
recommendation 
Fund performance history 3.95 1.14 3.38 1.30 3.31 1.04 4.37 0.76 3.84 1.15 0.!::72 10.421 0.000 
Fund ratins!rankinS 3.76 1.20 3.00 1.30 3.17 1.07 4.28 0.74 3.65 1.20 0.828 14.752 0.000 
• dfl 3, df2 213 6Box's M 214.149, F-test (approx) 2.;n6 p-value .000 
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4.10.3 Information Source and Selection Criteria Cluster Relationships 
It is expected that there is a relationship between the respective infonnation 
source and selection criteria clusters. A cross-tabulation of information and selection 
criteria clusters, presented in section Table 4.30, confinns these relationships. The 
majority of members of the Infonnation Dependent group (63 percent) are 
concentrated in the Endorseme11ts selection criteria group. For this cluster it can be 
argued that the importance attached to the large number of information sources, the 
main characteristic of this infonnation source cluster, very much drives the selection 
criteria. Those who rate all information sources highly need a mechanism to sort 
them, and hence their reliance on the endorsements. The Impersonal infonnation 
cluster is heavily concentrated (70 percent) in the Fund Focus/Cost Sensitive 
selection criteria. Here the selection criteria drives the information source as the 
individuals who are sensitive to fees, as evidenced by the selection criteria, select 
information sources that they can access more cheaply than through a professional 
adviser. The Information Independent infonnation source cluster is concentrated (65 
percent) in the two Fund Focus selection criteria clusters. Given that the Fund Focus 
clusters rated the fund company reputation as the highest selection criteria the 
information sources included didn't provide the assessment of the reputation used by 
these respondents. These four cells, of the 16 cells in the cross-tabulation, account 
for 60 percent of the respondents. The other cells do not reveal any large over or 
under representations. 
Table 4.30 lnvestor Information Source and Selection Crit~ria Clusters 
This table presents a cross-tabulation of Investor lnfonnation Source clusters, presented in Table 4.28, 
and Investor Selection Criteria clusters presented in Table 4.29. A Pearson chi-square test statistic of 
ex2ected counts in each cell is 2resented at the base of the table. 
Infonnation Source cluster 
Selection Criteria cluster Infonnation %info Impersonal %info Information %info Total 
Dependent cluster cluster Independent cluster 
Fund Focus/cost sensitive 3 4% 49 70% 18 26% 70 
(percent selection cluster) 5% 61% 31% 35% 
Fund Focus/cost insensitive 15 33% 13 28% 18 39% 46 
(percent selection chL~ter) 25% 16% 31% 23% 
Portfolio performers 8 29% 10 36% 10 36% 28 
(percent selection cluster) 13% 13% 17% 14% 
Endorsements 34 631lf 8 15% 12 22% 54 
(percent selection cluster) 57% 10% 21% 27% 
Total 60 30% 80 40% 58 29% 198 
100% 100% 100% 
x2 63.652 df-6p-value .000 
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4.11 Cluster Analysis of Ratings Inputs 
The importance scores for each of the ten rating inputs were examined for 
both samples in section 4.8. The following section examines whether distinctive 
clusters of respondents, in each sample, can be identified and whether for Investors 
these are related to infonnation sources or selection criteria clusters. The cluster 
analysis method employed is as discussed in section 4.10. 
4.11.1 Investors 
Four distinctive dusters can be identified for the Investor sample using the 
importance scores of the rating inputs: Historical Focus, Return Focus, Future Focus 
and Experience/Features Focus. The mean importance score for each rating sub-
component is presented in Table 4.31. 
The Historical Focus cluster is the largest and most distinctive in that all 
components rate greater than three and all of the historical measures of perfonnance 
are scored highly. Another distinguishing feature of the cluster is that the reputation 
of the backing company has the highest score for any cluster or input. The number 
of respondents in this cluster can be contrasted with the efforts of rating companies 
to promote the importance of forward-looking assessments. Historical perfonnance 
is clearly important for a large number of respondents. 
The Return Focus cluster is also distinctive in that the historical return has the 
highest importance score, whereas the administrative capabilities and fund product 
features have the lowest importance score. The Future Focus cluster scores each of 
the four historical measures of perfonnance less than three and has a future focus in 
that the scores for the overall experience of management and the experience in the 
particular investment sector of the fund product are the most important. The 
remaining Experience/Features Focus cluster is distinctive in that it has the lowest 
score within and across the clusters for the importance of fees and entry/exit costs 
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Table 4.31 Rating Inputs Clusters- Investors 
This table reports the mean importance scores for rating inputs for Investor clusters. Clusters were identified using a hierarchical procedure using the squared euclidean 
distance to measure similarity or proximity between and within clusters. Multiple discriminant analysis was used to confirm the reliability of the clusters. Wilks' lambda 
statistic indicates the similarity or difference between the clusters and ranges between zero to one. A value closer to zero indicates the means are different The F-value also 
is a measure of similarity between mean scores between clusters with large values supporting significant differences. Box's M statistic is presented at the bottom of the table 
which rejects the assumEtion ofbomoaenei~ of variance and covariance of the ind~ndent variables across the three ~OUE;S. 
Cluster 
Historical Focus Return Focus Forward Focus Experience/ Overall (n=213) 
(n=85) (n=42) (n=40) Features Focus 
(n=46) 
Rating Input Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Wilks' A F'' 
Historical return 4.29 0.65 4.10 0.66 2.63 0.95 4.09 0.78 3.9 0.97 0.588 48.784 
Historical variability 3.91 0.83 3.17 0.85 2.42 0.78 3.50 0.86 3.39 0.99 0.698 30.171 
Lowest return 3.80 0.96 2.79 0.9 1.88 0.82 3.22 0.94 3.11 1.16 0.624 41.918 
Product age 4.09 0.84 3.40 0.91 2.73 1.13 2.96 1.15 3.46 1.13 0.750 23.161 
Fees and entry/exit costs 4.52 0.67 3.76 0.98 3.57 1.11 222 0.87 3.69 1.22 0.500 69.788 
Reputation & strength of backing 4.61 0.58 4.07 0.64 4.30 0.56 4.11 0.8 4.34 0.68 0.879 9.603 
company 
Product features 3.89 0.83 2.95 0.91 3.60 I.OJ 4.09 0.96 3.69 0.99 0.836 13.660 
Overall experience/ability of 4.52 0.65 3.62 0.91 4.45 0.68 4.61 0.54 4.35 0.78 0.779 19.723 
management 
Experience/ability in particular 4.49 0.59 3.29 0.81 4.35 0.80 4.46 0.59 4.22 0.82 0.675 33.482 
sector 
Fund administrative caeabilities 4.44 0.63 2.83 0.73 4.00 0.88 3.93 0.80 3.93 0.94 0.611 44.434 
• dfl 3, df2 209 6 All values have a p-value <.001 Box's M 182.710, F-test (approx) 2.031 p-value .000. 
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and also the highest score for the fund product features. Respondents in this 
cluster scored the importance of the overall experience of management and 
experience in a particular sector as collectively the most important rating inputs. 
MDA was used to support the cluster classification. All rating input clusters 
have significantly different group mean scores between clusters. Three discriminant 
functions were produced that enabled 92.5% of respondents to be correctly classified 
into the four clusters. These rating clusters and selection criteria clusters allow tests 
of the consistency of responses to questions given the similarity of criteria and rating 
sub-components. These will now be addressed. 
4.11.1.1 Rating Inputs and Selection Criteria Cluster Relationships 
It is expected that the importance attached to the various rating sub-
components and selection criteria are related. A cross-tabulation of the selection 
criteria and rating sub-component clusters provides an opportunity to examine the 
consistency and robustness of responses. The results presented in Table 4.32, 
support the consistency and robustness of responses. 
Respondents who were in the Cost Insensitive selection criteria cluster are 
over-represented in the Experience/Features Focus rating cluster which had the 
lowest impottance for fees. Similarly those investors in the Cost Sensitive selection 
criteria cluster are under-represented in the corresponding Experience/Features Focus 
rating cluster. Respondents in the Portfolio Performer's selection criteria cluster who 
scored the investment objective and performance of the fund are over-represented in 
the Return rating inputs cluster. Respondents in the Historical rating sub-
components cluster, who scored the historical perfonnance measures highly, were 
over-represented in the Endorsements selection criteria cluster. While respondents in 
the Endorsements cluster score the rating/ranking of a fund and professional 
recommendations for the fund as the most important, relative to other clusters they 
had the highest mean score for the importance for the fund performance history as a 
selection criteria. 
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Table 4.32 Ratings Suf>..Components and Selection Criteria Clusters 
This table presents a cross-tabulation of 1he Selection Criteria clusters presented in Table 4.29 and 
Ratings sul,.components clusters presented in Table 4.31. The figures represent counts and expected 
counts (in bracket) in each cell. A Pearson chi-square test statistic of expected counts in each cell is 
presented at the base of the table. 
Selection Criteria Cluster 
Fund Focus/ Fund Focus/ Portfolio Endorsements Total 
Cost sensitive C.ist insensitive performers 
Rating Historical Focus 29 (27.4) 5 (18.0) 6 (9.0) 36 (21.5) 76 
InpuL'I R1;turn Focus 18 (14.1) 8 (9.2) 8 (4.6) 5 (11.1) 39 
Cluster Future Focus 14(13.0) 10 (8.5) 5 (4.3) 7 (10.2) 36 
Experience/ 9 (15.5) 23 (10.2) 4 (5.2) 7 (12.2) 43 
Features Focus 
Total 70 46 23 55 194 
x2 49.972 df-9 p-value .000 
4.11.1.2 Cluster Differences~ Investors 
Given the evidence of distinctive clusters for Investors, the demographics and 
financial characteristics of respondents were compared within infonnation clusters, 
selection criteria clusters and ratings input clusters. Chi-square tests of. cross-
tabulations of highest education level, income, gender, and ability to make financial 
decisions were conducted with each of the three cluster sets. One-way ANOV A tests 
of the equality of means for age, number of managed funds invested in, total amount 
invested in managed funds, amount invested in the most recent managed fund, and 
the proportion invested in superannuation were also conducted. 
. 
A significant difference can be supported only for gender in the infonnation 
source clusters, and the results are presented in Table 4.33. In this case females are 
under (over) represented in the Infonnation Dependent (Independent) duster. Of the 
financial characteristics, the proportion invested in superannuation is significantly 
different between clusters for alt groups of clusters. Post-hoc comparisons using 
Tukey's HSD test was used to identify pairwise where the differences were. For the 
Infonnation Source clusters respondents in the Impersonal cluster had a much lower 
proportion (30 percent) in superannuation than both the Infonnation clusters (50 
percent). For the Selection Criteria clusters the Reputation/Cost Sensitive had a 
much smaller proportion (32 percent) of funds in superannuation than the 
Endorsements cluster (54 percent). For the Ratings Sub-Components clusters the 
Return cluster has a lower proportion (25 percent) than the Reputation (52 percent) 
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and Cost Sensitive (SS percent) clusters. This suggests that as the size of 
superannuation increases, and il,;; importance to the respondent's portfolio increases, 
the infonnation sources, selection criteria, and ratings inputs change and this flows 
through to what is considered important in ratings. 
Table 4.33 Investor Information Source Cluster and Gend~r Cross-
Tabulation 
This table presents a cross.tabulation of Infonnation Source clusters, presented in Table 4.28, with the 
gender of respondents. The results are somewhat tentative given the relatively small number of 
female respondents in the sample. A Pearson chi-square test statistic of expected cciunts in each cell is 
presented at the base of the table. 
Cluster 
Information Dependent 
Impersonal 
Information Independent 
Total 
x2 8.076 df-2 p-value ,018 
Gender 
Male Female 
55 (49.3) 5 (10.7) 
69 (68.2) 14 (14.8) 
47 (53.4) 18 (11.6) 
171 37 
Total 
60 
83 
65 
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4.11.2 Summary of Cluster Analysis-Investors 
The analysis suggests that there are distinctive groups of individual investors 
who prefer particular information sources, place different importance on possible 
selection criteria beyond those of expected risk and return and place different 
importance on the inputs used to construct ratings. The Investors can not be 
classified as a homogenous group and reported attitudes in each group were 
consistent across a range of dcmogrJphic groups and financial characteristics. The 
exception to this was the difference in importance scores given the level of 
superannuation investments in an investor's portfolio. 
4.11.3 Advisers 
Cluster analysis of the importance scores for the rating inputs by Advisers 
also suggests four distinctive clusters which can be grouped using the same headings 
as for Investors: Future Focus, Return Focus, Experience/Features Focus, anrl 
Historical Focus. The characteristics of the four clusters are broadly consistent with 
the Investors with the exception of the Experience/Features cluster as outlined further 
in this section. 
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Before discussing the differences in the Adviser clusters, it is important to 
note that the clusters and respondents have much in common when it comes to what 
they consider the most important rating sub~components. The mean score for each 
rating s~b-components presented in Table 4.34 indicates that the overall 
experience/ability of management scores at least 4.29 for any cluster and the 
reputation and strerigth of backing fund/company scores at least 3.92. 
The Future Focus cluster has the smallest number of respondents and has no 
historical quantitative measure with a score greater than three, as with the Investors 
sample. Conversely, the Historical Focus cluster has the largest number of 
respondents and has the highest score for each of the four historical perfonnance 
measures. Again notwithstanding the rating companies arguments for the importance 
of forward looking assessments and downplaying of historical perfonnance, it is 
clear that for the largest number of Advisers the historical perfonnance remains the 
most important rating sub-component. 
The Return Focus cluster has the highest score for the historical return and 
has the lowest score for overall management experience overall or in the particular 
invesbnent sector. The final Experience/Features Focus cluster can be distinguished 
as it has the highest score for the fund product's fees, and therefore suggesting fee 
sensitivity. In contrast the Experience/Features cluster in the Investors sample had 
the lowest importance score for fees. 
MDA was used to confinn cluster membership. Table 4.34 includes test 
statistics for the equality of cluster means which is rejected in each case, though the 
assumption of homogeneity of covariance matrices between the clusters was rejected 
by Box's M test. A stepwise procedure was used to detennine three discriminant 
functions, which were able to correctly classify 96.3 percent of respondents into their 
respective clusters. The only ratings input that was not useful in classifying 
respondents was the overall experience of the fund's management team. 
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Table 4.34 Rating Inputs Clusters - Advisers 
This table reports the mean importance scores for rating inputs for Adviser clusters. Clusters were identified using a hierarchical procedure using the squared euclidean 
distance to measure similarity or proximity between and within clusters. Multiple discriminant analysis was used to confirm the reliability of the clusters. Wilks' lambda 
statistic indicates the similarity or difference between the clusters and ranges between zero to one. A value closer to zero indicates the means are different. The F-value also 
is a measure ofsimilarity between mean scores between clusters with large values supporting significant differences. Box's M statistic is presented at the bottom of the table 
which rejects the assumption of homogeneity of variance and covariance of the independent variables across the three groups. 
Cluster 
Future Focus Return Focus Experience/ Historical Focus Overall (n=401) 
(n=51) (n=llO) Features (n=l 18) (n=l22) 
Rating Input Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Wilks' A F" 
Historical return 2.63 0.85 4.06 0.61 3.23 0.79 4.04 0.68 3.63 0.89 0.649 71.622 
Historical variability 2.86 0.87 3.65 0.74 3.33 0.74 4.20 0.71 3.62 0.87 0.736 47.43 
Lowest return 2.06 l.08 226 0.95 2.06 0.72 3.47 0.75 2.54 l.05 0.652 70.71 
Product age 2.25 0.84 3.45 0.77 3.86 0.70 4.14 0.78 3.63 0.96 0.628 78.38 
Fees and entry/exit costs 2.71 l.04 2.63 0.97 4.03 0.64 3.73 0.91 339 l.07 0.67 65.182 
Reputation & strength backing 3.92 0.72 4.19 0.74 4.71 0.47 4.66 0.65 4.45 0.70 0.823 28.419 
company 
Product features 3.33 0.77 2.94 0.79 3.79 0.77 3.88 0.73 3.52 0.86 0.786 35.978 
Overall experience/ability of 4.39 0.70 4.29 0.71 4.70 0.49 4.72 0.46 4.56 0.61 0.899 14.811 
management 
Experience/ability in particular 4.14 0.66 3.81 0.77 4.51 0.60 4.52 0.59 4.27 0.72 0.817 29.706 
sector 
Fund administrative caebilities 3.84 0.73 3.10 0.83 4.35 0.58 4.39 0.58 3.96 0.87 0.598 88.949 
• dfl-3, dt2-397 Box's M 273.838, F-test (approx) 1.934 p-value .000. 
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4.11.3.1 Cluster Differences-Advii,;ers 
Adviser personal demographics level was tested for significant differences 
between clusters. Demographics include age, gender and highest education level and 
professional demographics including experience, funds under management, 
proportion of managed fund investments and authority. A significant difference can 
only be supported for gender, summarised in Table 4.35, with women over· 
represented in the Future and Fees clusters and under-represented in the Return 
cluster. Caution must be exercised though, as the number of female respondents was 
small which is a reflection of the low number of female financial planners in the 
wider population. 
Table 4.35 Investor Ratings Input Cluster and Gender Cross-Tabulation 
This table presents a cross-tabulation of Rating Input clusters, presented in Table 4.31, with the 
gender of respondents. The results are somewhat tentative given the relatively small number of 
female respondents in the sample. A Pearson chi-square test statistic of expected counts in each cell is 
presented at the base of the table. 
Gender 
Cluster Male Female Total 
Future 43 (45.8) 7(4.2) 50 
Return 107(100.9) 3(9.1) 110 
Fees 103 (107.3) 14(9.7) 117 
Historical 111(110) 9(10.0) 120 
Total 364 33 397 
x2 8.777 df-3 p-value ,032 
4.11.4 Consistency of response 
A number of questions allow for a check of the consistency of responses. 
The mean overall quantitative/qualitative rating input split that Advisers indicated 
was appropriate for a fund rating was discussed in section 4.8.1. The distribution of 
proportions ranged between zero to J 00 percent for the quantitative and qualitative 
components. It is expected that these proportions should be associated with the four 
rating input clusters. 
A cross-tabulation of the quantitative proportions reported for each cluster is 
presented in Table 4.36. One-way ANOVA tests of the mean proportion of 
quantitative/qualitative components that each cluster suggested are consistent with 
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the cluster description. The two clusters that had the highest importance attached to 
historical quantitative measures have in tum the highest proportion for quantitative 
components. Respondents in the Future cluster had the lowest importance score for 
the quantitative measures and in tum rated the qualitative inputs the highest 
importance. Post-hoc analysis using pair-wise comparisons support significant 
differences between the Forward Looking cluster and the Return and Historical 
clusters only. 
Table 4.36 Quantitative Inputs Proportion in Ratings -Adviser Sample 
This table presents a cross-labulation of the mean proportion Adviser's considered that quantitative 
inputs should comprise by the Adviser Rating Clusters, presented in Table 4.34, An F-test of a one-
way Anova test of the equality of mean proportions is presented al the bottom of the table infonned by 
a Levene test for homogeneity of variance. 
Cluster Mean 
Future (n-47) 
Return (n=IOJ) 
Experience/Features (n:I JO) 
Historical (n=l 12) 
Total 
37.45 
51.50 
43.55 
44.80 
4".36 
Standard 
Deviation 
16.01 
14.55 
13.35 
15.25 
15.21 
F-test 11.271, p-value .000 Levene statistic ,824 dfl-J dl2·368 p-value .481 
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4.12 Rating Inputs and Rating Relied On - Investors and Advisers 
The analysis of the importance attached to the range of rating inputs suggests 
distinctive groups for both Investors and Advisers, represented by the four rating 
inputs clusters. This corresponds with the efforts of the ratings companies to 
articulate a differences in rating process and construction. It is therefore of interest 
to examine the degree to which this view of the importance of the sub-components 
corresponds with rating use. This can be examined at the broad component level of 
the overall quantitative/qualitative split and at the level of sub-components using the 
rating sub-components clusters. 
For the Adviser sample one-way ANOV A tests of mean quantitative input for 
each of the three most relied on rating do not support significant differences. A chi· 
square lest of expected counts of a cross-tabulation of the four rating inputs clusters 
and the top three ratings relied on, presented in Table 4.37, does not support any 
significant differences. While Advisers appear to have differences in the importance 
of su~omponcnts to be included in ratings, this does not appear to translate to their 
choice of rating to rely on. 
Table 4.37 Cross-tabulation of Rating Inputs Clusters and Rating Most Relied 
on by Advisers 
This table cross-tabulates the three most relied on ratings by the Adviser sample, presented in 'fable 
4, 18, by the Adviser Rating Inputs clusters, presented in Table 4.34. A Pearson chi-square test 
statistic of expected counts in each cell is presented at the base of the table. 
Morningstar Count 
Assirt 
Van Eyk 
(expected) 
Count 
(expected) 
Count 
(expected) 
Total 
y_17.022 df-6 p-value .319 
Future Return Experience/ Historical Total 
Focus Focus Features 
17(15.7) 41 (38.7) 34(41.6) 
5 (8.5) 
10 (7.9) 
32 
I 8 (20.9) 
20 (19.5) 
79 
29 (22.5) 
22 (20.9) 
85 
Focus 
45(41.1) 
22 (22.2) 
17 (20.7) 
84 
137 
74 
69 
280 
The same cross-tabulation of Investor clusters and rating relied on is 
presented in Table 4.38. The results are similar to those for Advisers. No significant 
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differences can be supported for the rating most relied on and the four rating inputs 
clusters. 
Table 4.38 Cross-tabulation of Rating Inputs Clusters and Rating Most Relied 
on by Investors 
This table cross-tabulates the three most relied on ratings by Investors, presented in Table 4.16, by the 
Rating Input clusters, presented in Table 4.31. A Pearson chi-square test statistic of expected counts 
~-cell is eresented at the base of the table. 
Future Return Experience/ Historical Total 
Focus Focus Features Focus 
Morningstar Count JO 19 19 35 83 
(expected) (12.0) (16.8) (2 J.l) (33.1) 
Assirt Count 7 7 12 14 40 
(expected) (5.8) (8.1) (JO. I) (15.9) 
Van Eyk Count 3 2 4 6 15 
(expected) (2.2) (3.0) (3.8) (6.0) 
Total 20 28 JS 55 
X: 2.591 df-6 p-value 0.858 
This evidence does not appear to support the hypothesis relating to rating 
understanding for both Advisers and Investors. There does not appear to be 
discrimination between ratings based on the broad rating components or the more 
refined sub-components. 
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4.13 Summary 
The results in this chapter suggest that mana,ged fund ratings have become an 
accepted feature of the Australia managed fund hldustry. A sample of financial 
advisers from the Financial Planning Association and a sample of individual 
investors from the Australian Shareholder Association suggest that approximately 75 
percent of each sample used either ratings alone or ratings in conjunction with purely 
perfonnance based rankings. For both samples Morningstar is the most widely used 
and relied on measure. The largest proportion of both samples viewed the main 
purpose of a fund rating was to identify well managed/administered funds. The main 
reason why advisers used a rating was to help satisfy legal requirements. Significant 
proportions of both samples indicated that a performance expectation element is 
present in their use of ratings. 
The analysis suggests that there are distinctive groups of individual investors 
who prefer particular information sources, place different importance on possible 
selection criteria beyond those of expected risk and return and place different 
importance on the inputs used to construct ratings. The Investors can not be 
classified as a homogenous group and reported attitudes were pervasive across a 
range of demographic groups and financial characteristic:;. The exception was the 
difference in reported attitudes given the proportion of superannuation in the 
investor's portfolio. 
While ratings are widely used there does not appear to be a full understanding 
of the difference between each rating brand by both individual investors and 
financial advisers. Further, the emphasis given to the components used to construct 
their respective ratings by research companies does not appear to be marched by the 
choice of ratings by their users. For example each rating company strongly promote 
the respective weighting that quantitative and qualitative inputs have in their rating. 
However there were no significant differences in these weightings when financial 
advisers were grouped by the rating they relied on the most. The historical 
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perfonnance of a managed fund appears more important for the two sample of rating 
users than it has for rating companies in the construction of their ratings. 
Distinctive clusters of both individua\ investors and financial advisers can be 
identifed in tenns of the importance they attach to the various quantitative and 
qualitative sub-components used in constrncting a rating. The largest group rate 
historical perfonnance components highly. Smaller groups in each sample can be 
classified as truly forward-looking, to use the terminology of the rating companies, 
In short what has happened is important. While there are differences there is one 
common factor to respondents in each cluster, the reputation of the fund company. 
The results support an important role for ratings for managed fund investors. 
The evidence suggests that for Investors ratings are more likely viewed as an 
attribute of the managed fund product, which does not necessarily play a role due to 
an expected link with any likelihood about the fund's future perfonnance. This 
supports the arguments of Capon et al. (1996) and Nagy & Obenberger (1994) of 
investors having a wider framework when investing in managed funds than solely 
historical or expected risk and return. That said, a group of Investors do believe that 
the primary purpose ofmtings was to identify better future perfonners. 
Finally, evidence was presented for individual investors who were willing to 
trade-off expected return for increased levels of attribute or characteristic. 
Specifically investors expressed a willingness to sacrifice expected return if what 
they know about a fund's history, including its rating is improved. These results 
again suggest that for some individual investors, managed fund choice decisions can 
better be described as a purchase rather than investment decision. 
The final question to be examined is to what extent the use of ratings, 
supported by this chapter, can be sustained on the basis of a positive relationship 
with subsequent performance. This is the focus of the final two chapters. The 
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methodology to be employed empirically in Chapter 6 will be examined in Chapter 
5. 
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CHAPTERS 
ESTIMATING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
MORNINGSTAR FUND RATINGS AND SUBSEQUENT 
PERFORMANCE-METHODOLOGY 
The value of ratings as an infonnation input to an investment decision is in 
part a function of the relationship that exists between the rating of a fund and its 
subsequent performance. In section 3.6 the rating and performance link was 
discussed for the rating industry overall and in section J.7.5 the construction of 
Morningstar ratings was reviewed. The construction of Morningstar fund ratings 
implies a positive expected relationship between future performance and the product 
Star rating, the overall product rating (Q2). product quantitative rating (QT), product 
qualitative rating (QL) and their sub-components. In section 4.7.4 it was established 
from the sample of individuf 1 investors and financial advsiers that a proportion of 
users see this link as the primary purpose of a rating. This chapter outlines the 
methodological framework that is employed in Chapter 6 to estimate the empirical 
relationship between Morningstar ratings and subsequent performance. 
The chapter first articulates the three major hypotheses that will be examined 
in Chapter 6. Critical in estimation of any such relationship is the choice of 
perfonnance measure. The construction and choice of perfonnance measure is 
discussed together with the method to resolve potential problems including finalised 
funds and short performance periods. 
A time series of ratings and performance data is available for a cross-section 
of managed funds. Given the structure of the data, pooled time-series regressions 
have been employed to investigate the relationship between a rating and subsequent 
perfonnance. Various model specifications are possible using the pooled time-series 
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techniques and these are discussed along with the test statistics that can guide the 
choice of model. 
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5.1 Performance and Ratings Hypotheses 
The relationship to be explored in Chapter 6 uses funds classified as 
Australian Equity Trusts - General (DOST is the Morningstar abbreviation) and 
Superannuation Funds - Australian Equity {DSSB). This section outlines the specific 
hypotheses that will be examined. 
S.1.1 Hypothesis One: 
Before the question of whether ratings are related to future performance is 
addressed, it must be established that the ratings are different to estimated historical 
performance. If they are not different then the analysis becomes one of a related 
literature, that of performance persistence. Therefore the first hypothesis to be tested 
is 
H0 1: Morningstar fund ratings produce the same relative scores as those 
produced by available performance measures 
Evidence will be obtained by examining the correlation of contemporaneous 
ratings and four commonly used performance measures for the QT rating, QT 
components, QL and Q2 rating. For the Star ratings a Spearman-rho rank correlation 
test of the fund Star rating and its alternative performance ranking, within each 
subcategory will be conducted. The alternative performance measures will be 
divided into quintiles. Once this hypothesis has been resolved, the question of 
relationship between ratings and performance can be addressed. The major point 
here is to establish that the ratings are not merely rebadged performance measures. 
5.1.2 Hypothesis Two: 
In an informationally efficient market the value of a published rating is 
questionable. The strict market efficiency definition of Fruna (1970, 1991), 
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discussed in section 2.8.3, would preclude identifying a profitable relationship. 
Using ~e Grossman & Stiglitz (1980) definition, also discussed in section 2.8.3, 
allows the establishment of a relationship to the extent that the information 
discovered recoups the costs of discovering it. 
Ho2: Ratings have no relationship with subsequent performance of a fund. 
Evidence will be obtained for the QT rating, QT components, QL and the Q2 
rating using pooled-time series regressions estimated using several model 
specifications to be discussed in section 5.6. 
5.1.3 Hypothesis Three 
The QT and QL components determine the Q2 that in tum determines the 
managed fund's Star rating. While the same market efficiency argument is made, the 
categorical nature of the Star rating requires separate examination and hypothesis 
statement. 
H03: A five Star rating contains no information as to the subsequent fund 
performance relative to funds with lower Star ratings 
Evidence will be obtained using the dummy variable regression analysis of 
Blake & Morey ( 1999) using a pooled time series method. Both the sign and size of 
the estimated coefficients are of interest. If there is no difference in subsequent 
performance, the coefficients will not be significant. If a Star rating contains 
predictive information. the coefficients should be negative and significant. Further 
the size of the coefficients should increase in absolute value as the Star rating 
declines. 
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5.2 Choice of Performance Measure 
As discussed in Chapter 2, there is no shortage of literature devoted to the 
question of assessing managed fund performance just as there is no shortage of 
debate as to which is the most appropriate measure. Therefore the choice of 
performance measure in any analysis is captive to criticism of bias in both choice of 
model and benchmark. It is also apparent that the ongoing academic debate has 
made little impression on the practitioner's performance measures that have been 
developed by the research and ratings companies, discussed in section 3.7. There 
also appears little link between the academic performance literature and the 
advertising of performance by managed funds, which are predominantly return based 
with infrequent reference to, or adjustment for, any risk measure. 
While the criticism of potential bias in choice of performance measure, can 
not be avoided, at question however is not which is the most appropriate of the 
performance measures. What is at issue is whether there is any relationship between 
the rating a fund receives and its subsequent performance measured by a range of 
'"commonly used" performance measures. Evidence from the US suggests that raw 
returns and either one or four-factor alphas are significantly related to managed fund 
funds flow (Sirri & Tufano, 1998; Gruber, 1996).33 The choice of perfonnance 
measure here is also guided by the four measures used by Blake & Morey (1999), the 
only previous analysis of ratings and risk-adjusted performance. In view of the 
possible benchmark bias, insights from Allen & Soucik (2000) have also been 
incorporated. Finally, wherever possible, the chosen benchmarks must utilise 
existing and accessible indices, and not be individually constructed. The final 
criterion has been included in view of the identified difference in practitioner and 
academic performance measures. Attempts to bridge this gap must start with the use 
of inputs that are available and accessible to practitioners and investors. 
33 A problem inherent in these analyses is the correlation among the perfonnance measures, which 
makes it difficult to disentangle not only which infonnation is used but also how it is being used. 
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5.3 Monthly Returns 
The basis for each of the perfonnance measures is the calculation of a 
monthly return for a fund. This section outlines the method used in calculating 
monthly returns. All fund returns are based on the reinvested return index (RRI) 
constructed by Morningstar and provided in the TotalAccess CD. 
5.3.1 Entry and Exit Fees 
The RRI is constructed based on fund unit price data collected from the funds 
and reflects all ongoing management fees assessed against the fund (Morningstar, 
2001 ). The index assumes reinvesbnent of any fund cash distribution "in the fund on 
the day follov.ing the end of the accrual period to which the distribution relates, 
using the Ex~Price at the end of the period" (Morningstar, 2001, p.3). 
These returns do not include entry or exit fees, which can be substantial and 
have a direct impact on the investor's return. Blake & Morey (1999) incorporated 
load adjustments in their assessment of Morningstar US ratings as they argued that 
the Morningstar ratings in the US incorporated load-adjl!sted returns. 
The Morningstar Australia database includes the quoted fee infonnation from 
the most recent fund prospectus, though it is not complete. As a guide to the level of 
these fees, the average entry fee of the open34 funds in the DGST subcategory was 
2.8 percent, whereas in the DSSB subcategory it was 3.5 percent as at August 2001. 
These averages are based on the fee infonnation as at the most recent database 
update and not the fee necessarily applicable at the time of investment. Some or all 
of the entry fees may also be rebated to the investor depending on the avenue through 
which the fund is purchased and it is therefore difficult to determine what an investor 
would actually pay as an entry fee. In a review of fees and charges in the Australian 
34 An open MFP is one that is open to new investors. 
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industry such costs were investigated and it was concluded "what is actually paid by 
an investor cannot be determined" (KPMG, 2001, p.l). 
The monthly returns have not been adjusted for these fees for three reasons. 
Firstly, the varying rebating practices make it difficult to detennine a representative 
fee for the marginal investor. Secondly, the Morningstar Tota!Access CD provides 
fee information as updated by the fund, not a full history of the fees over time. 
Thirdly, Morningstar does not explicitly use these fees in the detennination of their 
ratings. In terms of the likely impact, Blake & Morey ( 1999) noted that the results 
for load/no load relationships were "generally the same" (Blake & Morey, 1999, 
p.23). 
S.3.2 Exit to Exit Price Returns 
The monthly returns are also based on exit-to-exit prices, which is the 
industry nonn, rather than the entry-to-exit prices an investor would determine their 
return by. This spread "is a transaction cost charged when you invest or withdraw 
your investment .. , This fee is nonnally paid to the fund to recover its costs and not 
to the fund manager" (Vanguard Investments, 2002, p.7). 
Blake & Timmennan (1998) calculated returns using bid prices plus income 
but excluding transaction costs and management fees. In the first month of a fund's 
existence they determined the return by the difference in the offer and bid price 
which, excluding changes in value, is in the order of three to six percent (Blake & 
Timmerman, 1998, p.59). Hallahan & Faff (2001) used the same data source" as 
used here as well as the same return index and concluded that the index "therefore 
gives representative returns which an actual investor may have achieved" (Hallahan 
& Faff, 2001, p.121). 
35 FPG Research, prior to the Morningstar joint venture. 
226 
The validity of this assertion may be questionable though. The mean same-
day entry-exit price spread for DGST funds was -2.35 percent and -1.08 percent for 
DSSB funds, over the period the ratings have been analysed. The highest spread for 
the DOST subcategory was -9.23 percent" and -10.98 percent37 for DSSB funds. 
These costs directly impact on the actual return the investor would make and also 
impact on any assessment of relative performance of funds within a subcategory 
given their distribution. 
This issue is problematic, as a reliable entry price series is not available for 
all funds, most notably closed funds. Further as Morningstar do not base their 
ratings on such spreads it would be unfair or biased to measure returns inclusive of 
these. As a result the unadjusted RRI is the basis of the monthly returns used to 
estimate performance. However, any comment on the usefulness of the ratings must 
therefore bare the caveat that they do not extend to the actual return an investor 
would receive based on actual entry and exit prices, and entry and exit fees. 
36 Morningstar Ticker 741 29/8/2000 
37 Morningstar Ticker 3593 28/5/1999 
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S.4 Performance Measures 
The relationship between ratings and performance is estimated with four 
performance measures: monthly geometric raw returns, one and four.factor Jensen's 
Alpha, and the Sharpe Ratio. This section discusses each of these measures and the 
indices used in their estimation. 
5.4,1 Raw Returns 
The large performance measurement literature, discussed in section 2.3, has 
made little impact on either the ratings industry or the managed funds themselves as 
evidenced by their product advertisements. In view of this, the raw returns measure 
has been included as it is by far the most widely used by managed funds and it is also 
an important component of the various rating measures. 
The raw return is defined as the geometric monthly rate of return over each 
time period. More formally the raw return is calculated as 
[ ' J"'. Geomelric Monlhly Relurn= n (I+ R,) -1 ,., equation 5.1 
where R, is the return for the fund in month I. 
5.4.2 Jensen Alpha Models 
Grinblatt & Titman (1995) argued that for those that have a diversified 
portfolio of investments, the adjustment for risk should incorporate the marginal 
contribution to risk of the fund. The marginal adjustment should therefore account 
for systematic risk and hence Jensen's Alpha is an appropriate measure. A one and 
four~factor model have been used. 
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The one-factor model is specified as 
equation 5.2 
where 
R;, is the return for fund i in month I; 
Rft is the return on the 13-week Treasury Note in month I; 
a1 is the risk-adjusted performance estimate for fund i, or one-factor alpha; 
/Jm; is the sc11sitivity of fund i to the market portfolio; 
R'"' is the return on the market index defined here as the value weighted All 
Ordinaries Accumulation Index in month 1; 
t:11 -1/D(O, a/). 
The four-factor model follows the characteristics based approach of Fama & 
French (1993). The first thre~ factors are exposure to the market risk premium, a 
size effect and a growth effect. The fourth factor is included following Gruber 
(1996) to account for exposure to fixed interest securities. The market risk premium 
is as calculated for the one-factor Alpha. The size effect is calculated by 
constructing a portfolio, which is long small capitalisation and short large 
capitalisation shares, SML using the notation of Fama & French (1993). The growth 
effect is calculated by constructing a portfolio that is long 'value' and short in 
'growth'shares, HML using the notation from Fama & French (1993). Each of these 
portfolios in effect creates a zero-investment portfolio. 
The overriding concern when constructing the portfolios was to make it easily 
replicable using established indices which are available to investors and financial 
advisers. The choice of benchmark inputs for the alpha measures was determined by 
the dual criteria of suitability and availability. Availability in the sense that they had 
to be "off the shelf' indices which were readily available to investors and advisers. 
As a consequence the portfolios are not as 'pure' as they could otherwise be. For 
both alpha measures excess returns on the 'market' is proxied by the All Ordinaries 
Accumulation Index less the return on a 13-week Treasury note. 
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For the four factor benchmarks, exposure to the SML effect utilises the 
S&P/ASXlOO, which is "Australia's premier large capitalisation equity index" and 
the S&P/ASX Small Ordinaries Index which includes the "smallest representatives 
of the S&P/ASX 300 Composite Index" (Australian Stock Exchaoge, 2001). The 
HML was constructed using MSCI indices which use price to book ratios to allocate 
shares to a value or growth classification. Each company in the index is sorted in 
ascending order of price to book.value. The market capitalisations are then summed 
until 50 percent of the index market capitalisation is reached. At this point a line is 
drawn between value and growth with all sei::urities above the· line included in the 
Value index and those below included in the Growth index (Datastream Advance 3.5 
(2002).38 The four-factor model follows Gruber (1996), discussed in section 2.3.3, 
by accounting for exposure to fixed-interest securities. The additional factor is 
measured in this analysis by the excess return on a composite of Australian 
government and corporate debt of all maturities and is measured by the UBS 
Warburg-Dillon Reed Composite Index. All data for the indices were accessed from 
Datastream except the UBS Warburg-Dillon Reed Composite Index which was 
sourced from Morningstar TotalAccess CD. The four-factor Alpha is specified as 
where 
Ril is the return for fund i in morith t; 
Rfi is the return on the 13-week Treasury Note in month t; 
ai is the risk-adjusted estimate for fund i, or four-factor alpha; 
/3; is the sensitivity of fund i to the respective portfolio; 
Rmr is the return on the market index defined as the value weighted All 
Ordinaries Accumulation Index in month t; 
38 At the time of calculation the MSC! indices targeted representation of 60 percent of market 
capitalisation in each country. The indices were changed to target a coverage of 85 percent of 'free 
float-adjusted market capitalisation' to reflect restricted investability in some companies in an index. 
This process was completed by May 2002 and for a further discussion see MSC! (2001 ). 
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Rs, is the return in month I for the S&P/ ASX Small Ordinaries Index; 
Ru is the return in month t for the S&P/ASXIOO; 
Rl't is the return in month I for the MSCI Value Index; 
Ra, is the return in month t for the MSCI Growth Index; 
RF, is the return in month t for a composite of government and corporate debt 
measured by the UBS Warburg-Dillon Reed Composite Index; 
&;, -1/D(O, a/). 
5.4.2.1 Risk-Free Proxy 
Previous Australian studies have investigated the sensitivity of perfonnance 
measures to choice of risk-free proxy. Robson (l 986) and Allen & Soucik (2000) 
found very little difference in the estimate of perfonnance based on the choice. 
Robson (1986) investigated 13 and 26-week Treasury Notes and two and ten-year 
government bonds. Allen & Soucik (2000) investigated a !3-week Treasury Note, 
10-year Government Bond and a composite measure linked to the average lifespan of 
the managed funds in their sample. They concluded "with few exceptions, the sign 
of the excess return is generally consistent across the three benchmarks, while the 
absolute values differ only marginally" (Allen & Soucik, 2000, p.23). Correlations 
ofthc various individwil performance measures based on the three proxies were very 
high with the lowest 0.9767 and the highest 0.9997. The 13-week Treasury Note has 
been used in all calculations, sourced from Datastream. 
5.4.2.2 Short Performance Periods 
The method in estimating the Jensen's alpha follows Elton et al. (!996) and 
Blake & Morey (1999) for performance periods of 12 and 24-months. To determine 
a 12 or 24-rnonth alpha they performed a regression using the full available history 
of the fund. To the intercept of this regression the average of the last 12 or 24 
residuals, the performance period, is added. The major motivation for this method 
was to increase the number of data points used when attempting to estimate an alpha 
over a performance period where only a small number of observations. that is 12 or 
24, were available (C. Blake. personal communication, 15/5/2001). 
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The choice of perfonnance period employed by Blake & Morey (1999) was 
static in that the reference point was always the beginning of the calendar year and 
performance in subsequent time periods. Blake & Morey (1999) also used two 
samples. To be included in the first sample a fund required a ten-year history 
whereas to he eligible for the second sample required a three-year history at the 
selection date, that is the beginning of the year in their methodology. To this they 
combined the data of the performance period to be examined up to a five-year 
maximum period. Therefore the maximum data they included for a fund was for a 
fund with a ten-year history whose performance was then tracked for a subsequent 
five year period, or 15 years in total. The minimum data inputs was for a fund with a 
three-year history that was then tracked for a one-year subsequent performance 
period, for a total of four years of data. 
This methodology contains a potential bias in that a constant exposure to each 
risk factor and average performance was assumed over the period when the rating 
has been detennined (selection period) and the perfonnance evaluation period. If 
there is a degree of correlation between contemporaneous perfonnance measures and 
ratings it will be more likely a relationship will then be found between ratings and 
subsequent perfonnance, given that subsequent perfonnance includes the data prior 
to the selectiqn date. In the main there is positive correlation between 
contemporaneous ratings and perfonnance measures as presented in section 6.2. 
As a point of difference in this study, as much as possible the chosen 
perfonnance periods exclude the data from the selection period, The methodology 
requires a minimum data history, selection and performance period, of three years 
data. To a large extent the smaller number and history of funds available in Australia 
dictates this. Thus for the 12 and 24-month alpha estimates, 24 and 12-month of data 
respectively is required from the selection period to estimate the perfonnance period 
measure. The three and four year measures require only perfonnance period data 
and are the intercept from the full regression. Each model has been estimated with a 
heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix following White (1980). 
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5.4.3 Sharpe Ratio 
The Sharpe Ratio has been included on the basis that while Grinblatt & 
Titman (1995) argued that for investors with a diversified portfolio the marginal 
contribution to risk was important, there are many investors who do not have 
diversified portfolios. The ASX 2000 Share Ownership Study (Australian Stock 
Exchange, 2000) for example indicated that one third of investors in direct shares 
have only on~ share and fifty percent have only one or two. The Sharpe Ratio is also 
one of few measures that incorporates risk that has consistently been provided to 
advisers and to lesser extent investors. The Morningstar TotalAccess CD Fund 
Profile Report which is the staple fund information report generated from their 
database, for example, includes the calculation. Further, fund advertisements that do 
includa: a risk component in their information, invariably do so in a return and 
standard deviation space. 
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S.S Data Issues 
This section discusses issues with the data that presented potential problems 
for the analysis and how they were dealt with in the various estimations. 
S.S. I Finalised funds 
Some funds finalised (tenninated) during the perfonnance period. In this 
instance available funds are returned to investors, or another fund within the 
company can be offered as an alternative investment. The Morningstar database 
contains incomplete data on these funds in tenns of the date they were finalised and 
does not indicate the reason for the fund being finalised. These funds are treated in 
two ways to examine their potential influence on the results. The first includes their 
returns and ratings up to the month prior to their finalisation. After this point, so as 
not to exclude the latest ratings from analysis, a variation on the method of Blake & 
Morey ( 1999) is followed. The second excludes them from the regression analysis 
totally. 
In the first case, it is assumed that investors from these finalised funds select 
another surviving fund within the same subcategory to invest their funds. As Blake 
& Morey ( 1999) suggested, as the purpose of such analysis is to examine the 
relationship between ratings and future perfonnance, rather than introduce a bias 
upwards or downwards by assuming investors move to a particular rating level, a 
random reinvestment assumption best achieves this. Blake & Morey (1999) used an 
equal weighted index of surviving funds to capture the returns for this. The 
Morningstar database includes a value-weighted index representing all funds within a 
particular subcategory. In the month when a fund is finalised the return on this index 
is used as the monthly return an investor would have received. By using the value 
weighted index the reinvestment is not strictly random as larger funds have a larger 
impact on the index return. This may introduce a bias if there is any relationship 
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between the size of the fund and future perfonnance. In terms of the Morningstar 
rating process the size of a fund is not a factor explicitly included. 
The raw returns measure and Sharpe Ratio are detennined using a 'spliced' 
series of returns. In the month a fund product is finalised the return of the 
subcategory index are substituted and the monthly returns measure calculated as 
previously discussed. In calculating the alpha Measures however, unless the risk 
exposures of the individual fund and the index are similar, calculating an alpha from 
a spliced series will not provide a valid measure.39 
Instead two regressions were performed to estimate two alphas. For example, 
in the case where a one-year alpha is required for a fund that ·is finalised in the fourth 
month after a rating is assigned. To determine the 12-month alpha would require 36 
months of data,. 24 months prior to the rating and 12 months after. The first of the 
two estimations uses the fund return series until the month prior to its finalisation. 
The second estimation uses the return series from the index for the 36-month period 
to the end of the 12-month performance period, A weighted average alpha is then 
calculated with the first alpha given a 25 percent weighting as it survived a full three 
months in the performance period and the second alpha given a 75 percent weighting 
representing the portion of the performance period it comprised. 
5.5.2 Duplicate Funds 
The Morningstar TotalAccess CD for the DSSB subcategory contains a 
number of funds that are ideutical in their return series as they are from a common 
pool of assets. That is, funds that have ~ique APIR PIC40 but have the same 
investment portfolios. For example, in Table 5.1 the details of duplicate Tower 
Australia Limited funds are presented which are included in the DSSB subcategory. 
39 Thanks to C. Blake (2002, private communication, 15/5/200 I) for this explanation. 
40 See discussion of APIR PIC in Section 3.2. 
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Both Morningstar41 and, where possible, the funds themselves were contacted to 
confirm that these funds were in fact identically managed funds. 
Table 5.1 Duplicate Funds in DSSB Subcategory -Tower Australia Limited 
Commenced APIR PIC 
Tower Managed DA· Australian Share Series 2 28/4/1995 
Tower Prestige DA Bond - Australian Share Series 2 28/4/1995 
Tower Prestige Super - Australian Share Series 2 28/4/1995 
TOW0077AU 
TOWOOJOAU 
TOW0038AU 
Each of these funds has an identical perfonnance history and if rated, each 
has been allocated the same QT, QL, and Star rating by Morningstar. Previous work 
which has examined the same subcategory of funds (Drew & Stanford, 2001a) did 
not recognise the duplicate funds in their analysis. The issue of duplicate funds is 
not prevalent in the DGST subcategory. 
The duplicate funds were excluded from the analysis as to include them 
would artificially weight these funds and ratings. A comparison of the perfonnance 
and ratings profiles of these funds is presented in section 6.1.3 as well as a discussion 
of the potential bias that Would result if they were included. 
5.5.3 Obsenation Period 
As discussed in section 3.7.5, the QT rating and its components are changed 
each month as the window of perfonnance measurement changes. The QL measures 
are however observed irregularly largely due to the time it takes Morningstar to 
complete a full qualitative analysis. The largest number of DGST funds had at least 
three new QL announcements bet\veen 8/1998 and 2/2001, with the largest number 
of observations being seven for one fund. For DSSB funds, between 8/1998 and 
8/200.1, the largest number of funds had at least two announcements with the largest 
number of observations for any fund being nine. An investor however who observes 
41 For example z. Trinnick (2001, personal communication, 28/11/2001) confirmed this for AMP 
products and C. Read (2001, personal communication, 14/11/200 I). 
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the QL, Q2 or Star rating can observe it at any month, not just when it is first 
released. If Morningstar considered that it needed reassessment it could suspend the 
rating or issue a new one. 
The performance and rating relationship can therefore be examined using 
either only the month that the _QL rating was issued or every month that it remains 
valid. The latter would therefore include a number of ratings that may have been 
issued many months previous, which in a large number of cases is between six to 
nine months previous. As an investor however will not generally know the currency 
of a QL, Q2 or Star rating, it could be argued that all monthly observations that they 
have been provided should be used. In section 6.4 and section 6.6, the relationship 
between the QL rating and performance is examined for every month as well as for 
the month the rating was announced and subsequently changed, respectively. The 
relationship between Q2, Star rating and performance is also examined for every 
month as well as for months in which the rating was first announced or changed. 
The same issue does not arise for the QT ratings as they invariably change each 
month. 
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5.6 Pooled Time Series Estimation 
For each rating measure other than the Star rating, the basic relationship to be 
estimated is 
Pi, =a,+ PC;1-1 +s1,, i = 1,2, ... N. t = 1,2, ... S, /=lag length 
where 
P11 is the measure of perfonnance for the fund i at time I; 
a is the constant for fund i; 
/3 is the sensitivity to the rating; 
C11.1 is the rating for fund i at time t-1 where I is the lag 
<11 -IID(O, a/). 
equation 5.4 
If a and /3 are constant over time and equal for each fund, all observations 
can be pooled and a pooled ordi'"'ary least squares regression (POLS) employed. 
Given that the perfonnance measure (P11) is a continuous variable and given that 
there are at least twelve monthly observations for each rating component "the 
researcher has a choice among five basic panel analysis models" (Johnson, 1995, 
p. l 066). These models .include: regression with lagged dependent variables, 
structural equation models with reciprocal and lagged effects, repeated measures 
analysis of variance, growth curve and hierarchical effects models, and fixed and 
random effects regression estimators for pooled time-series data sets. 
A distinction can be between panel data and pooled time-series of cross 
sections that 
panel data usually refer to a relatively few observations on a relatively 
larger number of cases. Pooled times-series of cross sections refers to a 
relatively large number of observations over time on a relatively large 
number of cases (Nielsen, 1999, p.1). 
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and 
although there is no fonnal difference between the two types of data, 
pooled time series are typically viewed as having a larger number of time 
points relative to units than do panels (Finkel, 1995, p.90). 
Of those available the fixed and random effects models are most suitable and 
are detailed in the next section. 
5.6.1 Fixed Effects Model- One-Way 
The assumption of a constant intercept may be unreasonable (Pindyck & 
Rubinfeld, 1998) for all individual funds over time. The relationship between rating 
and subsequent performance can be estimated to account for fund specific effects. In 
the fixed effects model (FEM), the individual effect, a1, is assumed to be constant but 
vary by cross-section (fund). Johnson (1995) identified two alternative approaches 
to estimate the FEM. The first uses ordinary least squares regression (OLS) by 
transfonning the dependent and independent variables into centred variables using 
the cross--section (fund) means. With more than two time periods the model becomes 
where 
Pi, is the measure of performance for the fund i at time t: 
C11-1 is the rating for fund I at time t-1 where I is the lag 
fJ is the sensitivity to the rating; 
£11-1/D(O. u/); 
equation S.S 
f!, Cj and &; are the means for each cross-section (fund) i over the I 
observations. 
The individual influence, a1, is captured as a,= Pi -bC1 where bis the OLS 
estimator of /J. The cross-section deviation approach can be estimated equivalently 
by creating dummy variables for each of the funds, less one to avoid perfect 
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collinearity, or alternatively with no constant and all funds included. This is 
specified by 
/}1 = PC11_1 +a,F;, +£11 ,i = l, ... N,t = J, ... ,S,l = lag length 
where 
P11 is the mtasure of perfonnance for the fund i at time t; 
Pis the sensitivity to the rating; 
equation 5.6 
<.."i1.1 is the rating for fund i at time period t-l, and I is the lag period; 
F,, = 1 for fund i, 0 otherwise; 
s,,-IID(O,a/). 
This approach may be cumbersome when the number of individuals is large, 
as is the case in this application with the number of funds, and the cross-section 
mean deviation approach is better suited. LIMDEP has been used to estimate all 
models discussed in this chapter. LIMDEP estimates the FEM with the group 
deviation approach with cross-section or fund specific constants and no overall 
constant. 
The advantage of the FEM, as compared with the random effi:cts model 
(REM) discussed below, is that coefficient estimates are not·biased by the observed 
or unobserved variables which can influence P that are time invariant, as differences 
are the variables of interest (Johnson, 1995). A disadvantage of the approach is that 
such a model cannot estimate coefficients for any such time-invariant explanatory 
variable. For the current application this is a potential disadvantage for some of the 
QL and QT rating components. Whilst a fund may be assigned a QL rating for each 
month, these may remain unchanged for a considerable length of time. Within the 
QT rating. the observed Age component may also be constant over short 
perfonnance periods as the age rating is capped at ten. Johnson (1995) suggested 
that time-invariant regressors could be included by way of interaction terms. That is 
an interaction between time-varying and time-invariant measures. 
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5.6.2 Random Effects Model- One-Way 
In the random effects model {REM), the specific cross-section or fund effect 
is considered random and "is a group specific disturbance, similar to &11, except that 
for each group [fund], there is but a single draw that enters the regression identically 
in each period" (Greene, 2000, p.560). In the REM, u1 is a random variable, assumed 
to be nonnally distributed, whereas in the FEM it is assumed to be a fixed effect. 
Keeping the variables as previously defined, the REM can be specified as 
Pi, =a+ /JC11 _1 +u1 +&11 ,i = J...N,t = J, ... S,/ = lag equation 5.7 
where 
P11 is the measure of performance for the fund i at time I; 
a is an overall constant 
/J.is the sensitivity to the rating; 
C11.,is the rating for fund i at time period t-1, and I is the lag period; 
<11-IID(O, u/)'. 
u1 -IID(O, u/). 
The two components &11 and u1 are treated as a ~mbined error tenn, where u1 
is constant over time and &;1 is assumed to be uncorrelated over time Verbeek (2000, 
p.315). LIMDEP uses a two-step procedure to estimate the parameters. In the first 
step the variance components are estimated from the residuals of OLS regressions. 
The estimate of a/ can be obtained from a least squares dummy variable regression. 
The estimate of a/ can be obtained from a group mean OLS regression.42 With an 
estimate of both components the parameters of equation 5.7 are estimated using 
generalised least squares (GLS) (Greene, 1998). 
111~ REM corrects for some of the limitations of the FEM but also has some 
timitatiom> of its own. Principally, the assumption that the individual effects that are 
u Greene (1998) also noted that this estimator may not be positive and outlines two further alternative 
methods to estimate a,,2 . If neither results in a positive estimate generalised least squares is not 
possible. A positive estimate is possible for all the REM estimated in Chapter 6. 
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included in the error term are uncorrelated with the regressors, which if not valid can 
lead to inconsistent parameter estimates (Maddala, 2001, p.256). 
5.6.3 Fixed Effects Model-Two-Way 
The one-way model Specified in equation 5.4 can als~ be extended to allow 
for time effects. Keeping the variables as in the base model but now including a time 
effect r for period I a two-factor model can be expressed as 
P;, =a+/JC11_1 +u, +r, +e11 ,i=l ... N.t=l...S,l=lag/ength equationS.8 
where 
P11 is the measure of performance for the fund i at time t; 
a is an overall constant; 
fJ is the sensitivity to the rating; 
Cit_, is the rating for fund i at time period t-1, and I is the Jag period; 
r,= I if t= I, 0 otherwise; 
B;, -JID(O, u/j. 
u1-IID(O.a/). 
This may be useful in the current estimation if there are variations in 
performance for all funds specific to a time period not accounted for by the 
performance measure. This may more plausibly be the case for performance 
measures that do not adjust for risk adequately. For example if all funds in a 
subcategory have heavy portfolio exposures in a sector that performs well over a 
subset of observations, the time effects will capture this. 
Within a FEM the additional factor can be accommodated by including 
1,. ,mmy variables for each time period less one, to avoid perfect collinearity, and can 
be expressed as 
I';, =a+ fiC1,_1 +a1F,1 +1:11';1 +1.111 ,i = 2, ... N,t = 2, ... ,S,l = lag length equation S.9 
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where 
Pu is the measure of perfonnance for the fund i at time t; 
a is an overall constant; 
C11-1 is the rating for fund i at time period /-/, and I is the lag period; 
f3 is the sensitivity to the rating; 
F1, is 1 for the i th fund, otherwise is zero; 
T1t is 1 for the t th time period, otherwise is zero; 
B;,-1/D(O,a/). 
The dummy variable coefficients estimate the change in the cros~section 
(funds) and time series intercepts with respect to the first fund and first time period 
(Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 1998, p.252). 
With a large number of cross-sections and time periods this est_imation 
method can be "numerically unattractive" (Verbeek, 2000, p.313). An a1te~ative is 
to use the deviation approach as discussed for the one-way model. LIMDEP again 
uses the deviation approach to estimate a;model with the full cross-section (fund) and. 
time effects with the additional restriction La, = L t 1 = O to avoid multicollinearity , , 
(Greene, 1998, p.338). In the instance of unbalanced data, which is thC case here for 
the majority of estimations, the sums are weighted by S1 !(Ls1)or Nrl<LN,), , . , 
(Greene, 1998, p.339). Whilst the cross-section and time effects are .important in the 
estimation process the interest re~ains with the estimation of /J, the sensitivity to the 
respective rating. Therefore the results presented in Appendix. III aricf Appe.ndix IV 
report the overall intercept where applicable but not the individual fulld or time 
. . 
intercepts, which total in some instances over 100 separate values . 
. 5.6.4 Random Effects Model-Two-)Vay 
-As with the FEM, the REM can be extended with the inclusion of time 
effects. '1t can be ~pecified as. 
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~' =a+ /JC;,-, +u; + r, +e,,, equation 5.10 
Pu is the measure ofperfonnance for the fund i at time t; 
a is an overall constant; 
c,,_, is the rating for fund ; at time period t-1, and I is the lag period; 
P is the sensitivity to the rating; 
µ, -1/D(O, a,,2) is a random cross-section error component for fund i constant 
through time; 
r, -IID(O, a,2) is a random time series error component for time I constant 
across funds; 
&11 -IJD(O, a/). 
LIMDEP estimates the two factor REM using the same procedure to estimate 
a/ and er/ as outlined in section 5.6.2. The estimate of a,2 is obtained as for a/ 
using a group mean OLS regression using the time period means instead of fund 
mem1s (Greene, 1998). 
5.6.5 Heteroscedasticity 
Two robust covariance matrices have been estimated for the one-way FEM 
and "the White estimator for the slopes is obtained just by using the data in group 
mean deviation fonn" (Greene, 2000, p.579). The first corrects for non-specific 
heteroscedasticity and "is a counterpart to the White estimator for unspecified 
heteroscedasticity" (Greene, 1998, p.326). The second is estimated with the more 
restrictive assumption of constant variance within each group. 
Greene has noted that it is not clear whether the second assumption is 
necessarily preferable. In the instance where the groupwise model is correct "then it 
and the White estimator will converge to the same matrix" (Greene, 2000, p.579). If 
the disturbances are different within the groups then understandably the second 
estimator may be inappropriate. The difference between the two values is not 
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consequential in this analysis in terms of guidance as to the significance of the 
coefficient estimates as whilst there are differences in the estimated values of the 
standard error, there is no change to whether the coefficients are significant or not. 
For the REM "robust estimation of the covariance matrix for the OLS 
estimator .. .is not the best use of the data" (Greene, 2000, p.579). Additionally the 
same estimation with the REM has the possibility of negative variance estimates for 
the individual fund errors, which given the number of observations is very likely and 
was therefore not estimated. 
5.6.6 Autocorrelation 
An extension of the Durbin-Watson statistic has been proposed to test for 
autocorrelation in the FEM (Bhargava, Franzini, & Narendranathan, 1983). 
Residuals are detennined from the regression using the mean deviation regression 
specified in equation 5.5 and the test statistic calculated as 
equation 5. 11 
to test against the null hypothesis, p = 0. W. Greene (personal 
communication, 15/4/2002) has however suggested that the estimated Durbin 
Watson statistic is only suggestive in these instances. 
The one-way cross-section (fund) effects FEM and REM can be estimated 
with an autocorrelation error structure. The one-way FEM and REM models 
·presented in equation 5.6 and equation 5.7 can be respecified with the following 
structure, the alt..:rnative hypothesis, added to each 
equation 5.12 
LIMDEP estimation uses the Cochrane-Orcutt transformation which omits 
the first observation (Cochrane & Orcutt, 1949). However, omitting the first 
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observation can "lead to a serious loss of efficiency" (Greene, 2000, p.582) though 
when the nwnber of cross·sections (funds) is large, as is the case for the majority of 
perfonnance periods here, 11omitting the first observations is less likely to cause the 
same problems" (Greene, 2000, p.582). In LIMDEP the estimate of p is obtained 
using the residuals from the regression using the cross·section (fund) mean 
deviations method discussed in section 5.6.1. The estimator of p used is specified 
(Greene, 1998, p.338) as 
f i;e,,e,.,-, 1[frs, -1;] 
r = ,~1 1=2 , .. 1 
fi;,;, 1[frs, -1;-K] 
,-1 , .. 2 1•1 
equation 5.13 
where 
K is the number of regressors; 
S1 is the number of observation for fund i. 
5.6. 7 Model Test Statistics 
The choice of model specification can be assisted through the estimation ofa 
number of test statistics. This section outlines the test statistics that are estimated 
and reported in Appendix III and Appendix IV. 
5.6.7.l FEM and REM versus POLS 
To support the use of the FEM over POLS an F·test can be employed to test 
which is the more efficient estimation method. The null hypothesis is that POLS 
with the same constant across all funds is the more efficient estimation method 
(Greene, 2000, p.562). This can be tested as 
F(n-l,nT-n-k)= (Rin~ -RJ.111R)l(n-l) 
(1-R,.,., )l(nT-n-K) 
where 
n is the number of funds; 
Tthe number of time periods; 
equation 5.14 
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K the number of regressors. 
If the dummy variable approach is used to estimate the model, the equivalent 
test is that the coefficients of all the dummy variables are zero. 
To test for REM against POLS, a Lagrange multiplier (LM) test using the 
OLS residuals, has been proposed by Breusch & Pagan (1980). When group sizes 
are equal, that is when there is the same number of observations for every fund, the 
LM test is calculated as 
equation 5.15 
with the null hypothesis that er; = 0. The statistic is distributed as chi-
squared and has one degree of freedom (Greene, 2000, p.573). When the cross-
section sizes are unequal, for example when there are different length histories for 
funds as is the case in some calculations here, the statistic is calculated as 
equation 5.16 
5.6.7.2 Time Effects 
A similar F-test can be used to test for the presence of a time effect either 
separately against the null of no time effect or in conj·Jnction with the cross-section 
(fund) effect against the same null. The question though must be raised as to the 
power of these tests where the number of funds and time periods is large, as is the 
case in this application as the null can be rejected fairly easily. The discussion in 
Chapter 6 will focus on all results as well as those guided by the test statistics. 
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5.6. 7.3 FEM vtrsus REM 
There appears a good deal ot' debate remains as to which model should be 
applied to the pooled time series estimation. Allison (1994) suggested that the 
choice should be based on the confidence held that th~ model is correctly specified. 
Allison (1994) also argued that if we believe that all variables have been included 
that jointly effects the dependent and independent variables then the REM should be 
used. If not the FEM should be used for the reasons previously alluded to. If there 
were such an omitted variable there would be a correlation between £11 and the 
independent regressors which will produce inconsistent estimates. This would appear 
to place the bias with the FEM as it would be reasonable to suspect that in most cases 
the researcher is unlikely to have supreme confidence that all variables have been 
included. 
Another view expressed by Petersen (1993) was that the choice of model 
should be guided by the sample characteristics and the assumptions made by the 
model, and specifically whichever appears closest. For example, in analysing survey 
data where a random sample of a population has been drawn from, and where the 
results would be extended to the population, the REM would be preferred. In the 
applications where there is a fixed number of cross-sections and there is no intent to 
extend to the population, then a FEM would be more appropriate. 
In the current application the issue of interest is the usefulness of ratings in 
terms of their relationship with future performance. As discussed in section 3.7 the 
Morningstar ratings are calculated based on funds within a particular subcategory. 
The regressions that will be estimated will also be for every fund rated within a 
selected subcategory, with the expectation that conclusions can be extended to all 
subcategories. This implies that the ratings apply only in the context of the funds 
within each subcategory. As each regression is only applied to funds within each 
subcategory the assumption of the FEM that the "differences between units can be 
viewed as parametric shifts of the regression function" (Greene, 2000, p.567) seems 
valid. If Morningstar considers there are not enough funds within any particular 
subcategory they are placed in a miscellaneous subcategory. Again this implies that 
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the ratings model is constant only within any subcategory which is again supports the 
rationale for applying the FEM. 
Hausman (1978) provides a specification test to compare estimated 
coefficients of both the FEM and REM.43 As identified previously, the REM 
assumes that the individual fund effects are uncorrelated with other regressors. 
Given no correlation, the null hypothesis, OLS and GLS should provide consistent 
estimators. Under the alternative, while OLS is consistent GLS is not. The Hausman 
test, tests the difference in the estimates from OLS and GLS. Failure to find 
significant differences supports the use of the FEM. 
Given the true coefficient vector, b, and estimated vector fi , the covariance 
of the difference vector is defined as 
Vaijb- Pl= Vaijbl+ VaitPl-Cov[b,Pl-Cov[b,PJ' equation 5.17 
"Hausman's essential result is that the covariance of an efficient estimator 
with its difference from an inefficient estimator is zero ..• " (Greene, 2000, p.576) that 
can be expressed as 
Cov[(b- in Pl =Cov[b,PJ-Var[Pl = 0 equation 5.18 
If this result is combined with the covariance of the difference vector it 
produces 
Var[b· Pl= Var(b]· Var[JJ] =~ equation5.19 
which produces a chi-squared test based on the Wald criterion of 
x'[Kl =(b· Pri:·'rh- Pi equation 5.20 
where K represents the degrees of freedom and :E is estimated using the 
respective covariance matrices of the OLS and REM. Significant and large statistics 
support the FEM specification. 
43 This summary of the test is taken from Greene (2000, p.576) 
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5.6.8 Goodness of Fit 
The results presented in Appendix III and Appendix IV include adjusted R2 
values for the one-way and two-way FEM estimations. Given that the REM is 
estimated by GLS regression, the R2 is not appropriate. It has been noted that "the 
computation of goodness-of-fit measures in panel data applications is somewhat 
uncommon" and alternative R2 measures that examine the varying dimensions of 
data may be of interest (Verbeek, 2000, p.320). These varying dimensions of data 
refer to the within cross-section (fund) variation and between cross-section (fund) 
variation. For example, using the symbols as previously defined, Verbeck (2000) 
presented the total variation as 
I NS INS IN ~~ - l ~~ - 2 ~ - - 2 
-"-4L.JP,,-P) =-"-4L,_/P,,-P,) +-L.JP,-P) 
NS 1-1 , .. r NS M , ... 1 N ,.r 
equation 5.21 
where 
Pis the overall sample average; 
P, is the average for fund i. 
The overall R2 is defined as 
2 • 2 • 
R,,..,!mll( /3) = corr { P,,.P;,}, 
the "within R2" can be estimated by 
2 • 2 "Ni •1,1,· -RK·iihm ( p N,') = corr { P,, -P, , P,1 - P; J 
and a "between R2" can be estimated by 
2 • 2 ·11 -
R,,,,,K'<!m (/3 11 )=coll {P1 .P1 } 
where 
A, = c;,h, is the estimated performance measure. 
FE denotes the estimator from the FEM; 
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B denotes the estimator from an OLS estimator using cross section means. 
Any estimator of the coefficient(s) can be used in these calculations, 
including the REM. However even given acceptance of the assumptions that 
underlie the REM, each R2 for the REM estimator will be smaller than the respective 
within, between and overall measures: "goodness-of fit-measures are not adequate to 
choose between alternative estimators" (Verbeek, 2000, p.321). 
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5.7 Summary 
The Morningstar TotalAccess CD pennits an empirical review of the 
.relationship between a fund rating and its subsequent performance. The argument 
for the expectation of a relationship is argued in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. A 
demonstration of its expectation for groups of individual investors and financial 
advisers is made in Chapter 4. This chapter has summarised the framework that will 
be used in Chapter 6 to examine the empirical evidence. 
Pooled time-series of cross-sections is the major regression method 
discussed. The attraction of the method for the data available is that it can make use 
of the time series of data available for the cross-section of managed funds in each 
Morningstar subcategory. The pooled time-series of cross-sections method offers a 
range of alternative specifications and the chapter concluded with the test statistics 
that can assist judgement of what specification best estimates the relationship 
between a fund rating and subsequent perfonnance. With the framework established 
the next chapter examines the empirical evidence. 
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CHAPTER6 
ESTIMATING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
MORNINGSTAR FUND RATINGS AND SUBSEQUENT 
PERFORMANCE - EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
The finnl component of the investigation of the use and usefulness of 
managed fund ratings is the investigation of the empirical evidence on any 
relationship between a fund's rating and its subsequent perfonnance. This is the 
contribution of this chaptt1r. 
The methodology outlined in Chapter 5 is applied to two of the largest 
Mom.ingstar subcategories: Australian Equity Trusts - General (DOST is the 
Morningstar abbreviation) and Superannuation Funds - Australian Equity (DSSB). 
The chapter commences with an overview of the two subcategories in terms of their 
ratings and historical performance and then addresses each of the three hypotheses 
presented in section 5.1. The full details of the many calculations summarised in this 
chapter are presented in Appendix III and Appendix IV. 
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6.1 Subcategory Overview 
Morningstar assign a fund rating relative to other funds within a 
subcategory.44 The relationship between the rating and subsequent performance 
must therefore be considered within the population of funds of each subcategory. As 
outlined in section 3.4 the Morningstar system of ratings commenced in August 1996 
with the fund QT rating, with fund QL, Q2 and Star rating beginning in January 
1998. This section provides an overview of the number of funds in each subcategory 
together with a preliminary analysis of the ratings and performance of these funds. 
The time period covered by the database of the DOST subcategory for rating 
purposes extends between August 1996 and February 2001. Over this time period 
there were 134 funds which were assigned a QT rating. Between January 1998 and 
February 2001 65 of these funds received a QL rating and subsequent Star rating. 
The number of fullds with a full quantitative and qualitative rating increased steadily 
since their inception and peaked in April 2001 as presented in Figure 6.1. The figure 
also identifies that the proportion of funds with each star rating varied over the time 
period. For example, in the DOST subcategory in March 1999 the largest number of 
funds had a two star rating whereas by February 2001 a majority had a four star 
rating. 
A longer time period was available for the DSSB subcategory and extends 
between August 1996 and August 2001. Over this time period 176 funds were 
assessed with a QT rating. Of these funds 69 received a QL rating and subsequent 
SW' rating. The number of funds with a full quantitative and qualitative rating also 
increased steadily since inception and peaked in January 2001, as presented in Figure 
6.2. 
44 The discussion of the Morningstar classification system is presented in section 3.2. 
254 
A comparison of the two subcategories indicates that the DGST subcategory 
had a more even distribution of star ratings whereas the DSSB subcategory had a 
much larger number of five star funds. A more detailed breakdown of the 
components of the Star ratings is presented in Table 6.1. Apart from the AR rating, 
all rating levels for the DSSB subcategory are larger than the DGST subcategory. 
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Figure 6.1 Profile of funds with a Morningstar Star rating between January 
1998 - February 2001- DGST Subcategory. 
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Figure 6.2 Profile of funds with a Morningstar Star rating between January 
1998 - August 2001- DSSB Subcategory. 
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Table 6.1 Subcategory Ratings Summary - DGST and DSSB Funds 
This table reports summary statistics for the full sample of funds in each of the subcategories to be 
analysed. A discussion of the construction of each rating measure is presented in section 3.7. For 
DOST funds the data is from the period 8/1996 to 2/2001, whereas for DSSB funds it ·is for the period 
8/1996 to 8/2001. Differences in mean rating scores between the subcategories is significant at 99"/o 
confidence level except for RRR. 
Observations Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Star rating 
QT rating 
QL rating 
Q2 rating 
Return rating (RR) 
Average risk rating (ARR) 
Downisde risk rating 
Risk return rating (RRR) 
Age rating (AR) 
Star rating 
QT rating 
QL rating 
Q2 rating 
Return rating (RR) 
Average risk rating (ARR) 
Downside risk rating 
Risk return rating (RRR) 
Age rating (AR) 
6.1.1 Rating Suspensions 
DSSB Subcategory 
1393 I 
5547 I 
1393 5.15 
1393 8 
5547 I 
5547 I 
5547 I 
5547 I 
5547 I 
DGST Subcategory 
1528 I 
5515 I 
1501 5.08 
1528 5.39 
5515 
5515 
5515 
5515 
5515 
5 
10 
9.18 
88.48 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
5 
10 
9.23 
88.3 
10 
10 
10 
10 
IO 
3.86 
5.39 
8.26 
55.66 
5.74 
7.62 
7.11 
5.87 
7.25 
3.28 
5.46 
8.21 
47.57 
5.38 
7.03 
6.59 
5.70 
8.30 
1.29 
2.31 
0.80 
16.41 
1.91 
1.91 
1.94 
1.96 
3.17 
1.28 
2.07 
0.87 
17.71 
1.93 
1.79 
1.79 
1.93 
2.90 
At various times a fund may have its rating suspended temporarily as 
Morningstar reassess their analysis in the light of new infonnation, provided by the 
fund company. As such whilst a fund may have a rating in the month before and 
after the suspension, they will not be included as a rated fund for that particular 
month. Hence the fund will not enter the regression analysis for the subsequent 12, 
24, 36 and 48 month perfonnance window, if available, for that month. 
6.1.2 Fund Performance 
A summary of the four perfonnance measW"es for each subcategory is 
presented in Table 6.2 and Table 6.3. Focussing on the risk-adjusted alpha measures 
and excluding entry/exit fees and entry/exit price spreads, for the DSSB funds all but 
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one of the one-factor alpha's are negative and whilst the four-factor alpha''s··-are .. 
positive, the largest for the 12-month period was 0.6 percent expre~sed cin an annual 
basis. For DOST funds the average perfonnance is relatively_ better. The high,est 
risk-adjusted alpha is 1.7 percent on an ~nual basis for the-'24-moiith four-factor 
alpha. Considering the level of average entry fees for DGST fund~ of 2.8 percent 
and 3.5 percent in DSSB funds, these funds were not able to recoup thCse costs. 
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Table 6.2 Monthly Performance - DSSB Funds 
Monthly perfonnance estimates for rolling 12, 24, 36, 48 and 60 month perfonnance periods ending 
between September 1996-August 200 I for DSSB subcategory funds in the Morningstar Total_Access 
CD. One-factor alpha is estimated using the regression (Rir - RJl)=a, + f3m1(R"'1 -Rp)+s1, where Ru, 
Rfi, Rm, represent the return in month I for fund i, a 13-week Treasury Note and the All Ordinaries 
Accumulation Index respectively, The monthly alpha 1ierfonnance eStimate for fund I is a,. The four-
factor alpha capt!lres exposure to market, size, style and fixed interest portfolios 
using( R., - Rft)=a1 + P .. d R,., - Rft )+ fJ.in( R,,;i - R,,) + f111J Rn - R,1, )+ Pnf RN - Rp) + e11 • Using 
the notation of Fama & French (1993) fJ.w.1 captures exposure to a SML portfolio where Rs, is the 
return on the S&P/ASX Small Ordinaries Index and R1., the S&P/ASX\00. fJmJ captures exposure to 
the HML portfolio where Rr, is the MSC) Value Index and Re;, the MSC( Growth Index. Following 
Gruber ( 1996) fJFt estimates exposure to fixed interest securities with R1.1 a composite of government 
and corporate debt measured by the UBS Warburg-Dillon Reed Composite Index. Each regression 
uses White (1980) to provide a heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimator. The Sharpe 
Ratio is calculated as Sharpe Ratio,,. (R, - R 1 )I er,. The raw returns measure is the geometric monthly 
return calculated as ' ( • r . Index data sourced from Datastream and 
<><·<>nw1ri<'M11mhb•l/dum"' nu+r.) -1 
,., 
Morningstar TotalAccess CD. All alpha estimates are significantly different to zero at 99% confidence 
level, exceet the 12-month one-factor Aleha. 
Observations Min. Max. Meao Std. Dev. 
All funds 
Sharpe Ratio 
12 month 5429 -5.331E-OI l.792E+OO J.539E·OI 2. IOOE-01 
24 month 4562 -3.461E-OI l.029E+o0 1.531 E-01 1.340E-01 
36month 3773 -2.972E-01 5.215E-01 J.344E-01 9.482E-02 
48 month 3101 -l.852E-OI 4.286E-01 1.360E-01 8.403E-02 
60 month 2560 -1.307E-OI 3.940E-OI l.403E-01 7.316E-02 
Raw Returns 
12 month 5429 -3.071E-02 3. 767E-02 7.668E-03 6.438E-03 
24 month 4562 -1.451E-02 2.499E-02 8.381E-03 4.489E-03 
36 month 3773 -9.4 \3E-03 J.986E-02 8.263E-03 3.502E-03 
48 month 3101 -5.92\E-03 l.918E-02 8.397E-03 3.088E-03 
60 month 2560 -3.319E-03 1.969E~02 8.751E-03 2.679E-03 
One-factor Alpha 
12 month 3731 -3.230&02 3.041E-02 -l.617E-05 5.541E-03 
24 month 3767 -2.390E-02 l.562E-02 -3.006E-04 4.356E-03 
36 month 3773 -3.230E-02 1.059E-02 -4.343E-04 3.739E-03 
48 month 3090 -l.577E-02 I.062E-02 -4.493E-04 3.0ISE-03 
60 month 2560 -1.050E-02 9.185E-03 -3.51 IE-04 2.690E-03 
Four-factor Alpha 
12 month 3716 -3. l 15E-02 2633E-02 6.419E-04 5.043E-03 
24 month 3764 -2.276E-02 \,819E-02 4.282E-04 3.947E-03 
36 month 3773 -1.995E-02 l.192E-02 2.307E-04 3.54\E-03 
48 month 3090 -1.506E-02 9.908E-03 I .408E-04 3.042E-03 
60month 2560 -9.868E-03 8.082E-03 l.404E-04 2.575E-03 
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Table 6.3 Monthly Performance - DGST Funds 
Monthly performance estimates for rolling 12, 24, 36 and 48 month performance periods ending 
between September 1996-February 2001 for DGST subcategory funds in the Morningstar TotalAccess 
CD. One-factor alpha is estimated using the regression (R1, -R.fl)=a1 + Pm1(R,..1 - Rp)+e1, where R;1, 
Rft, R,..1 represent return in month t for fund ;, a 13-week Treasury Note and the All Ordinaries 
Accumulation Index respectively. The monthly one-factor alpha performance estimate for fund i is 
denoted by a 1• The four-factor alpha performanc.e estimate captures exposure to market, size, style 
and fixed interest · portfolios using 
( Ri, - Rp)=a1 + {J.,i( R,..1 - Rfl )+ P.m( R,'il - R,.,J+ /JYl;JRr, - R11, )+ Pn( RH - Rft)+ e1,. Using the 
notation of Fama & French (1993) fJsu captures exposure to a SML portfolio where Rs, is the return on 
the S&P/ASX Small Ordinaries Index and Ru the S&P/ASXIOO. /3ft;i captures exposure to the HML 
portfolio where R1) is the MSC) Value Index and Re;, the MSCI Growth Index. Following Gruber 
{ 1996) fJH estimates exposure to fixed interest securities with Rt·) a composite of government and 
corporate debt measured by the UBS Warburg-Dillon Reed Composite Index. Each regression uses 
White (1980) to provide a heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimator. The Sharpe Ratio 
is calculated as Sharpe Rntio =(R, -R1 )la,, The raw returns measure is the geometric monthly retum 
Index data sourced from Datastream and calculated as ( • J''" Ci!'t,mrtrlcMfln/h/yll,·tr,m= fl(/+,;) - t' 
... 
Morningstar TotalAccess CD. All alpha estimates are significantly different to zero at 99% confidence 
level. 
Observations Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Sharpe Ratio 
12 month 5642 -J.654E+OO l.782E+OO 2.00lE-01 2.371E-Ol 
24 month 5027 -2.415E--Ol 9,00IE-01 l.985E-Ol l.430E-01 
36 month 4512 -2309&01 5.581E-01 l.677E-Ol 1.097E-Ol 
48 month 4110 -1.579E--OI 5.581E-01 l.725E-OI l.OOSE-01 
Raw Returns 
12 month 5642 -2.814E-02 5.886E-02 l.041E-02 7.707E-03 
24 month 5027 -1.576E-02 2.865E-02 l.090E-02 5.034E-03 
36 month 4512 -5.174E-03 2.200E-02 1.025E-02 4.039E-Ol 
48 month 4110 -5.128E-03 2.367E-02 l.078E-02 3.3578-03 
Alpha one-factor 
12 month 4512 -2.476E-02 S.444E-02 1.247E-03 6.945E-03 
24 month 4512 -2.214E-02 2.560E-02 I .263E-03 4.803E-03 
36 month 4510 -1.206E-02 l.281E-02 I.I 14E-03 3.628E--03 
48 month 4110 -8.032E·03 l.565E-02 l.224E-03 3.139E--03 
Alpha four-factor 
12 month 4512 -2.731 E-02 4.187E-02 l.416E-03 6.544E-03 
24 month 4512 -2.543E-02 2.018E-02 1.455E-03 4.639E·03 
36 month 4512 -1.327E-02 l.384E-02 I .355E-03 3.758E-03 
48 month 4110 -7.816E-03 I.254E-02 1.373E-03 3.l 15E-03 
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It is of interest to compare the performance of the funds in the period prior to 
ratings being introduced, the selection period, and after the ratings were introduced, 
the perfonnance period and thC focus of analysis, to examine whether the nature of 
the periods is different. 
In Table 6.4 a summary is presented ofperfonnance for the 60-month period 
up to August 1996 and the 60-month period from September 1996 for the DSSB 
subcategory. For 13 of the possible 20 performance and time period combinations, 
the two periods were significantly different. In IO of the 13 occasions the 
performance was lower in the latter period. For the DGST subcategory performance 
is significantly different in all but two of 16 possible perfonnance and time period 
combinations. In IO of the 14 significant differences, the latter time period was 
larger. 
In summary this data indicates that the period over which performance data 
could have been used to inform a rating was, in terms of the respective performance 
measures, in the majority of cases significantly different from the subsequent 
performance evaluation periods. 
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Table 6.4 Monthly Performance - Selection and Performance Period - DSSB Funds 
Monthly perfonnance estimates for rolling 12, 24, 36, 48 and 60 month perfonnance periods ending between September 1991-August 1996 and Septemberl996--August 2001 
for all DSSB funds in the Morningstar TotalAccess CD. One-factor alpha is estimated using the regression (R,, - RJI) =a,+ /3,..;(R,., - RJI )+e., where R11, Rf/, R,..,represent the 
return in month t for fund i, a 13-week Treasury Note and the All Ordinaries Accumulation Index respectively. The monthly one-factor alpha performance estimate for fund i 
is a,. Toe four-factor alpha captures exposures to a market, size, style and fixed interest portfolios 
using(R;, - Rft)=a
1 
+ fJ .. ,( R.,, - R11 )+ f3SLt( Rs, - Ru)+ Pl'u.f R,,, -R,;,)+ f3Fo( RFr - Rp) +e,,. Using the notation of Fama& French (1993) /JSL; captures exposure to a SML 
portfolio where Rs, is the return on the S&P/ASX Small Ordinaries Index and RLJ the S&PIASXIOO. Pm captures exposure to the HML portfolio where Rn is the MSCI Value 
Index and Ro, the MSCI Growth Index. Following Gruber (1996) /3Ft estimates exposure to fixed interest securities with RFt a composite of government and corporate debt 
measured by the UBS Warburg-Dillon Reed Composite Index. Each regression uses White (1980) to provide a heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimator. The 
Sharpe Ratio is calculated as Sharpe Ratio:: (R -R,)I~ . The raw returns measure is the geometric monthly return calculated as . ,.c.R [II" ]"" 1. Index data , , (,e,Jm<!lrir:Mmum.v enmi= (/+,;) -
" 
sourced from Datastream and Morningstar TotalAccess CD. For alpha measures,• denotes significant difference from zero at a 99 percent level. A significant difference 
between the mean scores of the two periods is indicated by• where differences are significant at a 95 percent confidence level. 
September 1991-August 1996 September 1996-August 200 I 
Four-factor Alpha 
N Minimum Maximum M~n Std.nev. N Minimum Maximum Mean StdJ)ev. 
12 month 1788 -8.002E-01 1.49IE+OO 1.414E-Ol 3.190E-01 4632 -5.33 l E-0 I l.145E+OO l.248E-Ol I.770E-Ol 
24month 1159 -1.383E-O I 5.043E-Ol l.301E-Ol l.215E-01 3136 -2.801E-01 5.885£-01 1.309E-01 l.l 17E-01 
36month* 719 -6.653£-03 3.466E-Ol 1.472£-01 6.858£-02 1907 -1.288£-01 4.554E-Ol l.307E-01 7.936E-02 
48month* 358 2.871£-02 2.832£-01 1.302E-Ol 4.306£-02 944 -5.76IE-02 3.l 17E-OI l.l99E-OI 6.599E-02 
60month 25 7.845E-02 2.772E-OI l.241E-01 4.500E-02 70 -3.270£-02 2.823E-01 l.357E-OI 5.815£-02 
12 month* 1788 -l.672E-02 4. I09E-02 8.413£-03 9.556£-03 4632 -3.071£-02 3.767E-02 6.903£-03 6.187£-03 
24month* 1159 -1.533E-03 2.686E-02 8.969E-03 4.437£-03 3136 -1.385£-02 2.480E-02 7.568£-03 3.985&03 
36 month* 719 3.472£-03 l.761E-02 9.490£-03 2.697£-03 1907 -4.140£-03 l.931E-02 7.788E-03 2.9IOE-03 
48 month* 358 5.496£-03 1.437£-02 9.166E-03 1.675£-03 944 -4.073£-04 l.245E-02 7.404E-03 2.378E-03 
60month 25 7.352E-03 l.421E-02 8.823£-03 l.534E-03 70 l.789E-03 l.150E-02 8.I02E-03 l.832E-03 
12 month* 743 -1.087£-02 l.884E-02 -6.193£-05 3.037E-03 3291 -3.230£-02 3.041E-02 -l.672E-04 5.449£-03 
24month* 743 -4.219£-03 1.078£-02 4.015£-04• 2.599E-03 2698 -2.390E-02 1.562E-02 -2.423E-04• 3.907£-03 
36month* 719 -t.087E-02 L884E-02 4.762E-04• 2.825£-03 1907 -1.886£-02 I.059E-02 -1.414E-04• 2.802E-03 
48month* 358 -2.775£-03 6.944E-03 2.653E-04• l.724E-03 933 -9.918£-03 4.046£-03 -3.01 lE-04• 2.260E-03 
60month 25 -l.849E-03 6.869£-03 2.701£-04 1.925E-03 70 -8. I 70E-03 4.286£-03 3.264£-07 2.246E-03 
12month~ 743 -6.217E-03 I.33 IE-02 I.623E-04 2.913E-03 3276 -3.115£-02 2.633E-02 5.762£-04• 5.086£-03 
24month* 743 -4.756£-03 9.995£-03 2.456£-04. 2.373£-03 2695 -2.276£-02 l.819E-02 6.146£-04" 4.067£-03 
36month 719 -3.614£-03 8.254E-03 4.406£-04• 2.210E-03 1907 -t.635E-02 1.192£-02 6.067E-04• 3.392£-03 
48month* 358 -2.314£-03 7.171E-03 4.395£-04• 2.045E-03 933 -1.086E-02 7.543£-03 7 .362E-04• 2.873£-03 
60month 25 -1.782E-03 5.793£-03 5.098£-04 2.037E-03 70 -8.303£-03 7.240E-03 9. 952£-04" 2.678£-03 
Shame Ratio 
Raw Returns 
One-factor Alpha 
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Table 6.5 Monthly Performance - Selection and Performance Period - DGST Funds 
Monthly performance estimates for rolling 12, 24, 36 and 48 month performance periods ending between March 1991-Augustl 996 and September 1996-February 2001 for all 
OSSB funds in the Morningstar TotalA.ccess CD. One-factor alpha is estimated using the regression (R;, - Rft }=a; + {J,.,1 (R,,., - Rp )+ ei, where R;i, RJi. R..u represent the return 
in month t for fund i, a 13-week Treasury Note and the All Ordinaries Accumulation Index respectively. The monthly one-factor alpha performance estimate for fund i is a,. 
The four-factor alpha captures exposures to a market, size, style and fixed interest portfolios 
using( R,, - Rp)=a1 + {3.,,( R.,, - Rft)+ {JSLJ( Rs, - Rll)+ f3va.(R.., - ~.)+ f3FO(Rf'l - Rft)+ E.,. Using the notation of Fama& French (1993) Psucaptures exposure to a SML 
portfolio where Rs, is the return on the S&P/ASX Small Ordinaries Index and Ru the s&P/ASXIOO. /Jn;, captures exposure to the HML portfolio where Rn is the MSCI Value 
Index and Rt,1 the MSCI Growth Index. Following Gruber (1996) /Jrrestimates exposure to fc.:ed interest securities with RFI a composite of government and cOipOrate debt 
measured by the UBS Warburg-Dillon Reed Composite Index. Each regression uses White (1980) to provide a heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimator. The 
Sharpe Ratio is calculated as s-Ratio= (R -R1 )la • The raw returns measure is the geometric monthly return calculated as . (rr" J''• . Index data ' ' (,,,.,..,etr,cl.lanth/y/lelrml= ( /+,;) -1 
" 
sourced from Datastream and Morningstar TotalAccess CD. For alpha measures,• denotes significant difference from zero at a 99 percent level and. A significant difference 
between the mean scores of the two periods is indicated by • where differences are significant at a 99 percent confidence level, except for one-factor alpha and Sharpe Ratio 
where significance is at the 95 percent level. 
March 1991-August 1996 September 1996-February 2001 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std.Oev. N Minimum Maximum Mean Std.Oev. 
Shame Ratio 12 month• 3158 -l.4266+-00 l.470E+OO l.814E-Ol 3.4936-01 4643 -l.654E+o0 l.017E+OO 1.621E-Ol 2.003E-Ol 
24month• 2192 -4.688E-01 5.444E-OI 1.1296-01 l.43IE·01 3134 -2415E-01 6.I90E-Ol 1.590E-OI I.159E-Ol 
36 month 1322 -2.068E-OI 4.331E-Ol 1.495E-01 8.746E-02 1810 -1.449E-01 3.771E-OI I.520E-01 9.3986-02 
48month• 483 -7.407E-02 3.955E-OI l.479E-01 8.430E-02 623 - l.449E-Ol 3.651£-01 1.61 lE-Ol t.006E-Ol 
Raw Returns 12 month• 3158 -4.564E-02 8.335E-02 l.074E-02 1.263E-02 4643 -2.814E-02 3.718E-02 9.330E-03 7.298E-03 
24month• 2192 -2.159E-02 3.583E-02 8.971E-03 5.620E-03 3134 -l.576E-02 2.477E-02 9.361E-03 4.598E-03 
36month• 1322 8.203E-04 2.055E-02 l.021E-02 3.2396-03 1810 -5.174E-03 1.790E-02 9.158E-03 3.698E-03 
48month• 483 2.71 IE-03 1.874E-02 9.847E-03 2.586E-03 623 -1.0SOE-03 l.643E-02 l.005E--02 2.796E-03 
One-factor Aloha 12 month"' 1799 -4.918E-02 4.604E-02 -5.975E-o4• 5.678E-03 3732 -2.476E-02 4.158E-02 7.182E-04• 6.654E-03 
24month• 1799 -2.395E-02 2.078E-02 -1.262E-04 3.918E-03 2842 -2.214E-02 2.lSIE-02 5.469E-041 4.416E-03 
36month 1322 -7.409E-03 8.618E-03 3.460E-04" 2.994E-03 1808 -l.206E-02 8.964E-03 4.667E-04" 3.578E-03 
48 month"' 483 -6.820E-03 1.067E-02 5.850E-041 2.943E-03 623 -6.708E-03 6.922E-03 9.399E-04" 2.675E-03 
Four-factor Aloha 12 month• 1799 -J.906E-02 2.749E-02 -5.241E-04" 4.494E-03 3732 -2.731£-02 4.187E-02 l.244E-03" 6.596E-03 
24 month"' 1799 -1.6896-02 I.28lE-02 -2.086E-041 3.262E--03 2842 -2.543E-02 2.018E-02 1.286E-031 4.793E-03 
36month"' 1322 -t.133E-02 7.947E-03 l.072E-04" 2.748E-03 1810 -1.327E-02 1.384E-02 l.017E-031 4.235E--03 
48 month* 483 -7.147E-03 ~.373E-03 l.799E-04 2.486E-03 623 -7.816E-OJ: 1.016E-02 l.497E-031 3.373E-03 
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6.1.3 Duplicate Funds 
The issue of duplicate funds in the DSSB subcategory was raised in section 
5.5.2. These duplicate funds have been excluded from the previous perfonnance 
discussion. Table 6.6 presents summary statistics for a sample that includes all 
individual funds irrespective of whether they are duplicates or not of other funds in 
the DSSB subcategory. These can be compared with the figures in Table 6.2 that 
excludes duplicate funds. The sample that includes the duplicates has perfonnance 
measures with a higher mean and a lower standard deviation for every perfonnance 
measure and time period than the sample that excludes the duplicate funds. This 
would suggest that the funds that are duplicated, not surprisingly, are the relatively 
more successful ones. The ratings presented in Table 6. 7 for the sample excluding 
duplicates also reflect this pattern. The full set of funds, presented in Table 6. 7, have 
higher mean scores with the exception of QL, ARR, and DRR. 
Including these funds in the analysis would therefore introduce a bias by 
overweighting funds that had perfonned better and generally assessed as likely to 
perform better in the future. Previous work that has examined this subcategory of 
funds (Drew & Stanford, 200 la) may. therefore overstate 1he perfonnance of these 
funds. A consequence of excluding duplicate funds is however a reduction in the 
number of funds in the analysis. The number who received a QT rating reduces to 
128 of which 51 received a QL rating and Star rating. In any one month the 
maximum number of funds who received a QT (Star) rating was 12 l (SO). 
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Table 6.6 Monthly Performance - DSSB Including Duplicate Funds 
Monthly perfonnance estimates for rolling 12, 24, 36, 48 and 60 month performance periods ending 
between August 1996-August 2001 for DSSB funds including duplicates. One-factor alpha is 
estimated using the regression (R,1 _ RJI) =a,+ po,j(R.,, - Rp )+e11 where R,,, Rfl, R,,,,represent the return 
in month t for fund ;, a 13-week Treasury Note and the All Ordinaries Accumulation Index 
respectively, The monthly one-factor alpha performance estimate for fund i is a,. The four-factor 
alpha captures exposures to a market, size, style and fixed interest portfolios 
using( R11 - Rp)=a, + P .. d R.,, - Rft)+ P.vi R.,;, - RM)+ P111l Rn - Ro,)+ Pn( RH - R.nJ+ £11 • Using 
the notation of Fama & French (1993) /Jsi.1 captures exposure to a SML portfolio where R~ is the 
return on the S&P/ASX Small Ordinaries Index and R,.1 the S&P/ASXlOO. /Jn;1 captures exposure to 
the HML portfolio where Rn is the MSCI Value Index and Rn, the MSC! Growth Index. Following 
Gruber ( 1996) {31•1 estimates exposure to fixed interest securities with R1,) a composite of government 
and corporate debt measured by the UBS Warburg-Dillon Reed Composite Index. Each regression 
uses White (1980) to provide a heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimator. The Sharpe 
Ratio is calculated as SharpcRatio=(R, R,ila,, The raw returns measure is the geometric monthly 
return calculated as (n )"" . Index data sourced from Oatastream and 
Cieom,:1ri<'Af1,n//1/yl(~1um .. 1111 +,;) -1 
"' Morningstar Tota\Access CD, All alpha estimates are significantly different to zero at a 99% 
confidence level, except 12-month one-factor Alpha which is significant at a 95 percent confidence 
level. 
Observations Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. 
Sharpe Ratio 
12 month 8191 -5.331&01 1.792E+o0 1.585E,01 2.038E-01 
24month 7121 -3.461E-OI 1.029Et00 1.567E-Ol 1.284E-Ol 
36 month 6000 -2.972E-01 5.215E-Ol 1.371E-01 9.190E-02 
48 month 4990 -1.852E-Ol 4.286E-01 l.391E-Ol 7.880E-02 
60month 4133 -1.307E-01 3.940E-OI l.426E-01 6.771E-02 
Raw Returns 
12 month 8191 -3.071E-02 3.767E-02 7.8328-03 6.341E-03 
24month 7121 -1.451&02 2.499E-02 8.518E-03 4.347E-03 
36 month 6000 -9.413E-03 I .986E-02 8.353E-03 3.375E,03 
48 month 4990 -5.921E-03 l.918E-02 8.510E-03 2.849E-03 
60month 4133 -3.319&03 1.969E-02 8.843E-03 2.427E-03 
One-factor Alpha 
12 month 5943 ·3.230E-02 3.041E-02 1.364E-04 5.213E-03 
24month 5991 -2.390E-02 1.562E-02 -1.81 IE-04 4.128E-03 
36 month 6000 -3.230E-02 l.059E-02 -3.655E-04 3.482&03 
48month 4979 -l.577E-02 l.062E-02 -3.689E-04 2.742E-03 
60 month 4133 -l.050E-02 9.185E-03 -2.761E-04 2.358E-03 
Four-factor Alpha 
12 month 5943 -3.115E-02 2.633E-02 9.01 IE-04 4.716E-03 
24 month 5991 -2276E-02 l.819E-02 6.184E-04 3.710E-03 
36month 6000 -l.995E-02 1.192E-02 3.381E-04 3.327E-03 
48 month 4979 -1.506E-02 9.908E-03 2.50\E-04 2.813E-03 
60month 4133 -9.868E-03 8.082E-03 2.504E-04 2.301E-03 
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Table 6.7 DSSB Ratings Summary- Including Duplicate Funds 
This table reports summary ratings statistics for the period 8/1996 to 81200 I for the DSSB 
subcategory including funds which are duplicates, discussed in section 5.5.2. A discussion of the 
construction of each rating measure is presented in section 3.7. 
Star rating 
QT rating 
QL rating 
Q2 rating 
Return rating (RR) 
Average risk rating (ARR) 
Downisde risk rating 
Risk return rating (RRR) 
Age rating (AR) 
Observations Minimum Maximum Meari 
1900 I S 3.91 
8333 I 10 S.65 
1900 S.IS 9.18 8.22 
1900 8 88,48 56.26 
8333 I 10 S.77 
8333 10 7.59 
8333 10 7,07 
8333 10 S.85 
8333 10 7.74 
Std. Deviation 
1.28 
2.22 
0.83 
IS.SO 
1.88 
1.97 
2.01 
1.93 
2.94 
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6.2 Contemporaneous Ratings and Performance Measures 
The range of available performance measures has been discussed in section 
2.3. While the research companies could rely on these measures as the basis for their 
ratings it has been argued in section 3.5.1 that there is a motivation for the research 
company to distinguish themselves from such measures. The companies do make a 
point of identifying that they rely on forward-looking qualitative assessments aside 
from the quantitative inputs, which are the basis for the performance measures. It is 
therefore of interest to explore the correlation of the various ratings and the 
corresponding contemporaneous performance measures. 
In the event that the ratings and performance measures are the same, the 
analysis of ratings and subsequent performance becomes one of a related literature, 
performance persistence. Therefore the first hypothesis to examine is whether 
ratings and contemporaneous perfonnance are perfectly correlated. The correlation 
coeffcient was calculated for each rating sub-component and its contemporaneous 
performance measure using available 12, 24, 36, 48, and 60-month histories .. 
The results in the top panels of Table 6.8 and Table 6.9 suggest a wide degree 
of correlation between the various rating measures and the four contemporaneous 
performance measures. There is however a common pattern in the level of 
correlation over time periods and across ratings measures, for both subcategories. 
The correlations are greater for the DGST funds relative to the DSSB 
subcategory. In most cases the correlations are lowest for the 12-month period 
though there are exceptions. For example in the DGST subcategory the correlation 
between ARR and perfonnance is lowest for the 36 or 48-month period and the 
correlation for AR is also low for the 36-month period. In the DSSB subcategory the 
correlation between the QL rating and perfonnance is also low for the 24-month 
period. Each of these ratings also have the lowest correlation overall in each 
subcategory. 
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In each subcategory all but two of the rating measures are positively 
correlated with the contemporaneous perfonnance measures. For DGST funds the 
ARR is negative for three of the. four performance measures though only one 
estimate is significant. The Q~ also has a negative correlation for two of the four 
measures though neither is significant. For OSSB funds the AR and QL are 
negatively correlated though onl). the AR has more than one estimate that is 
significant and this is not across all p...~rformance measures. 
The lowest correlations for both subcategories are for the AR across all 
performance measures. The QT rating is perhaps not surprisingly strongly correlated 
with each performance measure and highest for a three-year performance period. Of 
the components of the QT rating, the RR and RRR have consistently the highest 
correlation with each perfonnance measure. The QL rating, while having much 
lower correlations than the quantitative measures remain in the majority positive with 
the exception of some estimates for a 12-month perfonnance period which are 
negative. Whilst being promoted as a forward looking measure it appears that the 
longer tenn historical perfonnance of a fund remains related to the level of the QL 
rating the fund receives. The overall rating measures, the Q2 and Star ratings, are 
again positive and of similar level to the QT rather than the QL rating. 
6.2.1 Reduced Sample Correlations - Rating Changes 
While ratings may be observed and are effective at the end of each month, 
unless specifically noted by Morningstar, in many instances these reflect no change 
on the observation of the previous month. In the instance of the QL rating, this is 
most often due to the relatively infrequent assessments conducted. In the case of the 
(t and Star rating this may also be due to the QT rating being unchanged for a period 
of time. The correlation coefficients were estimated for a reduced sample that only 
included the original and any subsequent change in the QT, QT components, QL, Q2, 
and Star rating. 
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The bottom panel in Table 6.8 and Table 6.9 present the correlation 
coefficient using only the reduced sample of announcements. The coefficients for 
the reduced sample, in the majority of cases are smaller than for the full sample, 
though not unifonnly across each rating measure. In each subcategory the majority 
of AR correlations, and to a lesser extent QL correlations, are no longer significant in 
the reduced sample. In. the DGST subcategory the majority of QL, Q2 and Star 
ratings increase. However the same overall pattern as for the full set of observations, 
described previously, remain. 
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Table6,8 Performance and Ratings Correlations -DSSB Funds 
This table reports the correlation between comtemporaneous rating and performance measures for the 
DSSB subcategory over the different length periods ending between August 1996 - August 2001. For 
all rating measures except the Star rating, the value reflects the estimated Pearson correlation 
coefficient ror the Star rating, each performance measure has been divided into quintiles to reflect 
the S Star ratings and a Spearman Rho Rank correlation estimated. The top panel reflects correlations 
for all monthly observations whereas the bottom panel uses observations in the month a rating was 
first issued or subsequently changed. Coefficient based on OSSB funds excluding duplicates. 
Correlations are si6;!!ificant at 95% confidence level exceet those marked with an asterisk. 
Period RR ARR DRR RRR 
Rating 
AR QT QL 6' STAR 
All Observations 
Raw 12 month 0.309 0.120 0.208 0.392 -0.016* 0.200 -0.021• 0.334 0.247 
Returns 24month 0.516 0.257 0.384 0.539 -0,044 0.394 0.068 0.602 0.447 
36month 0.669 0.445 0.602 0.672 -0,043 0.636 0.174 0.633 0.419 
48 month 0.546 0.404 O.S IO 0.588 -0.031 0.578 0.262 0.614 0.455 
60month 0.404 0.359 0.468 0.542 0.526 0.177 0.578 0.499 
Alpha 12 month 0.521 0.232 0.376 0.555 0.065 0.455 -0.081 0.455 0.347 24 month 0.702 0.416 0.585 0.721 0.050 0.654 0.030* 0.705 0.558 One-Factor 36month 0.701 0.493 0.655 0.736 0.027 0.706 0.157 0.696 0.450 
48 month 0.642 0.477 0.652 0.719 0.027* 0.716 0.186 0.616 0.470 
60 month 0.550 0.390 0.589 0.643 0.645 0.195 0,402 0.262 
12 month 0.548 0.241 0.397 0.576 0.061 0.476 -0.059 0.453 0.323 
Alpha 24 month 0.681 0.348 0.546 0.700 0.037 0.612 0.043* 0.665 0.507 
Four-Factor 36month 0.689 0.431 0.610 0.716 0.025* 0.662 0.157 0,668 0.440 
48 month 0.645 0.432 0.618 0.700 0.024* 0.674 0.141 0.595 0.455 
60 month 0.543 0.297 0.519 0.609 0,570 0.133 0.383 0.247 
12 month 0.280 0.117 0.195 0.412 -0.005• 0.201 -0.009* 0.339 0.261 
24 month 0.499 0.272 0.408 0.591 -0.030 0.418 0.045* 0.607 0.557 
Sh"P' 36 month 0.718 0.480 0.675 0.752 -0.019* 0.703 0.131 0.664 0.439 
Ratio 48month 0.577 0.426 0.551 0.670 -0.017* 0.624 0.212 0.669 0.498 
60month 0.481 0.398 0.549 0.631 0.601 0.113 0.652 0.522 
Rating Change Observations 
Raw 12 month 0.232 0.010• 0.125 0.335 -0.014* 0.137 -0.023* 0.177 0.177 
Returns 24month 0.540 0.(\91 0.348 0.497 -0.108 0.342 0.107* 0.363 0.498 
36month 0.682 0.321 0.552 0.638 -0.043* 0.611 0.129* 0.357 0.400 
48month 0.491 0.260 0.515 0.550 0,099* 0.542 0.221 0.376 0.347 
60month 0.355 0.270 0.483 0.522 0.516 0.270 0.355 0.484 
Alpha 12 month 0.493 0.088 0.344 0.489 0.093* 0.351 -0.116* 0.253 0232 24 month 0.700 0.231 0.532 0.697 0.032* 0.560 0,055* 0.412 0.530 One-Factor 36month 0.713 0.273 0.603 0.688 0.020• 0.667 0.142* 0.394 0.304 
48month 0.592 0.283 0.646 0.655 0.020• 0.692 0.199 0.370 0.222 
60month 0.449 0.195 0.604 0.557 0.604 0.358 0.223 0.014 
12 month 0.508 0.105 0.350 0.526 o.o5o• 0.387 -0.172 0.224 0.156 
Alpha 24month 0.682 0.199 0.524 0.661 .().035* 0.542 0.029* 0.365 0.472 
Four-Factor 36month 0.684 0.256 0.562 0.656 -0.008* 0.635 0.114* 0.380 0.339 
48month 0.603 0.277 0.628 0.637 0.018* 0.663 0.12• 0.372 0.304 
60 month 0.450 0.142 0.559 0.526 0.554 0.306 0.221 0.120• 
12 month 0.258 0.039* 0.133 0.375 .().022* 0.178 -0.075* 0.181 0.218 
24month 0.536 0.149 0.398 0.566 -0.151 0.434 -0.044* 0.331 0.538 
Sharpe 36month 0.717 0.380 0.645 0.699 -0.058* 0.703 0.177 0.370 0.352 
Ratio 48month 0.536 0.340 0.572 0.663 0.058* 0.605 0.112• 0.385 0.382 
60month 0.443 0.312 0.550 0.607 0.587 0.155* 0.403 0,466 
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Table 6.9 Performance and Ratings Correlations - DGST funds 
This table reports the correlation between comtemporaneous rating and perfonnance measures for the 
DGST subcategory over the different length periods ending between August 1996 - February 2001. 
For all rating measures except the Star rating, the value reflects the estimated Pearson correlation. For 
the Star rating, each performance measure has been divided into quintiles to reflect the 5 Star ratings 
and a Spearman Rho Rank correlation estimated. The top panel reflects correlations for all monthly 
observations whereas the bottom panel uses observations in the month a rating was first issued or 
subsequently changed. Correlations are significant at 95% confidence level except those marked with 
an asterisk. 
Rating 
RR ARR DRR RRR AR QT QL Q STAR 
All Observations 
Raw 12 month 0.470 0.147 0.329 0.532 0,036 0.394 -0.022* 0.468 0.384 
Returns 24 month 0.672 0.184 0.41•\ 0.682 0.083 0.630 0.178 0.735 0.631 
36month 0.735 0.061 0.561 0.673 0.036 0.650 0.363 0.699 0.607 
48 month o.737 -0.005• 0.433 0.678 0.061 0,604 0.357 0.630 0.593 
12 month 0.664 0.167 0.495 0.640 0.034 0.624 0.015* 0.658 0.559 Alpha 24 month 0.810 0.133 0.595 0.758 0.061 0.727 0.200 0.827 0.766 One-Factor 36 month 0.840 0,047 0.595 0.769 0.054 0.724 0.379 0.775 0.706 
48 month 0.841 -0.086 0.508 0.719 0.057 0.656 0.379 0.676 0.653 
Alpha 12month 0.651 0.189 0.489 0.635 0.025* 0.606 0.081 0.696 0.620 
Four-Factor 24 month 0.776 0.151 0.583 0.730 0.038 0.695 0.202 0.838 0.784 
36month 0.788 0.084 0.570 0.726 0.029* 0.678 0.375 0.840 0.785 
48month 0.815 -0.011• 0.531 0.717 0.032• 0.653 0.394 0.786 0.770 
12 month 0.415 0.181 0.314 0.526 0.021 • 0.363 -0.006* 0.403 0,406 
Sharpe 24month 0.646 0.224 0.436 0.708 0.077 0.634 0.160 0.758 0.665 
Ratio 36 month 0.756 0.!09 0.612 0.721 0.016* 0.692 0.337 0.765 0.709 
48month 0.755 0.145 0.581 0.757 0.033 0.703 0.326 0.780 0.730 
Rating Change Observations 
Raw 12 month 0.456 0.196 0.334 0.4&3 -0.069' 0,385 0.058* 0.369 0.364 
Returns 24month 0.664 0.258 0.517 0.674 -0. 174 0.620 0.400 0.809 0.725 
36 month 0.699 0,078 0.516 0.620 -0.243 0.581 0.382 0.820 0.787 
48month 0.699 0.002• 0.389 0.619 0.136* 0.518 0.255 0.618 0.636 
12month 0.634 0.261 0.503 0.573 -0.00 I' 0.582 0.233 0.718 0.678 Alpha 24 month 0.758 0,248 0.628 0.724 -0.052' 0.687 0.393 0.902 0.861 One-Factor 36month 0.806 0.096 0.558 0.718 -0.066' 0.671 0.396 0.852 0.839 
48month 0.801 -0.070 0.435 0.626 0.029' 0.552 0.393 0.746 0.725 
Alpha 12 month o.600 0.308 0.540 0.576 -0.047' 0.576 0.082' 0.554 0.438 
Four-Factor 24 month 0.711 0.268 0.627 0.705 -0.075' 0.672 0.283 0.813 0.760 
36 month 0,732 0.174 0.566 0.704 -0.087' 0.653 0.374 0.836 0.804 
48month 0.772 0.033* 0.502 0.671 -0.059* 0.583 0.390 0.767 0.777 
12month 0.413 0.218 0.331 0.520 -0.117 0.367 0,061 • 0.26{; 0.370 
Sharpe 24month 0.651 0.278 0.515 0.702 -0.208 0.634 0.363 0.807 0.712 
Ratio 36month 0.731 0.126 0.564 0.676 -0.271 0.634 0.361 0.836 0.762 
48month 0.719 0.174 0.559 0.728 -0.041 * 0.649 0.340 0.734 0.683 
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6.3 Performaace - Ratings Regressions - Choice of mo.del 
The relationship between perfonnance ilnd lagged .QT .r~ti~g has been 
estimated using pooled time series regressiOris for 12, 24, 36 and .48-month time 
periods for DGST funds with a singl~ cross-section regression for a 60-nionth period 
also available for DSSB funds. The relationship for QL and Star i:atings has been 
·~ . 
estimated using pooled time series regressions for 12 and 24-month.time periods for 
DGST funds with a 36-month time period also available for DSSB funds. The full 
details of each estimation are presented in the tables of Appendix III and Appendix 
IV. 
Each table in Appendix III and Appendix IV present the.results for at least a 
base one-way fixed effects model (FEM) and random effects models (REM). The 
one-way model includes cross-section or fund specific effects only. The second 
model is also a one-way model but it also includes an ARI specification. A third 
model, where data allows, is a two-way FEM and REM. The two-way model 
includes both cross-section, and fund specific effects, and· time effects. ·The 
specification for each model is discussed in section 5.6. 
6.3.1 Model Test Statistics 
After each set of tables of estimated relationships for each rating measure a 
table of test statistics is presented that provides some guidance as to which model 
specification is the most appropriate for each performance period. The basis of these 
statistics is discussed in section 5.6.7. The first two columns of each statistics table 
report a F-test for the null hypothesis that an coefficients corresponding to the 
individual funds are equal Greene (2000, p.562), and. the associated -p-values 
respectively. A significant value supports the FEM over the pooled ordinary least 
square regression (POLS). The third and fouith columns also present a F-test and p-
values respectively for the null hypothesis that all coefficients for the cross-section 
effects are equal across funds and all coefficients for time effects are equal across 
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funds. Columns five and six present the Breusch-Pagan LM statistic where a 
significant value45 supports the REM model over the POLS. The final two columns 
present the Hausman test statistic. A large add significant value rejects the null 
hypothesis that the cross-section effects are uncorrelated with the other regressors 
and therefore supports the FEM. 
6.3.2 Reliability of ResultS 
Three software packages were reviewed to perform the pooled time series 
regressions: LIMDEP 7.Q,,·RATS 4.0 and EViews 4.0. There was considerable 
variation in the test statistics that are important in the guidance of model 
specif\cation between the packages. McCullough (1999) reviewed 'the comparability 
of a range Or packages including LIMDEP and EViews. McCullough noted that 
This review has demonstrated conclusively that econometric software 
packages can vary dr,amatically in the reliability with which they perform 
some fundamental procedures of applied econometrics (McCullough, 
1999, p.200). 
Given the variation in results in reported test statistics each software helpdesk 
was contacted to resolves the discrepancies. Responses from the helpdesk for RA TS 
and LIMDEP confirmed that their reported test statistics relied heavily on v~ance 
components estimators, which differed in their respective ca1culations46 that in tum 
were not able to be resolved. In view of the positive comments on LIMDEP by 
McCullough ( 1999) the results of this package are reported here. 
4
' All discussion of significance refers lo the 95% confidence level unless otherwise stated. 
4
~ Many thanks to Tom Maycock at RATS and Professor Bill Greene the author of LIMDEP, who 
provided these answers, quickly. 
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6.4 Results 
For all rating measures and each subcategory, each F-test and LM statistic 
reject the POLS in favour of either the FEM or REM and therefore only these results 
are reported in Appendix Ill and Appendix IV. E8.Ch F-test also supports a two-way 
specification or the ·presence of group and time effects against a one-way or fund 
effects only, for all rating measures. The question of whether the FEM or the REM 
is most appropriate specification varies by rating measure, perfom1ance measure or 
time period being examined. On balance the FEM is most supp,orted which accords 
with the theoretical perspective discussed in section 5.6.7.3. This section examines 
the relationship.estimated for each rating measure in tum with a separate discussion 
of each subcategory. 
Whilst the test statistics provide some guidance as to the choice of model 
specification. in some instances these have low power and it is therefore of interest to 
examine the sign of the coefficients for all model specifications. The discussion of 
the merit of the R2 estimates in s~ction 5.6.8 alluded to this problem, The inclusi~n 
and estimation of a large number of fund intercepts dramatically increases the R 2 
value though "it is hard to argue that the fixed effects ti1 explain the variation 
between individual [cross-sections], they just capture it" (Verbeek, 2000, p.320) 
[italics in original]. Therefore the discussion of results in this chapter include all 
specifications, except the POLS, as well as those supported by the statistics. The 
results presented in Appendix Ill and Appendix JV also include both FEM and REM 
specifications. 
6.4.1 Product Quantitative Rating 
The QT rating has the longest history of any rating measure and allows the 
most comprehensive analysis. The combination of four time periods, four 
performance measures and six model specifications determines at least 96 possible 
coefficients to examine for both subcategories. If guidance is taken from the test 
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statistics this reduces to four time periods, four performance measures with one 
model specification, which determines 16 possible coefficients. The number of 60-
month performance period observations does not permit a pooled-time series analysis 
and the results of a cross-sectional regression of these funds is considered separately. 
6.4.1.1 DGST funds 
Looking first at all estimated coefficients of the lagged QT ratings 
summarised in Table 6.10, 80 percent are negative and significant. A positive 
relationship is the least supported relationship between the QT rating and subsequent 
performance. This is robust to performance measure and model specification. The 
results also indicate that this result is robust to all but a 12-month time period, where 
a positive relationship is nonetheless the least supported relationship. Using all 
model specification test statistics, presented in Table A lll.5, to guide the 
interpretation does not change the dominance of a significant negative relationship 
for all time periods except the 12-month period where two coefficients are positive 
and the remaining two are not significant. 
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Table 6.10 QT Rating and Performance - DGST Funds 
This table aggregates the sign of coefficient (Pi) for the lagged QT rating regressions as presented in 
Table A Ill. I-Table A 111.4. The first breakdown, on the left side, aggregates for each perfonnance 
measure and model specification. The second breakdown aggregates all coefficients with a 
breakdown by time period The Jag periods (/) are 12, 24, 36 and 48 months between August 1996 to 
February 200 I. Three specifications have been used for both the fixed effects model (FEM) and 
random effects mo·je\ (REM). The first is a one-way FEM with cross-section or fund effects only, 
estimated as (P.,-P,°)=/li(QTn.,-QT,)+(cu-Eih i=l ... N, t=J...S, I =/2, 24, 36, 48 where: Ri, is the 
perfonnance mei.sure, being Raw Returns, One and Four-Factor Alpha and Sharpe Ratio, QT,,., is the 
QT rating at time period t-1 , QT I is the average QT rating for fund I over the observations and s,, 
-1/D{O,cr/J. The one-way REM with fund effects is specified as R,, =a+P1Q7;,_1 +u1+&.,, i=J ... N, 
t= I ... S, I = I 2, 24, 36, 48 where additionally a is an overall const;mt, u, is the cross-section error 
component for fund ;, and it is assumed 111 -IJD(O, er./). with no autocorrelation eit'ner over time or 
across crosMections (funds) and to be uncorrelated with e,,. The one-way FEM has been estimated 
consistent with White (1980) using the assumption of non-specific heteroscedasticity and alternatively 
constant variance within each fund, though the alternative assumptions makes no difference to the 
results here in terms of the significance of the coefficients at the 95 percent confidence level. The 
second specification incorporates fund effects and autocorrelation where the error term is specified as 
&11 = p&11_1 + v,, and is estimated using the Corchrane-Orcutt method. The thin! model is a two-way 
specification which includes cross-section or fund effects and time effects and is specified as 
R11 =a+ p1Qr;1_, +u, +r, + e.,, i=I ... N, l=I ... S, I =/2, 24, 36, 48, where additionally r, captures the 
effect of time period t. In the FEM the restriction Th=Lf,=0 is imposed, with the sums weighted by 
' ' 
S,l('[,Si) or N,!("£N,)for unbalanced samples, to avoid multicollinearity (Greene, 1998). In the 
' ' REM, r1 is the time series error component, and it is assumed r, -//D{O,cr/Jand not to be 
autocorrelated either over time or across cross-sections (funds} and to be uncorrelated withs,, and u1-
Majority total and proportions in bold. Test statistics reported in Table A 111.5. 
Model 
Fund Effects 
Positive 
Negative 
not significant 
Fund effects ARI 
Positive 
Negative 
not significant 
Fund & Time Effects 
Positive 
Negative 
not significant 
Totals 
Positive 
Negative 
not significant 
Proportion 
Positive% 
Negative% 
not significant% 
Performance Measure 
Raw Alpha Alpha Sharpe 
Returns One-factor Four-factor Ratio 
0 2 0 
7 4 6 5 
3 0 3 
0 0 0 1 
8 7 8 7 
0 1 0 0 
0 0 2 
6 6 6 7 
2 2 0 0 
0 4 2 
21 17 20 19 
3 6 0 3 
0 4 17 8 
88 71 83 79 
13 25 0 13 
Total 
(percent) 
3 (9) 
22 (69) 
7 (22) 
1 (3) 
30 (94) 
1 (3) 
3 (9) 
25 (78) 
4 (13) 
7 (7) 
77 (80) 
12 (13) 
Time Period 
(months} 
12 24 36 48 
7 0 0 0 
8 23 24 21 
9 1 0 3 
29 0 0 0 
33 96 100 88 
38 4 0 13 
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6.4.1.2 DSSB funds 
The overall results for the DSSB funds identify either a negative relationship or no 
significant relationship between a fund's QT rating and subsequent performance. A 
positive relationship is the least supported for each model specification presented in 
Table 6.11. This is robust to each performance period and perfonnance measure, 
When guidance is taken from the model test statistics, reported in Table A IV.5, each 
coefficient for each time period and performance measure is negative and significant. 
The more limited set of observations available for a 60-month pooled cross-sectional 
regression, reported in Table A IV.6, do not support any significant coefficients. 
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Table 6.11 QT Rating and Performance - DSSB Funds 
This table aggregates the sign of coefficient {/J1) for the lagged QT rating regressions as presented in 
Table A IV. I-Table A IV.4. The first breakdown, on the left side, aggregates for each perfonnance 
measure and model specification. The second breakdown aggregates all coefficients with a 
breakdown by time period. The lag periods (/) are 12, 24, 36 and 48 months between August 1996 to 
August 200 I, Three specifications have been used for both the fixed effects model (FEM) and 
random effects model (REM). The first is a one-way FEM with cross-section or fund. effects only, 
estimated as 1Pa-ifl=/Ji1Q7;,_,-QT,)+(ca-i;l, i=I ... N, t=J ... S, I =12, 24, 36, 48 where: R1, is the 
perfonnance measure, being Raw Returns, One and Four-Factor Alpha and Sharpe Ratio, QT11.1 is the 
QT rating at lime period t-l, QT1 is the average QT rating for fund i over the observations and £11 
-JID{O,a/). The one-way REM with fund effects is specified as R,, =a+ p1QJ;,_1 +111 +&1,, i=I ... N, 
t=I ... S, I = I 2, 24, 36, 48 where additionally a is an overall constant, u, is the cross-section error 
component for fund i, and it is' assumed u1 -JJD{O,u,/), with no autocorrelation either over time or 
across cross-sections (funds) and to be uncorrelated with s11• The one-way FEM has been estimated 
consistent with Whitr (1980) using the assumption of non-specific heteroscedasticity and alternatively 
constant variance within each fund, though the alternative assumptions makes no difference to the 
results here in tenns of the significance of the coefficients at the 95 percent confidence level. The 
second SJ.,~iffcation incorporates fund effects and autocorrelation where the error term is specified as 
e11 = pe11• 1 +v11 and is estimated using the Corchrane-Orcutt method. The third model is a two-way 
specification which includes cross-section or fund effects and time effects and is specified as 
R,1 =a+f31Q7;,_1 +u, +.1 +&11 , i=I ... N, t=I ... S, I ""/2, 24, 36, 48, where additionally r1 captures the 
effect of time period t. In the FEM the restriction Th""2},=0 is imposed, with the sums weighted by 
' ' S1 /(Ls,) or N, J(_L N,) for unbalanced samples, to avoid multicollinearity (Greene, 1998). In the 
' ' 
REM, r1 is the time series error component, and it is assumed r1 -1/D(O,a/)and not to be 
autocorrelated either' over time or across cross-sections (funds) and to be uncorrelated with &11 and 11~ 
Majority .total and proportions in bold. Test statistics reported in Table A IV .5. 
Performance Measure Time {monthsl 
Raw Alpha Alpha Sharpe Total 12 24 36 48 
Returns One-factor Four-factor Ratio (percent) 
Model 
Fund Effects 
Positive 0 0 6 0 6 (19) 
Negative 6 3 0 6 JS (47) 
not signifiC'.lnt 2 5 2 2 11 (34) 
Fund effects AR I 
Positive 0 0 0 0 0 (0) 
Negative 4 7 7 5 . 23 (72) 
not significant 4 I I 3 9(2S) 
Fund & Time Effects 
Positive 0 0 0 I I (3) 
Negative 8 8 8 7 31 (97) 
not significant 0 0 0 0 0 (0) 
Totals 
Positive 0 0 6 7 (7) 2 3 2 0 
Negative 18 18 IS 18 69 (72) 17 JS 16 20 
not significant 6 6 3 5 20(21) 5 6 6 4 
Proportion 
Positive% 0 0 25 4 8 12 8 0 
Negative% 75 75 62 75 71 63 67 83 
not significant% 25 25 13 11 21 25 25 17 
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6.4.2 Product Quantitative Component Ratings 
The QT rating is comprised of up to five sub-component ratings that have 
been discussed in section 3.7.5.2. Given the ratings construction, it would again be 
expected that a positive relationship exist between each component and future 
perfonnance. This section presents the results of the estimated relationship between 
these QT components and subsequent performance. 
6.4.2.1 DGST 
ThC results in total do not support a positive relationship between the QT rating sub-
components and future perfonnance. The summary of estimated coefficients is 
presented in Table 6.12. In aggregate. across all time periods, perfonnance measures, 
and model specifications, only 29 percent of the coefficients are positive with a 
majority of 43 percent being negative. Individually, no component has a majority of 
positive coefficients for all performance measures. The AR and ARR do have a 
majority of positive coefficients but not for all performance measures. Only the RR 
and RRR have consistently significant coefficients for all performance measures and 
. time periods, though they are negative. 
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Table 6.12 QT Component Ratings and Performance - DGST Funds 
This table aggregates the sign of the coefficient (/J) for the lagged QT component rating regressions as presented in Table A lll.23-Table A III.26 with a breakdown for each perfonnance 
measure and model specification. The lag periods{{) are 12, 24. 36 and 48 months between August 1996 to February 2001. lbree specifications have been used for both the fixed effects model 
(FEM) and random effects model {REM). llle first is a one-way FEM with cross-section or fund effects only, estimated as 
{P,,-P,)= p1(AR,,.i-AR.)+ /J2(A~-AAA) + ~(DRR,u-DRR,)+P,<RR...i-R!l.) +Pi(RRR,<-1-RRR.) +(en-&,). i=l ... N. t=l ... .S: I =12, 24, 36, 48 where: R,, is the performance measure, being 
Raw Returns (RR), One and Four-Factor Alpha (Al, A4) Sharpe Ratio {SR), (AR,,4 -ARJ) is the component rating at time t-1 for fund i, less its average over the observations arc and &,1 
-IID(O,a/). The one-way REM with fund effects is specified as R,,=a+/Ji(AR,,.i)+P2 (ARR,,-1) +A(DRR,,.i)+A(RR,,-1) +/Js(RRR,,-1)+u,+e,1 , i=J ... N. t=I ... S. I =/2, 24. 36; 48 where 
additionally a is an overall constant, u1 is the cross-section error component for fund i, and it is assumed u,-l!D(0,(1/), with no autocorrelation either over time or across cross-sections (funds) 
and to be uncorrelated with e,,. The one-way FEM has been estimated consistent with White (I 980) using the assumption of non-specific heteroscedasticity and alternatively constant variance 
within each fund, though the alternative assumptions makes no difference to the results here in terms of the significance of the coefficients at the 95 percent confidence level. The second 
specification incorporates fund effects and autocorrelation where the error term is specified as e1, = pe1,_1 + v,, and is estimated using the Corchrane-Orcutt method. The third model is a two-
way specification which includes cross-section or fund effects and time effects and is specified as 
R,. :::a+ p1(AR,,.,)+Pl(ARR,,_,) + p3(DRR,,-1)+ p,,,(RR;1-1) +P5(RRR,,.,)+u1 +-r, +e,,. i=J .•. N. t=l ... S, 1 =12, 2-1. 36, -18. where additionally -r,captures the effect of time period t. In the 
FEM the resbiction Th= i); =0 is imposed. with the sums wdghted by s, /(LS,) or N, J(E N,) for unbalanced samples, to avoid multicollinearity (Greene, I 998). In the REM, -r, is the time 
' ' ' 
series error component, and it is assumed -r, -IID(0.(1/) and not to be autocorrelated either over time or across cross-sections (funds) and to be uncorrelated with e,, and uf Majority total and 
proportions in bold. Test statistics reported Table A 111.27. 
Performance• 
Model 
Fund Effects 
Positive 
Negative 
not significant 
Fund effects AR I 
Positive 
Negative 
not significant 
Fund & Time Effects 
Positive 
Negative 
not significant 
Totals 
Positive 
Negative 
not significant 
Proportion 
Positive% 
Negative% 
not significant% 
RR Al 
2 3 
5 I 
I 4 
I O 
I 2 
6 6 
4 5 
I I 
3 2 
7 8 
7 4 
10 12 
29 33 
29 17 
42 50 
AR 
A4 
5 
2 
I 
3 
0 
5 
6 
I 
14 
3 
7 
58 
13 
29 
SR 
I 
4 
3 
I 
6 
4 
2 
2 
6 
7 
II 
25 
29 
46 
RR 
4 
2 
2 
0 
2 
6 
4 
2 
2 
8 
6 
10 
33 
25 
42 
ARR 
Al A4 
8 
0 
0 
4 
2 
2 
5 
0 
3 
17 
2 
5 
71 
8 
21 
6 
0 
2 
3 
2 
3 
8 
0 
0 
17 
2 
5 
71 
8 
21 
SR 
I 
4 
3 
0 
4 
4 
2 
0 
6 
3 
8 
13 
13 
33 
54 
RR 
4 
2 
2 
0 
3 
5 
5 
0 
3 
9 
5 
10 
38 
21 
42 
OT Ratine Cnmrmnent 
ORR 
Al A4 
6 
0 
2 
0 
7 
6 
12 
8 
4 
50 
33 
17 
5 
0 
3 
0 
6 
2 
4 
0 
4 
9 
6 
9 
38 
25 
38 
SR 
3 
0 
5 
3 
I 
4 
6 
0 
2 
12 
I 
II 
so 
4 
46 
RR 
0 
8 
0 
0 
7 
I 
0 
7 
I 
0 
22 
2 
0 
92 
8 
RR 
Al A4 
0 0 
8 8 
0 0 
0 0 
8 8 
0 0 
0 0 
8 8 
0 0 
0 0 
24 24 
0 0 
0 0 
100 IOO 
0 0 
SR 
0 
7 
I 
0 
4 
4 
0 
7 
I 
0 
18 
6 
0 
75 
25 
RR 
I 
7 
0 
I 
7 
0 
4 
3 
3 
18 
3 
13 
75 
13 
RRR 
Al A4 
4 
3 
I 
8 
0 
2 
4 
2 
4 
16 
5 
16 
64 
20 
2 
5 
I 
0 
6 
2 
I 
5 
2 
3 
16 
5 
13 
67 
21 
SR 
0 
8 
0 
0 
8 
0 
0 
6 
2 
0 
22 
2 
0 
92 
8 
Totm 
52 
67 
33 
17 
79 
57 
63 
SI 
38 
132 
197 
128 
Percent 
33 
42 
21 
II 
" 37 
41 
34 
25 
29 
43 
28 
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6.4.2.2 DSSB 
There appears no systematic or robust positive relationship between any of 
the QT components and subsequent perfonnance. Table 6.13 presents a summary of 
the QT components and subsequent performance regressions. A positive relationship 
is the least supported relationship across each model specification with the overall 
majority of toefficients not significant. There are exceptions with a positive 
relationship supported for ARR, RR and RRR and subsequent performance though 
this is restricted to only one performance measure in each case and is not robust to 
model specification, 
When the test statistics in Table A IV .29 are used to guide interpretation of 
the coefficients a two-way FEM specification with fund and time effects is supported 
in every case. Given the four time periods, five components and four perfonnance 
measures there are 80 coefficients estimated. Of the 80 possible coefficients 42 are 
negative with only seven positive. Individually however the RR and ARR are the 
only components that have a majority of negative coefficients. The AR and DRR 
have· a majority of coefficients, which are not significant. The RRR has the largest 
number of positive coefficients with four of the possible 16 coefficients positive and 
significant. 
The results for the 60-month perfonnance period are Table A lV.28. The 
majority of coefficients are again not significant The ARR is positively related to 
subsequent perfonnance using three of the four perfonnance measures and each of 
the RRR coefficients are negative, though only two are significant. 
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Table 6.13 QT Component Ratings and Performance - DSSB Funds 
This table aggregates the sign of the coefficient (P) for the Jagged QT component rating regressions as presented in Table A IV.24-Table A IV.27 with a breakdown for each performance 
measure and model specification. The lag periods(/) are 12, 24. 36 and 48 months between August 1996 to August 2001. Three specifications have been used for both the fixed effects model 
(FEM) and random effects model (REM). The first is a one-way FEM with cross-section or fund effects only. estimated as 
(P,,-P,°) = p1(A~ -AR,)+ fJ1(ARJt.i-ARR.) + !J,(DRR,,r DRR. )+ /J~(RR.,., - RR.) + /JJ(RRR,,..,-RRR,) + (&K -~l· i= I ... N. t=l •.. S. I = 12. 2-1. 36, 48 where: R,, is the perfonnance measure, being 
Raw Returns (RR). One and Four-Factor Alpha (Al, A4) Sharpe Ratio (SR), (AR,,.-l -AR,) is the component rating at lime t-1 for fund i, less its average over the observations and e,,-IID(O.a/). 
The one-way REM with fund effects is specified as R,, =a+ JJ1(AR,,,1)+ P1(AR~,4 ) + P)(DRR,,.i)+ P~<R~..i) + Ps(RRR,,4 )+ u, + £,,, i=l ... N, t=! ... S. I =I 2, 24, 36 . ./8 where additionally a is an 
overall constant, u; is the cross.section error component for fund i. and it is assumed u, -IID(Qa.1), with no autocorrelation either over time or across cross-sections (funds) and to be 
uncorrelated with e,1• The one-way FEM has been estimated consistent with White (1980) using the assumption of non-,specific heteroscedasticity and alternatively constant variance within 
each fund, though the alternative assumptions makes no difference to the results here in terms of the significance of the coefficients at the 95 percent confidence level. The second specification 
incorporates fund effects and autocorrelation where the error term is specified as £ 11 = PEi,-• +v;, and is estimated using the Corchrane-Orcutt method. The third model is a two-way 
specification which includes cross-section or fund effects and time effects and is specified as 
R,, =a+ /J1(AR,,_1)+ P~(ARR1,.i) +P)(DRR,14 )+ P,(RR,,.,) + PsCRRRr.-1)+111 +t", +£;,• i=l ... N, t=J ... S. I ~12. 24, 36. 48. where additionally r,capturesthe effect of time period,. In lhe 
FEM lhe restriction Th= 1); =0 is imposed. wilh the sums weighted by S, !(ESj) or N, t(E N,) for unbalanced samples. to avoid multicollinearity (Greene. 1998). In the REM, r, is the time 
I I I I 
series error component. and it is assumed f', -IID(O,a/) and not to be autocorrelated either over time or across cross-sections {funds) and to be uncorrelated with £,, and u,. Majority tot3l and 
proportions in bold. Test statistics reported in Table A IV 29. 
Performance• 
Model 
Fund Effects 
Positive 
Negative 
not significant 
Fund effects ARl 
Positive 
Negative 
not significant 
Fund & Time Effects 
Positive 
Negative 
not significant 
Totals 
Positive 
Negative 
not significant 
Proportion 
Positive% 
Negative% 
not significant % 
AR 
RR Al A4 SR 
2 6 8 
2 0 0 
4 2 0 
I O 2 
2 0 0 
S 8 6 
I 2 4 
3 0 0 
4 6 4 
4 8 14 
7 0 0 
13 16 10 
17 33 58 
29 0 0 
54 67 42 
RR Al 
0 6 
3 0 
' 2 
I 7 
4 0 
3 I 
0 2 
3 6 
' 0 
I 15 
IO 6 
13 3 
4 63 
42 25 
54 13 
ARR 
A4 
2 
3 
3 
0 
2 
6 
2 
6 
0 
4 
II 
9 
17 
46 
38 
I 
2 
s 
0 
' 3 
0 
6 
2 
I 
13 
10 
4 
54 
42 
SR RR Al 
S O 
O I 
3 7 
0 0 
I 2 
7 6 
2 I 
' 2 I S 
7 I 
6 , 
11 18 
29 4 
25 21 
46 75 
DRR 
A4 
2 
2 
4 
0 
6 
2 
0 
8 
0 
2 
16 
6 
8 
67 
25 
SR RR • Al 
4 0 2 
0 0 0 
4 8 6 
0 0 I 
6 1 0 
2 7 7 
4 2 0 
O S 7 
4 I I 
8 2 3 
6 6 7 
IO 16 14 
33 8 13 
25 25 29 
42 67 58 
RR 
A4 
0 
4 
4 
0 
6 
2 
0 
8 
0 
0 
18 
6 
0 
75 
" 
0 
6 
2 
0 
6 
2 
0 
7 
I 
0 
19 
' 
0 
79 
21 
SR 
6 
0 
2 
' 2 
I 
I 
6 
I 
12 
8 
4 
50 
33 
17 
RR 
0 
8 
0 
0 
8 
0 
Al 
2 
2 
4 
2 
18 
4 
8 
75 
17 
RRR 
A4 
0 
7 
I 
0 
4 
4 
3 
3 
2 
3 
14 
7 
13 
58 
29 
I 
6 
I 
0 
2 
6 
SR 
4 
2 
2 
s 
10 
9 
21 
42 
38 
Total Percent 
0 45 30 
8 44 29 
0 63 41 
0 17 II 
6 57 38 
2 78 SI 
0 30 20 
S 79 52 
3 43 28 
0 92 20 
19 180 39 
5 184 40 
0 
79 
21 
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6.4.3 Product Qualitative Rating 
A smaller number of funds have a QL rating and subsequent Q2 or Star 
ratings in each subcategory. A more limited analysis is therefore possible for the QL 
ratings and the Q2 and Star rating which require the QL input. 
6.4.3.1 DGST 
A regression of each performance measure against .the fund QL rating was 
conducted for a 12 and 24-month period. The results are presented in Table 6.14. 
When all model specifications are aggregated, none of the estimated coefficients are 
positive and 60 percent are negative and significant. The results when broken down 
by time period identify that the negative relationship is more prevalent for a 12-
month perfonnance period. Using the tests presented in Table A IIl.12 to guide 
selection of model specification interpretation, each coefficient for the REM with 
group and time effects are negative and significant. 
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Table 6.14 QL Rating Performance Regressions- DGST Funds 
This table aggregates the sign of coefficient (/Ji) for the lagged QL rating regressions as presented in 
Table A 111.7 - Table A IIl.10, The first breakdown, on the left side, aggregates for each performance 
measure and model specification. The second breakdown aggregates all coefficients with a 
breakdown by time period. The lag periods ({) are 12 and 24 months between August 1998 and 
February 2001. Three specifications have been used for both the fixed effects model (FEM) and 
random effects model (REM). The first is a one-way FEM with cross-section or fund effects only, 
estimated as (P,,-'lfl= ACQ4_1 -Ql,)+(i;, -i;), i=J ... N, t=l ... S, I =12, 24 where: Ru is the performance 
measure, being Raw Returns, One and Four-Factor Alpha and Sharpe Ratio, QL11.1 is the QL rating at 
time period t-1, QL1 is the average QL rating for fund i over the observations and e11 -IID(O,a/). The 
one-factor REM with fund effeets is speeified as R,,=a+(J1QL,,_,+u,+e11 , i=J...N. t=l •.. S, I =/2, 24 
where additionally a is an overall constant, u1 is the cross-section error component for fund l, and it is 
assumed u1 -IID(O, ~ 2). with no autocorrelation either over time or across cross-sections (funds) and 
to be uncorrelated with e11• The one-way FEM has been estimated consistent Y.ith White (1980) using 
the assumption of non-specific heteroscedasticity and alternatively constant variance within each fund, 
though the alternative assumptions makes no difference to the results here in terms of the significance 
of the coefficients at the 95 percent confidence level. The second specification incorporates fund 
effects and autocorrelation where the error term is specified as e11 = ps,J-I + v1, and is estimated using 
the Corchrane-Orcutt method. The third model is a two-way specification which includes cross-
section or fund effeets and time effects and is specified as Ri, =a+ f11QL;,-i +111 +r, +e11 , i=/ ... N, 
l=l ... S, I =12, 24 where additionally r, captures the effect of time period t. In the FEM the restriction 
Th=D,=0 is imposed, with the sums weighted by s, !(LS,) or N, /(rN1) for unbalanced samples, 
I I j I 
to avoid multicollinearity (Greene, 1998). In the REM, -r, is the time series error component, and it is 
assumed -r, -IID(O,u,2) and not to be autocorrelated either over time or across cross-sections (funds) 
and to be uncorrelated with £11 and u1• Majority total and proportions in bold. Test statistics reported in 
Table A lll.12. 
Perfonnance Measure Time Period 
(months) 
Raw A1pha Alpha Sho,pe Total 12 24 
Returns One-factor Four-factor Ratio (percent) 
Model 
Fund Effects 
Positive 0 0 0 0 0 (O) 
Negative 2 3 2 8 (SO) 
not significant 2 2 3 8 (SO) 
Fund effects ARI 
Positive 0 0 0 0 0 (0) 
Negative l 2 2 l 6 (38) 
not significant 3 2 2 3 10 (62) 
Fund & Time Effects 
Positive 0 0 0 0 0 (0) 
Negative 3 4 4 4 IS (94) 
not significant I 0 0 0 l (6) 
Totals 
Positive 0 0 0 0 0 (0) 0 0 
Negative 6 9 8 6 29 (60) 21 8 
not significant 6 3 4 6 19 (40) 3 16 
Proportion 
Positive% 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Negative% so 75 67 so 88 33 
Not significant% so 25 33 so 12 67 
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6.4.3.2 DSSB 
The number of observations allows each model specification to be estimated for a 12 
and 24-month performance period. A more limited analysis is available for a 36-
morith period d~e to a smaller number of observations. Looking at all models 
together, presented in Table 6.15, 42 percent of the coefficients estimated are 
significant and positively related to subsequent perfonnance though 47 percent of the 
coefficients are not significant. The relative proportion of coefficient sign differs by 
the perfonnance measure and model specification. For example if the Sharpe Ratio 
is used or the model is estimated with fund effects only the majority of coefficients 
are positive. A comparison over time isolates the majority of positive coefficients to 
a 24-month perfonnance period and the negative coefficients to a 12-month period. 
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Table 6.15 QL Rating Performance Regressions - DSSB Funds 
This table aggregates the sign of coefficient (/l,) for the lagged QL rating regressions as presented in 
Table A IV.8-Table A 1v:11. The first breakdown, on the left side, aggregates for each perfonnance 
measure and model specification. The second breakdowti aggregates all coefficients with a 
breakdown by time period. The lag periods([) are 12, 24 and 36 months between August 1998 and 
August 2001. Three specifications have been used for both the fixed .effects model (FEM) and 
rand~m effects model (REM). The first is a one-way FEM with crosMection or fund effects oiily, 
estimated as (P,,-Pi)"'/Ji(Q4,.,-Ql,)+(c1,-c1), i=l ... N, t=l...S, I =12, 24, 36 where: R11 i.s··the 
perfonnance measure, being Raw Returns, One and Four-Factor Alpha and Sharpe Ratio, QL11.1 is the 
QL rating at time period t-1, QL 
I 
is the average QL rating for fund i over the observations and Bu 
-IID{O,a/). The om .. ·way REM with fund effects is specified as R,, =a+ p1Q£i1_1+111+c11 , i=I ... N. 
t=J ... S, I =12, 24, 36 where additionally a is an overall constant, u1 is the cross-section error 
component for fund i, and it is assumed u1 -l/D{O,a/), with no autocorrelation either over time or 
across cross-sections (funds) and to be uncorrelated with i;,. The one-.way FEM has been estimated 
consistent with White (1980) using the assumption of non-specific heteroscedasticity and alternatively 
constant variance within each fund, though the alternative asstimptions makes no difference to the 
results here in terms of the significance of the coefficiCnts at the 95 percent confidence level. The 
second specification incorporates fund effects and autocorrelation where the error term is specified as 
s,, = ps1J-I +v1, and is estimated using the Corchrane.Orcutt method. 'The third model is a two-way 
specification which. includes cross-section or fund effects and time effects and is specified as 
R11 =a+ f11QL1,_1 +111 +r, +£1,, i=l ... N. t=I ... S, I =12, 24, 36 where additionally ..-1 captures the effei::t 
of time period t. In the FEM the restriction Th=li,=0 is imposed, with the sums weighted by 
' ' S1 l(LS1) or N1 J('f.N,) for unbalanced samples, to avoid multicollinearity (Greene, 1998). In the 
' ' REM, 1'1 is the time series error component, and it is assumed ..-, -llD{O,a,2) and not to be 
autocorrelated either over time or across cross-sections (funds) and to be uncorrelated with e11 and u1• 
Majority total and proportions in.bold. Test statistics reported in-Table A IV .13. 
Perfonnance Measure Time Period 
(months) 
Raw Alpha Alpha Sharpe Total 12 24 36 
Returns One-factor Four-factor Ratio (percent) 
Model 
Fund Effects 
Positive 3 2 2 4 11'(46) 
Negative 0 1 2 0 3 (13) 
not significant 3 3 2 2 10 (42) 
Fund effects ARI 
Positive 1 2 2 4 9 (38) 
Negative 0 1 0 0 1 (4) 
not significant 5 3 4 2 14 (58) 
Fund & Time Effects 
Positive 2 2 1 2 5 (19) 
Negative 1 0 2 0 3 (31) 
not significant 1 2 1 2· 8 (SO) 
Totals 
Positive 6 6 5 10 27 (42) 5 22 0 
Negative 2 4 0 7 (11) 4 0 3 
not significant 9 8 7 6, 30 (47) IS 2 13 
· Proportion 
Positive% 38 38 31 62 21 92 0 
Negative% 6 12 25 0 17 0 18 
Not signifkant % 56 so 44 38 62 8 82 
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6.4.4 Product Q2 Rating 
The QL and QT rating are multiplied together to detennine the fund Q2 rating 
which is in tum used to fonn the fund Star rating within each subcategory. Each 
perfonnance measure was regressed against the lagged values of the Q2 rating for 12 
and 24-rnonth periods for DOST funds with additionally a more limited analysis 
using a 36-month period for DSSB funds. 
6.4.4.1 DGST 
In aggregate the regression results presented in Table 6.16 suggest somewhat 
mixed results with 40 percent of all coefficients negative and 25 percent positive. 
Whilst a positive relationship is the least supported relationship overall, this is 
sensitive to model specification and perfonnance measure. For example for a 12-
month perfonnance period only the Sharpe Ratio measure does not support a positive 
and significant relationship for the base model. Inclusion of an ARl term for the 
four-factor alpha estimation results in the coefficient no longer being positive and 
when a time effect is added to the ~lfoup effect the four-factor alpha is also no longer 
positive. For the 24-month perfonnance period every performance measure has a 
negative and significant relationship for the base model. When an ARI term is 
included, only the one-factor alpha has a negative and significant relationship. When 
a time ciffect is included all coefficients are again negative and significant. When the 
results arc examined by performance period the positive coefficients call be isolated 
to the 12-month period, wherCas for the 24-rnonth period the majority of coefficients 
are negative. 
If the model test statistics presented in Table A 111.19 are used_ to guide choice 
of coefficients for each of the four perfonnance measures, two estimated coefficients 
are positive for a 12-month period, whereas all four coefficients are.negativ~ for the 
24-month period. When the relationship is estimated with an ARI term the 12-
month period results remain but only one of the four negative relationships for the 
24-month period remains significant. 
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Table 6.16 Q2 Rating Performance Regressions - DGST Funds 
This table aggregates the sign of coefficient (/J1) for the lagged Q2 rating regrei;sion.~ as presented in 
Table A 111.15-Table A JII.18. The finit breakdown, on the left side, aggregates for each perfonnance 
measure and model specification. The second breakdown aggregates all coefficients with a 
breakdown by time period. The lag periods ({) are 12 and 24 months between August 1998 and 
February 200 I. Three specifications have been used for both the fixed effects model (FEM) and 
random effects model (REM), The first is a one-way FEM with cross-section or fund effects only, 
estimated as (P,, _ff)= .Oi((f •. , -Q2, )+ (c1, -i,), i= J .. ., t=l ... S. I = J 2, 24 where: R11 is the performance 
mea.~Ure. being Raw Returns, One and Four-Factor Alpha and Sharpe Ratio, Q\., is the Q1 rath~ :,t 
tim~ period t-1, Q? 1 is the average Q1 rating for fund i over the observations and e11 -IID(O,a/). The 
one-way REM with fund effecL'I is specified as R11 =a+P1Q1,,.1+11i+e,,, i=l...N, 1=!...S, I =12, 24 
where additionally a is an overall constant, 111 is the cross-section error component for fund i, and it is 
OS!illmed 111 -IID(O, a;,2). wilh no autocorrelation either over time or across cross-sections (funds) and 
to be uncorrelated with c11• The one-way FEM has been estimated consistent with White (1980) using 
the as.,;umption of non-specific heteroscedasticity and alternatively constant variance within each fund, 
though the alternative assumptions makes no difference to the results here in tenns of the significance 
of the coefficients at the 95 percent confidence level. The second specification incorporates fund 
effects and autocorrelation where the error term is specified as cir = pc1J_ 1 + v11 and is estimated using 
the Cflrchrane-Orcutt method. The third model is a two-way specification which includes cross-
secJ.fon or fund effects and time effecL'I and is specified as R;, =a+p1Q~,,-1+111+r, +&11 , i=l ... N, 
t=-J'.:.S. 1 =I 2, 24 where additionally r1 captures the effect of time period /. In the FEM the restriction 
Th=});=O is imposed, with the sums weighted by s, /(LS1) or N, /('f,N1 ) for unbalanced samples, 
I I I I 
to avoid multicollinearity (Greene, 1998). In the REM, r1 is the time series error component, and it is 
assumed r1 -IID(O,a/) and not to be autocorrelated either over tinie o·r across cros.,;-sections (funds) 
and to be uncorrelated with &11 and u1• Majority total and proportions in bold. Test statistics reported in 
TableAIIl.19. 
Perfonnance Measure 
Raw Alpha Alpha Sharpe 
Returns One-factor Four-factor Ratio 
Model 
Fund EffecL~ 
Positive 2 
Negative 2 
not significant O 
Fund effecL'I ARI 
Positive 
Negative 
not significant 2 
Fund & Time Effects 
Positive 
Negative 2 
not signiticant 
Totals 
Positive 4 
Negative 5 
not significant 3 
Proportion 
Positive% 33 
Negative% 42 
Not significant % 25 
2 2 
2 2 2 
0 0 1 
0 
1 0 
2 3 3 
0 0 
2 2 2 
2 2 
4 2 
5 5 4 
3 5 7 
33 16 9 
42 42 33 
25 42 58 
Total 
(percent) 
7 (44) 
8 (50) 
1 (6) 
3 (19) 
3 (19) 
10 (62) 
2 (12) 
8 (SO) 
6 (38) 
12 (25) 
19 (40) 
17 (35) 
Time Period 
(months) 
12 24 
12 0 
2 17 
10 7 
50 17 
8 so 
42 33 
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6.4.4.2 DSSB 
The results in aggregate for the DSSB funds, presented in Table 6.17, 
strongly support a negative relationship, though this is influenced by model 
specification. Where the results do not support a negative relationship for an AR 1 
model, the relationship supported is not a positive one. The prevalence of a negative 
relationship is not sensitive to either the perfonnance measure or time period 
employed. 
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Table 6.17 Q2 Rating Performance Regressions by Model- DSSB Funds 
This table aggregates the sign of coefficient ((J1) for the lagged Q2 rating regressions as presented in 
Table A IV.16-Table A IV.19, The first breakdown, on the left side, aggregates for each performance 
measure and model specification. The second breakdown aggregates all coefficients with a 
breakdown by time period. "Ib.e lag periods(/) are 12,24,36 months between Augmt 1998 and August 
2001. Three specifications have been used for both the fixed effects model (FEMJ and random effects 
model (REM). The first is a one-way FEM with cross-section or fund effects only, estimated as 
(Pi, -P,) = p1(Qii,.1 -Qi 1 )+(s,. -£1), ic:::/ ... N, tc:::J , •• S. I =:J 2,24,36 where: R11 is the perfonnance measure, 
being Raw Returns, One and Four-Factor Alpha and Sharpe Ratio, Q211•1 is the Q2 rating at time period 
t-1, Q~ 1 is the average Q2 rating for fi11id i over the observations and e11 -1/D(O,a/). The one-way 
REM with fund effects is specified as R11 =a+PifJ\-1 +111 +e11 , j:=/ ••• N, t=l ... S, / =12,24,36 where 
additionally a is an overall constant, u1 is the cross-section error component for fund i, and it is 
assumed u1 -IID(O,au 2), with no autocorrelation either over time or across cross-sections (funds) and 
to be uncorrelated with .Iii· The one-way FEM has been estimated consistent with White (1980) using 
the assumption of non-specific heteroscedasticity and alternatively constant variance within each fund, 
though the alternative assumptions makes no difference to the results here in tenns of the significance 
of the coefficients at the 95 percent confidence level, The second spreification incorporates fund 
effects and autocorrelation where the error term is specified as e11 = ps11_1 +v11 and is estimated using 
the Corchrane-Orcutt method. The third model is a two-way specification which includes cross-
section or fund effects and time effects and is specified as R11 =a+ fJ1Q211 •1 +u1 +r1 +s11 , i=l ... N, 
t=J...S, I =12,24,36 where additionally r1 captures the effect of time period t. In the FEM the 
restriction Th=Vi=O is imposed, with the sums weighted by s, /(LS,). or N, /(LN,) for unbalanced 
I I I I 
samples, to avoid multicollinearily (Greene, 1998). In the REM, r, is the time series error component, 
and it is assumed r1 -JJD(O,a/) and riot to be autocorrelated either over time or across cross-sections 
(funds) and to be uncorrelated with s1, and u1• Majority total and proportions in bold. Test statistics 
reported in Table A IV.22. 
Perfonnance Measure Time Period (months) 
Raw Alpha Alpha Sharpe Total 12 24 36 
Returns One-factor Four-factor Ratio (percent) 
Model 
Fund Effects 
Positive 0 0 0 0 0 (0) 
Negative 6 6 6 6 24 (100) 
not significant 0 0 0 0 0 (0) 
Fund effects ARI 
Positive 0 0 0 0 0 (0) 
Negative 0 J 4 4 11 (46) 
not significant 6 3 2 2 13 (54) 
Fund & Time Effects 
Positive 0 0 0 0 0 (0) 
Negative 6 6 6 6 24 (100) 
not significant 0 0 0 0 0 (0) 
Totals 
Positive 0 0 0 0 0 (0) 0 0 0 
Negative 12 15 16 16 59 (82) 17 20 22 
not significant 6 3 2 2 13 (18) 7 4 2 
Proportion 
Positive% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Negative% 67 83 89 89 71 83 92 
Not significant% 33 17 11 11 29 17 8 
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6.4.5 Product Star Rating 
The Q2 rating is the basis for detennining the Star rating that a fund receives. 
The distribution of scores is divided into one of five stars as discussed section 
3, 7.5.:3. Both the size and sign of the dummy coefficients are of interest in asse~sing 
the relative infonnation that a Star rating provides in terms Of future performance. A 
set of four dummy variables were created, following Blake & Morey (1999) as 
discussed in section 2.6.2, to denote whether a fund had been rated a one, two; three 
or four star fund with the five star fund being the base comparison. A negative 
estimate for a coefficient can be interpreted as signifying under-performance of the 
particular star rating relative to a five-star fund in the particulal" performance period. 
The size of the coefficient is important because it is expected that not only the 
coefficients for lower rated funds are negative hut also they increase in absolute 
value as the star rating declines. 
The number of observations used in the estimations needs 'to borne in mind 
when reviewing the results as there are far fewer observations than for the 
regressionS based on the components of the Star rating. An illustration of how the 
number of funds assigned a particular Star rating has changed over time has been 
presented in Figure 6.1 and Figure· 6.2. One star ftm,ds are less frequent than the 
other levels. The estimated relationships reported therefore rely on a small number 
of observations in Some Star rating levels and are highly influenced . by the 
performance of a relatively small number of observations. 
6.4.5.1 DGST 
The data pennit examination of a relationship over 12 and 24-month periods. 
The estimated relationships,.summarised in Table-6._18, provide mixed evid,ence. In 
aggregate, given the two time periods, four performance measures and four dummy 
variables in ·each regression, there are -3_2 possible coefficients. Of these only 9 are 
negative, whereas 13 are positive and 10 are not significantly differently from zero. 
The specification of the model and time period does change the proportion of each 
signed coefficient. For example, the 24-month period has a larger number of 
negative coefficients in aggregate for all performance measures. This however is 
largely accounted for by the fund effects only model .which has 66 percent of 
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possible coefficients negative whereas in the AR 1 and group and time effects model, 
the proportion of negative coefficients are 9 and 42 percent respectively. 
If the pattern. and size of each . of the dumrriy variable coefficients are 
·examined it is expected that the greate5t performance disparity would be for a one 
and five star fund, redu~ing as the 'star-gap' decrCases .. The results provide some 
support-for this as the greatest number or'tlegative coefficients for a 12-month period 
is found for fJ1, and for a 24 month period both /Ji and /31 have the highest proportion 
of negative coefficients. 'Much of this is accounted for in the fund Cffects only model 
as in each other time period, for all performance measures and models, there is no 
majority of negative coefficients, even for /3, and {Jz, 
Returning to the size of the coefficients, there is no pattern of increasingly 
negative coefficients as would be expected as we move from /1,_ to /J,, that is from 
higher to lower rated funds. If a case was to be made 'to support the relative 
predictive performance of the star ratings, there is however some limited evidence. 
Where there are more than two significant negative coefficients, the most common 
pattern in ascending order is f3z, /31, /33 and then /34. That is, the largest disparity is 
between a two star and five star fund with the least difference between a four and 
five star fund. Where there are significant differences, in every instance the biggest 
perfonnance differenCe is between two and five star funds. This iS broadly 
consistent, if a title weaker, with Blake & Morey {1999) discussed in section 2.6.2 
who pC:rfonned the same analysis in the US and found evidence of the predictive 
content of the one and two-star funds when compared to a five-star fund, but not for 
three and four star. 
It must be remembered though that the results reported for the current study 
are after aggregat,ing across performance measures and _ models, without guidance 
from the model test_ statistics. If a case was to be made for contrary evidenCe and 
therefore the prevalence of positive ·coefficients, that is that lower rated funds 
outperform in the future, there is relatively weaker evidence. By far the strongest 
291 
case to mount is that of no significant difference between relative rating and future 
performance. 
If the test statistics are used to guide selection of coefficients, there is 
stronger evidence in the sign of the coefficient to support either no relative 
performance difference of lower star ratings or in fact positive performance, that is 
lower rated funds outperform, or are not distinguishable from the five-star fund 
performance. 
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Table 6.18 Star Rating and Performance - DGST Funds 
This table aggregates the sign of coeffcients for the lagged Star rating dummy variables across all 
performance measures in Table A IIl.29-Table A 111.32. The first breakdown, on the left side, 
aggregates for each performance measure and model specification, The second breakdown aggregates 
all performance measures and specification with a breakdown by coefficient. The lag periods (f) are 
12 and 24 months between August 1998 and February 2001. Three specifications have been used for 
both the fixed effects model (FEM) and random effects model (REM). The first is a one-way FEM 
with cross-section or fund effects only, estimated as 
R1, = /3 1 (D\ 1~1 -DI,)+ p2 (D2 11•1-D2, )+Pl ( DJ114 - D3i)+ p~(D411-1 -04,) +(ei, -&1), t=l ... N, t=l .•. S, 
I :=:/2, 24, 36 where: R1, is the performance measure, being Raw Returns, One and Four-Factor Alpha 
and Sharpe Ratio, D(X),.1 is one if the Star rating at time t-1 wasX, zero otherwise, DX, is the average 
for fund i over the observations and &it -IID(O,a/J. If a five Star· rating is a guide to future relative 
perfonnance the sign of the coefficients should be negative and significant. It could be expected that 
the largest difference in the size of the coefficient would be for DI, the lowest rating. The one-way 
REM with fund effects is specified as R,, =a+/J1Q11,_1 +r11+e1,, i>=/ ..• N, t=l ... S. I =12, 24, 36 where 
additiona11y a is an overall constant, u1 is the cross-section error component for fund i, and it is 
assumed u1-IID(O,aw 1), with no autocorrelation either over time or across cross-sections (funds) and 
to be uncorrelated with e11• The one-way FEM has been estimated consistent with White (1980) using 
the assumption of non-specific heteroscedasticity and altemalive\y constant variance within each fund, 
though the alternative assumptions makes no difference to the results here in tenns of the significance 
of the coefficients at the 95 percent confidence level. The second specification incorporates fund 
effects and autocorrelation where the error tennis specified as e,r = peu., +v,, and is estimated using 
the Corchrane-Orcutt method. The third model is a two-way specification which includes cross-
section or fund effects and time effects and is specified as R11 =a+ fJ1Q11,-1 +111 +r, +c 11 , /=/ ... N, 
t=I. .. S, I =/2, 24, 36 where additionally r, captures the effect of time period I. In the FEM the 
restriction Th =Lr,=0 is imposed, with the sums weighted by s1 /(LS,) or N, J(EN,) for unbalanced 
I r I I 
samples, to avoid multicollinearity (Greene, 1998). In the REM, r1 is the tinie series error component, 
and it is assumed r1 -JJD(O, a/) and not to be autocorrelated either over time or across cross-sections 
(funds) and to be uncorrelated with e11 and U;. Majority total and proportions in bold.· 11est statistics 
reported in Table A IIl.33. 
Perfonnance Measure Coefficient 
Perfonnance measure RR Al A4 SR Total % lb.. 
~' lb ~· Model 
Fund Effects 
Positive 2 2 0 2 6 9 
Negative 9 12 II 10 42 66 
Not significant 5 2 5 4 16 25 
Fund· effects with ARI 
Positive 2 I 2 6 9 
Negative J 4 4 J 14 22 
Not significant 12 10 11 11 44 69 
Fund and Time Effects 
Positive II 7 2 7 27 42 
Negative J J 6 I 13 20 
Not significant 2 6 8 8 24 38 
Totals 
Positive 14 II J II 39 20 9 4 8 18 
Nega'tive 15 19 21 14 69 36 13 JS 15 6 
Not significant 19 18 24 23 84 44 26 9 25 24 
Proportion 
Positive% 29 23 6 23 19 8 17 38 
Negative% JI 40 44 29 27 73 JI 12 
Not significant% 40 37 50 48 54 19 52 50 
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6.4.5.2 DSSB 
The data allows examination of Star ratings and subsequent performance for 
up to a 36-month period for DSSB fund~ However given the number of DSSB 
' funds that have received a Star rating, the full pooled time series analysis is available 
only for a 12-month period with a more limited analysis for the 24 and 36-month 
periods. As outlined ~n section 6.1, the spread of Star ratings has changed over time. 
For a 36-month performance period there are no funds with a one-star rating and 
therefore the dummy variable for one star funds is dropped from the regression. 
In aggregate the results presented in Table 6.19 for the DSSB subcategory do 
not support relative under-perfonnance of lower rated funds when compared to a 
five-star fund. This is robust to perfonnance measure and time period. If the test 
statistics are used to guide estimation, the positive estimates remain dominant. These 
results are quite different to the DOST subcategory and to Blake & Morey (1999). 
Not only do lower rated funds not underperfonn, they outperform subsequently, 
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Table 6.19 Star Rating and Performance - DSSB Funds 
1bis table aggregates the sign of coeffcients for the Jagged Star rating dummy variables across a)I 
performance measures in Table A IV.31-Table A IV.34. The first breakdown, on the left side, 
aggregates for each perfonnance measure and model specificatiOIL The second breakdown aggregates 
all performance measures and specification with a breakdown by coefficient. The lag periods (!) are 
12, 24 and 36 months between August 1998 and August 2001. Three specifications have been used 
for both the fixed effects model (FEM) and random effects model (REM). The first is a one-way 
FEM with cross-section or fund effects only, estimated as 
R1, = P1 (DIN -DI,)+ /31 (021,.t -D2, )+ /J3 (03 11.1- DJ,)+ /J4(D4i,-1 -041) +(i:1, -C, ), i=J ... N. t=l ... S, 
I =12, 24, 36 where: R11 is the performance measure, being Raw Returns, One and Four-Factor Alpha 
and Sharpe Ratio, D(X),-1 is one if the Star rating at time t-1 wasX zero otherwise, DX1 is the average 
for fund i over the observations nnd £11 -//D(O,a/). If a five Star rating is a guide to fture relative 
perfonnance the sign of the coefficients should be negative and significant. It could be expected that 
the largest diffCrence in the size of the coefficient would be for DI, the lowest rating. The one-way 
REM with fund effects is specified as Ri, =a+ fJ1Q\-, +111 +e11 , i=l ... N, t=l ... S, I =12, 24, 36 where 
additionally a is an overall constant, u1 is the cross-section error component for fund i', and it is 
assumed u1 -IID(O, a/), with no autocorrelation either over time or across cross-sections (funds) and 
to be uncorrelated with £11 • The one-way FEM has been estimated consistent with White (1980) using 
the assumption of non-specific heteroscedasticity and alternatively constant variance within each fund, 
though the alternative assumptions makes no difference to the results here in terms of the significance 
of the coefficients at the 95 percent confidence level. The second specification incorporates fund 
effects and autocorrelation where the error tenn is specified as Eu = PEu-i + v1, and is estimated using 
the Corchrane-Orcutt method. The third model is a two-way specification which includes cross-
section or fund effects and time effects and is specified as R11 =a+ fl1Q211-1 + 111 +r1 + r: 11 , i=J ... N, 
t=J...S, I =12, 24, 36 where additionally r1 captures the effect of time period t. In the FEM the 
restriction Th=L;,=O is imposed, with the sums weighted by s1 /(LS,) or N1 !(LN,) for unbalanced 
I I . I I 
samples, to avoid multicollinearity (Greene, 1998). In the REM, r, is the time series error component, 
and it is assumed r, -JJD(O,a/J and not to be autocorrelated either over time·or across cross-sections 
(funds) and to be uncorrelated with e1, and u1• Majority total and proportions in bold. Test statistics 
reported in Table A IV.36. · 
Perfonnance measure 
Model 
Fund Effects 
Positive 
Negative 
Not significant 
Fund effects with ARI 
Positive 
Negative 
Not significant 
Fund and Time Effects 
Positive 
Negative 
Not significant 
Totals 
Positive 
Negative 
Not significant 
Proportion 
Positive% 
Negative% 
Not significant% 
Perfonnance Measure 
RR Al : A4 SR Total 
15 19 
I I 
6 2 
6 13 
I 0 
15 9 
6 8 
0 0 
2 0 
27 40 
2 I 
23 II 
52 77 
4 2 
44 21 
16 
0 
6 
10 
I 
II 
5 
0 
3 
31 
I 
20 
60 
2 
38 
20· 70 78 
I 3 3 
15 19 
16 45 51 
0 2 2 
2 37 47 
8 
0 
0 
44 
I 
3 
SS 
2 
13 
27. 
0 
5 
142 
5 
57 
84 
0 
16 
69 
2 
29 
Coefficient 
%· p,· {32 lb '{J,, 
30 49 27 35 
5 0 0 0 
4 7 28 20 
77 88 48 64 
13 0 0 0 
10 12 52 36 
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6.5 Finalised funds 
The issue of survivorship bias .has been prominent: in the managed funds 
perfonnance literature .ind has been discussed in section 2.4. The dataset used in this 
analysis is free of survivorship bias as the Morningstar database purchased includes 
all the details on open, closed and finalised funds. It is interesting to examine for 
comparative purposes what impact survivorship bias may have given that other 
databases may not be as complete when the ratings and perfonnance relationship is 
considered for other rating companies. The relationship between each of the rating 
measures and the four~factor alpha performance measure was estimated using a 
sample that exclude.d finalised funds, to investigate the possible impact. The results 
of these eStimatio~s follow the estimation results for each rating measure in 
Appendix Ill and Appendix IV and are summarised below. 
6.5.1 DGST 
Excluding finalised funds from the analysis does not change the predominant 
relationship outlined above for DGST _funds. Each of the regressions was estimated 
excluding the finalised funds focussing on the four-factor alpha perfonnance 
measure for QT (Table A Hl.6), QL (fable A Ill.I I), Q2 (Table A 111.21) and Star 
(Table A Ill.36). For the QT estimation, there is an increase in the ·m1mber of 
negative. relationships. For the components of the QT rating, summarised in Table 
6.20 the results are. ~!so broadly the same as the full sample, except for the ARR 
where the proportion of significant positive relationship increases from 29 to 71 
percent for the coe;fficients estimated excluding the finalised funds. The negative 
relationship for RR and RRR remain. 
For the Star rating regressions, excluding finalised funds reduces the number 
of significant coefficients that have been estimated, in particular the number of 
significant negative coefficients is reduced. The pattern of two-star funds having 
lower subsequent performance relative to five-star funds remains however. There is 
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a greater number of positive and significant coefficients when finalised funds are 
excluded. · For the four~factor alpha perfonnance measure a greater proportion of 
coefficients are positive (44 percent) when finalised funds are excluded than the full 
sample (6 percent). 
6.5.2 DSSB 
When each of the relationships are estimated excluding finalised funds, there 
is no change in sign of the coefficient with the QT (Table A JV.7), QL Table A 
IV.12) and Q2 rating (Table A IV.20). When the five components of the QT rating 
are examined (Table A IV.30) a small number of coefficieuts change sign. Of the 
120 coefficients estimated for the five components, three model specifications and 
four time periods, 12 estimated coefficients change sign. Five change to a positive 
relationship, five to a negative and two are ~o longer significant. In the Star rating 
regressions (Table A IV.38) there is no change in sign of any of the coefficients. In 
tenns of the absolute size of the coefficient and in the majority of cases the 
coefficients are larger when estimated excluding the finalised funds. 
,, 
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Table 6.20 QT Component Rating and Performance - DGST Exclnding 
Finalised funds 
. This table aggi,egates the sign of coefficients <P~} for the lagged QT component's rating regressions across all 
time periods as presented in Table A 111.28, with breakdown by perfonnance measure, funds that finalised over 
the time period are excluded. The Jag periods(/) are 12, 24, 36, 48-months between 8/1996 to 212001. Three 
spe(:ifications have i·'.":11 used for both the fixed effects model (FEM) and random effects model (REM} 
The first is a one-way FEM with cross-section or fund effects only, specified as: 
R11 =fi'C~., +a1F;, +e1,.l=l, .. J1,t=l, .. .,s,l=lag where: R1, is the perfonnance measure. being Raw_ Returns 
(RR), One and Four-Factor Alpha (Al, A4) Sharpe Ratio (SR), F1, is I for the I th fund, othetwisli is zero. 
P~u-1 = /11 AR ... 1 + p1 ARRM + Pi DRJli,4 + p, RRi,.1 + p; RRRu.1 being QT rating components, £1, is the _er!'Or 
component. The REM with fund effects only is specified as 
R11 =a+ P'C1r., + 111 + ,1,, I"" \. .. N,1 ""l, .• .S,I"" fag where additionally: a is an overall constant, 11, iS the crosS-
section error component for fund I assumed with no autocorrelation either over time or across cross-sections 
(funds) and assumed to be uneorreiated with t 11• The one-way FEM has been estimated consistent with White 
(1980) using the assumption of non-specific heteroseedastieity and alternatively constant variance within each 
fund, though the alternative assumptions makes no diff1.'l'Cl1ce to the results here in temis of the significance of the 
wefflcients at the 95 percent confidence level. The second ~-pceification incorporates fund effects and 
autocorrelation where the error tenn is specified as e11 = P'u-i + v1, and is estimated using the Corehrane·Orcutt 
method, The third model is a two-way specification which includes cross-section or fund effects and time effects 
and is specified as R,,=a+p1Q211-1+u,+r1 +&11 , i"'I ... N .. t=I...S, / "'12, 24. 36 where additionally -r1 
captures the effect of time period 1. In the FEM the restriction Th= D, =0 is imposed, with the sums weighted 
' ' by s1 /(ts,) or N, /('f,N,) for unbalanced samples, to avoid multicollinearity (Greene, 1998), In the REM, r, 
' ' is the time series error component, and it is assumed r1-IID(O.a/) and not to be autocorrelated either over time or 
across cross-sections (funds) and to be uncorrelated with e., and 11~ Majori!): total and proportions in bold, 
Quantitative rating com0poe-"n0e0nt~c----:,=--AR ARR DRR RR RRR 
Model 
Fund Effects 
Positive 6 2 6 0 0 
Negative 1 3 0 8 8 
not significant 1 3 2 0 0 
Fund effects ARl 
Positive 5 2 0 0 0 
Negative I 2 2 8 7 
not significant 2 4 6 0 I 
Fund & Time Effects 
Positive 4 3 2 0 0 
Negative I 0 0 7 7 
not significant 3 5 6 I I 
Totals 
Positive 15 7 8 0 0 
Negative 3 5 2 23 22 
not signifiCant 6 12 14 1 2 
Proportion 
Positive% 63 29 33 0 0 
Negative% 13 21 8 96 92 
not significant % 25 so 58 4 8 
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6.6 Rating Announcements and Changes 
As discussed in section 6.2. l, the ratings and perfonnance relationship call be 
examined using all monthly observations or only those in thC month that the rating 
was first issued or changed, which isJess frequent. It -was srigges'ted in st;ction 5.5.3 
that the ratings in these months may .be· more valuable as _information sources rather 
th.an a sample which includ~·s all obsefVed t'atings,: whether they have.changed or not. 
To investigate t~is a sample was constructed that only includes the rating and 
performance observRticins for the month that a rating was first announced and when it 
was subsequently changed. This sample was then used and each of the relationships 
were estimated. 
When emploY:ing the p~oled time-series models, a minimum of two 
observations per ·group or fund is required. In the full sample, for example, this 
means that fonds with only a 12-month his~ory are not included as only· one 
observation is possible. When only the month of a rating annoU:ncement change is 
used this leads to the rejection of a large number of funds that only have the one :i 
observation. For example while 48 funds are available for the full sample, only 21 
funds have the minimum requirements in the reduced sample. As a consequence the 
full range of estimations is not possible and the advantage of employing the pooled 
tirrie. series tec~niqµe is lost for 24 and 36-month i,erfonnance periods. ·· For 
Comparative purposes, both. the pooled time series and pooled OLS result'! are 
presented for th~ 12".'month perfonnance period, where model. statistics support lhC?Jll. 
For regressions using one-factor and four-factor alpha perfonnance measures 
over a 12-month period, there are no corresponding lagged one star ratings. The 
dummy regressions. therefore use only three dummies for two, three and four star 
funds with the default remaining the fiv·e star. 
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6.6.1 DGST 
The estimated relationship between the fund QL rating and subsequent 
performance in the full sample was in the majority of cases negative. When the 
reduced sample is used the majority of estimates across time periods and 
performance measures arc now not significant. More notably a number of previously 
significant and negative relJtionships are now positive and significant, particularly 
for a 12-month perfomiance period. Where POLS has been used to estimate the 
relationship, the adjusted-R2 values are very low, suggesting that the QL rating 
explains little of the variability in subsequent perfonnance. 
The estimated relalionship between Q2 and subsequent performance in the 
full sample was mixed and influenced by model specification for the full sample. In 
the reduced sample a larger number of coefficients are not significant with a larger 
proportion of positive relaticnships estimated than in the full sample. 
The estimated relationship for lower Star rated funds relative to five Star 
funds in the reduced sample is broadly consistent overall wtt:i the full sample. as the 
largest number of coefficients are positive. While in the full sample the largest 
number of negative coeffici~nts were estimated for 24-month perfonnance period, 
for the reducetl sample it is for the 12-month peric,d. That is, the lower rated funds 
were estimated to underperfonn the five star funds but only in the next 12-month 
period. Consistent across both samples is the larger number of negative coefficients 
for one and two star funds, supporting underperfonnance of lower rated fonds, 
relative to higher rated funds. 
6.6.2 DSSB 
In the full sample the majority of the estimated lagged QL ratings were not 
significantly related to future performance across all specifications, though 42 
percent of coefficients were positively related. In the reduced sample, while it is not 
a like-with-like comparison in that not all the same specifications are estimated, there 
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is a lar·5er number of coefficients that are not significant. Overall though the results 
are not greatly different. For the Q2 the results are again similar between the two 
samples. None of the estimated relationships between the Q2 rating and subsequent 
perfonnance are positive and in the majority of cases they are negative. 
When the Star rating relationships are estimated they again are similar to the 
full sample. Only one estimated coefficient across all time periods and perfonnance 
measures is negative. However whereas in the full sample the majority of 
coeffcients were positive, and thus predicting that lower rated funds subsequently 
?erfonn better than five star funds, in the reduced sample the majority of funds are 
not significant, and therefore not providing any relative performance 1information. 
Where POLS has been used to estimated the relationship, the lvw am! i:isome 
instances negative adjusted-R2 value highlights the limited ability of the Star ratings 
to explain subsequent variability in the perfonnance of lower rated funds relative to 
the five star funds. 
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6. 7 Economic Significance 
The di.!>cussfon so far has focus.1,ed exclusivelv on the statistical significance 
of results. A related and perhaps morJ important question for investors is whether 
there is any economic significance to the relationship estimates. That is, where a 
positive relationship has been identified, could it have been used profitably by an 
inve .. tor, or in the case of a negative relationship, what hann would an investor have 
suffered if they hud pursued investment guided by the ratings? 
Economic significance must be coupled with results that are replicable and 
consistent over time. The present analysis could not claim any irrevocable 
conclusions on the relationship betv. .!en the various rating measures. Notably, the 
relationships could be a captive of the overall time period that has been examined. 
More definitive statements will only be possible when a much longer time period is 
available so that relationships can be estimated in periods where for ex.ample overaH 
markets have moved up and down, where a greater number of funds exist, or where a 
greater spread of Star ratings exist. This will happen with time. 
With thest; caveats in mind some general comments can be made about the 
current sample in tenns of their economic significance. Rather than discuss each 
perfonnance measure and model specification, this section focuses on the estimated 
relationship between the ratings and four-factor alpha perfonnance using the model 
specification supported by the test statistics. 
For DGST funds for every extra QT point, on an annual basis the 
perfonnance reduces by a maximum of 0.60 percent on a nominal per annum basis, 
using a 12-month performance period. For DSSB funds the reduction is to a 
maximimum of 1.0 percent on a nominal per annum basis. For the QL rating the 
impact is larger, with tht~ performance reducing by a maximum of 4.5 percent on a 
nominal per annum basis for every point for DGST funds whereas for DSSB funds 
the estimate is for a maximum two percent increase per point for DSSB funds. As 
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previously reported in Table 6.1, the average QL mting for the DGST and DSSB 
subcategories was 8.22 and 8.21, with a range of 4 points for both. In contrast the 
QT rating average was 5.63(DGST) and 5.46(DSSB) with a range of nine points. 
For the Q2 rating the reduction in perfonnance for both subcategories is a 
maximum of 0.1 percent nominal per annum. The mean Q2 score for DSSB funds 
was 56 and 47 for DGST funds. Given the categorical nature of the Star ratings and 
the dummy variable regressions, the coefficients for the Star rating are much larger. 
It must be remembered that the most common coeffcient estimated for both 
subcategories for the Star dummy variable regressions was not significant. Where 
the coefficients were significant, the largest difforential was for a two star relative tc, 
a five star fund where the difference on a nominal per annum basis was a reduction 
of 7 percent for DGST funds using 11 12-month performance period. For a two star 
fund DSSB funds their perfonnance was 6 percent better than a five star fund, 
expressed on nominal per annum basis. Blake & Morey (1999) who performed the 
same dummy variable regressions with the same performance measure reported the 
difi~rence beiween a two star and five star of 3.6 percent per annum, with the 
diffemnce for the one star and five star much larger at 15.6 percent (Blake & Morey, 
1999, p.47), in both instances the lower rated funds underperformed. 
It could be argued that given the size of the entry and exit fees discussed in 
section 5.3.1, which these performance figures exclude, closer attention to these may 
be a more profitable measure to base the choice of fund rather than the respective 
ratings. 
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6.8 Results Summary 
This chapter has investigated the relationship between Morningstar ratings 
and the subsequent perfonnance of two of the largest subcategory of funds. It is 
important to note that Morningstar make abundantly clear that they make no claim as 
to the predictive value of their ratings. However the rating and expected 
perfonnance 1ink has been discussed at an industry level, section 3.6, demonstrated 
through the surveys of individual investors and financial advsiers, section 4.7.4, and 
implied by the construction of the ratings, section 3.7.5. Aside from these 
arguments, it is of inten:st to investigate what relationship, if any, these ratings may 
provide and further whether these relationships are consistent with what would be 
regarded as quality funds. 
In total the results do not provide evidence to support a positive relationship 
between the ratings or their components and any of the four performance measures 
for DGST funds. There are some instances where a positive relationship is supported 
but it is not systematic across time period, performance measure or model 
specification. There is some evidence, which accords with Blake & f..forey ( 1999) 
that the subsequent performance of two-star funds is lower than the five-star funds 
and that there is no significant difference for the four-star funds relative to five star 
funds. The available sample period for the overall fund Star rating and Q2 rating is 
short and thus caution must be exercised when drawing conclusions. As estimation 
over longer time periods become possible it may become possible to be more 
confident in the conclusions. It must also be restated that the relationships have only 
been explored for a selection of four commonly used performance measures. 
The results for the DSSB subcategory provides evidence that the various 
rating measures are not positively related to subsequent perfonnance. A positive 
relationship between QT or QL components is the least supported relationship. 
There is further little evidence to support the view that five-star funds will 
subsequently outperform lower rated funds. Momingstar's disclaimers concerning 
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the relationship between ratings and subsequent pcrfunnance appear well made. If 
relative perfonnance is a component of quality however, the rating measures do not 
provide evidence that they are positively related to them. 
Relationships were estimated using observations where a rating was first 
announced and subsequently changed. These results for the DGST subcategory 
reduced the number of negative relationships between the various ratings and future 
performance though the reestimated relationships were predominantly not 
significantly different to zero. The results for the DSSB subcategory were largely 
similar to the overall sample. There does not appear to be strong evidence that 
changes in ratings are any more informative. 
Finally the economic significance of the estimated relationships were 
examined where a significant relationship had been estimated for a rating component 
or overall Star rating. Given the range of possible rating scores, the maximum 
possible effects do not appear to be the source of harmful or profitable strategies for 
the components of Star ratings. For the Star ratings themselves, the results were 
larger and within the range of the only similar study conducted by Blake & Morey 
(1999) in the US. There were conflicting results for the Star ratings though as the 
DGST subcategory provided weak evidence supporting the under-performance of 
lower rated funds whereas the DSSB provided evidence of the opposite. 
ln view of the magnitudes of the estimated relationships, the final 
recommendation for investors is that they may be better served examining 
information on fees which in magnitude appear greater on average and far more 
certain. 
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CHAPTER7 
CONCLUSION 
This thesis commenced with Alfred Cowles' reflection on the utility of his 
research into the investment recommendations of various investment subscription 
services. In view of his negative findings on the ability of such seivices to identify 
better investments, he suggested that their role would however continue. His 
reasoning was based on an inhe~ently optimistic view he suggested people held in 
regards the ability of analysts to choose better investments. This optimism hfl 
implied was partly fuelled i>y the alternative frightening prospect where nobody 
knows the better inveshnents. 
In some respects, this thesis also arrives at a negative conclusion. Very little 
evidence can he found to support a positive relationship between a fund's 
Morningstar ratii1g and its subsequent perfonnance. The usefulness of these ratings, 
to the extent that such a relationship is important and the extent to which 
Morningstar fund ratings are indicative, is therefore questionable. 
The survey of two of the main target markets for ratings, being individual 
investors and financial advisers, also produces a somewhat negative conclusion. The 
importance attached to the components that are used in constructing a rating are not 
significantly different between users who rely on each of the top three rating 
suppliers. Yet each of the top three rating companies supply notably different rating 
measures. Whether this reflects a misunderstanding by users or a failure by the 
rating supplier in articulating these differences remains unclear. 
This final chapter synthesises the major results of this thesis and concludes 
with a discussion of the potential future role of ratings and suggestions for potential 
future research. 
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7.1 Managed Fund Investment and Research Industry 
The managed fund sector has experienced rapid growth in Australia over the 
past two decades. The three major managed fund types of superannuation funds, life 
offices and public unit trusts have all enjoyed growth. Superannuation funds have 
been the beneficiary of concerted federal government efforts to have Australian 
employees provide fur their retirement. As'ide from these funds, public unit trusts 
have also attracted increasing money flows reflecting the continued sophistication in 
savings and investment patterns of Australian individual investors. 
Obtaining quality infonnation from managed funds themselves to assist 
investment decisions is difficult. Pinnock (1999) reviewed the mandated or 
voluntarily disclosed infonnation from the managed funds and found little relevant 
perfmmance information. This created an asymmetry 4'between fund managers who 
knows their true perfonnance and the unit holder who does not." (Pinnuck, 1999, 
p. 76). Further Jain & Wu (2000) reviewed fund advertising in the US and implied 
that this infonnation asymmetry may be used with less than honourable motives. 
In effect this infonnation vacuum has created a role for a research industry to 
supply required infonnation to individual investors and financial advisers who guide 
individual investors. Managed fund ratings represent a key component of this 
research and have gained an increasing profile through their publication by a number 
of newspaper, magazine and online outlets and their incorporation into managed fund 
advertisements. 
Similar rating companies exist in overseas markets but a key difference in the 
Australian ratings is the role of qualitative inputs to the rating construction and 
assessment process. Whether this is a reflection more of an opportunity offered by 
the smaller size of the managed fund industry in Australia, and hence ability to 
undertake interviews of fund managers, than a fundamental insight into what 
determines a better managed fund investment is debatable. What is not debatable, at 
least in the Australian ratings industry, is the need for these qualitative assessments 
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which are absent from the major rating providers in the UK and US. In fact the 
Australian providers appear to compete on the basis of how much rather than how 
little of their respective ratings reflect a qualitative component. 
The four main rating companies, Morningstar, Assirt, van Eyk, and 
InvestorWeb, vary in how much detail they provide in, respect of their rating 
constructions. Morningstar and van Eyk provide th~ most detailed breakdown of 
how their ratings are constructed in terms of the sub-components of the quantitative 
and qualitative inputs, without the specifics of the questions used in fund interviews. 
Notable in a review of avaliable rating construction infonnatiori is the range of 
generic factors used by each provider but inevitably with an attr"1pt at some level of 
branding or identification made to particular companies. 
The classifications in each rating scheme differ in tenns of how explicit and 
equivocal each is. van Eyk and to a lesser degree InvestorWeb are explicit in their 
ratings as to an expectation of higher rated funds to outperform in the future. Assirt's 
rating definitions provide the weakest endorsement in terms of future performance, 
Momingstar's rating definitions are predictive but this extends to identifying 
''quality" funds, though this remains undefined. 
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7.2 Individual Investors and Financial Advisers 
The two main target markets for ratings are individual investors and those 
who guide individual investors, namely financial advisers. It has been demonstrated 
that ratings clearly have a role for both groups. 
7.2.1 Rating Use 
The large finance literature, reviewed in Chapter 2, has cast the behaviour of 
individual investors on a wide spectrum between rational wealth maximising agents 
at one extreme and irrational inconsistent agents at the other. Nonnative and positive 
theories of rational behaviour underpin the major building blocks of modem portfolio 
theory and the capital asset pricing model respectively. The anomalous and irrational 
behaviour of individuals has become synonymous with behavioural finance. A 
consumer behaviour framework, more associated with the purchase decisions of 
durable and non-durable goods, offers a wider framework for examining the choice 
of managed funds that goes beyond the examination of expected return and risk of 
the financial asset under consideration. 
The pursuit of valuable infonnation search has also been considered across a 
range of literatues. Finance has focussed on questions of market efficiency whereas 
in consumer behaviour the focus has been on the infonnation search, the amount of 
infonnation collected and the pattern of information accumulation. The benefit of 
the approach offered by economics has been the focus on the outcomes of 
infonnation search within a traditional cost-benefit framework. 
Chapter 4 reported on a survey of the key user groups of ratings, individual 
investors and financial advisers in respect of ratings as infonnation inputs. From 
these surveys it appears that managed fund ratings are an accepted feature of the 
Australia managed fund industry. A sample of financial advisers from the Financial 
Planning Association and a sample of individual investors from the Australian 
., 
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Shareholder Association suggest that approximately 75 percent of each sample had 
used either ratings alone or ratings in conjunction with purely performance based 
rankings. For both samples Morningstar ratings are the most widely used and relied 
on. The main purpose of a fund rating was considered by the largest number of both 
groups to identify well managed/administered funds. The main reason why advisers 
used a rating was to help satisfy legal requirements. Significant proportions of both 
samples indicated that a performance expectation element was present in their use of 
ratings. 
Distinctive groups of individual investors were identified who preferred 
particular information sources and placed importance on selection criteria beyond 
those of expected risk and return. Individual investors can not be classified as a 
homogenous group though some attitudes were pervasive across a range of 
demographic groups and financial characteristics. Capon et al. (1996) was first to 
apply a consumer behaviour framework in identifying attribuks such as fund 
rankings and other non~performance related infonnation as important to individuals 
when choosing a managed fund. He suggested "financial perfonnance is only one of 
several factors considered by investors in making investment decisions for mutual 
funds" (Capon et al., 1996). This current study is the first to demonstrate separately 
the importance of fund ratings and the first to confirm the work of Capon et al. 
(I 996) outside the US. 
The results support an important role for ratings for individual managed fund 
investors. The evidence suggests that for individual investors ratings are more likely 
viewed as an attribute of a managed fund product, that does not necessarily play a 
role due to an expected link with any Jikelihood about the fund's future performance. 
This supports arguments of Capon et al. (1996), Choong (1997) and Nagy & 
Obenberger (1994) of investors having a wider framework than solely historical or 
expected risk and return when investing in managed funds. 
Significant numbers of individual investors reported that they were wil1ing to 
trade~off expected return for increased levels of a specified fund attribute or 
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characteristic. Specifically, investors expressed a willingness to sacrifice expected 
return if a fund had a better historical perfonnance or if its rating was higher, 
independent of any expectation of future perfonnance. Whether such findings are 
better explained through pschological models such as theories of regret (Shefrin, 
2000) or costly information search models such as. Sirri & Tufano (1998) is difficult 
to detennine. What is clear though is that ratings matter to some individual 
investors. 
7,2,2 Ratings Understanding 
While ratings are widely used by both individual investors and financial 
advisers there dces not appear to be a full understanding of the difference between 
each rating brand by either group. Further, the emphasis given to the components 
used to construct the respective ratings of each research company does not appear to 
be matched by the choice of ratings by their users. For example, each rating 
company strongly promotes the respective weighting that quantitative and qualitative 
inputs have in their rating. However there were no significant differences in these 
weightings when financial advisers were grouped by the rating they relied on the 
most. 
Distinctive clusters of both individual investors and financial advisers can be 
identifed in tenns of the importance they attach to the various quantitative and 
qualitative sub-components used in constructing a rating. The largest number in each 
sample rate historical perfonnance components highly, a component consistently 
downplayed by each rating provider. Smaller groups in each sample can be 
classified as truly forward-looking, which each rating company in contrast emphasise 
as importance. In short what has happened in the past for a fund appears more 
important for fund rating users than rating suppliers. 
While differences can be identified in what is considered important in 
constructing a rating there is one common factor to respondents in each cluster and 
each sample, the reputation of the fund company. While this conflicts with the 
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evidence of Shefrin & Statman ( 1997) who suggested that such reputational standing 
was not necessarily beneficial in subsequent perfonnance, it supports the "perception 
of value" model and anomaly suggested by De Bondt (1998i Ratings serve to 
reinforce the individual fund reputation and support its role as a valuable attribute. 
Within the investments management industry in Australia, ratings also appear 
• to _have gained gradual acceptance. A review of the practitioner publications 
supports an increased awareness of the potentially positive role that ratings can have. 
However, with the acceptance has come a broadening of discussion with the industry 
increasingly ca11ing for a demonstration of their infonnational value, specifically the 
link with subsequent pcrfonnance of a fund. 
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7.3 Ratings and Subsequent Performance 
The final issue ex.amined in this thesis was the relationship between a rating 
and a fund~ subsequent pcrfonnance. Australian Equity TrusLs • General (DOST) 
and Superannuation Funds • Australian Equity (DSSB) are two of the largest 
subcategories of funds that Morningstar rate and they represent two of the most 
significant groupings of funds for Australian investors. The overall Star rating .ind 
rating componen~ of these funds were trucked for periods ofup to five years after a 
rating to examine possible relationships. 
Overall for each subcategory the results are not supportive of a positive 
relationship between a fund's rating and its subsequent perfonnance. For DGST 
funds there arc some instances where a positive relationship is supported though this 
is not systematic across time period, perfonnance measure or model specification. 
The results for the DSSB subcategory are less supportive as a positive relationship 
between QL, QT, or QT components is the least supported relationship. 
In t.,;:rms of the overall star rating there is some evidence supportive of Blake 
& Morey (1999) who examined Morningstar ratings in the US. The evidence 
suggests subsequent under·performance of two-star funds relative to five·star funds 
while there is no significant relative difference for four and five·star funds. This 
however is only true for DGST funds and the perfonnance time period is restricted to 
two years only and therefore such conclusions are made cautiously. There is little 
evidence of higher rated DSSB funds outperfonning lower rated funds subseq\lent to 
a rating, with in fact some evidence that lower rated funds subsequently outperfonn. 
The same caveats of restricted time periods must again be home in mind. These 
results were not changed when the sample was reduced to include only observations 
when a rating had changed. If relative performance is a component of quality 
however, the rating measures do not provide such infom1ation. 
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Given the estimated relationships the financial or economic consequence of 
following a rating does not appear to have a large financial effect for an investor, 
whether profitable or not. While the financial consequence of choosing a fund with a 
high (low) Star rating relative to a fund with a low (high) Star rating is larger than 
when considering its quantitative and qualitative components, in absolute tenns they 
were within the range of Blake & Morey (1999) in the US. 
Given the magnitude of the estimated relationships and their uncertainty, a 
major conclusion in regards the usefulness of ratings was that investors may be better 
served examining information on managed fund fees which in magnitude appear 
greater on average and far more certain. 
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7.4 Potential Role for Ratings 
Ratings have a simple appeal, particularly the popuJar star ratings and given 
their widesprf.'ad usage in any number of fields it is unlikely that they will not 
continue to be provided. The objectivity of fund ratings range from one extreme 
where measurable demonstrable characteristics are captured to another where they 
are a relative summary of a subjective or artistic assessment. At one extreme is 
science, at the other is art. Australian managed fund rating providers appear willing 
to demonstrate a rigorous assessment process while at the same time emphasising the 
need and role for a subjective and qualitative judgement. 
In view of the lack of evidence supporting a consistent information role of 
ratings and in view of the evidence that ratings have become an accepted feature of 
the managed fund industry, by both individual investors and financial advisers, it is 
instructive to review the experience of the credit ratings industry. The growing 
credit ratings literature discussed in Chapter 2, highlighted the paradoxical 
development of the credit ratings industry at the same time as similar negative 
evidence on the informational value of credit ratings was being produced. It has 
been suggested that this paradox could be reconciled through the legitimisation that 
credit ratings had received through their adoption as regulatory tools (Partnoy, 2001; 
Schwarcz, 2001). 
The legitimisation of fund ratings has been aided by their adoption by 
managed fund companies in the advertisements of their products. They have also 
been aided by thr. relatively positive market conditions that have been enjoyed since 
the inception of ratings in 1996. For example since Morningstar commenced its 
quantitative ratings in August 1996 the Alt Ordinaries Share Price Index has risen 36 
percent up to July 2002. Scrutiny may not be as high as it otherwise might be when 
returns remain positive. The ratings companies have enjoyed an increash1g profile 
and growing reputation through the advertisements but not the closer examination as 
to the basis of the reputation. However between August 1996 and July 2002, the 
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largest one-year period fall, lhe only two-year period fall and the smallest three-year 
rise have occurred only recently in June and July 2002. The level of scrutiny may 
change if markets continue a sustained deterioration. 
The introdu1..1ion of the superannuation guarantee surcharge by the federal 
government and the move towards individuals having to accept greater responsibility 
for their retirement were noted in Chapter 3 as key drivers of the increase in managed 
fund assets. The increased choice offered to Australian employees ahead of potential 
compulsory superannuation choice legislation was identified in Chapter 3 as possible 
avenues through which ratings may be given a legitimised role. The Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority who is in charge of the supervision of the 
superannuation industry has recently expressed enthusiasm for the use of credit 
ratings as part of the regulatory regime for the banking sector (Australian Pruden,tial 
Regulation Authority, 200 I). Fund ratings have an obvious and similar attraction in 
a mandatory choice environment. 
Given the increased profile of ratings there may also be seen to be a role for 
an agency such as the Australian Securities and Investments Commission who have 
the primary role for the regulation and enforcement of financial services law for the 
protection of investors. The U.S. experience in relation to credit ratings suggests that 
this may not necessarily have desirable consequences, notwithstanding honourable 
motives. 
The need for such regulation can be informed by a closer examination of the 
respective reputation and regulatory licenses arguments (Partnoy, 2001) that have 
prevailed for credit ratings. Credit ratings have a history extending to the beginning 
of the 201h Century in the US and Moodys, arguably the preeminent credit rating 
company, now has a market capitalisation of over US$5 billion (Partnoy, 2001) and 
operates worldwide. Schwarcz (2001) has argued that the reputation of Moodys, 
Standard and Poors and other credit rating companies is tied to the usefulness and 
infonnation value of their ratings. 
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Managed fund ratings in contrast have Jess than a decade of history in 
Australia and not much longer in the US or UK. Their reputation has been enhanced 
through the eagerness of managed funds to adv.ertise good ratings, the willingness of 
popular invesment magazines to include them in perfonnance tables, their use by 
investment advisers in making recommendations and their use by individual 
investors in making their investment decisions. Each of these has been demonstrated 
in this thesis and has demonstrably improved the reputation of the rating companies. 
The negative findings of this thesis in respect of user understanding and estimated 
perfonnance relationships are a question against this reputation capitaJ. Replicated 
work that is not captive to particular time periods or rating company is needed to 
further aid these discussions. 
In the absence of such work it is difficult to argue for any regulatory 
intrusion. Partnoy (200 I) has argued that in the case of credit ratings such regulatory 
involvement has led to the influence of ratings in the absence of reputation 
supporting perfonnance by the credit rating companies. In effect credit ratings have 
become important because the regulations have said they are Partnoy (2001). 
Involvement of any regulation at such an early stage of the managed fund ratings 
industry development could therefore waste an opportunity for a strong reputation 
based market to develop. This discussion of a possible role for ratings strongly 
advocates areas of future work that will conclude the thesis. 
318 
7.5 Future Resoarch 
The immediate work in this thesis can be added to merely with the passage of 
time. Longer time periods will allow work that can make more robust conclusions 
on the estimated relationships and their replication in alternative market conditions. 
Replication of the performance related work to other Morningstar subcategories 
would also be of value,- as the number of funds in the each subcategory grows over 
time. 
A discussion of the use and usefulness of managed fund ratings will be 
greatly enhanced by more rating companies making their rating data histories 
available. Assirt and van Eyk in particular could greatly assist this by making their 
data more freely available as Morningstar does through the purchase of its 
TotalAccess CD. 
In respect of the level of understanding of ratings, replicating surveys of 
broader investor and potential investor groups will assist in clarifying the level of 
understanding to allow rating companies to promote more infonned use. More 
qualitative research into the nature of the utility individual investors gain from a fund 
rating itself in view of the evidence presented that has suggested a role independent 
of expected perfonnance. 
Finally, the discussion of the usefulness of ratings in this thesis has been 
restricted to the micro level of individual investors and, to a lesser extent, financial 
advisers. At a macro level the discussion of usefulness and value requires closer 
examination of the resources consumed by the entire rating process. Managed fund 
companies allocate considerable resources in order to meet and supply_ the 
infonnation requirements of rating companies and very few appear willing not to 
participate. Little is known of these compliance costs and research in this area would 
greatly enrich the research. 
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APPEND.IX I 
INVESTOR SURVEY 
This is an anonymous questionnaire. Please ensure that you do not write your 
name, or any other comments that wlll make you Identifiable, on the attached. 
By completing the questionnaire you are consenting to take part in this 
research. As such you should first read the Introduction below as It explains 
fully the intention of this project 
Managed Funds - Investor Survey 
PLEASE ONLY COMPLETE THIS SURVEY IF YOU ARE OR 
HAVE PREVIOUSLY INVESTED IN MANAGED FUNDS/UNIT 
TRUSTS 
Dear Member, 
If you are or have been a managed fund investor I am seeking your 
assistance with research I am conducting into managed funds In Australia, as 
part of my Ph.D studie$. Your participation will help gain a better 
understanding of investment decisions in managed funds. 
The survey is completely anonymous, as no identifying details are required 
from you. Neither the survey nor myself are supported through any 
commercial links and I will not pass on any data from the survey for any 
further use. The distribution of the survey has been possible only with the 
support of the Australian Shareholders' Association. The Association 
encourages your completion of the survey and will be provided with results of 
the survey when completed. 
The survey Is only Intended for those who have or currently are Invested In 
managed funds. 
I appreciate that your time is valuable so I would be very grateful if you were 
able to spare 10-15 minutes of your time to complete the survey enclosed and 
mail it to me in the postage paid reply envelope. If you would like any further 
information on the survey please feel free to contact me. 
Once again thanks for your time. 
Paul Gerrans 
School of Finance and Economics 
Edith Cowan University 
100 Joondalup Drive 
Joondalup, W.A. 6027 
Ph. 08 94005605 
p.gerrans@cowan.edu.au 
I ., , EDITH COWAN UNIVERSITY l'fRTH WESTERN AUSTI\ALIA 
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This first section relates to your investments in managed funds .[ 
In terms of your managed fund Investments overall: 
1. How many separate managed funds are you currently invested in? ___ _ 
2. What is the dollar value of your total managed fund investment(s)? $ ____ (approx) 
3. What proportion of your total investments is in managed funds ____ % 
4. What proportion of your managed funds is for superannuation? ____ % 
The follow Ing 7 questions relate to the managed fund you most recently Invested In 
5. What is the name of the: 
Fund product _______ Backing Fund/Company _______ _ 
(To clarify: examples of fund products are BT American Growth Fund, AMP Gold 
Trust and their Backing Fund/Company is BT Funds Management and AMP Group 
respectively. The same terms are used throughout this survey) 
6. How much did you invest? $, _____ _ 
7. Which of the following describes the main focus of the fund: 
Asset Cla11 Style Investment Tax Category 
Cash/Fixed Interest Growth Domes lie Superannuation 
Equity Value Overseas Non-Super 
Property Balanced Balanced Don't know 
Diversified Don't know Don't know 
Don't know 
8. Was the decision lo invest in the fund made: (please tick one only) 
in consultation with Following professional Solely by yourself 
"'"rtner/friends/ familv recomme 1dation 
9. When you chose your last managed fund product how important were the 
following in choosing a managed fund rather than making a direct investment 
ourself? 1"1ease circle\ 
Low High 
Importance Importance 
Hinher --ssible return 1 2 3 4 5 
Lower nossible risk 1 2 3 4 5 
Cost of investinn 1 2 3 4 5 
Exposure to greater number of 
investments 
1 2 3 4 5 
Access to mananement skill 1 2 3 4 5 
Ease of administration 1 2 3 4 5 
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1 O. How important were each of the following information sources when you 
purchased your last managed fund product? (please circle) 
Low High 
Importance Importance 
Fund advertisements 1 2 3 4 5 
Recommendations of family/friends 1 2 3 4 5 
Investment books 1 2 3 4 5 
Financial adviser recommendation 1 2 3 4 5 
Published fund ratings/rankings 1 2 3 4 5 
Magazine/paper investment articles 1 2 3 4 5 
Investment programme on television 1 2 3 4 5 
11. In choosing your last managed fund product how important was: (please circle) 
Low High 
Importance Importance 
The specific manager(s) of the fund 1 2 3 4 5 
Reputation of backing companynund 1 2 3 4 5 
Investment objective of the fund 
1 2 3 4 5 
product 
Features of fund product 1 2 3 4 5 
Fund product customer relations 1 2 3 4 5 
The level of entry/exit fees 1 2 3 4 5 
The annual management fees 1 2 3 4 5 
Professional recommendation 1 2 3 4 5 
Fund product pertormance history 1 2 3 4 5 
Fund product ratings/rankings 1 2 3 4 5 
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This section relates to hD\"I you manage your managed fund Investments and 
how you assess their performance 
For the managed fund product you most recerftlv invested in: 
12. What rate of return did this fund achieve In the year 2000? 
___ % Don't know D 
13. How would you assess the fund's return level compared with simnar funds? 
High D Average D Low D Don't know D 
14. How would you assess the fund's risk level compared with similar funds? 
High D Average D Low D Don't know D 
15. When assessing the risk of a managed funds, how important are: (please circle) 
Low High 
Importance Importance 
Variabilitv of returns 1 2 3 4 
Likelihood of losing money on 1 2 3 4 investment 
Likelihood of meeting/not meeting 1 2 3 4 vour investment obiectives 
16. When assessing the pertormance of your managed fund(s), in terms of return 
and risk, how important are each of the following? (please circle) 
Low 
5 
5 
5 
High 
Importance Importance 
Performance of the whole market 1 2 3 4 
Performance of similar funds 1 2 3 4 
The stated obiectives of the fund 1 2 3 4 
Your own investment obfectives 1 2 3 4 
17. What do you consider to be an appropriate time period to assess the 
performance of a managed fund? 
__ years months 
18. Overall how would you rate your ability to make investment decisions? Please 
tick. 
Above Average D Average D Below Average D 
5 
5 
5 
5 
19. In your experience if a fund has perfonned above average in one year then in the 
following year it is more likely to perform 
Above average Cl Average D Below average D Any of these D 
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This section relates to the ratings and rankings produced for managed funds 
and publisherf In magazines, newspapers and on the web 
Research companies produce both rankings and ratings. Rankings are 
generally quantitative and use historical return and risk measures and then 
rank performance. Ratings combine the quantitative analysis with qualitative 
analysis which Is a more subjective assessment of how the research company 
assesses the fund management, Investment expertise, administration etc .• 
For example on 31st August 2000, Colonial First State's, Count First Australian 
Share Fund had a one year return of 20.98% 1• 
Ranking 
When compared with similar funds the Count First Austral/an Share Fund 
achieved an s~ ranking (le. s~ highest one year return). Other rankings might 
group the fund as being In the top ten percent of funds or the top 25 percent of 
funds based on the one year return. 
Rating 
At the same time the fund was given a five star rating by Morningstar alter they 
had assessed the fund, compared with other slmllar funds, not just for return & 
risk rankings but also the Investment manager's experience, administration 
and the other factors Morningstar consider Important In their assessment of a 
fund. 
20. Which do you pay most attention to? 
Rankings O Ratings D Both O Neither D 
The questions that follow relates to managed fund ratings only. 
21. Which of the following managed fund ratings have you used as part of your 
. t d" k'?PI t'k mves ment ec1s1on ma ma ease IC ; 
Mominostar 
Assirt 
Van Evk 
If other, i: lease specifiv 
Any that 
vou use 
The one you 
retv on most 
}
Tick only 
1-~~~--1 one 
1-----, 
22. What do you consider the primary purpose of these ratings. Tick one only. 
To identitv well manaaed/administered funds } 
e-eld,,eecn,:tifv"-'h"'is,,to,ecne,·c.,aecllv'-"w"e!!.11= oe"rtoe,r,.,m,,e,,dc,f,,.une,de,s'--------------!---j Tick only 
Jdentifv funds that should outoerform lower rated funds in the future one 
Identify 'value for money funds' 
23. What level of importance do you give to the rating of a fund when you make your 
investment decision? 
I ~w 
High 
2 3 4 5 
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1 Data £ourced from Morningstar TotalAccess 
24. Does a managed fund have to have a minimum rating before you will invest in it? 
Yes D 
n 
No D Please go to question 25 
If yes what is the lowest rating you would recommend? Only Indicate for the 
ratlng(s) you are lammer wHh. 
Morningstar j stars I Assirt stars / van Eyk j _ 
25. The various ratings are based on Information criteria that you may use when 
choosing a fund. In general how Important Is each of the following criteria to you 
when choosinn a fund? Please circle 
LOW High 
lmnortance lmoortance 
Hlstorlcal return of fund product t 2 3 4 5 
Historical variability of fund product 1 2 3 4 5 
Lowest return achieved by fund product 1 2 3 4 5 
How long the fund product has been 1 2 3 4 5 ottered 
Fund management fee, entry & exit fees 1 2 3 4 5 
Overall strength of backing 
fund/company 1 2 3 4 5 
Fund product features 1 2 3 . 4 5 
Overall experience and ability of the 1 2 3 4 5 fund nroduct's Investment team 
Experience and ability In the partlcul.;•.r 1 2 3 4 5 sector of the fund 
Administrative capability of fund 1 2 3 4 5 
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This section asks you about the features and characteristics of managed funds 
The Information you may h.nve about a managed fund product, or the features a 
managed fund product offers, cen very. With this In mind: 
26. When you invest in a managed fund would you be willing to accept a lower 
return if a fund product had the following characteristics? Please indicate yes or no. 
If yes please also indicate what proportion of the expected annual return you would 
be willing to give up to gain the improvement. 
Proportion of 
each years Characteristic compared with similar funds No Yes If yes expected return 
wllllnn to reduce 
Above averaae historical returns 
Below averaas historical risk 
Above averane ratinn from research comoanv 
27. When you invest in a managed fund would you be willing to accept a lower 
return to improve the following features from average to above average, when 
compared with slmilar funds? Please Indicate yes or no. 
If yes please also Indicate what proportion of the expected annual retum you would 
be wlllin to ive u to ain the im rovement. 
% 
% 
% 
Proportion of 
each years Feature Improved from average to above 
average when compared to similar funds No 
Yes If 
yes expected return 
wllllnn to reduce 
This last section seeks some demographic characteristics 
28. Gender: 
Male D Female D 
29.Age: _years 
30. What Is your total Income per year before tax? 
Less than $20,000 D $60,001 • $80,000 
$20,000 • $40,000 D $80,001 • $100,000 
$40,001. $60,ooo D $100,001 • $120,000 
D More than $120,000 D 
D 
D 
31. What is the highest education level you have completed? Please tick one only. 
Secondary University Undergraduate Degree 
UniversityffAFE Diploma University Postgraduate Degree 
Please return the questionnaire in the reply paid envelope. Many thanks again for your lime. 
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APPENDIX II 
ADVISER SURVEY 
This Is an anonymous questionnaire. Please ensure that you do not write your name, 
or any other comments that will make you identifiable, on the attached. By 
completing the questionnaire you are consenting to take part in this research. As 
such you should first read the Introduction below as It explains fully the Intention of 
this project 
Managed Funds • Adviser Survey 
Dear Financial Adviser, 
I am seeking your assistance with research I am conducting Into managed funds in 
Australia, as part of my Ph.D studies. I am interested In learning more about how 
managed fund ratings are used by you when making recommendations and by your 
clients in making their investment decisions. 
I appreciate that your time is valuable and I would be very grateful if you were able to 
spare approximately 10-15 minutes to complete the survey enclosed and mail it to 
me In the postage paid reply envelope. 
The survey is completely anonymous, as no identifying details are required from you. 
If you would like any further information on the survey please feel free to contact me. 
Once again thanks for your time. 
Paul Gerrans 
School of Finance and Business Economics 
Edith Cowan University 
100 Joondalup Drive 
Joondalup, W .A. 6027 
Ph. 08 94005605 
p.gerrans@cowan.edu.au 
II . . EDITH COWAN UNIVERSITY PERTH WE'Sl£RN AUSTIIALIA 
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This first section relatss to your current employment and your clients 
1. In what capacity do you offer financial advice? 
Principal D Proper Authority Holder D 
2. In your current position do you or your principal offer 'independent' advice, as defined by 
ASIC PS 116? 
YesD No D 
3. Could you please identify your FPA membership level. Please tick. 
I Principal 
CFP 
I Senio~ Associate I 
Associate 
4. How many years have you been employed providing financial advice? __ years 
5. In your current employment are you restricted In the managed fund products you can 
recommend to your clients? 
YesD No D 
If yes, are you restricted to {please tick) 
Emplover/Dealer croup's fund products onlv 
A list of funds nominated bv vour emolover 
6. What were your individual funds under management for the year ended 30/12/2000? $ _______ _ 
7. What was your Individual, total investments placed for clients for the year ended 
30/12/2000? $ ______ _ 
a . For the vear ended 30/12/2000 what oro " rtion of investments placed went to 
Direct shares % 
Manaaed funds % 
Direct orooe""' % 
Short term fixed interest % 
Other % 
Total 100% 
9 . For the vear ended 30/12/2000 what oro ortion of Investments placed went to 
Suoerannuation & Rollover % 
Allocated oension % 
Non-suoerannuation % 
Total 100% 
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This section relat,s to managed fund research produced by research companies 
10. Is the research you rely upon for managed funds and their products supplied by: (please 
tick one onlvl 
Your employer/dealer group, oroduced solely In house 
Your employer/dealer group, croduced in house and external research groups 
Your employer/dealer group, accessed solely from external research groups 
Yourself, using a number of research groups 
Don't know 
If other, please specify 
11. A number of research companies currently produce managed fund research for managed 
funds In Australia. Please tick: 
Any that you use The one that you rely on most 
Morningstar 
Assirt 
van Eyk 
lnvestorWeb 
Lonsdale 
FPI 
lntech 
Other, please specify 
Research companies produce both rankings and ratings. Rankings are generally 
quantitative and use hlstorlcal return and risk measures and then rank performance. 
Ratings combine the quantitative analysis with qualitative analysis which Is a more 
subjective assessment of the fund management, Investment expertise, etc .• 
For example on 31" August 2000, Colonial First State's, Count First Australian Share 
Fund had a one year return of 20.98%1• 
Ranking 
When compared with similar funds the Count First Australian Share Fund achlaved an 
a~ ranking (le. a~ highest one-year return). Other rankings might group the fund as 
being in the top ten percent of funds or the top 25 percent of funds baaed on the one 
year return. 
Rating 
At the same time the fund was given a five star rating by Morningstar alter thsy had 
assessed the fund, compared with ot1.,er slmllar funds, on the basis of return, risk, 
Investment manager's experience and the other factors Morningstar consider 
Important In their assessment of a fund. 
12. Which do you use the most? 
Ratings O Rankings O Both D Neither D 
1 Data sourced from Morningstar Tota1Access 
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The questJons that follow relate to managed fund ratings only. 
13. For the following research companies that produce managed fund ratings, please tick: 
Any that you The one that 
use vou relv on most 
Morningstar 
Assirt 
van Eyk 
If other, please 
soecifiv 
14. For the one rating you ticked that you rely on most, what do you consider Its main 
1urnnse ltlck one onlv)? To identifv: 
Well mananed/administered funds 
Historicaflv well oertormed funds 
Funds that should outoerform lower rated funds In the future 
'Value for money funds' 
If other, please specifiy 
15. What is the main reason vou use manaoed fund ratinns? (Please tick one o nly) 
Comclement vour own research 
Provide an external iustification for vour recommendations 
Increase the likelihood of selectina a better oertormina fund 
Help satisfy 'reasonable basis' or 'reasonable grounds' requirements 
when makina recommendations 
If other, please specifiy 
16. How frequently do you refer to the rating of a fund when you make recommendations tO 
clients? Please circle. 
I ~ever I ~lways 
17, Before you recommend a managed fund or product does it need to have a minimum 
rating level before you recommend it? Please tick. 
YesD No D Please go to quest/on 18 
a 
If es what is the lowest ratin ou would recommend? 
Momin star stars Assirt stars van Ek 
18. What level of importance do you give to the rating of a fund when you make 
recommendations to a client? Please circle. 
ILow I I I l~igh 12 3 4 
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19. In your view, when a rating is compiled on a fund product, what weighting should be 
placed on the quantitative and qualitative components? Please indicate percentages, which 
add to 100%. 
Quantitative analysis I % I + Qualitative analysis I % I = 100% 
20. Now consider the possible components of these quantitative and qualitative analyses. In 
uour view how im"'"rtant are· each of the followina? Please circle. 
Low High 
Importance Importance 
Quantitative 
Historical return of fund product 1 2 3 4 
Historical variability of fund product 1 2 3 4 
Lowest return achieved by fund 1 2 3 4 nroduct 
How long the fund product has been 1 2 3 4 offered 
Fee structure and level 1 2 3 4 
Qualitative 
Overall strength of fund manager 1 2 3 4 and narent comoanv 
Overall experience and ability of the 1 2 3 4 fund nroduct's investment team 
Fund product features 1 2 3 4 
Experience and ability in the 1 2 3 4 narticular sector of the fund 
Administrative capability of fund 1 2 3 4 
21. What do you consider to be an appropriate time period to assess the performance of a 
managed fund? 
___ years months 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
22. In your experienc~. if a managed fund has perlonned above average in one year then In 
the following year tt is more likely to perlonn (please tick) 
Above average D Average D Below average D Any of these D 
This section relates to your clients' Information sources, their understanding of 
managed fund ratings and how they assess performance 
23. Overall, what importance do you believe your clients place on fund rankings and ratings 
when thev decide on manaaed fund investments? Please circ e. I 
Low Hinh 
Rankinns 1 2 3 4 5 
Ratinns 1 2 3 4 5 
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24. Which rating is the most popular amongst your clients. Tick one only. I Morningstar I I I Assirt I I I van Eyk ] 
Other, please specify ___________ _ 
25. When assessing the performances of managed funds, what focus or balance do you 
consider your clients place on risk and return? Please circle. 
I ~eturn only · 1
2 
I ~lskonly 
26. When assessing the return of their managed funds, what importance do your clients 
I thfll'?PI II ace on e o owma ease c rce. 
Low High 
Comoonent lmnortance lmnortance 
The All Ordinaries Index return 1 2 3 - 4 5 
The return of other similar funds 1 2 3 4 5 
Their fund meeting the objectives 1 2 
,.,,.h;n ,ho;, nu,n ' nlon 3 4 5 
Other 1 2 3 4 5 
27. When assessing the risk of their managed funds, what importance do your c/lents place 
on thfll'?PI 'I e o owma· ease c1rce. 
Low High 
lmportan lmportan 
ce ce 
Returns below the long term average 1 2 3 4 5 
of the fund 
Spread of returns above and below 1 2 3 4 5 
the averaae of the fund 
Under performance compared to 1 . 2 3 4 5 
similar funds 
Under performance compared to a 1 2 3 4 5 
tow risk investment. en. bank denosit 
Other 1 . 2 3 4 5 
28. What typically do your clients seem to consider to be an appropriate time period to 
assess the performance of a fund? 
___ years months 
This final sect!on focuses on some of your demographics 
29. Gender: Male D Female D 
30. Age: years 
. 
31. What is the highest level of education you have completed relating to the provision of 
financial advice? Please tick one onl . 
I Some, but not all of DFP 1 - a University Undergraduate Degree I 
J TAFE/Universirv Diploma University Postgraduate Degree l 
. 
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APPENDIX Ill 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR AUSTRAUAN EQUITY TRUSTS -GENERAL (DGST) SUBCATEGORY 
Explanation of Tables 
Each of the re£1"ession tables has the same six model sneci fi cation estimat:tons as f, ollows: 
Fixed Effects Model Random Effects Model 
Fund effects R;, = p'c~_, +a,D~ +e .. ,i=J,..,n,t= l,...,s,1-lag R,, =a+ p'c,,_1 +c,,,c,, = µ, +v,,,I =fag 
Reported p-values reflect two robust covariance matrix 
estimations. The first corrects for non-specific heteroscedasticity 
and the second bracketed value reflects the more restrictive 
assumption of constant variance within each group (Greene, 
1998, o.326). Discussed further in section 5.6.5. 
Fund effects ARI R,, -fl'c,,+a,D,,+t:,.,i l,....n,t l,...,s,e,, f'£u-1 +r,,,,/ lag R,, a +/J'c.,_1 +£.,;£,, - pe,~_1 +w,,,1-lag 
reported var[e] and var[u] is var[e}(l-p)2 and var[u](l-p)2 
respectively 
Fund and time effects R,, -O+p'c.,4 +a,D,,+t,D,,+t:,,,i 2~,1 - 2,...,s,I lag R,, -a+P'c,,_1 +&,,,c,, - µ, +r, +o,, 
Table A Ill.I-Table A IIl.4 p'c,.-1 = P, QT...i 
p'ch "'/J, Ql,,-1 
Table A IIl.7-Table A III.IO 
Table A III.15-Table A IIl.18 P'c,. -/31 Q11t-1 
Table A III.23-Table A IIl.26 P'c,, = /J, AR,"'+ P1 ARR,"'+ P, DRR,~, + p. RR,,.,+ P, RRR.~1 
Table A Ill.29-Table A Ill.32 /fc,, -/3, Dl...,+P1 D2...i+P_, D3...i+P. D4u./ 
where: DI= Ii/a OneS!orfund,D2 = I if a TwoStarfimd, DJ= I if a ThreeStarfimd, 04 = I if a FourSJarfand 
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Explanation of Tables 
Each table in this appendix includes the following test statistics, which are discussed in further detail in section 5.6. 7. 
F-tests for FEM versus OLS and FEM fund and time effects versus group effects only: 
F( IT k) _(R°!rlTlr:ttd-R.!.rr~rr1~)/(n-l) n- ,n -n- - 2 (l-Rmtrimd )/(nT-n-K) 
Breusch-Pagan LM test REM versus POLS: 
' L(T;,)' 
IM= nT I The statistic is distributed as chi-squared and has one degree of freedom [Greene, 2000#191, p.573] .. 
2(T-l) ~~ , 
£.£...e11 
i•I 1•! 
Hausman Test 
This description of the test is taken from Greene (2000). Given the true coefficient vector, b, and estimawd. vector P, Greene (2000, p.576) identified 
that "Hausman's essential result is that the covariance of an efficient estimator with its difference from an inefficient estimator is zero". The variance of 
the difference vector can be expressed as: 
Var[b-Ji] = Var[b]+ Var[JiJ-Cov[b,JiJ-Cov[b,p]'. 
Therefore 
Cov[(b-P),Ji] =Cov[b,p]- Var[Ji]=O. 
The covariance matrix for the test is 
Var(b· Pl= Var(b] -Var[fl] =l:. 
t-1 is estimated using the respective covariance matrices of the LSDV and REM. Given the null hypothesis, based on the Wald criterion, Wis 
expressed as 
w = x'CKJ = Ch- Jirt-'(b- JiJ 
and W is asymptotically distributed as chi-squared, with K degrees of freedom. 
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Table A 111.1 Raw Returns and QT Product Rating Regressions- DGST Subcategory-All Funds 
Constant QT Product Rating AdjustedR 
' 
Funds Total Obs. 
Fixed Effects 12month -.2419138 I60E-03 .14922 .46578E-04 111 3904 
p-value .0279 (.0296) 
J?=.751988 -.7650648601E--03 
p-value .0000 
Fund and time effects .9139058E-02 .6972166529E--04 .58975 .22572E--04 
p-value .0000 .3022 
24 month -.5515476744E-03 .50894 .10472E--04 104 2624 
p-value .0000 
R=,761418 -.8486373247E-03 
p-value .0000 (.0000) 
Fundandtiineeffects .1377292E-01 -.7886762471E-03 .71235 .62097E-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
36month -.1050501516E--02 .75806 .28727E-05 87 1453 
p-value .0000 (.0000) 
R=.544369 -.8033154680E--03 
p-value .0000 
Fund and time effects .I200446E--Ol -.4616357742E--03 .85225 . I 7783E--05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
48 month -.9824486669E-03 .93536 .41210E-06 71 483 
p-value .0000 ( .0000) 
R=,306088 -.4820374039E-03 
p-value .0000 
Fund and time effects .ll21303E-Ol -.I374079210E-03 .97657 .15839£-06 
p-value .0000 .0463 
Random Effects 12 month .9783606£-02 -.8404485530£-04 V,u[u]- .791254E-05 111 3904 
Va~~]= .465416E-04 
p-value .0000 .2896 
R=.759188 .1123826E-OI -.4583954712E-03 V,u[u]- .791254E--05 
V,u[CF .465416E-04 
value .0000 .0005 
I 
> 
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Constant QT Product Rating AdjustedR ,- Funds Total Obs. 
Fund and time effects .8935747£-02 .6708011731E-04 Var{u]- .979143£.05 
Var{w]= .224423£.()4 
Ya,[o]: .237900£-04 
p--value .0000 .2723 
24month .1 l59740E-Ol -.4639690834£-03 Ya,[u]: .107776£-04 104 2624 
Va,[o]: .104656£-04 
p--value .0000 .0000 
P.-.761418 .1305738£-01 -.6808092538£-03 Ya,[u]: .590319£-06 
Ya,[o]: .418564£-05 
p--value .0000 .0000 
Fund and time effects .1252845£-01 -.6440925626£-03 Var{u]= .142036£-04 
Ya,[w]: .613049£-05 
Var{e]= .446747£-05 
p--value .0000 .0000 
36month .1407814E-Ol -.9131803513E-03 Ya,[u]: .866584£-05 87 1453 
Ya,[o]: .286523£-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
P.: .544369 .1280491E-Ol -.7288591099E-03 Ya,[u]- .204433£-05 
Var[e]= .148421E-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
Fund and time effects .1177025£-01 -.4749382238£-03 Var{u]= .974878£-05 
Var{w]= .174974£-05 
Ya,[o]: .110845£-05 
p--value .0000 .0000 
48month .1389570£-01 -.6986466436£-03 Ya,[u]- .579399£-05 71 483 
Var{e]= .402662£-06 
p--value .0000 .0000 
P. -.306088 .l 186193E-Ol -.3248594155£-03 Ya,[u]: .234496£-06 
Va,[o]: .284242£-05 
p--value .0000 .0001 
Fund and time effects .1127733£-01 -.1511637998£.()3 Ya,[u]: .874523£-06 
Ya,[w]: .145951£-06 
Ya,[o]: .607989£-08 
value .0000 .0006 
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Table A ill.2 One Factor Alpha and QT Product Rating Regressions - DGST Subcategory - All Funds 
Constant QT Product Rating AdjustedR 
' 
Funds Total Obs. 
Fixed Effects 12month .9645930l 13E-04 .20748 .30176£-04 98 3289 
p-value .4539 (.4581) 
R=.868042 -.5165693450£-03 .50347£-05 
p-value .0000 
Fund and time effects .9139058£-02 .6972166529£-04 .58975 .22572E-04 
p-value .0000 .3022 
24month -.7380749162£-03 .59865 .67108£-05 98 2449 
p-value .0000 (.0000) 
p=.880407 -.5638105323£-03 .11267£-05 
p-value .0000 
Fund and time effects .1377292£-01 -.7886762471£-03 .71235 .62097£-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
36 month -.4927092864£-03 .81501 .18522£-05 87 1451 
p-value .0000 
R=.733150 -.3604617531E-03 .43026E-06 
p-value .0000 (.0000) 
Fund and time effects .1200446£-01 -.4616357742£-03 .85225 .17783£-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
48 month -.4876602945£-04 .97167 .16733£-06 71 483 
p-value .3637 (.3162) 
R=.377981 -.1444023852£-03 .99283£-07 
p-value .0221 
Fund and time effects .1121303E-01 -.13740792IOE-03 .97657 .15839£-06 
p-value .0000 .0463 
Random Effects 12 month . IO 1164 IE-04 .1629922075£-03 Vo,[u]- .726767£-05 98 3829 
Var[e]= .301710E-04 
p-value .9856 .0473 
n=.868042 .3424778£-02 -.4554523461£-03 Vo,[u]- .30631 lE-06 
Vo,[e]- .503419£-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
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Constant QT Product Rating AdjustedR 
' 
Funds Total Obs. 
Fund and time effects .8935747£-02 .6708011731E-04 Va,[u] .979143£-05 
Va,[e]= .224423£-04 
Var[wJ= .237900E-04 
p-value .0000 .2723 
24month .4266124£-02 -.6821260568£-03 Va,[u]= .973424£-05 98 2249 
Va,[e]a .6708I3E-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
v=.880407 .3508829£-02 -.5594685713£-03 Va,[u]= .173348£-06 
Va,[e]= .112677E-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
Fund and time effects .1252845£-01 -.6440925626£-03 Va,[u]= .142036£-04 
Va,[e]= .613049£-05 
Va,[w]= .446747£-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
36month .3094464£-02 -.4648617247£-03 Va,[u]= .796355£-05 87 1451 
Va,[e]= .185199£-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
J!=.733150 .2414003£-02 -.3832471203E-03 Va,[u]= .746941E-06 
Va,[e]= .430207E-06 
p-value .0000 .0000 
Fund and time effects .ll77025E-Ol -.4749382238£-03 Va,[u]= .974878£-05 
Va,[e]= .174974E-05 
Var[w]"" .l 10845E-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
48month .1519979£-02 -.2452215806E-04 Va,[u]= .567474E-05 71 483 
Var{eJ= .167269E-06 
p-value .0000 .6563 
J!=.377981 .1935606E-02 -.l084997674E-03 Va,[u]= .230749£-05 
Va,[e]= .991889E-07 
p-value .0000 .0640 
Fund and time effects .1127733E-Ol 
-.1511637998£-03 Var{u)= .874523£-06 
Va,[e]= .145951E-06 
Va,[w]= .6Q7989E-08 
p-value .0000 .0006 
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Table A 111.3 Four Factor Alpha and QT Product Rating Regressions - DGST Subcategory - All Funds 
Constant QT Product Rating AdjustedR 
' 
Funds Total 
Observations 
Fixed Effects 12month .5449681268E-03 .35128 .23074E-04 98 3289 
p-value .0000(.0000) 
p=.844957 -.4330997741£-03 .42249E-05 
p-value .0000 
Fund and time effects -.1437566560E-02 .499228I591E-03 .43212 .20370E-04 
p-value .0012 .0000 
24month -.3017695276£-03 .70605 .58245E-05 98 2449 
p-value .000 (.0000) 
p=.864278 -.4215846997E-03 .12054£-05 
p-value .0000 
Fund and time effects .3973897226£-02 -.4244257566£-03 .76530 .47215£-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
36month -.4283049383£-03 .87274 .18181£-05 87 1453 
p-value .0000 (.0000) 
P.=.756192 -.3508287357£-03 .39003£-06 
p-value .0000 (.0000) 
Fund and time effects .3862745863£-02 -.4579498960£-03 .88290 .16962£-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
48 month -.2107448705£-03 .98329 .13861£-06 71 483 
p-value .0002 (.0000) 
P.=.249156 -.1756316816£-03 
p-value .0036 
Fund and time effects .3122711818E-02 -.2113078256E--03 .98449 .13070£-06 
p-value .0000 .OOH 
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Constant QT Product Rating AdjustedR2 ? Funds Total 
Observations 
Random Effects 12month -.1432253053£-02 .519368695!.E-03 Va,[u] .120215E-04 98 3289 
Va,(e]a .230735£-04 
p-value .0109 .0000 
A =.844957 .4029315715E-02 -.4137644642£-03 Va,(u]- .580234E--06 
Va,(e]- .422489E--05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
Fund and time effects -.1323391309E--02 .4956306997£-03 Va,(u]a .14005IE-04 
Va,(e)- .201982£-04 
Var[w]"" .347949E--05 
p-value .0393 .0000 
24month .3064018044E-02 -.3059133948E--03 Var{u]= .13594IE-04 98 2449 
Va,(e]- .58245JE.05 
p-value .0000 .0000. 
p-.864278 .3766995182£-02 -.4288884002E--03 Va,(u]a .320507£.()6 
Va,(e]- .120543E--05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
Fund and time effects .3383960576£-02 -.3800501382E--03 Var[u]= .132562£--04 
Va,(e)- .465049E-05 
Va,(w)- .138101E--05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
36month .3440216272E--02 -.4268809595E--03 Var{u]"" .120808£-04 87 1453 
Va,(e]a .181813E-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
A=.756192 .2966273632£-02 -.3771603285£-03 Va,(u]a .939606£.()6 
Va,(e]a .389960£.06 
p-value 
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Constant QT Product Rating AdjustedR 
' 
Funds · Total 
Observations 
Fund and time effects .3492645130£-02 -.4354028182£-03 V,u[u]- .125527£-04 
V,u[ep .167291£-05 
V,u[w]a .192670£-06 
p-value .0000 .0000 
48month .2953749575£-02 -.1789342720£-03 V,u[u]a .804809£-05 71 483 
V,u[e]a .138501£-06 
p-value .0000 .0005 
Ra.249156 .2757839003£-02 -.1425347999£-03 V,u[u]- .462156£-05 
V,u[e]a .100623£-06 
p-value .0000 .0127 
Fund and time effects .2870511076E-02 -.1619503683E-03 V,u[u]- .871231E-05 
Varfe]"" .128567£-06 
V,u[w]a .766670£-08 
p-value .0000 .0043 
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Table A 111.4 Sharpe Ratio and QT Product Rating Regressions - DGST Subcategory- All Funds 
Constant QT Product Rating AdjustedR 
' 
Funds Total 
Observations 
Fixed Effects 12month -.S206044803E..03 .12767 .32283E..OI l ll 3904 
p-value .8491 (.8507) 
p=.689830 -.7653317216E-02 .13531E..01 
p-value .0483 
Fund and time effects .1268275275 .7634087525£--02 .61129 .l4458E..Ol 
p-value .0000 .0000 
24month -.3442048442£--02 .48497 .68059E--02 104 2624 
p-value .0513 (.0507) 
p=.747130 -.1774497318E..01 .28620E..02 
p-value .0000 
Fund and time effects .2361077163 -.1375776959E-Ol .72240 .37502E..02 
p-value .0000 .0000 
36month -.1997063053£-01 .75747 .18558£-02 87 1453 
p-value .0000 (.0000) 
R =.509825 -.1712S72489E..Ol .11335£-02 
p-value .0000 
Fund and time effects .2026793795 -.7830540741E..02 .88076 .93640E-03 
p-value .0000 .0000 
48month -.2657195542E-Ol .92704 .39892£-03 71 483 
p-value .0000 (.0000) 
R •.228043 -.1627225610£-01 .29764£-03 
p-value .0000 
Fund and time effects .2118645996 -.5734420844£-02 .95585 .24779E..03 
p-value .0000 ,0392 
Random Effects 12month .15351302[1 .2062183527£-02 Va,(u]• .45192SE-02 111 3904 
Va,(e]- .322736£..01 
p-value .0000 .3147 
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Constant QT Product Rating AdjustedR1 ? Funds Total 
Observations 
R=.689830 .1643415893 -.3635891791£-02 Vm[u]= .413105£-03 
Vm[e]= .135271£-01 
p-value .0000 .2536 
Fund and time effects .1271237503 .6840698471£-02 Vm[u]= .587585E-02 
Vm[e]= .1438IOE-01 
Var[w]= .178020E--Ol 
p-value .0000 .0000 
24month .1718443950 -.3167231720£-02 Var[u]= .638620£--02 104 2624 
Vm[e]= .680584£-02 
p-value .0000 .0455 
p=.747130 .2388121028 -.1437644331£-01 Vm[u]= .410179£-03 
Vm[e]= .286013£-02 
p-value .0000 .0000 
Fund and time effects .2069844798 -.1006548494£-01 Vm[u]= . 726754£-02 
Vm[e]= J66830E--02 
Var[w]= .334919£-02 
p-value .0000 .0000 
36 month .2492597217 -.1786552797£-01 Vm[u]= .559997£--02 87 1453 
Vm[e]= .185409£-02 
p-value .0000 .0000 
A=.509825 .2331062312 -.1586209778£-01 Vm[u]= .150587£-02 
Vm[e]= .113334E-02 
p-value .0000 .0000 
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Constant QT Product Rating AdjustedR 
' 
Funds Total 
Obsenrations 
Fund and time effects .2202632713 -.1207797195£-01 Va.-(u]a .354930£-03 
Va.-(e]a .911572£-03 
Var{w]= .I68I85E-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
48 month .2747017157 -.1887962214E-Ol Va.-[u]• .498879£-02 71 483 
Va.-[e]• .391987£-03 
p-va1uc .0000 .0000 
R "'.228043 .2306718702 -. I 0704650 l IE-0 I Va.-[u]a .300404E-02 
Va,[e]a .295048E-03 
p-value .0000 .0000 
Fund and time effects .2194914717 -.7337481914£-02 Va.-[u]• .759297£-03 
Va.-[e]• .237193E-03 
Va.-[w]• .J74156E-05 
value .0000 .0000 
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Table A IIl.S Model tests - QT Product Rating and All Performance Measures - DGST Subcategory - All Funds 
Dependent F-test p-value F-test FEM (group p-value LM-test p-value Hausman p-value 
FEM vs POLS and time effects vs REM vs POLS FEM vs REM 
FEM u effects 
Raw Returns 
12montb 7.031 .0000 37.371 .0000 1273.15 .0000 12.80 .00034 
24month 27.215 .0000 49.229 .0000 7792.12 .0000 10.58 .001145 
36month 52.029 .0000 49.345 .0000 5882.73 .0000 20.67 .00000 
48month .99.875 .0000 121.483 .0000 1117.93 .0000 38.37 .0000 
Alpha-one factor 
12month 9.163 .0000 97.952 .0000 1939.46 .0000 5.06 .024488 
24month 37.607 .0000 60.376 .0000 10592.16 .0000 9.78 .001768 
36month 73.45 .0000 49.345 .0000 7603.87 .0000 1.75 .185388 
48month 234.120 .0000 121.483 .0000 1313.63 .0000 1.35 .244893 
Alpha-three factor 
I2month 19.015 .0000 11.006 .0000 6710.58 .0000 3.15 .076145 
24month 48.195 .ooou 16.081 .0000 13860.32 .0000 .08 .775794 
36month 108.596 .0000 7.689 .0000 8472.70 .0000 .04 .847988 
48month 374.176 .0000 5.'?81 .0000 1310.95 .0000 5.72 .016815 
Alpha-four factor 
12month 18.655 .0000 ll.812 ,0000 6627.26 .0000 1.81 .178118 
24month 59.878 .0000 20.776 .0000 15902.95 .0000 .09 .759749 
36month 113.109 ,0000 7.583 .0000 8513.98 .0000 .01 .933925 
48month 400.289 .0000 6.293 .0000 1307.87 .0000 4.56 .032783 
Sharpe Ratio Ratio 
12month 2.052 .0000 113.332 .0000 50.93 .0000 3.31 .068782 
24month 24.887 .0000 72.818 .0000 778652 .0000 .15 .699499 
36month 51.959 .0000 79.408 .0000 6222.40 .0000 7.50 .006175 
48month 88.452 .0000 45.704 .0000 1062.47 .0000 26.47 .00000 
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Table A m.6 Four Factor Alpha and QT Product Rating Regressions - DGST Subcategory- Excluding Finalised Funds 
Constant QT Product Rating AdjustedR s Funds Total 
Observations 
Fixed Effects 12month ·.2587564082£-03 ".43780 .31382E-02 78 2677 
p-value .0079 (.0071) 
p=.853639 -.5642627121£-03 .27778E-05 
p-value .0000 
Fund and time effects .5435727807£-02 -.5739682flOOE-03 .54110 .10487£-04 
p-value .0000 .0000 
24month -.3225127378£-03 .71548 .42199£-05 78 2065 
p-value .0000 
p=.88271 -.2408701628E-03 .83519£-06 
p-value .0000 
Fund and time effects .5880979323£-02 -.6983099398£-03 .79254 .31665E-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
36month -.1925917243£-03 .91334 .95708E-06 72 1282 
p-value .0038 (.0008) 
P.=.738968 -.2293646433£-03 .30974£-06 
p-value .0000 
Fund and time effects .3814104147£-02 -.3998679974£-03 .92633 .82975E-06 
p-value .0000 .0000 
48montb -.2180902006£-03 .98610 .11063£-06 67 463 
p-value .0000 (.0000) 
P. =.180753 -.1873880550£-03 .89087£-07 
p-value .0007 
Fund and time effects .3254818166£-02 -.2327854501£-03 .98744 .10108£-06 
p-value .0000 .0001 
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Constant QT Product Rating Adju.sted R-
' 
Funds Total 
Observations 
Random Effects 12 month .3138266099E-02 -.188735632 l E-03 Var[u] .906838E-05 78 2677 
Var[e]= .12635BE-04 
p-va1ue .0000 .0069 
P. =.853639 .5704980077E-02 -.4730126593E-03 Var[u]= .201392£-06 
Var{eJ= .277675£-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
Fund and time effects .4162215394E-02 -.4185279542£-03 Var[u]= .135283£-04 
Vru[e]a .I0314IE-04 
Var[w]= ~219776E-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
24 month .34000989 I 8E-02 -.287856801 IE-03 Var{uJ= .104114E-04 78 2065 
Var{e]= .421891E-05 
p-va1ue .0000 .0000 
p=.882751 .3420998998£-02 -.2156918894E-03 Var[u}== .13367SE-06 
Vru[e]a .8351 ISE-06 
p-value .0000 .0000 
Fund and time effects .4478524782E-02 -.5326061163E-03 Var[u]= .134262£-04 
Vru[e]a .307619£-05 
Var[w]= .I0373IE-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
36month .2540882924£-02 -. l 736230869E-03 Var[u]= .I00040E-04 1282 
Var[e]= .956930E-06 
p-value .0000 .0000 72 
P. =.738968 .2820120436E-02 -.2108095705E-03 Var(u]= .745993£-06 
Vru(e]a .309703£-06 
value .0000 .0000 
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Constant QT Product Rating AdjustedR ,· Funds Total 
Observations 
Fund and time effects .3098165687E-02 -.2970926213E-03 Va,[uj .113603£..(}4 
Va,[e]• .813495E-06 
Var[w]= .I 19444£..(}6 
p-value .0000 .0000 
48 month .2997516669E-02 -.1841919369E-03 Va,[uj• .758550E-05 463 
Var{e]= . l 10498E-06 
p-value .0000 .0001 67 
R =.180753 .2805799291E-02 -.148084468SE..(}3 Var[u]= .Sl2738E-OS 
Va,[e]• .889477E-07 
p-value .0000 .0048 
Fund and time effects .2966190981E-02 -.1767692401 E-03 Var[u]= .864261E-05 
Va,[ej• .997981E-07 
Var[w]= .996414E-03 
p-value .0000 .0006 
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Table A III. 7 Raw Returns Ratio and QL Product Rating Regressions - DGST Subcategory - All Funds 
Constant QL Product Rati.ig Adjusted R· 
' 
funds Total 
Observations 
Fixed Effects 12_month -.2038926484E-02 .28798 .55265E-04 53 895 
p-value .0228(.0565) 
p=.7TI253 -.8'702880328£-03 .16250E-04 
p-wlue .3098 
Fund and time effects .3918l01694E·O I -.3821492380£-02 .71276 .14906£-04 
p-value .0000 .0000 
24 month .422175 l 113E-04 .70289 .40202£-04 34 326 
p-value .9780(.9789) 
p=.491693 .4796000649£-03 .43549£-05 
p-valuc .7503 
Fund and time effects .2099415745£-01 -.1547816044£-02 .90845 .32344£-05 
p-value .0024 .0510 
Random Effects 12month .2000161208E-Ol -.1528542003E-02 Varfu]= .150632E-04 53 895 
Va,[e]• .402026E-04 
p-value .0000 .0043 
A: =.777253 .190396571 IE-01 -.1382410612£-02 Va,[u]• .639550£-06 
Va,[e]• .152014E-04 
p-value .0005 .0347 
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Constant QL Product Rating AdjustedR 
' 
Funds Total -
Observations 
Fund and time effects .2309592776£-01 -.1829062639E-02 Vm-[u]- .157324E--06 
Vm-[e]= .128308£-04 
Vm-[w]= .976526£-06 
p-value .0000 .0000 
24month .16884S3072E--Ol -.1069442017E--02 Vm-[u]= .IS21S3E--04 34 326 
Vm-(e]= .719338E-05 
p-value .0405 .2566 
p=.491693 .1270942062E--01 -.5931567980E-03 Var[u}= .257202E-06 
Vm-[e]= .382540E-05 
p-value .1571 .5641 
Fund and time effects .2272439367£.01 -.17427768S7E-02 Vm-[u]= .163280E--OS 
Vm-[e]= .221659E.05 
Vm-[w]= .217389E-06 
p-value .0000 .0000 
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Table A 111.8 Alpha"'6ne factor and QL Product Rating Regressions - DGST Subcategory- All Funds 
Constant QL Product Rating AdjustedR s Funds Total 
Observations 
Fixed Effects 12month -.4287245888E-02 .41862 .6I l6IE-04 47 792 
p-value .0000(.0000) 
p,,:.620552 -.5768256594£-02 .21030E-04 
p-value .0000 
Fund and time effects .2673407149£-0l -.3465792624£-02 .67044 
p-value .0000 .0000 
24month -.1281932999E-02 .91530 .25092E-04 31 305 
p-value .2515(.2617) 
p=.450721 .4453629917E-03 
p-value .6111 
Fund and time effects .1620I l l914E-Ol -.2131333638E-02 .93085 .33032£-05 
p-vaiue .0137 .0037 
Random Effects 12month .2422834101E-Ol -.3145946642£-02 Var[u};' .238120£-04 47 792 
Va,[o]- .373493£-04 
p-value .0000 .0000 
P. =.620552 .3183381066E-Ol -.3999149549£-02 Var[u]= .234496£-05 
Va,[o]- .209186£-04 
p-value .0000 .0000 
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Constant QL Product Rating AdjustedR s Funds Total 
Observations 
Fund and time effects .2837812717£-0l -.3568084l09E-02 Var{u]= .241987E-04 
Var{e]= .211722E-04 
Va,[w]a .I80184E-04 
p-value .0000 .0000 
24month .I031997706E-Ol -.1439186473E-02 Va,[u]a .227862E-04 31 305 
Va,[e]a .230635E-05 
p-value .0814 .0326 
p=.450721 -.6666346628E-03 -.1672360724£-03 Va,[u]" .637363£-05 
Va,[e]a .141158£-05 
p-value .9214 .8282 
Fund and time effects .13324l l806E-Ol -.1772258161£-02 Var[u]= .262799£-05 
Va,[e]a .I88286E-05 
Va,[w]a . 752562£-07 
p-value .0007 .0001 
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Table A 111.9 Alpha-four factor and QL Product Rating Regressions- DGST Subcategory-All Funds 
Constant QL Product Rating AdjustedR 
' 
Funds Total 
Observations 
Fixed Effects 12 month -.3454080188£..()2 .57088 .42381£-01 47 792 
p-value .0235(.0017) 
p=.647706 -.4982330646£-02 .17789£-04 
p-value .0000 
Fund and time effects .2469472387E-Ol -.3133259436£-02 .69501 .26747£-04 
p-value .0001 .0000 
24 month -.4638164931 E-03 31 305 
p--value .4704(.4411) 
p=.435990 .3264735627£-04 
p-value .9697 
Fund and time effects .1134444412E-Ol -.1460969412£-02 .95874 
p-value .0709 .0442 
Random Effects 12 month .222158308 IE-Ol -.2772641921£-02 Var[u}= .452350£-04 47 792 
Vm'[o]a .351228£-04 
p-value .0000 .0000 
R °".647706 .3086131781E-Ol -.3773788826£-02 Vm'[u]a .381581£-05 
Vm'[o]a .177402£-04 
p-value .0000 .0000 
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Fund and time effects .2683344445£.01 ·.32562920I3E.02 Var[uJ- .438479£.04 
V,u[o]= .249628£·04 
V,ufw]= .122256£.04 
p·value .0000 .0000 
24month .4681896141£.02 -.6676531123£-03 V,u[u]= .407069E.04 31 305 
V,u[o]= .218095£.-05 
p·value .4378 .3268 
p=.435990 .1871020534E·02 ·.3288979192£.03 V,u[u]= .123965£.-04 
V,u[o]= .137452£.05 
p·value .7908. .6809 
Fund and time effects .117576151 BE.Ol ·.1465793830£.02 V,u[u]= .483926£-05 
V,u[o]= .185466£.-05 
V,u[w]= .142410£.06 
p--value .0109 .0059 
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Table A 111.10 Sb.arpe Ratio and QL Product Rating Regressions - DGST Subcategory- All Funds 
Constant QL Product Rating Adjusted R2 ,' Funds Tola! 
Observations Fixed Effects 12month 
-.4474509333£-01 .20962 .40266E-Ol 53 895 p-value .0863(.0975) 
p=.711433 -.3160543206E-Ol 
p-value .1987 
Fund and time effects . 7749099871 -.7961368196E-01 .74544 .11690E-Ol 
p--value .0000 
24month -.246141486IE-Ol .70799 
p-value .5330 
.25970£-02 34 264 
p=.53764 .1858877914E-Ol 
p-value .6274 
Fund and time effects .6601782518 -.6245676906£-0I .93769 .18676E-02 
p-value .0000 .0025 
Random Effects 12month .4118172474 -.3612018580E-OI Vm[u]• .11152IE-01 53 895 
p-value .0006 .0127 
Var[e]= .291141E-Ol 
P. =.711433 .4959686341 -.4555603187E-01 Vm[u]• .254697E-04 
p-value .0001 .0029 
Vm[e]• .139617E-01 
Fund and time effects .4880379062 -.4377702405E-Ol Vm[u]• . 700369E-04 
Vm[e]• .104475E-Ol 
Vm[w]• .584906£-03 
p-value .0000 .0000 /-P 
24month .4701924339 -.4072147013E-Ol Vm[u]• .IOIJ94E-01 34 264 
Vm[e]• .462864£-02 
p-valuc .0257 .0914 
p=.53764 .3755242069 -.2729353802£-0l Vm[u]• .101526E-02 
Vm[e]• .257798£-02 
p-value .0492 .2125 
Fund and time effects .5500546612 -.4927260536£-01 Var[u]= .138665£-02 
Vm[e]• .110499E-02 
value .0000 .0000 
Vm[w]• .146376£-03 
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Table A IIl.11 Alpha-four factor and QL Rating Regressions - DGST Subcategory- Excluding Finalised Funds 
Constant QL Product Rating AdjustedR 
' 
Funds Total 
Observations 
Fixed Effects 12month -3.66E-03 0.54092 .11628E-04 46 713 
p-value .0063(.0006) 
p=.761642 -2.3lE-03 .40496E-05 
p-value .0018 
Fund and time effects 2.74E-02 -3.07E-03 0.67868 .87757£-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
24month -5.44E-04 0.87392 .19544E-05 31 243 
p-value .3869 
p=S33088 3.44E-04 .92275E-06 
p-value .6346 
Fund and time effects 1.30E-02 -1.23E-03 0.88875 .20761E-05 
p-value .0329 .0816 
Random Effects 12 month 1.40E-02 -1.43E-03 Var[u}= .134525E-04 46 713 VM[e]a .114260E-04 
p-value .0006 .0040 
P. "".761642 1.16E-02 -1.04E-03 Var[u]= .338147E-06 VM[e]a .4026SOE-05 
p-value .0040 .0314 
Fund and time effects. l.09E-02 -1.IOE-03 Var[u]= .225454E-04 VM[e]a .799747E-05 
Var[w]= .446479E-05 
p-value .0071 .0207 
24month 8.03E-03 -6.30E-04 Var[u]= .133660E-04 31 243 
Var[e]= .195425E-05 
p-value .1269 .2949 
p=.533088 2.89E-03 -2.12E-05 VM[u]a .217553£-05 
VM[e]a .921339E-06 
p-value .5886 .9723 
Fund and time effects l.30E-02 -1.26E-03 VM[u]a .125054E-04 VM[e]a .172448£-05 
Var[w]= .I50937E-05 
value .0125 .0358 
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Table A 111.12 Model tests-QL Product Rating and All Performance Measures-DGST Subcategory- All Funds 
Dependent F-test p-value F-test FEM (group p-value LM-test p-value Hausman p-value 
FEM vs POLS and time effects vs REM vs POLS FEM vs REM 
FEM u effects 
Raw Returns 
12month 7.434 .0000 38.851 .0000 814.30 .0000 0.69 .4069 
24month .0000 63.771 .0000 .0000 1.55 .2127 
Alpha-one factor 
12month 11.949 .0000 21.710 .0000 1310.58 .0000 4.72 .0299 
24month 100.786 .0000 85.864 .0000 1120.95 .0000 0.29 .5932 
Alpha-four factor 
12month 23.118 .0000 25.335 .0000 2695.45 .0000 2.70 .1003 
24month 189.515 .0000 153.334 .0000 120594 .0000 0.88 .3476 
ShBIJ>C Ratio 
12month 7.578 .0000 33.664 .0000 808.59 .0000 0.27 .6011 
24month 18.357 ,0000 95.739 .0000 296.40 .0000 0.51 .4730 
Table A III.13 Model tests -QL Product Rating and All Performance Measures-DGST-All Funds Announcement Month Only 
Dependent F-test p-value LM-test p-value Hausman p-value 
FElvlvsPOLS REM vs POLS FEM vs REM 
Raw Returns 
12month 1.158 .2922 0.14 .7106 5.26 .0218 
24month 7.184 .0000 14.19 .0002 0.35 .5545 
Alpha-one factor 
12month 3.409 .0000 5.88 .0153 18.87 .0000 
24month 13.571 .0000 21.33 .0000 0.37 .5442 
Alpha-four factor 
12month 5.054 .0000 20.38 .0000 18.19 .0000 
24month 30.602 .0000 26.38 .0000 0.04 .8472 
Sharpe Ratio 
12month 2.601 .0000 4.87 .0273 10.42 .0012 
24month 7.972 .0000 13.21 .0003 0.79 .3728 
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Table A III.14 QL Product RatingRegressions-DGST Subcategory- All Funds-Announcement Month Only 
Model Time Constant QL Product Rating AdiustedR- s Funds Total Obs. 
Raw Returns 
POLS 12month .1860195787E-02 .9324646817£-03 .01828 .358923E-04 140 
p-value .7235 .1329 
POLS 24 month 2107863521E-Ol -.I589049162E-02 .01627 .416632£-04 73 
p-value .0646 .2093 
Random Effects 24month .104I001814E--01 -.4726950337£-03 Var[u]= .308091£- 29 63 
p-value .5195 .7944 Va,[e]" 04.l0854IE-04 
Random Effects ARI 24month .1156825910E-02 .l025189964E-02 Var[u]= .111125£- 29 63 
p-value .7892 .0472 Va,[e]= 04.253217£-04 
Alpha One-faelor 
Fixed Effects 12 month .5562561273£-02 .44233 .277175£-04 36 111 
p-value .0000(.0000) 
POLS 24 month -.3347627308£--02 .4016334976£-03 .01092 .287246£.-04 126 
.4550 .4418 
Random Effects 24 month -.2679471557£-04 -.2782935328£-03 Va,[u]= .287856£-04 29 63 
p-value .9984 .8499 Var[eJ= .498846£--05 
Random Effects AR 1 24month .4689548442£-02 -. 7736499845£-03 Var[u]= .564929E-04 29 63 
p-value .7646 .6596 Va,[e]• .I24172E-04 
Alpha Four-factor 
Fixed Effects 12 month .6990874878E-02 .59272 .389974£-04 36 ! II 
p-value .0000(.0000) 
Fixed Effects ARI 12-month -.2265212595£-01 .2658310402£-02 .297063E-04 36 111 
p-value .0004 .0005 
Random Effects 24 month -.9753437528£-02 .9203074496£-03 Va,[u]" .480875E-04 29 63 
p-value .4513 .5253 Va,[ei= .353907E-05 
Random Effects AR 1 24month .4903086137E-02 -.7123854637£-03 Var[u = .I44474E-03 29 63 
p-value .6979 .6140 Va,[e]= .376726£-05 
POLS 24month .1027617439E-Ol -.1267464919E-02 -.00025 .SOI360E-04 69 
p-value .4446 .40Il 
Sharpe Ratio 
Fixed Effects 12 month .1562557505 .37452 .292402E-Ol 40 121 
p-value .0000(.0000) 
Fixed Effects ARI 12-month .1423525247 .237179E-Ol 40 121 
p-value .0013 
Random Effects 24month .3259917137 -.2563892517E-OI Va,[u]" .204376£-01 26 55 
.4244 5766 Var{eJ= .621414£-02 
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Table A 111.15 Raw Returns and Q1 Product Rating Regressions - DGST Subcategory- AU Funds 
Constant Q Product Ratin,g AdjustedR 
' 
Funds Total Obs. 
Fixed Effects 12 month .1144216966E-03 .26471 .382182E-04 52 815 
p-value .0000(.0000) 
11=.763891 -.1140819169£-04 .158731£-04 
p-value .0002 
Fund and time effects . 7993564646£-02 -.3467827128£-05 .75045 .159995£-04 
p-value .0000 .8566 
24month -.1824063929£-03 .75656 .573058£-05 34 264 
p-value .0000 (.0000) 
J?=.506455 -.3687533865£-04 .333412£-05 
p-value .3426 
Fund and time effects .1670930537£-01 -.1577670701£-03 .94583 .419278£-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
Random Effects 12 month .2754014166£-02 .1041008313E-03 Var[u]= .107635£-04 52 815 
Vu(o]- .382122£-04 
p-value .0190 .0000 
P. =.763891 .4480443343£-02 .6112794708E-04 Vu(u]- .833555£-07 
Var[e]= .158104£-04 
p-value .0028 .0362 
Fund and time effects .3910495870£-02 .9008865257£-04 Vu(u]- .308209£-07 
Var[e]= .1296b7E-04 
Var[w]= .792373£-06 
p-value .0000 .0000 
24month .1485995728£-01 -.J424447310E-03 Vu[u]- .176727£-04 34 264 
Var[eJ= .567420£-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
R=,506455 .7951252174£-02 .7937910972£-05 Var[u}= .151603E-05 
Vu(o]- .331145£-05 
p-value .0000 .7291 
Fund and time effects .1352179860E-Ol -.1084014181E-03 Vu[u]- .512882£-05 
Vu(o]- .126255£-05 
Vu[w]a .469738£-06 
value .0000 .0000 
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Table A ffl.16 Alpha·one factor and Q2 Product Rating Regressions-DGST Subcategory-All 'Fmids 
Constant iy Product Rating AdjustedRJ ' F=ds Total Obs:·. ,·
Fixed Effects 12month .l096839308E-03 .43282 .259284£-04 46 713 
p-value .0002 (.0007) 
R=.805431 .3387756670£-04 .769112£-05 
p-value .2850 
Fund and ti.me effects -.5524352402£-03 -.1382795021£-04 .69785 .179131£-04 
p-value .6068 .5141 
24month -.1190883186£-03 .91537 .167871£-05 31 243 
p-value .0000 (.0000) 
R=.504237 -.2383709686£-04 .986166£-06 
p-value .2706 
Fund and time effects .6052280335£-02 -.1240303230£-03 .92273 .453207£-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
Random Effects 12 month -.6853193022£-02 .1137923366£-03 Var[u]= .153466£-04 46 713 
Va,[o]'" .259274£-04 
p-value .0000 .0000 
R= -.4895054366£-02 . 7438425869£-04 Var[u]= .957097£-06 
Va,[o]- .767091£-05 
p-value .0028 .0079 
Fund and time effects -. 7753808998£-02 .1295032599£-03 Var[u]= .440520£-06 
Va,[o]- .138123£-04 
Var[w]=c .164426£-06 
p-value .0000 .0000 
24.month .4328319987E-02 -.1138433583£-03 Var[uJ.=cc .182275£-04 31 243 
Va,[o]- .167767£-05 
p-value .0001 .0000 
n=.504237 -.1188306174£-02 -.5248452893£-05 Va,[u]- .260211:£..05 
Var[e]= .982121£-06 
p-value 
Fund and time effects .4156984365E-02 -.1012972160£-03 Va,[u]- .537821£-05 
Va,[o]- .144265£-05 
Var[w]= .211757£-06 
-value .0000 .0000 
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Table A 111.17 Four-factor Alpha and Overall Q1 Product Rating Regressions - DGST Subcategory -AU Funds 
Constant Q· Product Rating Adjusted R· ,· Funds Total Obs. 
Fixed Effects 12 month .1149971392E-03 .58644 .229808e-04 46 713 
p-value .0000 
P. =.808543 -.5050404445E-04 .621532E-05 
p-value .0001 (.0005) 
Fund and time effects -.159680473IE-02 .297l183I25E-04 .71215 .20115iE-04 
p-va1ue .1668 .1925 
24month -.907!30I657E-04 .94691 .171015E-05 31 243 
p-value .0000 (.0000) 
P.-'=.495259 ·.6383302029E-05 .946582E-06 
p-valuC .7616 
Fund and time effects .6394366127E-02 -.1036114964E-03 .95750 .692958E-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
Random EflCCts 12 month -.6289746534E-02 .1275838553E-03 Var(u]= .224683E-04 46 713 
Varfe]= .229715E-04 
p-va1ue .0000 .0000 
P. =.808453 -.4825637013E-03 -.6565755873E-06 Var[u]= .160722E-05 
Varfe]= .618464E-05 
p-value .7744 .9802 
Fund and time effects -.3672674809£-02 . 7464892066£-04 Var[u]=c .3 i 6752E-04 
Var{e]= .159885E-04 
Var[w]= .ll7891E-04 
ivaiue .0004 .1649 
24month .3912980073£-02 -.8664509658E-04 Var{uJ= .293995E-04 31 243 
Va<[o]a . l 70952E-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
P. =.495259 -.1068269741E-02 .1555447094£-04 Var[u]= .415784£-05 
Var[e]"" .940888£-06 
p-value .4098 .4238 
Fund and time effects .5314517787£-02 -.9617065162E-04 Var[uJO; .939976£-05 
Va<(o]" .135593£-05 
Var{wJ= .453002£-06 
-value .0000 .0000 
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Table A-IU.18 Sharpe Ratio and Q2 Product Rating Regressions- DGST Subcategory-All Funds 
· Constant Q- Product Rating AdjustedR ,· Funds Total Obs. 
Fixed Effects 12 month .2257180437E-02 .26374 .275442E-01 52 815 
p-value .0023 (.0013) 
R=.703~64 -.1 I 12822215E-02 .134866E-Ol 
p-va1ue .3741 
Fund and time effects .1488585545 -.4806735064£-03 .72741 .119212£-01 
p-value .0000 .3717 
24 month -.3658777740£-02 .73710 .419397£-02 34 264 
p-va1ue .0000 (.0000) 
R=.542344 -.2938476124£-03 .258327£-02 
p-value .7898 
Fund and time effects .3058883239 -.3043179650£-02 .94282 .283862£-02 
p-value .0000 .0000 
Random Effects 12month .6136404544£-02 .2446666587£-02 Var(u]= .765533£- 52 815 
Vfil[e]= 02.275422£-01 
p-va1ue .0001 .8542 
R=.703864 .4470097495£-01 .1527001062£-02 Var[u]= .334226£-03 
Var{e]= .134027£-01 
p-vaiue 
Fund and time effects .1244653946 .2664778425£--03 Var[u]= .II3050E-Ol 
Vfil[e]= .101970£-01 
Var[w]= .184386£-01 
p-value .0014 .5725 
24 month .2673880995 -.2788784363£-02 Vfil[u]= .117415£-01 34 264 
Var[c]= .416725£-02 
p-value. .0000 .0000 
R=.542344 .1107300851 .5351865110£-03 Vfil[u]= .108815£-02 
Vfil[e]= .257579£-02 
Ji:"Value .0026 .4182 
Fund and time effects .2286617569 -.1829248726£-02 Vfil[u]= .321704£-02 
Var[e]= .906353£-03 
Var[w]= .300065£-03 
-value .0000 .0000 
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Table A 111,19 Model tests-Q1 Product Rating and All Performance Measures - DGST Subcategory - All Funds 
Dependent F-test p-value F-test FEM (group p-value LM-test p-vaJue Hausman p-value 
FEM vs POLS and time effects vs REM vs POLS FEM vs REM 
FEM u effects 
Raw Returns 
12month 5.490 .00000 60.329 .00000 332.57 .00000 .29 .589602 
·24month 25.728 .00000 62.552 .00000 329.84 .00000 7.74 .005397 
36month 77.063 .00000 3.72 .053762 .60 .440370 
Alpha-one factor 
12month 10.352 .00000 24.367 .00000 689.20 .00000 .12 .730738 
24montb 88.280 .00000 3.644 .00004 452.91 .00000 1.91 .166648 
36month 108.439 .00148 3.75 .052776 .92 .336542 
Alpha-three factor 
12montb 17.580 .0000 13.575 .00000 1121.75 .00000 1.8 .179115 24month 149.726 .0000 5.900 .00000 379.77 .00000 1_.6 
.205419 
36month 23.170 .0141 2.50 .113576 3.59 .058081 
Alpha-four factor 
l2month 16.454 .0000 12.635 .00000 1041.08 .00000 1.83 .176385 
24montb 139.153 .0000 5.233 .00000 391.53 .00000 1.73 .187894 
36month 18.353 .0000 2.21 .137175 3.68 .055091 
Sharpe Ratio Ratio 
12mon!h 5.431 .0000 52.847 .00000 322.20 .00000 .14 .713088 
24month 23.370 .0000 64.377 .00000 372.42 .00000 4.67 .030605 
36rnonth 76.929 .00246 3.73 .053384 .50 .478845 
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Table A ID.20 Model Tests-Q1 Product Rating and All Performance Measures-DGST All Funds· Rating Change Month Only 
Dependent F-test p-value LM-test p-value Hausman p-value 
FEM vs POLS REM vs POLS FEM vs REM 
Raw Returns 
12month 3.744 .0000 174.59 .0000 1.00 .3169 
24month 13.851 .0000 245.08 .0000 0.74 .3899 
Alpha-one factor 
12month 5.355 .0000 262.05 .0000 4.05 .0443 
24month 54.193 .0000 443.37 .0000 2.44 .ll84 
Alpha-four factor 
12month 9.627 .0000 594.99 .0000 5.87 .0154 
24month 97.727 .0000 448.29 .0000 4.23 .0398 
Shrupe Ratio 
12month 7.736 .0000 430.98 .0000 0.10 .7510 
24month 13.220 .0000 131.98 .0000 0.06 .8126 
' 
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Table A 111.21 Four-factor Alpha and Overall Q2 Product Rating Regressions - DGST Subcategory- Excluding Finalised Funds 
Constant g Product Rating AdjustedR 
' 
Funds Total Obs. 
Fixed Effects 12 month .1824717667£-04 .55301 .349862E-04 41 639 
p-value .6906(.6907) 
P-=.794171 -.8585251989£-04 .544589E-05 41 598 
p-value .0039 
Fund-and time effects .2699880755£-02 -.3358606989E-04 .68544 .153529E-04 41 598 
p-value .0210 .1386 
24 month -.9398J39283E-04 .92633 .221483E-04 27 225 
p-value .0000(.0000) 
P.=.499016 -.1066533254£-04 .927699£-06 27 198 
p-value .6201 
Fund and time effects .86025060llE-02 -.1281715221£-03 .94634 .419360E-05 27 225 
p-value .0000 .0000 
Random Effects 12month -.1264277607£-02 .4655351721£-04 Var[u}= .165415£-04 41 639 
Var[e]= .184448E-04 
p-value .3320 .0386 
P. =.794171 .2504701691E-02 -.2935336383£-04 Var(u]= .122755E--05 41 598 
Var(e]= .541088£-05 
p-value .1298 .2762 
Fund and time effects .4317527240£-03 .8063019505£-05 Var[u]= .261296£-04 41 598 
Var[e]= .1298_01£-04 
Vaqw]- .834892£-05 
p-value .7705 .7000 
24month .5199715944£-02 -.8458709090£-04 Var[u]= .199763£-04 27 225 
Va,[eJ- .170986£-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
P.=.499016 .9355704260£-04 .1833337733E-04 Var[u]= .2552670-05 27 198 
Var[e]= .9178620-06 
p-value .9392 .3363 
Fund and time effects . 6088941938E-02 -.9950527985£-04 Var[u}= .652594£-05 . 27 198 
Vaqe]- .124533E-05 
Var[w]= .219436£-06 
-value .0000 .0000 
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Table A 111.22 Q2 Product Rating Regressions - DGST Subcategory - All Funds - Rating Change Month Only 
Model Time Constant Q Product Rating AdjustedR s Funds Total Obs. 
Raw Returns 
Random Effects 12 month .3626524672E-02 .835702456IE-04 Var[uJ= .123066E-04 54 562 
p-value .0001 .0000 Var[e];; .473891£-04 
Random Effects p=.663600 .5174161503E-02 .3974099083E-04 Var[u]= .185327E-05 54 508 
p-value .0000 .0015 Va,[e]= .239733£-04 
Random Effects 24month .1016019624E-Ol -.4955817404E-04 Var[u]= .187743E-04 32 198 
p-value .0000 .0000 Var[e]= .923691E-05 
Random Effects p=.663600 .69 I 5168635E-02 .619158165 lE-05 Var[u]= .677558£-06 32 166 
p-value .0000 .6371 Var[e]= .653764£-05 
Alpha One-factor 
Fixed Effects 12 month .5315780819£-04 .32332 .689195£-04 45 521 
p-value .0054 
Fixed Effects ARI p=.514166 .8394935187£-05 .348614£-04 45 476 
p-value .6179 
Random Effects 24month -.i 782198878£-02 -.1070261980E-04 VarfuJ= .241742£-04 31 194 
p-value .0735 .2137 Var{e]= .290856£-05 
Random Effects ARI p=.272807 -.3129988211 E-02 .1761016214E-04 Var[u]= .106863E-04 31 163 
p-value .0010 .0556 Va,[e]= .216625£-05 
Alpha Four-factor 
Fixed Effects 12 month . 7436296894£-04 .49482 .809327£-04 45 521 
p-value .0000(.0000) 
Fixed Effects p=.574757 .8391492037£-05 .290202£.-04 45 476 
p-value .5765 
Fixed Effects 24 month -.7228823204£-05 .94019 .425105£-04 31 194 
p-value .4115(.3533) 
Fixed Effects p=.219853 .1638025389£-04 .196058£-05 31 163 
value .0670 
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Model Time Constant q- Product Rating AdjustedR· ,- Funds Total Obs. 
Sbar'pe Ratio 
Random Effects 12 month .4798395296£-01 .1185663429£-02 Var[u]= .258882£-0 l 54 562 
p-value .1402 .0203 Var[e]:: .406099E-Ol 
Random Effects p=.579184 .4777282276£-0I .8446183297£-03 Var[u)= .370429£-02 54 508 
p-value .1479 .0472 Var[e]= .258844£-01 
Random Effects 24month .1669699556 -.9002368209£-03 Var[u]= .137275£-01 32 158 
p-value .0000 .0456 Var[e]= .565283£-02 
Random Effects p=.188810 .1286796478 -.1367310253E-03 Var[u]= .574097£-02 32 126 
value .0001 .7725 Var[e]= .440049£-02 
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Table A 111.23 Raw Returns and QT Component Rating Regressions- DGST Subcategory-All Funds 
Constant AR ARR ORR RR !'RR AdjustedR- ,· Number Total 
Of funds Obs 
Fixed Effects 12 month -3.18£-04 3.66£-04 1.32£-03 -6.51E-04 -9.76E-04 . .18853 .44827E-04 111 4053 
p-value .0021(.0017) .0034(.001) .0000(.0000) .0001(.0000) .0000.0000 
P. =.754365 5.03£-04 -5.92E-05 2.27£-05 -1.81£-06 -1.07£-03 .169_84£-04 
p-value .0229 .5750 .8604 .9885 .0000 
Fund and time effects 4.44E-03 4.44£-03 -2.71£-06 1.49E-03 -1.59£-03 8.24£-05 .61049 .21656£-04 
p-value .0000 .9753 .0000 .0000 .3439 .0000 
24 month 2.15£-04 l.55E-04 6.85£-04 -9.09E-04 -6.lSE-04 .54334 .99078£-05 107 2946 
p-value .0027(.0045) .0244(.0178) .0000(.0000) .0001(.0000) .0000.0000 
p,=.748405 1.17E-04 -2.51£-05 -2.22£-05 -2.79£-04 -6.47£-04 .40844£-05 
p-value .4344 .6767 .7669 .0001 .0000 
Fund and time effects 8.55£-03 4.59E-04- -7.78£-05 7.59E-04 -l.22E-03 -1.56£-04 .7259 .60104E-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 .1810 .0000 .0000 .0052 
36month -l.90E-04 l.45E-05 -6.92£-05 -9.72£-04 -3.75E-04 .80849 .27312£-05 96 1709 
p-value .0116(.0111) .8175(.7855) .2856(.2907) .0000(.0000) .0001(.0000) 
P. =.50582 4.68£-07 -1.89E-04 -2.60£-04 -4.18£-04 -2.92£-04 .15173£-05 
p-valu.e .9969 .0006 .0001 .0000 .0000 
Fund and time effects 9.85£-03 2.73£-04 2.49E-04 1.55£-04 -9.86£-04 -1.48£-04 .89021 .16284£-05 
p-value .0000 .. 0004 .0000 .0111 .0000 .0011 
48 month -6.81£-04 -l.44E-04 1.21£-04 -4.48£-04 -2.lOE-04 .93382 .53964E-06 87 608 
p-value .0000 .0003 .1954 .0000 .0012 
P. =.371200 -2.78£-04 -9.13£-06 -4.65£-05 -2.41E-04 -1.71£-04 .25430E-06 
p-value .0335 .8154 .4474 .0000 .0006 
Fund and time effects l.l IE-02 -3.87E-05 9.41E-05 -3.06E-05 -257£-04 -1.64E-05 .97813 .17551E-06 
p-value .0000 .6738 .0008 .5233 .0000· .6436 
Random Effects 12 month -l.48E-04 3.65£-04 l.13E-03 -4.lBE-04 -9.06£-04 7.98E-03 Var[u]= .819620E-05 111 4053 
Va,[e]a .447429£-04 
p-value .0431 .0009 .0000 .0021 .0000 .0000 
p. =.754365 6.31E-05 1.73£-05 1.29£-04 7.30£-05 -9.24£-04 1.20£-02 Var[u]= . 754365£-04 
Va,[e]a 
-.169386£-04 
p-value .5945 .8645 .3046 .5459 .0000 .0000 
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Constant AR ARR DRR RR RRR AdjustedR 
' 
Number Tatal 
of funds Obs 
Fund and time effects 6.36E-03 1.44E-04 9.45E-06 1.44£-03 -l.50E-03 8.03E-05 Var[u]= .131182E-04 
Viif[e]= .214772£-04 
Var[w]= .247045£-04 
p-value .0000 .0266 .9122 .0000 .0000 .3516 
24 month 1.15£-02 6.30£-05 l.46E-04 6.88£-04 -8.47£-04 -6.25£-04 Vrufu]- .102573£-04 107 2946 
Var{e] = .989272£-05 
p-value .0000 .3307 .0286 .0000 .0000 .0000 
P.=.748405 l.40£-02 1.71E-05 3.99£-06 -7.05£-06 -2.66£-04 -6.16£-04 Var[u]= .664334E-06 
Va,[e]a .408233£-05 
p-value .0000 .8515 .9462 .9241 .0002 .0000 
Fund and time effects 1.06£-02 2.18£-04 -5.I9E-05 7.22E-04 -1.18£-03 -1.62£-04 Va.iu]= .141590£-04 
Var[e]= .593787£-05 
Var{w]= .405677£-05 
p-value .0000 .0001 .3634 .0000 .0000 .0033 
36 month 1.69£-02 -1.38£-04 2.30£-05 -4.48£-05 -9.46£-04 -3.21£-04 Var[u] = .902586£-05 96 1709 
Vrufe] a .272664£-05 
p-value .0000 .0394 .6677 .5130 .0000 .0000 
P.=-50582 1.55£-02 -4.l4E-05 -1.54£-04 -2.39£-04 -4.21£-04 -2.75£-04 Var[u]= .238792£-05 
Var[e]= .151638£-05 
p-vaJue .0000 .5960 .0038 .0002 .0000 .0000 
Fund and time effects 1.35£-02 -5.49£-05 I.OOE-04 2.63E-05 -8.31£-04 -1.19£-04 Var[u]= .492240£-06 
Var[e]= .15631 IE-05 
Va,[w]a .315078£-08 
p-value .0000 .0238 .0057 .5690 .0000 .0014 
48month l.50£-02 -2.IIE-04 -1.52£-04 t.71£-04 -4.53£-04 -1.78£-04 Va,[u]- .681767£-05 87 608 
Var[e]= .528297£-06 
p-value .0000 .0076 .0007 .0218 .0000 .0016 
P. =.371200 l.29E-02 -1.17£-04 -1.48£-06 -2.62£-05 -2.51£-04 -1.50E-04 Va,[u]a .278210£-05 
Va,[e]a .253090£-06 
p-value .0000 .1304 .9691 .6531 .0000 .0016 
Fund and time effects 1.09£-02 -3.25£-05 9.28£-05 6.55£-06 -2.93£-04 1.61£-05 Vrufu]• .986532£-06 
Var[e]= .174589£-06 
Var[w]= .320957£-07 
p-value .0000 .3269 .0006 .8718 .0000 .6100 
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Table A III.24 Alpha One-factor and QT Component Rating Regressions - DGST Subcategory- All Funds 
Constant AR ARR ERR RR RRR AdjustedR 
' 
Funds Total 
Ob, 
Fixed Effects 12 month 2.l3E-04 6.18E-04_ 1.25E-03 -1.68E-03 2.78E-04 .26369 .33526E-04 98 3497 
p-value .0655(.0712) .0000(.0000) .0000(.0000) .0000(.0000) .0679(.0722) 
f?=.800703 5.0IE-04 2.0IE-04 -4.ISE-04 -5.97E-04 -2.72E-04 .91478E-05 
p-value .0594 .0439 .0002 .0000 .0141 
Fund and time effects -7.67E-03 5.02E-04 2.39E-05 l.94E-03 -l.99E-03 2.72E-04 .36594 .28995E-04 
p-value .0000 .0006 .8555 .0000 .0000 .1072 
24month 3.74E~04 4.48E-04 4.58E-04 -1.09E-03 -l.64E-04 .61887 .74755E-05 102 2738 
p-value 
.0000(.0000) .0000(.0000) .0000(.0000) .0000(.0000) .0471(.0444) 
P. =.851269 8.97E-05 l.94E-04 -1.99E-04 -2.62E-04 -2.52E-04 .15746E-05 
p-value .4602 .0000 .0001 .0000 .0000 
Fund and time effects -3.56E-03 6.03E-04 9.19E-05 8.86E-04 -l.20E-03 -2.28E-04 .64678 .69922E-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 .2368 .0000 .0000 .0161 
36month 1.67E-04 1.31£-04 1.33E-04 -8.87E-04 -2.32E-04 .84395 .20611E-05 96 1707 
p-value .0065(.0024) .0141(.0031) .0150(.0162) .0000(.0000) .0000(.0000) 
P. =.726925 1.65E-04 -7.57E-05 -1.39E-04 -2.48E-04 -l.17E-04 .51212E-06 
p-value .0603 .0195 .0002 .0000 .0009 
Fund and time ·effects -3.60E-04 4.05E-04 2.23E-04 l.61E-04 -8.56E-04 -l.67E-04 .85879 .18860E-05 
p-value .6764 .0000 .0000 .0156 .0000 .0007 
48 month -l.48E-04 l.14E-04 -2.19E-05 -3.58E-04 7.1 lE-06 .96398 .26318E-06 87 521 
p-value 
.0148(.0255) .0001(.0000) .7169(.7088) .0000(.0000) .8687(.8640) 
P. =.409457 -l.07E-04 2.30E-05 -5.03E-05 --2.94E-04 -8.90E-05 .14743£-06 
p-value .2892 .4419 .2759 .0000 .0187 
Fund and time effects l.08E-03 1.67E-OS 1.65£-04 -3.16E-05 -3.15E-04 2.97E-05 .96259 .26318E-06 
p-value .2901 .8822 .0000 .5911 .0000 .4953 
Random Effec:ts 12 month -5.09E-03 1.24E-04 4.82E-04 l.llE-03 -l.44E-03 3.24E-04 - Var[u],;,, 
.954969£-05 3497 98 
Va,[e]~ .334394£-04 
p-_value .0000 .2676 .0001 .0000 .0000 .0266 
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Constant AR ARR ERR RR RRR AdjustedR s Funds Total 
Obs 
(l=.8007:oJ 5.27E-03 -3.52E-06 2.25E-04 -3.41E-04. -5.13E-04 -l.63E-04 Var[u]- .392251E-06 
Va,(e]= .912444E-05 
p-value .0110 .9861 .0188 .0023 .0000 .1346 
Fund and time effects -425E-03 I34E-04 5.98E-05 l.75E-03 -l.87E-03 3.60E-04 Var[ul= .1546IOE-04 
Var[e]= .287959E-04 
Var[w]= .491219E-05 
p-value .0012 .2272 .6363 .0000 .0000 .0286 
24month -5.2IE-04 l.98E-04 4.08E-04 - 4.73E-04 -l.04E-03 -l.83E-04 Var[u]= . I 07094E-04 102 2738 
Va,(e]= .745912E-05 
p--value .4811 .0028 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0194 
R=.851269 2.61E-03 7.74E-06 2.08E-04 -I.96E-04 -2.61E-04 -2.46E-04 Var[u]= .2890I6E-06 
Va,(e]= .157425E-05 
p-va1ue .DlOO .9376 .0000 .0001 .0000 .0000 
Furtd and time effects -4.5lE-04 2.63E-04 1.50E-04 7.73E-04 -1.I6E-03 -L89E-04 Var[u]"' .I61853E-04 
Var[e]= .691295E-05 
Var[wJ= .674080E-06 
p-value .5694 .0001 .0466 .0000 .0000 .0406 
36month 3.92E-03 4.97E-05 1.17E-04 I.54E-04 -8.65E-04 -2.23E-04 Var[u]"" .9ll836E-05 96 1707 
Va,(e]= 205758£-05 
p--value .0000 .4239 .0128 .0103 .0000 .0000 
R=.726925 3.12E-03 6.25E-05 -6.86E-05 -1.43£-04 -2.57E-04 -1.26£-04 Va,(u]= .843296E-06 
VarfeJ= .511560£-06 
p-value .0000 .3673 .0324 .0001 .0000 .0003 
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Constant AR ARR ERR RR RRR AdjustedR· 
' 
Funds Total 
Obs 
Fund and time effects 2.26E-03 I.30E..04 2.llE-04 l.39E..04 -8.45E-04 -1.67E-04 Var[u]= .124244E..04 
Va,[e]- .186188E-05 
Var[w]= .209085E..06 
p-value .0034 .0365 .. 0000 .0322 .0000 .0006 
48 month 2.49E-03 -8.46E-05 -u tE-04 -1.l9E..05 -3.56E..04 1.43E-05 Va,[u]- .670753£-05 87 521 
Va,[e]- .273131E..06 
p-value .0007 .2267 .0006 .8305 .0000 .7321 
P.=,409457 3.45E-03 -8.26E-05 2.57E-05 -4.BE-05 -2.96E-04 -7.99E-05 Var[u]= .252408£..05 
Va,[e]- .147369£..06 
p-value .0000 .2370 .3822 .3571 .0000 .0305 
Fund and time effects 1.60E-03 -3.63E-05 l.53E-04 · -2.23E..05 -3.23E..04 3.15E-05 Varfu]= .673299£-05 
· var[e]= .262974E-06 
Var[w]= .138866£-07 
p-value .0347 .6071 .0000 .6893 .0000 .4512 
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Table A III.25 Alpha Four Factor and QT Component Rating Regressions - DGST Subcategory- Ali Funds 
Constant AR ARR DRR RR RRR AdjustedR 
' 
Funds Total 
Obs 
Fixed Effects 12month 6.39E-04 - 5.73E-04 6.lOE-04 ~7.84E-04 5.79E-04 .39908 .27216E-04 98 3497 
p-value .0000(.0000) .0000(.0000) .0000(.0000) .0000(.0000) .0000(.0000) 
P.=.769444 6.67E-04 4.12E-05 -4.07E-04 -4.04E-04. l.17E-05 
.85467E-05 
p-value .0057 .6696 .0002 .0002 .9130 
Fund and time effects -1.20E-02 6.87E-04 2.87E-04 l.17E-03 -8.lOE-04 2.78E-04 .45820 .246510£-04 
p-value .0000 .0000 .0176 .0000 .0000 .0741 
24month 4.78E-04 6.0IE-04 2.08E-04 -5.09E-04 -l.53E-04 .72852 .63996E-05 102 2738 
p-value .0000(.0000) .0000(.0000) .0121(.0060) .0000(.0000) .0437(.0401) 
p.=.827734 3.16E-04 2.17E-04 -I.82E-04 -l.78E-04 -I.99E-04 
.16633E-05 
p-value .0091 .0000 .0006 .0007 .0002 
Fund and time effects -5.24E-03 6.05E-04 2.05E-04 6.45E-04 -6.16E-04 
-2.c:iBE-04 .76348 .56312E-05 
p-value. .0000, .0000 .. 0032 .0000 .0000 .0144 
36Dlonth 2.89E-04 1.56E-04 1.08E-04 -8.07E-04 -2.23£-04 .88805 .20952E-05 96 1709 
p-value 
.0000(.0000) .0038(.0006) .0476(.0501) ,0000(.0000) .0000(.0000) 
P. =.766303 2.34E-04 -9.41£-0.) -1.35E-04 -2.12£-04_ -1.34£-04 
.44943£-06 
p-value .0060 .0018 .0001 .0000 .0000 
Fund and time Eiffects -5.96E-04 4.74£-04 2.37E-04 1.21E-04 -7.89E-04 -1.63E-04 .89587 .19710£-05 
p-value .4985 .0000 .0000 .0749 .0000 .0012 
48 month· -2.29£-04 1.IIE-04 2.56E-05 -3.96£-04 -1.64£-05 .97625 .27525£-06 87 608 
p-value 
.0010(.0010) .0001(.0001) .6644(.6536) .0000(.0000) .7134(.6937) 
R".328427 -1.56E-04 5.60E-05 -4.89£-05 -3.32E-04 
-8.95£-05 .18617£-06 
p-value .1613 .0925 .3561 .0000 .0346 
Fund and time effects l.04E-03 4.45E-05 l.99E-04 -4.48E-06 -3.21E-04 2.89£-05 .97893 .249000£-06 
p-value .2925 .6822 .0000 .9369 -·.0000 .4915 
Random Effects 12 month -9.06£-03 4.03£-04 ·-5.31£-04 5.89E-04 -7.18£-04 5.73E-04 Var[u]= .154708£-04 98 3497 
p-value .0000 .0003 .0000 .0000 
Va,[e]a .271835E-04 
.0000 .0000 
P. =.769444 3.46E-03 1.73E-04 7.97£-05 -3.66E-04 -3.72E-04 6.38E-05 Var[u]=· .918529£-06 
v 
'" 
.853202E-05 
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Constant AR ARR DRR RR RRR AdjustedR 
' 
Funds Total 
Ob, 
p-value .0796 .3699 .3951 .0007 ·.0004 .5448 
Fund and time effects -8.91E-03 3.69E.04 3c68E-04 l.OOE-03 -7.78E-04 3.73E-04 Var[u]" .207731E-04 
Var[e]= .245091£-04 
Var[w]= .294852£-05 
p-value .0000 .0006 .0017 .0000 .0000 .0136 
24month -3.29E-03 3.22E-04 5.86E-04 2.24£-04 -4.72E-04 -1.93£-04 Var{u]= .157705E-04 102 2738 
Vo,[e]- .638907E-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 .0000 .0020 .0000 .0087 
R=.827734 l.38E-03 1.61E-04 2.28E-04 -l.78E-04 -1.77£-04 -1.94E-04 Var[u]= .580358E-06 
Vo,[e]a .166222E-05 
p-value .1880 .1119 .0000 .0007 .0006' .0002 
Fund and time effects -2.83E-03 3.47£-04 2.62E-04 5.64£-04 -5.90E-04 -1.99£-04 Vo,[u]- .208640E-04 
Var(e]= .556651£-05 
Var[w]= .103425£-05 
p-value .0003 .0000 .0001 .0000 .0000 .0175 
36month 3.38E-03 l.49E-04 1.42E-04 l.22E-04 -7.93E-04 -2.28E-04 Var[u]= .l37585E-04 96 1709 
Var[e]= .20911 lE-05 
p-value .0000 .0263 .0029 .0455 .0000 .0000 
R=.766303 3.18E-03 1.32E-04 -9.03E-05 -1.40E-04 -2.19E-04 -l.42E-04 Var[u]= .951377£-06 
Va,(e]- .448925E-06 
p-valuc .0001 .. 0695 .0026 .0000 .0000 .0000 
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Constant AR ARR DRR RR RRR Adju.~tcd R" s· Funds Total 
Obs 
Fund and time effects 2.IIE-03 2.04E-04 2.27E-04 9.31E-05 -7.82E-04 -1.71E-04 Var[u]- .183430E-04 
Var[e}= .194505£-05 
Var[w]= .J61793E-06 
p-value .0119 .0022 .0000 .1598 .0000 .0006 
48 month -2.29E-04 l.l IE-04 2.56E-05 -3.96E-04 -1.64[-05 Var[u]= .106994[-04 87 608 
Var[e)= .274947£-06 
p-value .0358 .0008 .6650 .0000 .7075 
P. =.328427 3.85E-03 -1.52E-04 l.OSE-04 l.05E-05 -3.87E-04 -2.40E-05 Var{uJ= .497657£-05 
Var[c]= .186127[-06 
p-value .0000 .0551 .0010 .8536 .0000 .5723 
Fund and time effects 3.29E-03 -8.57E-05 1.26£-04 -4.85E-05 -3.37E-04 ·2.94£-05 Var[u}= .158836[-05 
Var[c]= .243955£-06 
Var[wJce .890137[-09 
p-value .0000 .0382 .0000 .3114 .0000 .4280 
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Table A 111.26 Sharpe Ratio Ratio and QT Component Rating Regressions - DGST Subcategory - All Funds 
Constanl AR ARR DRR RR RRR AdjustedR- ,· Funds Total 
Ob, 
Fixed Effects 12 month -6.61E-03 5.09E-03 3.74E-02 -l.09E-02 -2.92E-02 .17873 .31157£-01 111 4164 
p-valuc .0359(.0210) .1377(.0944) .0000(.0000) .0057(.0051) .0000(.0000) 
P.=.679662 l.87E·02 -2.15E-03 9.30E-03 4.34E-03 -3.2IE-02 .13169E-Ol 
p-vaiue .0003 .4629 .0094 .1103 .0000 
Fund and time effects 9.64E-03 l.19E-02 -2.21E-04 3.66E-02 -3.13E-02 -2.35E-03 .62373 .14370E-Ol 
p-vaJue .6557 .0000 .9219 .0000 .0000 .2948 
24month 8.92E-03 4.57E-04 2.18£-01 -i.53E-02 -2.0RE-02 .56167 .60605£-02 107 2946 
p-value .0000(.0000) .8097(.7905) .0000(.0000) .0000(.0000) .0000(.0000) 
P.""·707004 6.73E-03 -l.59E-03 3.48E-03 -5.04E-03 -l.87E-02 .27965E-02 
p-value .0650 .3151 .0761 .0086 .0000 
Fund and time effects Q.64E-02 l.32E-02 -2.32E-03 2.07E-02 -2.30E-02 -7.44E-03 .75028 .35035E-02 
p-value .0000 .0000 .0981 .0000 .0000 .0000 
36 month -2.31E-03 -3.46E-03 l.24E-03 -l.85E-02 -l.l8E-02 .80421 .17952£-02 96 1709 
p-value .2445(.2576) .0256(.0120) .4624(.4658) .0000(.0000) .0000(.0000) 
P.=A9!948 3.21E-03 -8.33E-03 -5.42E-03 -7.52E-03 -8.37E-03 .l 1004E-02 
p-value .3124 .0000 .0019 .0000 .0000 
Fund and time effects 0.15893 6.39E-03 4.75E-03 4.56E-03 -I.93E-02 -4.82E-OJ .90103 .93448£-03 
p-value .0000 .0006 .0000 .0019 .0000 .0000 
48 month -l.71E-02 -4.89E-03 5.69E-04 -4.42E-03 -8.24E-03 .'J4!i~3 .53212E-03 87 608 
p-value .0000(.0000) .0001(.0005) .8305(.8185) .0128(.0154) .0000(.0000) 
P.=.084798 -1.06E-02 -3.83E-03 -3.93E-03 l.81E-04 -7.59E-03 .46476£-03 
p-value .0383 .0137 .1495 .9304 .0002 
Fund and time effects 0.27803 -8.00E-03 -1.82E-03 7.89E-04 -L48E-03 -6.35E-03 .96073 .41615£-03 
p-,:alue .0000 .0714 .1788 .7323 .3905 .0002 
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Constant AR ARR DRR RR RRR AdjustedR 
' 
Funds Total 
Obs 
Random Effects 12month .1221562 -3.60E-03 6.17E-03 3.25E-02 -5.25E..03 -2.76E-02 Var{u]= .303802E-02 111 4164 
Var[e]• .311171£-01 
p-value .0000 .0552 .0324 .0000 .1407 .0000 
R=.619662 0.175598 2.56E-03 1.34E-04 1.21E-02 5.67£-03 -2.90E-02 Va.iuJ= .572624£-03 
Var[eya .131189£-01 
p-value .0000 .3578 .9617 ,0005 .0878 .0000 
Fund and time effects 6.48E-02 4.63E-03 4.44E-04 3.57£..02 -2.95E-02 -2.51E-03 Varfu}= .847046£-02 
Var[e]• .l42564E-OI 
Var{w]= .178346E-Ol 
p-value .0217 .0054 .8405 .0000 .0000 .2586 
24month 0.181586 2.78E-03 6.75£-04 2.32E-02 -1.39E-02 -2.16E-02 Variu]= .656150£-02 107 2946 
Vru-[e]• .604182£-02 
p-value .0000 .0854 .6822 .0000 .0000 .0000 
R"-,70700 0.259099 8.87E-04 -7.00E-04 3.93E-03 -4.85£-03 -1.81£-02 Vru-[u]• ,612817£-03 
Vru-[eya .279299E-02 
p-value .0000 .6943 .6517 .0424 .0097 .0000 
Fund and time effects 0.147784 7.21£-03 -1.58E-03 1.99£-02 -2.23E-02 -7.76£-03 Vru-[u]• .995990£-02 
Var{e]= .344210£-02 
Var{w]= .278035£-02 
p-value .0000 .0000 .2515 .0000 .0000 .0000 
36month 0.337821 -2.92£-03 -3.04£-03 2.04£-03 -1.82£-02 -1.08£-02 Vru-[u]• .593602£-02 96 1709 
Vru-[e]• .179338£-02 
p-value .0000 .0899 .0271 .2438 .0000 .0000 
R=,491948 0.315888 -4.95£-04 -7.20£-03 -4.65£-03 -7.71£-03 -8.lOE-03 Var{u]= .170713£-02 
Vru-[e]• .109849£-02 
p-value .0000 .8095 .0000 .0063 .0000 .0000 
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Constant AR ARR DRR RR RRR AdjustedR- s Funds Total 
Obs 
Fund and time effects 0.254716 -2.34E-03 1.92E-03 3.38E-03 -1.67E-02 -6.0lE-03 V,rr[u]- .334530£-03 
V,rr[e]a .906551E-03 
V,rr(w]- .586281E-05 
p-value .0000 .0002 ,0338 .0034 .0000 .0000 
48 month 0.33574 -8.41E-03 -4.81E-03 9.55E-05 -4.88E-03 -8.?3E-03 V,rr[u]- .826115E-02 87 608 
V,rr[e]a .528424£-03 
p-value .0000 .0016 .0007 .9682 .0094 .0000 
R=.084798 0.305444 -6.llE-03 -3.27E-03 -4.49E-03 -9.55E-04 -7.92E-03 V,rr[uJ- .806315£-02 
V,rr(e]- .464764£-03 
p-value .0000 .0248 .0304 .0735 .6347 .0000 
Fund and time effects 0.287285 -4.95E-03 -1.31E-03 -1.55E-03 -4.90E-03 -8.06E-03 Var[u]= .117622E-02 
V,rr(e]- .405531E-03 
Var[w)= .715052£-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 .2893 .3831 .0016 .0000 
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Table A Ill.27 Model tests-QT Component Ratings and All Performance Measures - DGST Subcategory- AU Funds 
Dependent F-tcst p-value F-test FEM (group and time p-value LM-test p-va1ue Hausman p-value 
FEM vs POLS effects vs FEM group effects) R.E.\i vs POLS FEM vs REM 
Raw Returns 
12month 7.924 .00000 105.407 .00000 1477.05 .00000 57.61 .000000 
24month 29.758 .00000 63.918 .00000 10010.96 .00000 29.41 .000019 
36month 60.341 .00000 67.497 .00000 8481.22 .00000 23.82 .000235 
48month 91.335 .00000 175.231 .00000 1487.13 
.00000 25.78 .000099 
Alpha-one factor 
12month 11.278 .00000 14.031 .00000 2482.91 .00000 61.64 
24month 39.836 .00000 7.929 .00000 12426.93 .00000 33.48 .000003 
36month 80.349 .00000 10.378 .00000 994534 .00000 13.06 .022818 
48month 172.906 .00000 4.321 .00029 1681.82 .00000 1.78 .878082 
Alpha-four factor 
12month 21.483 .00000 9.818 .00000 8109.41 .00000 34.87 .000002 24month 67.768 .00000 13.959 .00000 19014.56 .00000 23.41 .000282 
36month 118.947 .00000 7.708 .00000 11163.51 .00000 13.50 .019133 48month 273.401 .00000 11.925 .00000 1718.86 .00000 3.58 .611321 
Sharpe Ratio Ratio 
12month 7.12 .00000 114.988 .00000 1227.67 .00000 51.62 .000000 
24month 31.122 .00000 72.348 .00000 10366.90 .00000 37.00 .000001 
36month 60.355 .00000 88.390 .00000 8421.44 .00000 18.49 .002389 
48month 110.435 .00000 27.061 .00000 1542.70 
.00000 13.78 .017049 
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Table A 111.28 Alpha Four Factor and QT Component Rating Regressions - DGST Subcategory - Excluding Finalised Funds 
Constant AR ARR DRR RR RRR AdjustedR 
' 
Funds Total 
Obs 
Fixed Effects 12month 8.43E-04 -l.61E-04 2.18£-04 -3.33£-04 
-2.50£-04 0.46824 .12139£-04 78 2716 
p-value .0000(.0000) .0887(.0901) .0319(.0384) .0081(.0142) .0123(.0212) 
P. =.848686 4.09£-04 -9.73£-08 -2.96E-04 -2.14£-04 -2.26£-04 
.27334£-05 
p-value .0111 .9988 .0000 .0031 .0012 
Fund and time effects 8.46E-04 4.03£-04 7.86£-05 l.96E-04 -2.79E-04 -5.47E-04 .55771 .10244£-04 
p-value 0.3934 0 0.3723 0.0615 0.0155 0 
24month 3.57£--04 4.29E-04 2.51£-04 -3.7IE-04 
-7.03E-04 0.76925 .34439£--05 82 2127 
p-value 
.0000(.0000) .0000(.0000) .0002(.0002) .0000(.0000) .0000(.0000) 
P.=.856718 2.71£-04 1.07E-04 -8.36£-05 -1.97£-04 -2.26E--04 
.78482£-06 
p-value .0021 .0034 .0426 .0000 .0000 
Fund and time effects 3.27£-03 1.94E-04 1.23£-04 3.35£-04 -6.02E-04 
-5.54E-04 0.82772 .26113£-05 
p-value .0000 .0004 .0221 .0000 .0000 .0000 
36month 1.60£-04 -8.12E-05 1.62E-04 -4.44£-04 
-2.05£-04 0.92812 .79946£-06 76 1329 
p-value .0052(.0015) .0123(.0080) .0001(.0002) .0000(.0000) .0000(.0000) 
P.=.699935 2.06£-04 -1.36£-04 -4.31£-05 -l.64£-04 -1.27£-04 
.28946£-06 
p-value .0019 .0000 .1710 .0000 .0000 
Fwid and time effects 4.78E-03 -3.47E-05 6.99E-05 -6.86£-05 -4.76£-04 -l.21E-04 0.94082 .66599£-06 
p-value .0000 .5119 .0405 .1322 .0000 .0001 
48 month -1.75£-04 1.43£-05 -2.47£-05 -1.55£-04 -6.20£-05 0.98764 .10067£-06 67 468 
p-value 
.0064(.0011) .5075(.4801) .5418(.5001) .0000(.0000) .0202(.0159) 
P. =.182468 -1.63£-04 8.97£-06 -3.76E-05 -l.61E-04 
-4.88£-05 .84604£-07 
p-value .0285 .7058 .3653 .0000 .1079 
Fund and time effects 4.12£-03 -1.32E-04 l.97£-05 -1.41£-05 -1.35£--04 -7.85£-05 0.98868 .95393E-07 
p-value .0000 .0610 .4038 .7208 .0000 .0068 
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Constant AR ARR ORR RR RRR AdjustedR .. Funds· Total 
Obs 
Random Effects 12month -I.IOE-03 6.45E-04 -2.!0E-04 2.57E-04 -2.98E-04 -l.90E-04 Var[u]- .898529E-05 78 2716 
Var[e]= .121032E-04 
p-value .2292 .0000 .0160 .0095 .0073 .0559 
R=.848686 4.60E-03 2.06E-04 -1.0lE-05 -2.72E-04 -1.48E-04 -l.79E-04 Var[u]= .245985E-06 
Var[e]= .272952E-05 
p-value .0018 .1463 .8728 .0001 .0372 .0089 
Fund and time effects -4.15E-04 5.14E-04 3.94E-05 1.89E-04 -2.13E-04 -5.13E-04 Var[u]= .166790E-04 
Var[e]= .100667E-04 
Var[w]= .232414E-05 
p-value .6743 .0000 .6493 .0670 .0585 .0000 
24month 5.99E-04 2.9IE-04 3.93£-04 2.64E-04 -3.41E-04 -6.91E-04 Var[u]= .ll0134E-04 82 2127 
Var[e]= .343918£-05 
p-value .3452 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 
R=,856718 2.17£-03 2.lOE-04 I.OOE-04 -7.74E-05 -I.76E-04 -2.07£-04 Var[u]= .229735£-06 
Var[e]= .784357£-06 
p-value .0077 .0060 .0055 .0585 .0000 .0000 
Fund and time effects 2.34E-03 2.65£-04 l.lSE-04 3.44E-04 -5.73E-04 -5.49E-04 Var[u]= .153133£-04 
Var{e}= .256764£-05 
Var[w]= .100691E-OS 
p-value .0005 .0000 .0251 .0000 .0000 .0000 
36month 3.47E-03 l.33E-04 -8.62E-05 t.70E-04 -4.32E-04 -l.99E-04 Var[u]= .101209E-04 76 1329 
Var[e]= .799033£-06 
p-value .0000 .0046 .0081 .0001 .0000 .0000 
R=.699935 3.06E-03 I. 71£-04 -1.37£-04 -4.0SE-05 -1.56E-04 -121£-04 Var[u]= .986530£-06 
Var[e]= .289367£-06 
p-value .0000 .0029 .0000 .1938 .0000 .0000 
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Constant AR ARR ORR RR RRR AdjustedR1 ., Funds Total 
Obs 
Fund and time effects 3.83E-03 5.83E-05 6.00E-05 -4.llE-05 -4.66E-04 -1.23£-04 Vm{u]- .122526£-04 
Var(e]= .657864£-06 
Var{w]= .122526£-04 
p-value .0000 .1642 .0756 .3617 .0000 .0001 
48 Ill3nth 3.87£-03 -1.02£-04 1.08£-05 -1.33£-05 -1.49£-04 -5.58£-05 Vm{u]- .725197£-05 67 468 
Vm{e]- .100272E-06 
p-value .0000 .0733 .6193 .7381 .0000 .0501 
P.=.182468 3.76£-03 -8.58£-05 4.22E-06 -2.62£-05 -1.48£-04 -4.03£-05 Vm{u]- .496483£-05 
Vm{e]- .841903£-07 
p-value .0000 .1552 .8576 .5205 .0000 .1774 
Fund and time effects 2.36E-03 6.58£-06 l.23E-05 3.97£-05 -1.14£-04 -2.02£-05 ·Vm{u]- .108632£-05 
Var(e]= .917999£-07 
Var[w)= .882081£-09 
p-value .0000 .8470 .5623 .2672 .0001 .4412 
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Table A 111.29 Raw Returns and Product Star Rating Regressions - DGST Subcategory - All Funds 
p, p, p, p, Constant AdjustedR s- Funds Total 
Observations 
Fixed Effects 12 month -9.l lE-04 -5.90£-03 -4.54£-04 1.87E-03 .34970 .3675£-04 54 908 
p-value .5174(.5493) .0000(.0000) .6229(.6580) .0188(.0263) 
R "'.725842 2.00E-03 3.04E-04 2.75£-03 1.21E-03 .1600£-04 
p-value .2123 .8160 .0131 .1461 
Fund and time effects 2.27E-03 -1.35£-03 5.SlE-04 1.71E-03 6.61£-03 .75949 .1627£-04 
p-value .0074 .0654 .3886 ,0014 .0000 
24month -2.42E-03 -4.15E-03 -l.62E-03 -8.02E-04 .69512 .8602E-05 52 854 
p-value .0000(.0003) .0000(.0000) .0003(.0008) .0441(.0529) 
R "'.685076 -8.81E-04 -L89E-03 l.43E-04 2.41E-05 .4227E-05 
p-value .2916 .0068 .8123 .9552 
Fund and time effects 4.57E-03 4.86£-03 3.SOE-03 3.00E-03 4.82£-03 .94701 .3301E-05 
p-valuc .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 
Random Effects 12 month -1.09£-03 -5.72£-03 -3.76£-04 2.0IE-03 8.12E-03 Var[U]"' .1149020-04 54 908 
Vru-[o]a .3674840-04 
p-value .3355 .0000 .6557 .0105 .0000 
R "',725842 -1.24£-03 -2.09£-03 1.llE-03 4.47E-04 7.36£-03 Vru-[u]a .1198500-06 
Vru-[o]a .1591490-04 
p-valuc .3211 .0362 .2056 .5406 .0000 
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p, p, p, p, Constant AdjustedR- s Funds Total 
Observations 
Fund and time effects -2.40£-03 -5.60E-03 -1.04£-03 2.00E-03 8.70E-03 V~u]aa .8918490-07 
Var[e]= .1359151)..()4 
Var[w]= .8254250-06 
p-value .0000 .0000 .0041 .0000 .0000 
24month -2.75E-03 4.38E-03 -1.SlE-03 -7.SIE-04 9.72£-03 V~u]a .1178330-04 52 854 
V~e]" .8597980-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 .0001 .0536 .0000 
R=,658076 -2.0SE-03 -2.82£-03 -5.61E-04 -2.64£-04 8.21£-03 V~u]aa .1296430--05 
Var[e]= .4215040-05 
p-value .0078 .0000 .3106 .5203 .0000 
Fund and time effects 8.SOE-04 1.26£-03 1.43£.-03 2.16£-03 6.43£-03 Var[u]= .7975710-06 
Var[e}= .1291260-05 
Var[w]= .478501D--06 
p-value .1379 .0004 .0000 .0000 .0000 
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Table A ill.30 One Factor Alpha and Product Star Rating Regressions - DGST Subcategory-AU Funds 
p, p, p, fl, Constant AdjustedR s Fuods Total 
Observations 
Fixed Effects 12month 3.28E-03 -7.74£--03 -2.19£-03 1.30£--03 .49719 .3208£-04 48 805 
p-val~e .1954(,0555) .0000(.0000) .0096(.0320) .0485(.0787) 
P. =.534411 6.82£-03 -2.65£--03 2.46£-04 I.21£-03 .2089£-04 
p-value .0001 .0753 .8487 .1963 
Fund and time effects 4.37£-03 -3.77£--03 -2.24£-04 I.72E-03 -2.lOE--03 .68932 .2182E-04 
p-value .0002 .0000 .7771 .0086 .0001 
24month -5.0IE-03 -5.96£--03 -3.46E-03 -l.SOE-03 .81583 .4962£-05 48 805 
p-value .0000(.0000) .0000(.0000) .0000(.0000) .0000(.0000) 
A: =.763605 -5.SSE-04 -l.29£-03 -1.ISE-04 -1.83£-05 .ll84E--05 
p-value .2131 .0006 .7178 .9349 
Fund and time effects -9.41£-05 I.40£--03 1.74£--03 I.91E--03 -3.44£--03 .93787 .3991£--05 
p-value .9329 .0054 .0000 .0000 .0000 
Random Effects 12month 2.97£--03 -7.52£--03 -l.98E-03 1.47£--03 -1.35£-04 V,u[u]- .1906280--04 48 805 
V,u[c]'" .3206840-04 
p-value .0167 .0000 .0198 .0548 .8779 
A =.534411 4.42£-03 -4.30£-03 -8.07£-04 8.74£-04 -8.89£-04 V,u[u]- .3635201)..05 
V,u[e]• .2083090-04 
p-value .0044 .0005 .4528 .3080 .3874 
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p, p, p, p, Constant AdjustedR s Funds Total 
ObSCfVlltions 
Fund and time effects 2.13E-03 -5.09£-03 -7.90£-04 l.37E-03 -3.45£-04 Vm(u]- .2279310-04 
Vm(e,- .1981490-04 
Var[w}= .1526690-04 
p-valuc .0529 .0000 .2806 .0309 .7762 
24month -5.23£-03 -6.07E-03 -3.54£-03 -1.47E-03 I.71E-03 VLiuF .1000040-04 48 805 
Vm(e]a .496:0SD-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0011 
P. =.763605 -1.05£-03 -1.65£-03 -3.73£-04 -1.25£-04 -1.36£-03 Vm(u]a .9593350-06 
V,u{e]a .1182570-05 
p-value .0223 .0000 .2321 .5734 .0419 
Fund and time effects -1.00E-03 -1.0SE-03 -3.47£--04 1.23£-03 -2.04£-03 Var(u)= .1076970-05 
Var[e]= . n0049D-05 
Var[w]= .4122720-06 
p-value .2940 .0104 .2150 .0000 .0000 
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Table A 111.31 Four Factor Alpha and Product Star Rating Regressions- DGST Subcategory-All Funds 
p, p, p, p, Constant AdjustcdR s Funds Total 
Observations 
Fixed Effects 12 month -5.42E-04 -9.35E-03 -3.28E-03 5.53E-04 .63421 .2970E-04 48 sos 
p-value .8239(.7571) .0000(.0000) .0001(.0013) .3336(.4002) 
A =.569155 4.90E-OJ -2.88E-03 -J.45E-04 4.96E-04 .1814E-04 
p-valO< .0040 .0417 .7;'12 .5722 
Fund and time effects 3.54E-04 -6.46E-03 -I.46E-03 I.09E-03 -l.SJE-04 .72450 .2470E-04 
p-va1ue .7741 .0000 .0832 .1159 .7463 
24month -4.71E-03 -5.JJE-03 -2.65E-03 -6.47E-04 .87783 .4472£-05 48 sos 
p-value .0000(.GOOO) .0000(.0000) .0000(.0000) .0592(.0278) 
P. =.769070 -4.37E-04 -l.06E-03 2.25E-04 1.04E-04 .I065E-05 
p-va1ue .3269 .0027 .4551 .6238 
Fund and time effects -1.SOE-04 5.IIE-04 8.94E-04 1.21E-03 -1.98E-03 .95985 .5107E-05 
p-value .8757 .3250 .0094 .0003 .0000 
Random Effects 12month -1.00E-03 -9.32E-03 -3.43E-VJ 6.94E-04 2.04E-03 Varfu]= .2879810-04 48 sos 
Var[e]"" .2968890-04 
p-va1uc .4087 .0000 .0000 .3523 .0379 
A =.569155 2.35E-OJ -4.78E-03 -l.86E-03 1.37E-05 7.35E-04 Varfu]= .5245390-05 
Vru[e]= .1808040-04 
p-valuc .1294 .0001 .0862 .9868 .5232 
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/!, /!, /!., . /l, Constant Adjusled R s- Fu .... Total 
Obscrv3tions 
Fund and time effects -2.00E--03 -7.69E--OJ -2.t7E--OJ 7.:54E-04 l.66E--03 Var[u]= .373!>780-04 
Va,je]= .2236030-04 
Var[w]= .!093470-04 
p-value .0895 .0000 .0060 .2661 .1953 
24month -4.94E--03 -5.47E--03 -2.80E-03 -6.48E-04 1.99£--03 Var[uJ= .1473960-04 48 805 
Va,je]= .4470750-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 .0000 .0284 .0010 
A =.769070 -8.04E-04 -1.34£--03 8.04E-06 I.77E-05 -4.17E-04 Va,ju]= .1391040-05 
Var[c]= .1064170--05 
p-valuc .0680 .0001 .9784 .9331 .5989 
Fund and time effe.;ts -2.22E-03 -2.29£--03 -I.SSE-OJ 3.97£-04 -3.89£-04 Var[u]= .!74318D-05 
Var[e]= .1811180-05 
Var[w]= .6144290-06 
p-value .0306 .0000 .0000 .1997 .3152 
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Table A 111.32 Sharpe Ratio and Product Star Rating Regressions - DGST Subcategory - All Funds 
p, p, P., p, Constant AdjustedR s- Funds Total 
Observations 
Fixed Effects 12month -1.36E-02 -0.13117 2.06E-03 5.90E-02 .43271 .3156E-OI 54 908 
p-value .7226(7266) .0000(.0000) .9310(.9388) .0071(.0!08) 
A =.642689 7.49E-02 2.30E-02 7.92E-02 3.52E-02 
p-value .1355 .5828 .0262 .1890 
Fund and time effects 5.60E-02 -2.47E-02 2.58E-02 5.50E-02 7.64E-02 .71982 .177IE-01 
p-value .0514 .3179 .2327 .0025 .0000 
24month -8.54E-02 -1.08E-OI -4.68E-02 -2.69E-02 .71564 .5250E-02 52 854 
p-value .0000(.0000) .0000(.0000) .0000(.0000) .0076(.0104) 
A"'.621423 -3.40E-02 -4.82£-02 -3.73£-03 -5.93E-03 .2820E-02 
p-value .1089 .0069 .8091 .5918 
Fund and time effects 8.43E-02 7.64£-02 5.35E-02 6.47E-02 7.13E-02 .95179 .2166E-02 
p-value .0008 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 
Random Effects 12 month -6.99£-03 -0.11864 l.37E-02 7.0IE-02 0.101723 Vfil"[u]- .1863170-01 54 908 
Vfil"[e]- .3155560-01 
p-value .8414 .0000 .5991 .0032 .0002 
A=,642689 3,73E-02 -3.06£-03 6.55E-02 3.JIE-02 6.85E-02 Var[u)= .2275230-02 
Var{e)= .1649200-01 
p-va!, .3853 .9314 .0345 .1825 .0334 
' ' 
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p, P, p, p, Constant AdjustedR s Fund< Total 
Obst:rvations 
Fund and time effects -1.75£--02 -1.0IE--01 2.36£--02 8.88£-02 9.53£-02 Vu(u]- .7645010-03 
Var[e]= .1558520-01 
Var[w]= .3004040.03 
p-valuc .3680 .0000 .0943 .0000 .0000 
24month -9.33£--02 ·1.14E-Ol -5.13£-02 -2.61£-02 l.82£--01 Var[u]= .7847760-02 52 854 
Vu(o]- .5247550-02 
p-value .0000 .0000 .0000 .0090 .0000 
R=.621423 -6.42£-02 -7.28£-02 -2.23£--02 -1.34£--02 l.44£-01 Vu(u]- .106073D-02 
Vu(e]- .2811450-02 
p-value .0011 .0000 .1160 .2058 .0000 
Fund and time effects 8.09£-03 3.30£-04 1.04£-02 4.93£--02 0.105609 Vu(u]- .6530080--03 
Vu(e]- .8603810-03 
Var[w]= .3237390--03 
p-value .6040 .9718 .1032 .0000 .0000 
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Table A 111.33 Model tests - Star Ratings and All Performance Measures - DGST Subcategory - All Funds 
Dependent F-test p-value F-test FEM (group and time p-value LM-tcst p-valuc Hausman p-value 
FEM vs POLS effects vs FEM group REM vs POLS FEM vs REM 
effects 
Raw Returns 
12month 6327 .00000 58.929 .00000 504.53 .00000 2.00 .735889 
24month 30.579 .00000 73.700 .00000 770.60 .00000 16.34 .002595 
A]pha-one factor 
12month 11.118 .00000 19.626 .00000 862.39 .00000 34.29 .000001 
24month 116.876 .00000 3.743 .00000 1141.45 .00000 11.44 .022020 
Alpha-four factor 
12month 17.511 .00000 10.872 .00000 1309.07 .00000 40.28 .000000 
24month 174.069 .00000 3.239 .00015 l05i.86 .00000 14.65 .005490 
Shmpe Ratio Ratio 
12month 11.060 .00000 35.840 .00000 773.36 .00000 J..98 .561168 
24month 32.537 .00000 76.376 .00000 880.13 .00000 10.63 .031094 
Table A 111.34 Model Tests - Star Ratings and All Performance Measures - DGST All Funds - Rating Change Month Only 
Dependent F-tcst p-value LM-test p-value Hausman p-value 
FEM vs POLS REM vs POLS FEM vs REM 
Raw Returns 
12month 1.071 .74566 0.11 .7457 2.59 .6282 
24month 8.940 .0000 22.99 .0000 16.17 .0028 
A]pha-one factor 
12month 2.04-6 .0028 12.37 .0004 14.49 .0059 
24month 36.841 .0000 51.96 .0000 12.85 .0120 
Alpha-four factor 
12month 3.281 .0000 37.33 .0000 16.51 .0024 
24month 43.68 .0000 47.00 .0000 13.56 .0088 
Sharpe Ratio 
12month 1.334 .1197 l.55 .2133 1.96 .1425 
24month 11.176 .0000 32.74 .0000 13.82 .0079 
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Table A Ill.35 Four Factor Alpha and Product Star Rating Regressions - DGST Subcategory - Rating Change Month 
p, p, p, p, Constant Adjusted& s Funds Total 
Observations 
Raw Returns 
POLS 12 month -.434£-02 -.805£-02 -.966E-03 .158E-02 .860E-02 .14517 .644337£-04 191 
p-value .0693 .0000 5850 .2117 .0000 
Fixed Effects 24month .IJ13E-01 .518E-02 .899E-02 .568E-02 .79534 .262093£-04 21 68 
p-value .0000(.0000) .0000(.0000) .0000(.0000) .0000(.0000) 
POLS .lOlE-01 -.530£-03 .531E-02 .401£-02 .359£-02 .17545 .309244£-04 84 
p-value .0085 .7902 .0040 .0468 .0325 
Alpha One-Factor 
Fixed Effects 12month -.692£-02 -.lllE-01 -.326£-02 .543£-03 .45743 .487103£-04 34 154 
p-value .0000(.0004) .0000(.0000) .0403(.0506) .6166(.7094) 
Fixed Effects ARI A =.284638 -.6278£-02 -.1121E-Ol -.3191E-02 .2641£-04 .40813E-04 
p-value .1059 .0019 .3158 .9909 
POLS 12month -.790£-02 -.117E-Ol -.332E-02 .888£-03 -.21 IE-03 170 
p-value .0022 .0000 .0311 .3535 .7893 
Fixed Effects 24month -.423£-03 .460£-03 .366E-02 .254E-02 .92925 .289364£-04 21 68 
p-value .8515(.8515) .4795(.4795) .0000(.0000) .0000(.0000) 
POLS 24month .966£-02 -.352E-02 .195£-02 .180E-02 -.449£-02 .12639 .289364£-04 81 
p-value .0399 .0731 .2481 .2938 .0011 
Alpha Four-Factor 
Fixed Effects 12 month -.988£-02 -.117E-Ol -.406£-02 .169£-03 .59561 .551495£-04 34 154 
p-value .0000(.0001) .0000(.0000) .0093(.0152) .8595(.9000) 
Fixed Effects ARI P. =333802 -.5184£-02 -.8518£-02 -.1394E-02 .154E-02 .39328£-04 
p-value .1660 .0136 .6485 .4875 
POLS -.129E-01 -.138E-01 -.534£-02 .865£-03 .124£-02 .37467 .551495£-04 170 
p-value ,0000 .0000 .0014 .3612 .1343 
Fixed Effects 24month .192£-03 .376£-03 .357£-02 .248E-02 .93751 .432716£-04 21 68 
p-value .7912(.9395) .6043(.6053) .0000(.0000) .0000(.0000) 
POLS 24month .114£-01 -.491£-02 .834£-03 .164£-02 -.357£-02 .11715 .433699£-04 81 
p-value .0686 .0398 .6902 .4482 .0420 
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p, p, p, p, Constant AdjustedR s Funds Total 
Observations 
Sharpe Ratio 
Random Effects 12month -L44E-OI -l.808E-01 8.02E-03 5.16E-02 1.21£-01 V,u(u]~ .303961£-02 39 172 
Var[e]= .399551E-01 
p-value .0293 .0008 .8759 .3130 .0047 
Random Effects AR 1 R=.072928 -2.539£-01 -2.521£-01 -5.672£-02 -2.330£-02 1.723E-Ol V,u(u]~ .840437£-02 43 133 
Var[e]= .329135£-01 
p-value .0019 .0004 .4061 .7152 .0047 
POLS 12 month -1.374£-01 -1.985£-01 -2.567£-02 3.104£-02 1.448£-01 .13289 .42977£-01 191 
p-value .0228 .0000 .5802 .3772 .0000 
Fixed Effects 24 month 2.603£-01 7.485E-02 l.BOSE-01 l.195E-01 .82255 .19936E-Ol 21 68 
p-value .0112(.0000) .0112(.0001) .0000(.0000) .VVU0(.0000) 
FOLS 24month 2.172E-OI -5.319£-02 1.083E-Ol 8.964£-02 3.957£-02 .16111 84 
p-value .0077 .2755 .0169 .0731 .3099 
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Table A 111.36 Four Factor Alpha and Product Star Rating Regressions - DGST Subcategory - Excluding Finalised Funds 
p, p, p, p, Constant AdjustedR s Funds Total 
Observations 
Fixed Effects 12month 2.477E.03 -6.312E-03 -l.714E.03 1.117E.Q3 .61217 4.522E.05 41 _687 
p-value .3987(.2278) .0000(.0000) .0640(.0895) .0567(.0723) 
P. =.61217 3.157E-03 -3.441E--03 -1.393E.03 1.055E-04 1.755E--03 l.376E-05 41 646 
p-valuc .0414 .0038 .1621 .8898 .0949 
Fund and time effects 2.077E-03 -4.887£-03 -8.902E-04 1.lllE-02 7.566£-04 .69242 2.017E-04 41 687 
p-value .1073 .0000 .2833 .0901 .1619 
24 month 4.713E-05 3.649E-04 I.164E-03 l.377E-03 .94252 .2929E-04 27 "265 
p-value .9537(.9477) .6385(.5912) .0138(.0052) .0002(.0001) 
R=.460453 -1.022E-03 - l.252E.03 2.374E-04 2391E-04 .1212E-05 27 238 
p-value .4489 .0539 .6394 .5492 
Fund and time effects 3.659E-04 8.964E-04 1.027E-03 1.266E-03 -5.750E--04 .94717 .3426E-05 27 265 
p-value .7617 .1301 .0080 .0004 .0211 
Random Effects 12month 1.662£-03 -6.593£--03 -2.1544E-03 l.l03E-03 Var[u]= .214407£-04 41 687 
Var{e]= .237884£-04 
p-value .1984 .0000 .0095 .1128 
R =.61217 3.157E~03 -3.44IE-03 -l.393E-03 1.054E-04 l.755E-03 Var[u]= .321813£-05 41 646 
Var[e]= .136885E-04 
p-value .0414 .0038 .1621 .8898 .0949 
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p, p, p, p, Constant AdjustedR- s- Funds Total 
Observations 
Fund and time effects 2.733E-04 .:.s.967E-03 -l.672E-03 7.105E-04 2.214£...03 V,ufu]- .2791 l 6E-04 27 265 
Var[e]= .I8866IE-04 
Var[w]= .753007£-05 
p-value .8252 .0000 .0314 .2667 .0595 
24month -1.696£-04 1.428£-04 1.003£-03 1.320E-03 -2.632£-04 V,ufu]- .272752£-04 27 265 
V,ufe]- .201905£-05 
p-value .8891 .8037 .0068 .0002 .7796 
A =.460453 -1.468£-03 -I.720£-03 -1.574£-04 2.214E-05 7.525£-04 Var(u]= .660915£-05 27 238 
V,ufe]- .120772£-05 
p-value .2704 .0064 .7498 .9550 .4377 
Fund and time effects -1.632£-03 -1.342£-02 -5.01 IE-04 7.053£-04 5.122£-04 V,ufu]- .281204£-05 27 265 
Var[e]= .18556IE-05 
Var(w]= .224802£--06 
p-value .1362 .0095 .1470 .0326 .2213 
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APPENDIX IV 
REGRESSION RESULTS SUPERANNUATION TRUSTS AUSTRALIAN EQUITY - GENERAL 
(DSSB) SUBCATEGORY 
Explanation of Tables 
Each of the re ..... ession tables in this a" ... endix have th e same six model ~ecification estimations as follows: 
Fixed Effects Model Random Effects Model 
Fund effects R,, = p'c,,_1 + a,D,, + c,, ,i - J,. .. 11,t -1,...,s,l - lag R,, =a +JJ'c,,_1 +£,,,&,, = µ, +v.,,l=lag 
Reported p-values reflect two robust covariance 
matrix estimations. The first corrects for non-
specific heteroscedasticity and the second bracketed 
value reflects the more restrictive assumption of 
constant variance within each group (Greene, 1998, 
n.326'1. Discussed further in section 5.6.5. 
Fund effects ARI Ri, = P'c 1,+a1D,, +&,,,i -1,...n,t -1,...,s,c,, = p,;,J-L +r, R,, ==a+ P'c;,-, +e,,,c,, = pe1J.1 +111,,,I = lag 
reported var[e] and var[u] is var[e]{l-p)2 and var[u](1-p)2 
res--tivelv 
Fundandtirneeffects R;, =S+p'c,r-1 +a,D,,+r,D,, +E11 ,i-2,...n,t-2,...,s,l-lag R,, =a +P'c.,_1 +&,,,&,, = µ, +r, +v,, 
Table A IV.l·Table A IV.4 P'c,,-1 = P, QT..., 
Table A IV.24-Table A IV.27 P'c,, = P, AR,,.,+ /11 ARR,,.,+ Pi D~ + /1, RR,,.,+ P, RRR.,., 
Table A IV.16-Table A IV.19 fl'c., "'P, Q1w 
Table A IV.8-Table A IV.I I P'c,, = P, Q4.t 
Table A IV.31-Table A IV.34 /J'c,, = /11 DIM+ /11 D2J>.,+ /J, D3...,+ /J, D4""' 
where: DI =lifa OneSlarfimd, D2 = I if a Two Star fund, D):l ifa Three Star fund, D4 = I [faFourStarjund 
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Explanation of Tables 
Each Table includes the following test statistics, which are discussed in further detail in section 5.6.7. 
F-tests for FEM versus OLS and FEM fund and time effects versus group effects only: 
F(n-1,nT-n -k) = ( R!s,,,e1;t-R,2,,,ratri,utl)l{n-1) 
(1-R="'""')l(nT-n-K) 
Breusch-Pagan LM test REM versus POLS: 
2 
nT 
1;(T;;,)' 
LM= I 
2(T-I) ' ' I;I;e; 
The statistic is distributed as chi-squared and has one degree of freedom [Greene, 2000 #191, p.573]. 
1 .. 1 1=1 
Hausman Test 
This description of the test is taken from Greene (2000). Given the true coefficient vector, b, and estimated vector P, Greene (2000, p.576) identified 
that "Hausman's essential result is that the covariance of an efficient estimator with its difference from an inefficient estimator is zero". The variance of 
the difference vector can be expressed as: 
Va,[b- jJJ = Var[b]+ Varf PJ-Cov[b,JiJ-Cov[b,jJ]'. 
Therefore 
Cov[(b- jJ),PJ=Cov[b,jJJ- Var[PJ = 0. 
The covariance matrix for the test is 
Var[b-,8] = Var[b]- Var[.B]=I:. 
f-1 is estimated using the respective covariance matrices of the LSDV and REM. Given the null hypothesis, based on the Wald criterion, Wis 
expressed as 
w = x'[KJ =[b-pyi:-'[b-PJ 
and W is asymptotically distributed as chi-squared, with K degrees of freedom. 
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Table A IV.I Raw Returns and Quantitative Product Rating Regressions-DSSB Subcategory~ All Funds 
Constant QT Product Rating AdjustedR 
' 
Funds Total Obs. 
Fixed Effects 12month -.287I904308E-03 .13306 .41531E-04 120 3977 
p-value .0000 (.0000) 
R=,727033 -.2709115744£-03 
p-value .0472 
Fund and time effects .1020831£-01 -.6337317746£-03 .56397 .18501E04 
p-value .0000 .0000 
24month -.1586293131£-03 .38994 .16535£-04 98 2722 
p-value .0005 (.0002) 
p=.79964[ -.2241771560£-03 
p-value .0150 
Fund and time effects .1228121£-01 -.9577844719£-03 .62738 .64821£05 
p-v,Jue .0000 .0000 
36month -.1389705016£-03 .49870 .69074£-05 79 1646 
p-value .0020 (.0008) 
n=.122004 .4585225804£-04 
p-value .5468 
Fund and time effects .1261087E-01 -.9583330706£-03 .73748 .20052E-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
48 month -.1328036024£-02 .80689 .39244£-05 62 772 
p-value .0000 (.0000) 
P. =.432256 -.6609790068:E-03 
p-value .0000 
Fund and time effects .8931057£-02 -.26921711 llE-03 .93924 .26561£-06 
p-value .0000 ,0000 
Random Effects 12month .7031297£-02 -.9174719356£-04 Var[u]= .530965£-05 120 3977 
Vu(e]= .362218E-04 
p-value .0000 .1118 
R=,727033 .6283058£-02 -.1685934361£-04 Yu[u]= .479010£-06 
Yu(e]= .161988£-04 
p-value .0000 .8752 
422 
Constant QT Product Rating AdjustedR s Funds Total Obs. 
Fund and time effects .7941219E-02 -.3525020699E-03 Vm"[u] .132140E-04 
Vm"[e]- .182176E-04 
Var[w]= .194603E-04 
p-value .0000 .0000 
24month .7390701E-02 -.8521829356E-04 Var[u]= .641484E-05 98 2722 
Vm"[e]: .101204E-04 
p-value .0000 .0630 
p=.799641 .8180678E-02 -.9840754809E-04 Var[u]= .138867£-06 
Vm"(e]: .340618E-05 
p-value ,0000 .2002 
Fund and time effects .9491847E-02 -.5812214340E-03 Vm"[u]: .188001E-04 
Vm"(e]: .618153E-05 
Var[w]= .489413E-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
36month .8616650E-02 -.M75635157E-03 Var[u]= .337715E-05 79 1646 
Vm"[e]: .353031E-05 
p-value .0000 .0009 
p,=.722004 .8174825E-02 -.6291661261E-04 Vm"[u]: .264029E-06 
Vm"(e]: .1471SOE-05 
p-value .0000 .3286 
Fund and time effects .9945215£-02 -.4746872588E-03 Vm"[u]: .668591£-05 
Var[e]= .184875E-05 
Vm"[w]- .174139£-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
48month .1249027E-Ol -.1077850631E-02 Var[u]= .314212E-05 62 772 
Vm"[e]: .782356£-06 
p-value .0000 .0000 
p, =.432256 .9709706E-02 -.5312450929£-03 Vm"[u]: .829081E-06 
Vm"[e]- .429994E-06 
p-value .0000 .0000 
Fund and time effects .9484039£-02 -.4014920288E·J3 Var[u]= .235424E-06 
Vm"[e]: .246155£-06 
Var[w]= .102339£-07 
p-valu~ .0000 .®00 
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Table A IV.2 One Factor Alpha and Quantitative Product Rating Regressions -DSSB Subcategory- All Funds 
Constant QT Product Rating AdjustedR 
' 
Funds Total Obs. 
Fixed Effects 12 month -2.35252E-05 .18157 .24801£-04 85 2935 
p-value .7479 (.7630) 
R=.894818 -.6855643957£-03 
p-value .0000 
Fund and time effects .4306657E-02 -.7479776262E-03 .28326 .22152E-04 
p-value .0000 .0000 
24month -.3282507643E-04 .44482 .14895E-04 85 2443 
p-value .4313(.3920) 
p=.906182 -.3261355486E-03 
p-value .0000 
Fund and time effects .5545050E-02 -.1082357295E-02 .53911 .72651E-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
36 month .5746237985E-05 .58998 .59316E-05 79 1646 
p-value .8799(.8528) 
R=.817825 -.1905447314E-03 
p-value .0001 
Fund and time effects .47187SOE-02 -.9840576917E-03 .69155 .20167E-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
48month -.1481167664E-03 .90439 .33164E-05 61 772 
p-value .0012(.0001) 
R=.624985 -.8579218909£-04 
p-value .0591 
Fund and time effects .1547963E-02 -.3456455231£-03 .91172 .29611E-06 
p-value .0000 .0000 
Random Effects 12month -.717775E.OJ .8535394719E--04 Vu[u]= .494896E.05 
Vu[,]= .247832E-04 
p-value .1369 .2133 
a=.894918 .3417784E-02 -.5633853179E-03 Vu[u]= .152217£-08 
Vu[o]= .425860E-05 
· p-value .0000 .0000 
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Constant QT Product Rating AdjustedR 
' 
Funds Total Obs. 
Fund and time effects .2422294E-02 -.4962694239E-03 Va,[u]- .120556£-04 
Va,[o]" .217041 E-04 
Va,[w]0 .464962E-05 
p-value .0004 .0000 
24 month -. 700930E-03 .1030969869£-04 Va,[u]" .646875£-05 
V,u[e]" .822243E-05 
p-valuc .0571 .8238 
p=.906182 .2125770£-02 -.3275771128£-03 Va,[u]0 .318529£-07 
Va,[e]" .101246£-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
Fund and time effects .2503099£-02 -.6959150455£-03 Var(uJ= .187330£-04 
Var(cl= .682605£-05 
Var[w]= .321668£-05 
p-value .0001 .0000 
36month .1248800E-04 -.1544926781£-04 Var(u]= .346169£-05 
Var(c]= .243732£-05 
p-value .9635 .6837 
R=.817825 .1148982£-02 -.21 l5331140E-03 Va,[u]c .l 16881E-06 
Va,[o]" .478131E-06 
p-value .0000 .0000 
Fund and time effects .1723253£-02 -.4393108529£-03 Var(u}= .702151£-05 
Var(c]= .183355£-05 
Var{w]= .934581£-06 
p-value .0000 .0000 
48 month .6098794£-03 -.1416421360£-03 Va,[u]c .299160£-05 
Va,[e]0 .316955£-06 
p-valuc .0317 .0004 
R=.625053 .3855499£-03 -.9112223627£-04 Va,[u]" .369328£-06 
Va,[,]c .138905£-06 
p-valuc .1798 .0326 
Fund and time effects .1327233£-02 -.3003075428£-03 Va,[u]0 .326397£-05 
Var{e]= .292629£-06 
Var(w}= .520772£-07 
p-value .0000 .0000 
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Table A IV .3 Four-Factor Alpha and Quantitative Product Rating Regressions- DSSB Subcategory - AU Funds 
Constant QT Product Rating AdjustedR 
' 
Funds Total Obs. 
Fixed Effects 12month .3652311215E-OJ .30541 .24835E-04 85 3020 
p-value .0000 (.0000) 
P. =.862223 -.467504586!£-03 .37839£-05 
p,-value .0000 
Fund and time effects .2689507E-02 -.3637224868£-03 .41499 .15733£04 
p-value .0000 .0000 
24 month .1937561929£-03 .61432 .15604£-04 85 2443 
p-value .0000 (.0000) 
jr.905673 -.2957541055E-03 .91479£-06 
p-value .0000 
Fund and time effects .4747667E-02 -.7674995399£-03 .70453 5l001E05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
36month .2069495014£-03 .73344 .83444£-05 79 1646 
p-value .0000 
P. =.799249 -.1199331952£-03 .42367£-06 
p-value .0066 
Fund and time effects .4653768£-02 -.7899469824£-03 .80426 .17289£-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
48month -.1647343378£-04 .92498 .54125£-05 62 772 
p-value .723P {.6776) 
P.=.630670 -.6408241087£-04 .16331£-06 
p-value .1942 
Fund and time effects .2504390£-02 -.3373098248E-03 .93479 .32366£-06 
p-value .0000 .0000 
Random Effects 12 month -.171185E-02 .3924796702£-03 V,u[u]- .701596E-05 
V,u[e]- .178200E-04 
p-value .0000 .0000 
P.=.862223 .2588507£-02 -.3386733044£-03 V,u[u]- .132776£-06 
V,u[e]- .378180£-05 
p-value .0004 .0004 
-
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Constant QT Product Rating AdjustedR1 ;;, Funds Total Obs. 
Fund and time effects .1465783E-02 -.21 l7647814E-03 Var[u]- .115762E-04 
Var[e]= .150087E-04 
p-value .0218 
Var[w]= .48890IE-05 
.0016 
24month -.711155E-03 .1992556307E-03 Vmfu]= .957307E-05 
Vmfe]= .603740E-05 
p-value .0734 .0000 
p=.905673 .2655385E-02 -.2705950319E-03 Va,[u]= . 736352E-07 
Vmfe]= .914717E-06 
p-value .0000 .0000 
Fund and time effects .2123092E-02 -.4695623140E-03 Var[u]= .187918E-04 
Var[e]= .462522E-05 
p-value .0006 
Var[w]= .306138E-05 
.0000 
36month .9511650E-04 .1665234659E-03 Var(u]= .564735E-05 
Vmfe]= .212999E-05 
p-value .7691 .0000 
R=.799249 .1840370E-02 -.1519584718E-03 Var[u]= .232053E-06 
Vmfe]= .423523E-06 
p-value .0000 .0003 
Fund and time effects .2087224E-02 -.3301121 l 97E-03 Var(u]= .762736E-05 
Var[e]= .15641 IE-05 
p-value .0000 
Var[w]= .103205E-05 
.0000 
48 month ;1176026E-02 
-.4607514321E-04 Vmfu]= .423573E-05 
Vmfe]= .367966E-06 
p-va1ue .0003 .2929 
R=.630670 .1466289E-02 -.9829257744E-04 Vmfu]= .518236E-06 
Vmfe]= .163193E-06 
p-value .0000 .0358 
Fund and time effects .2388338£-02 -.3142729000E-03 Vmfu]= .420195E-05 
Var[e]= .319869E-06 
p-value .0000 
Var[w]= .922172E-07 
.0000 
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Table A IV.4 Sharpe and Quantitative Product Rating Regressions - DSSB Subcategory - All Funds 
Constant QT Product Rating AdjustcdR .. Funds Total Obs. 
Fixed Effects 12month -.123504992IE-01 .13040 .34448E-Ol 120 3977 
p-value .0000(.0000) 
R"'.710319 -.1790542422£-01 .l3513E-01 
p-value .0000 
Fund and time effects .2104380810 -.1575337886E-Ol .60022 .14087E-Ol 
?""Value .0000 .0000 
24month -.1925848438E-02 .34686 .14447£--01 98 2722 
p-value .1883(.1631) 
p=.758159 -.1248156958E-01 .J3381E-02 
p-value .0000 
Fund and time effects .2363807175 -.2125516773£-01 .68164 .45951£-02 
p-value .0000 .0000 
36month -.3661900195£-02 .55588 .92042£-02 79 1646 
p-value .0082(.0038) 
R=.530627 .37416761 IOE-03 .16116£-02 
p-value .8503 
Fund and time effects .2433653743 -.2199975395£-0l .79426 .13261£-02 
p-volue .0000 .0000 
48 month -.3850517601£-01 .82731 .66926£--02 62 772 
p-value .0000(.0000) 
R=,547669 -.1213004993£.01 .26099£.-03 
p-value .0000 
Fund and time effects .1646921471 -.80254 l6673E-02 .94592 .20888E-03 
p-value .0000 .0000 
Random Effects l2month .1423939593 -.S256678934E-02 Var[u]= .4346170-02 120 3977 
Vm[e]• .3010220-01 
p-value .0000 .0015 
R=,710319 .1159515633 -.3078830558E-02 Vm[u]• .1153900-03 
Vm[e]• .1345690-01 
p-value .0000 .2566 
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Constant QT Product Rating AdjustedR s Funds Total Obs. 
Fund and time effects .1522647050 -.9135853345£-02 Va,[u]- .lll3430-0l 
Var[e]= .1383870-01 
Var[w]= .1736380-01 
p-value .0000 .0000 
24month .1159537151 .18,18883533£-03 Va,(u]= .4319390-02 i,8 2722 
Va,(o]= .8331060-02 
p-value .0000 .8885 
{F,758759 .1542663905 -.5197076528£-02 Va,[u]= .1841980-03 
Va,(e]= .3328520-02 
p-value .0000 .0188 
Fund and time effects .1055512099 .3873129162£-02 Va,(u]= .1504290-03 
Var[e]= .4060780-02 
Var[w]= .2420280-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
36month .1517489740 -.3550007318E-02 Var[u]= .3164380-02 79 1646 
Va,(e]= .2556180-02 
p-value .0000 .0035 
P. =.530.627 .1423769414 -.1179385524E-02 Va,(u]= . 7110560-03 
Va,(e]= .1610960-02 
p-value .0000 .4890 
Fund and time effects .1514665678 -.3377019346E-02 Va,(u]= .1583950-03 
Va,(e]= .ll8412D-02 
Var[w]= .2094210-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
48month .2695380897 -.3186369925£-0l Va,(u]= .2882850-02 62 772 
Va,(e]= .6151900-03 
p-value .0000 .0000 
P.=.541669 .1616[[4208 -.1031936376E-01 Va,(u]= .4254320-03 
Va,(e]= .2606440-03 
p-value .0000 .0000 
Fund and time effects - .1797388360 -.1166629176E-Ol Va,(u]= .2192900-03 
Var[e]= .192632D-03 
Var[w]= .8567130-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
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Table A IV.S Model tests -QT Product Rating and All Performance Measures- DSSB Subcategory - All Funds 
Dependent F-test p-value F-test FEM (group p-value LM-test p-value Hausman p-value 
FEM vs POIS and time effects vs REMvsPOLS FEM vs.REM 
FEM u effects 
Raw Returns 
12month 8.175 .0000 9.672 .0000 744.83 .0000 15.586 .0000 
24month 23.862 .0000 14.393 .0000 3488.53 .0000 9.04 .0026 
36month 30.935 .0000 22.486 .0000 5561.93 .0000 1.95 .1623 
48month 120.423 .0000 5.912 .0000 3613.58 .0000 .23 .6335 
Alpha-one factor 
12month 5.896 .0000 31.274 .0000 590.23 .0000 32.44 .0000 
24month 19.774 .0000 34.991 .0000 3061.28 .0000 15.25 .0001 
36month 21.163 .0000 44.665 .0000 3798.35 .0000 .16 .6864 
48month 51.697 .0000 156.476 .0000 2365.42 .0000 67.34 .0000 
Alpha-four factor 
12month 15.146 .0000 15.85 .0000 3178.48 .0000 2.29 .1305 
24month 47.078 .0000 20.99 .0000 788226 .0000 .37 .5433 
36month 56.882 .0000 24.607 .0000 7828.60 .0000 145.65 .0000 
48month 146.305 .0000 9.8804 .0000 3824.31 .0000 4.89 .0270 
Sharpe Ratio 
12month 5.823 .0000 36.232 .0000 545.46 .0000 51.00 .0000 
24month 15.539 .0000 43.929 .0000 3318.03 .0000 13.16 .0003 
36month 27.092 .0000 62.138 .0000 5085.21 .0000 .OS .8293 
48month 60.153 .0000 179.535 .0000 2507.59 .0000 68.12 .0000 
Table A IV.6 60 month Performance and QT Ratings Regressions-POLS DSSB Subcategory- All Funds 
Constant QT Rating AdjustedR· 
' 
Observations 
Raw Returns .8255340E-02 .1683334858E-04 -.01776 .233226E-05 57 
p-value .0000 .8877 
Alpha One-Factor -.211637E-04 .9824048090E-04 -.00713 .297608E-05 57 
p-value .9737 .4406 
Alpha Four-Factor .2000799E-02 -.1654783187E-03 ,00407 .414493E-05 57 
p-va1ue .0114 .2661 
Sharpe ratio .1373449343 .1509236038E-02 -.01533 .273996E-02 57 
value .0000 .7083 
430 
Table A IV.7 Alpha-four factor and Quantitative Rating Regressions- DSSB Subcategory· Excluding Finalised Funds 
Constant QL Product Rating AdjustcdR 
' 
Funds Total 
Observations 
Fixed Effects 12month .3484522606E--03 .23432 .16985£--04 76 2748 
p-value .0000(.0000) 
p=.868149 -.3885361952£--03 .30323£--05 
p-value .0001 
Fund and time effects .4313338694£--02 -.549007776IE--03 .37661 .11158E--04 
p-value .0000 .0000 
24month .2504453753£--03 .47321 .10466£-04 76 2267 
p-value .0000(.0000) 
p=.910809 -.2567165580£--03 .82115£-06 
p-value .0000 
Fund and time effects .511 l488987E--02 -.7607730082£--03 .60369 .44526£--05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
36month .2313711958E--03 .71844 .73108E--05 73 1569 
p-value .0000 (.0000) 
p=.801297 -.1252914138E--03 .40808£--06 
p-value .0046 
Fund and time effects .468334033 IE-02 -.7793307187£-03 .79945 .15495£-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
48 month -.l 751490152E--04 .92329 .53902£--05 59 757 
p-value .7083(.6598) 
p=.633189 -.6854924862£-04 .16275£--06 
p-value .1672 
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Constant QL Product Rating Adjusted.R 
' 
Funds Total 
Observations 
Fund and time effects .2553587759£--02 -.3403535843£-03 .93332 .32485£--06 
p-value .0000 .0000 
Random Effects 12month -.7982914614E--03 .3267667870£--03 Vru'[u]- .383200£--05 76 2748 
Vru'[e]: .131540E-04 
p-value .0480 .0000 
p=.868149 .2954514339£-02 -.3025756287£--03 Vru'[u]- .122663£-07 
Vru'[ep .303150£-05 
p-value .0000 .0008 
Fund and time effects .2489192848£-02 -.2820403568£--03 Var[u]= .520259£--05 
Var[e]= .I07095E--04 
Var[w]= .379837£-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
24month -.1689700039£-03 .2302297968£-03 Var[u]= .492766£-05 76 2267 
Vru'[e]: .548626£-05 
p-value .6067 .0000 
p=.910809 .3137694481£--02 -.2546745994£-03 Vru'[u]: .198668£-07 
Vru'[e]: .821159E--06 
p-value .0000 .0000 
Fund and time effects .2222512258£--02 -.3132812086E--03 Vru'[u]: .648760£--05 
Var[eJ= .412736£--05 
Vru'[w]: .2!9263E-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
36 month ·.1559808095£--03 .1993446568£--03 Vru'[u]- .493374£--05 73 1569 
Vru'[e]: .t96602E-05 
p-value .6092 .0000 
p=.801297 .2027531104E--02 -.1404863678E--03 Vru'[up .156500E--06 
Vru'[e]: .408054£--06 
p-value .0000 .0008 
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Constant QL Product Rating AdjustedR 
" 
Funds Total 
Observations 
Fund and time effects .20850204I6E-02 -.3123099122E-03 Va,[u] .6545770-05 
Va,[e]a .1400400-05 
Var[w]= .1003630-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
48 month .1266205938E-02 -.4194227916E-04 Va,[u]" .420055£-05 59 757 
Va,[e]" .372833£-06 
p-value .0000 .3444 
--·--,p,,;,.633189 .1557942833£-02 -.9665363980E-04 Va,[u]" .5072460-06 
Va,[e]" .1626680·06 
p-value .0000 .0411 
Fund and time effects .2405193032£-02 -.3075040083£-03 Va,[u]" .4149900-05 
Var[e]= .3240810-06 
Var{w]= .7619460-07 
p-value .0000 .0000 
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Table A IV.! Raw_ Returns Ratio and Qualitative Product Rating Regressions-DSSB Subcategory- AU Funds 
Constant QL Product Rating AdjustedR s Funds Total 
Observations 
Fixed Effects 12month .3109193769£-03 .10986 .34811£-04 48 826 
p-value .0048(.011 [) 
p=.757808. .1979413326E-03 .12690E-04 
p-value .1965 
Fund and time effects .8443304392£-02 -.2371011494E-03 .63964 .13747E-04 
p-value .0000 .0957 
24month .5891056325£-02 .52443 .14864£-04 22 278 
p-value .0000(.0000) 
p=.662375 .2580662574£-02 .36174£-05 
p-value .0000(.0000) 
Fund and time effects -.2151311503E-OI .3217575286E-02 .81241 .43812£-05 
p·value .0000 .0000 
36month -.3404630357£-03 .64473 .ll941E-05 12 59 
p-value .5190(.4343) 
p=.489505 . 7771148068£-03 
.11941£-05 
p-value .4321 
Fund and time effects .3360608419E.()I -.3004552284£.()2 .87321 .17998£-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
Random Effects 12month .4363231934£-02 .2506185773£-03 Var[u]= .383933£-05 48 826 
VIU[e]= .309724£-04 
p-value .007! .1937 
R=.757808 .3464173812£.()2 .1541241164£.()3 VIU[u]= .596058£-06 
VIU[e]= .11890IE-04 
p-value .0105 .2779 
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Constant QL Product Rating AdjustedR 
' 
Funds Total 
Observations 
Fund and time effects .9623348438[-02 -.2859697967E-03 V,u(u]- .720544E-05 
Var[e}= .125490E-04 
Var{w}= .227258E-04 
p-value .0000 .0370 
24month -.1433233139E-01 .2430928909E-02 V,u(u]• .776056E-05 22 278 
Var[e}= .699969E-05 
p-value .0016 .0000 
p=.662378 .141485I504E-02 .6023507471E-03 V,u(u]• .346267E-06 
V,u(e]• .355466E-05 
p-value .8036 .3606 
Fund and time effects .9976352457E-03 .6356781838E-03 Var[u]= .702313E-06 
V,u(e]• .276103E-05 
Var[w]= .652390E-07 
p-v,Jue .6207 .0067 
36month .8721382206E-02 -.1871 l 7859IE-03 V,u(u]• .36126IE-05 
Var[e}= .194862E-05 
p-value .1876 .8014 
p=.489505 .17506193 llE-03 .8390535105E-03 V,u(u]• .956772E-06 12 59 
V,u[e]a .119396E-05 
p-v,Jue .9835 .3780 
Fund and time effects .1898155771E-01 -.1394933039E-02 V,u(u]• .102523E-05 
Var{e]= .695414E-06 
Var{w]= .350146E-06 
p-value .0000 .0038 
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Table·A IV .9 Alpha-one factor and Qualitative Product Rating Regressions - DSSB Subcategory - All Funds 
Constant QL Product Rating Adjusted R- s Funds Total 
Observations 
Fixed Effects I2month -.1367478322E-03 .29067 .27740E--04 42 736 
p-value .3531(.2359) 
p=.868419 .1329782745E-03 .53459E-05 
p-value .2744 
Fund and time effects .2502677828E-02 -.3213300737E-03 .55226 .14422E-04 
p-valoc .1256 .0976 
24 month .4116473516£-02 .75637 .12176E--04 21 268 
p-value .0000(.0000) 
p=.705728 .2986025565E-02 .74913E-06 
p-valuc .0000 
Fund and time effects -.3373649365£-0l .3781799120E-02 .76924 .50361E-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
36month -.l097952129E-02 .41987E-05 12 59 
p-value .0001(.0000) 
p=.468194 -.3750148226E-03 .50608E-06 
p-value .0000 
Fund and time effects .2142023095E-01 -.2509024382E-02 .72237 .17372E-05 
p-valoc .0033 .0024 
Random Effects 12 month .2615385416E-02 -.2810897229E-03 Var[u)= .781702E-OS 42 736 
Va,(c]• .199232E-04 
p-valoc .1476 .1823 
A •.868419 -.13221673IOE-02 .1200556809E-03 Var[u]= .291948E-06 
Var[e)= .501461E-OS 
p-value .2585 .2939 
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Constant QL Product Rating Adjusted.R s Funds Total 
Observations 
Fund and time effects .3255748756E-02 -.3573845508E-03 Va,(u]- .933749E-05 
Var[e]= .125760E-04 
Var[w]= .940698E-05 
p-value .0626 .0551 
24month -.2232342584E-01 .2501844284E-02 Va,(u]= .921339E-05 21 268 
Va,(e]= .297649E-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
p=.705728 -.1864670550E-01 .2138515586E-02 Va,(u]= .555878E-06 
'. 
Va,(,]= .737480E-06 
p-value .0000 .0000 
Fund and time effects -.1577979490E-01 .1694133420E-02 Va,(u]= .316981 E-04 
Var[eJ= .281927E-05 
Var[w]= .212323E-05 
p-value ,0003 .0005 
36month .7901950493E-02 -.9813014534E-03 Va,(u]= .630301E-06 12 59 
Va,[,]= .50600IE-06 
p-value .1580 .1186 
p=.468194 .2639679790E-02 -.3283282947£-03 Va,(u]= .630301E-06 
Va,(e]= .506001E-06 
p-value .6324 .5957 
Fund and time effects .6678988198E-02 -.8428516969E-03 Va,(u]= .626496E-06 
Var[e]= .115664E-05 
Var[w]= .121984£-07 
p-value .1596 .1156 
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Table A IV.10 Alpba-fov.rfactor and Qualitative Product Rating Regressions -DSSB Subcategory-All Funds 
C~!.:mt QL Product Rating AdjustedR s Funds Total 
Observations 
Fixed Effects I2month -.4129893475E-03 .42964 .27050£--04 42 736 
p-value .0678(.0003) 
p=.839926 .8297338419£-04 .43228E-05 
p-value .4481 
Fund and time effects .5505755731£-02 -.5472090879£-03 .57329 .12900£-04 
p-value .0005 ,0033 
24month .2305889553£-02 .84541 .16007£--04 21 268 
p-value .0000(.0000) 
p=.625407 .2112667109E-02 
.80545£-06 
p-value .0000 
Fund and time effects -.1544972395E-OI .1865556204£-02 .85810 .38496£-05 
p-value .0006 .0004 
36month -.1275840026£-02 .72396 .51325£-05 12 59 
p-value .0000(.0000) 
p=.300441 -.8618648224£-03 .92291£-06 
p-value .2709 
Fund and time effects .1954529371E-OI -.2092318954£-02 
.16191E-05 
p-valuc .0094 .0137 
Random Effects 12month .4753282176E--02 -.4391602349£-03 Va,[u]- .ll5179E--04 42 736 
Va,[e]- .155328£--04 
p-value .0044 .0211 
R 0 .839926 .1701131721E-03 .7219556859£--04 Va,[u]ao .191259E-06 
p-value .8129 
Var[e}= .432278E--05 
.4940 
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Constant QL Product Rating AdjustcdR 
' 
Funds Total 
Observations 
Fund and time effects .4476080477E-02 -.4764066718E-03 Vm[u] .IIS3S8E-04 
Var(e]= .116207£-04 
Vm[w]= .S43067E-OS 
p-valuc .0079 .0082 
24month -.1521211614E-Ol .1825573575E-02 Var[u]= .135664E-04 21 268 
Vm[e]= .2477S7E-OS 
p-value .0000 .0000 
p=.625407 -.1353565722E-Ol . l698217449E-02 Vm[u]= .12529IE-05 
Vm[e]= .802484E-06 
p-value .0001 .0000 
Fund and time effects -.4861233724E-02 .5793246535E-03 Vm[u]= .231725E-04 
Var(e]= .227421E-05 
Vm[w]= .227419E-OS 
p-value .2068 .1764 
36month .ll51240576E-Ol -.1200293462£-02 Vm[u]= .370909E-05 12 59 
Vm[e]= .142348E-05 
p-value .0446 .0620 
p= .8064S76644E-02 -.7648981668E-03 Vm[u]= .9 I 8 I 92E-06 
Vm[e]= .922487£-06 
p-valuc .2195 .3002 
Fund and time effects .1534222467£-01 -.1643521404£-02 Vm[u]= .455250E-05 
Var[e}= .125199E-05 
Vm[w}a .725345E-06 
p-value .0101 .0145 
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Table A IV.11 Sharpe Ratio and Qualitative Product Rating Regressions - DSSB Subcategory - All Funds 
Constant QL Product Rating AdjustedR 
' 
Funds Total 
Observations 
Fixed Effects 12 month .1777569618E-01 .14189 .35427£-01 48 826 
p-value .0001(.0001) 
p=.73!041 .1740103659E-OI .13354E-OI 
p-value .0005 
Fund and time effects .1324651442 -.2631529072E-02 .62321 .l:{!Ht:E-01 
p-value .0006 .5712 
24month .2292667185 .55165 .172 lSE·-0 I 22 278 
p-value .0000(.0000) 
p=.657827 .1325412832 .38924E-02 
p-value .0000 
Fund and time effects -1.076896312 .1353177381 .82554 .52170£-02 
p-value .0000 .0000 
36month -.2575858327E-01 .61393 ;60885E-02 12 59 
p-value .2316(.1678) 
p=.177109 .4494689685£-04 .19085E-02 
p-value .9989 
Fund and time effects .8710708675 -.8792258561E-Ol '.87257 .15330£-02 
p-value .6000 .0001 
Random Effects 12month -.1757546733E-01 .1543041290E-OI Var[u}= .496429E-02 48 826 
VM(e]- 304629E-Ol 
p-value .7347 .0121 
R=.731041 -.6259490199E-Ol .1445616009E-OI VM[u]- .732375E-03 
VM(e]- .125074E-Ol 
p-_value .1486 .0018 
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Constant QL Product Rating Adjusted R- ,- Funds Total 
Observations 
Fund and time effects .1757034220 -.4722628089£-02 Var[u] .876725£-02 
\'ar[e]= .133762£-01 
Var[w]= .l73768E-01 
p-value .0002 .2932 •• 
24 month -.7844949513 .1034893070 V,rr[u]- .9535 l I E-02 22 278 
Var[e]= .774241£-02 
p-value .0000 .0000 
p=.657827 -.3748982973 .5448633734£-01 Var[u]= .460992£-03 
V,u-(e]0 .379472£-02 
p-value .0493 .0137 
Fund and time effects -.1626785769 .3053142371E-Ol Var[u]= .809697£-03 
Var[e]= .301274E-02 
Var[w]= .587124E-04 
p-value .0155 .0001 
36 month .2589199930 -.1863618914E-01 Var[u]= .377831E-02 12 59 
V,rr[e]a .231021E-02 
p-value .2532 .4646 
p=.177109 .47835 l2221E-OI .654753267 lE-02 Var[u]= .233157E-02 
Var[e]= . l 90622E-02 
p-value .8603 .8304 
Fund and time effects .4733545444 -.4404183541E-01 Var[u]= .107527E-02 
V,u-[e]a .762543E-03 
Var[w]= .237265E-03 
p-value .0006 .0049 
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Table A JV.12 Alpha-four factor and Qualitative Rating Regression:, - DSSB Subcategory- Excluding Finalised Funds 
Constant QL Product Rating AdjustedR ,· Funds Tola! 
Observations 
Fixed Effects 12 month -.4117900565£-03 .35064 .21500E-04 39 678 
p-value .0684(.0004) 
p=.847678 .8449477144£-04 ..37105£-05 
p-value .4045 
Fund and time effc.:::ts .5698614520£-02 -.5047280919£-03 .48453 .11607£-04 
p-value .0002 .0057 
24month .2289502369£-02 .83653 .14009£-04 19 246 
p-valuc .0000(.0000) 
p=.644996 .2086105370E-02 .76588£-06 
p-value .0000 
Fund and time effects -.1773775758E-Ol .2184705438£-02 .84468 .287540-05 
p-value .0177 .0000 
36month -.1275840026£-02 .71914 .518640£-05 ll 57 
p-value (.0000)(.0000) 
p=.297167 -.8648214487£-03 .925610£-06 
p-value .2693 
Fund and time effects .1960039253£-0I -.2092318954£-02 .71583 .155620£-05 
p-value .0101 /0159 
Random Effects 12monlh .4941460679£-02 -3920723909£-03 V,ufura .753102£-05 39 678 
V,ufc]• .139697£-04 
p-value .0014 .0287 
P.=.847638 .5827559670£-03 .9488053058£-04 V,ufu]• .229395£-07 
V,ufe]• .371052£-05 
p-value 5299 .3256 
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Constant QL Product Rating AdjustedR· ,- Funds Total 
Observations 
Fund and time effects .5698614520£-02 -.5047280919£-03 Vm[u]- .690792£-05 
Vm[o]- .110894£-04 
Var[wJ= .3648311).()5 
.0002 .0057 
24month -.1469861457£-01 .1907577032£-02 Var[u]= .116856£-04 19 246 
Vm[o]- .229976£-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
p=.644996 -.1348710812E-01 .1768615952£-02 Var[u]= .l09142E-OS 
Vm[e]- .764040£-06 
p-value .0001 .0000 
Fund and time effects .2184705438£-02 .2184705438E-02 Vm[u]- .6907920-05 
Var[e]= .1108940-04 
Var[w]= .3648310-05 
p-value .0001 .0000 
36month .1 l31558080E-OI -. l l62789865E-02 Vm[u]- .3732251).()5 11 57 
Vm[e]- .1454161).()5 
p-value .0508 .0743 
p=.297167 .7670593989[-02 -.7085482616£-03 Vm[u]- .923801£-06 
Vm[e]= .924505E-06 
p-value .2436 .3386 
Fund and time effects -.1773775758£-0l .2184705438[-02 Vm[u]= .1453340-04 
Var[e]= .2185150-05 
Var[w]= .1151450-05 
p-value .0001 .0000 
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Table A IV.13 Model Tests-Qualitative Product Rating and All Performance Measures -DSSB Subcategory - All Funds 
Dependent F-test p-value F-test FEM (group p-value LM·test p-value Hausman p-value 
FEM vs POLS and time effects vs REM vs POLS FEM vs REM 
FEM u effects 
Raw Returns 
12month 3.173 .0000 19.491 .0000 79.31 .0000 .40 .5246 
24month 15.571 .0000 311.231 .0000 281.82 .0000 37.54 .0000 
36month 10.607 .0000 11.938 .0000 46.68 .0000 .46 .4999 
Alpha-one factor 
12month 8.024 .0000 13.110 .0000 474.14 .0000 3.94 .0471 
24month 42.169 .0000 23.078 .0000 491.46 .0000 31.55 .0000 
36month 11.555 .0000 8.838 .0000 50.40 .0000 .40 .5263 
Alpha-four factor 
12month 14.275 .0000 14.337 .0000 1278.87 .0000 .28 .5987 
24montb 73.827 .0000 41.239 .0000 788.61 .0000 5.04 .0247 
36montb 14.502 .0000 10.264 .0000 42.64 .0000 .20 .6529 
Sharpe Ratio 
1201ontb 3.857 .0000 18.182 .0000 129.70 .0000 .73 .3945 
24month 17.186 .0000 32.849 .0000 259.45 .0000 46.89 .0000 
36montb 9.475 .0000 21.901 .0000 38.04 .0000 .75 .3875 
Table A IV .14 Model tests - QL Product Rating and All Performance Measures - DSSB All Funds Announcement Month Only 
Dependent F-test p-value LM-test p-value Hausman p-value 
FEM vs POLS REM vs POLS FEM vs REM 
RawRetwns 
12month 0.372 .9901 4.83 .0279 0.37 .5437 
24month 1.554 .1412 0.08 .7793 3.48 .0621 
Alpha-one factor 
12month 0.775 .7062 0.87 .3508 0.12 .7321 
24month 5.224 .0000 3.78 .0519 4.21 .0402 
Alpha-four factor 
12month 0.744 .7367 0.56 .4531 0.00 .9843 
24month 11.652 .0000 8.99 .0027 1.54 .2142 
Sharpe Ratio 
12month 1.265 .2555 0.15 .7011 0.47 .4908 
24month 3.048 .0037 2.15 .1422 3.15 .0757 
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Table A IV .15 QL Product Rating Regressions - DSSB Subcategory· All Funds • Rating Change Month Only 
Model Time Constant QL Product Rating AdjustedR 
' 
Funds Total Obs. 
Raw Returns 
POLS 12month -.4651401521E-02 .1724100164E-02 .065648 .335187E-04 89 
p--value .3885 .0073 
POLS 24month .6583843960E-02 -.1503715456E-05 .00000 .161218£-04 58 
p-value .0700 .9973 
POLS 36month .8902451841E-02 -.2652217156E-03 .00455 .359065£-05 19 
p-value .2343 .7572 
Random Effects I 12 month -.6528178295£-02 .1910012223£-02 Vm[u]- .632009£-05 21 63 
Vm[e]- .348659£-04 
p--value .3692 .0283 
Alpha One-factor 
POLS 12month .4583862651£-02 -.4928218514E-03 .007688 .161529E-04 73 
p-value .3111 .3734 
POLS 24month .8264873196E-02 -.l 110022889E-02 .. 056659 .172937£-04 56 
p-value .0077 .0080 
POLS 36month . 7963785056E-02 -.1045995738£-02 .00855 .375645E-05 19 
p-va1ue .1250 .0991 
Alpha Four-factor 
POLS 12 month .5108720994£-02 -.5096567815£-03 .009698 .136683£-04 73 
p-value .2440 .3332 
POLS 24month .2176203204£-02 -.2150915227£-03 .001175 .226973£-04 56 
p-value .5051 .6405 
POLS 36month .1233325983£-01 -.1383625650E-02 .01359 .608463£-05 19 
p-value .0228 .0339 
Sharpe Rado 
POLS 12month -.9672254834£-01 .3388944681£-01 .030414 .290083£-01 89 
p-value .4403 .0341 
POLS 24month .1756095170 -.9541390769£-02 .003621 .207356£-01 58 
p-value .1658 .5435 
POLS 36month .3408320971 -.3119581420E-01 -.01021 .471798£-02 19 
e:vaiue .2469 .3569 
1Breusch-Pagan LM test 4.83 p-value 0.0279 
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Table A IV.16 Raw returns and Overall Q2 Product Rating Regressions-DSSB Subcategory M All Funds 
Constant Q Product Rating AdjustedR 
' 
Funds Total Obs. 
Fixed Effects 12 month -.8588447467£-04 .12573 .348294£-04 48 826 
p-value .0045(.0004) 
R=.737185 -.l 125029140E-04 
.127151£-04 
p-value .5807 
Fund and time effects .l 194155535E-OI -.9727816883E-04 .66018 .130714E-04 
p-va!ue .0000 .0000 
24 month -.1948838196E-03 .53193 .190851£-04 22 278 
p-value .0000(.0000) 
R=.699508 -.5246549594E-04 
.363641£-05 
p-value .1830 
Fund and time effects .1433596IOOE-01 -.1422528684£-03 .84000 .354402£-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
36month -.9803345512£-04 
p-value .0001(.0003) 
.71603 .839057£-05 12 59 
R=.29H646 -.5525998197E-04 
.118280E-05 
p-value .1642 
Fund and time effects .1416131069£-01 
-.1269272623£-03 .92062 .248555E-05 
p-valuc .0000 .0000 
Random Effects 12month .853536167IE-02 
-.3804515490£-04 Vru"(u]- .440933E-05 48 826 
Vru"(e]- .304202£-04 
p-value .0000 .0173 
R=.737185 .5515659507E-02 -.1321444896£-04 Vru"(u]= .607620£-06 
Vru"(e]- .119142E-04 
value .0000 .4532 
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Constant §- Product Rating AdjustedR2 ,, Funds Total Ohs. 
Fund and time effects .1176569609£-01 -.8024097484£-04 Var[u]= .106813£-04 
Var[e]= .118242£-04 
Var[w]= .225854£-04 
p-value .0000 .0000 
24month .1464462747£-01 -.1482921964£-03 Vu[u]- .752109£-05 22 278 
Vu[e]- .688922£-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
P. =.699508 .8757393883£-02 -.3967042895£-04 Vu[u]- .260662£-06 
Vu[e]- .363476£-05 
p-value .0000 .1560 
Fund and time effects .1220045686E-01 -.1028900347£-03 Var[u]= .767354£-06 
Varfe]"° .235488£-05 
Var[w]= .105696£-06 
p-value .0000 .0000 
36month .I 192308163E-01 -.8525518668£-04 Var[u]= .382930£-05 
Var[e]= .155757£-05 
p-value .0000 .00012 
P. =.298646 .9840990719£-02 -.4205678626£-04 Vu[u]- .182525£-05 
Vu[e]- .117888£-05 
p-value .0000 .2363 
Fund and time effects .1420532677£-01 -.1348085107E-03 Var[u]= .111031£-05 
Var[e]= .435379£-06 
Var[w].:: .650371£-06 
value .0000 .0000 
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Table A IV .17 Alpha-one factor and Overall Q1 Product Rating Regressions - DSSB Subcategory - All Funds 
Constant <i Product Rating AdjustedR2 •' Funds Total Obs. 
Fixed Effects 12month -.1224918489E-03 .33750 .186397E--04 42 736 
p--value .0000(.0000) 
R=.829708 -.2515676770E-04 .534883E-05 
p--value .0689 
Fund and time effects .7695438858E.02 -.1356606830E.03 .60388 .136793E.04 
p-value .0000 .0000 
24month -.1745995338E-03 .80641 .ll9892E-04 21 268 
p--value .0000(.0000) 
R=.731414 -.3978819851E-04 .864144E-06 
p--value .0409 
Fund and time effects .8532166816E-02 -.1706781031E-03 .81957 .365696E-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
36month -.1602418313E-03 .90387 .398994E-05 12 59 
p-value .0000(.0000) 
R=.219522 -.1383827438E-03 .249455E-06 
p--value .0000 
Fund and time effects .8700S94384E-02 -.1690719304E-03 .94376 .185478E-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
Random Effects 12month .63_63554165E-02 -.1034899685E-03 Vm[u]= .950704E-05 42 736 
Vm[e]= .186079E-04 
p--value .0000 .0000 
R=.829708 .4753770837E-03 -.1681454686E-04 Var[u]= .636540E-07 
Vm[,]= .534585E-05 
value .6141 .1930 
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Constant Q Product Rating AdjustedR s Funds Total Obs. -
Fund and time effects .6689867330E-02 -.1116233108E-03 Vm[u]- .128295£-04 
Varfe]= .111260E-04 
p-value .0000 
Var{w]= .965254£-05 
.0000 
24month .7894415014E-02 -.1611773828E-03 Vm[u]- .961821E-05 21 268 
Vm[e]- .236515E-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
R=.731414 .1252098675E-02 -.3142890537£-04 Var[u]= .439775£-06 
Vm[e]- .863430E-06 
p-value .2647 .0685 
Fund and time effects .8081817961E-02 -.1719ll7794E-03 Vm[u]- .167523£-04 
Varfe]= .220435E-05 
p-value .0000 
Var[w]= .176158E-05 
.0000 
36month .7924192775£-02 -.1530223951£-03 Vm[u]- .338641£-05 12 59 
Var[eJ= .400479£-06 
p-value .0000 .0000 
R-.279522 .6786328052E-02 -.1282937588E-03 Vm[u]- .148009E-05 
VmJ:eF .247087E--06 
p-value .0000 .0000 
Fund and time effects .7742002022E-02 
-.1567231867E-03 Vm[u]- .829888E-06 
Var{e}= .234283£-06 
value .0000 
Var[w]= .298789£-06 
.0000 
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Table A IV .18 Four-factor Alpha and oVerall Q2 Product Rating Regressions - DSSB Subcategory- All Funds . 
Constant Q' Product Rating AdjustedR 
' 
FUnds Total Obs. 
Fixed Effects 12month -.1027750696E--03 .46030 .272114E--04 . 42 736 
p-value .0000(.0000) 
R=.812999 -.2653797382E--04 .431878E--05 
p-value .0328 
Fund and time effects .7905531865E-02 -.1202560873E-03 .61108 .185478£-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
24month -.1436740779£-03 .88887 .161071E--04 21 268 
p-value .0000(.0000) 
R=.593244 -.3739336985£--04 .878863£--06 
p-value .0474 
Fund and time effects .9429830752E--02 -.155551992IE-03 .90964 .288686E--05 
p-vruue .0000 .0000 
36month -.1581028100E-03 .90319 .562345£--05 12 59 
p-vruue .0000 
R"'.155399 -.1558728397£-03 .466545£--06 
p-value .0000 
Fund and time effects .9741107284E-02 -.1553880339E--03 .91694 .137375£--05 
p-value .0000 .0000 
Random Effects 12 month .6354680198£--02 -.8933271746£--04 Vm[u]= .125135E--04 42 736 
Vm[e]= .146979£--04 
p-value .0000 .0000 
R=.812999 .1882407404E--02 -.1975434976E-04 Vm[u]= .293200£--06 
Vm[e]= .431681E--05 
value .0447 .0970 
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Constant Q Product Rating AdjustedR 
' 
Funds Total Obs. 
Fund and time effects .6292191431E..02 -.1024007112E..03 Var(u] .15282SE-04 
Var[e]- .105916£--04 
Var(w]= .617136E-OS 
p-value .0000 .0000 
24month .7882414021£..()2 -.1364687618E..03 Var[u}o .142769£-04 21 268 
Var[e]a .178IOOE-OS 
p-vnlue .0000 .0000 
a=.593244 .2193465224E-02 -.2463882788E-04 Var[u]a .148898E-05 
Var[e}o .87706SE-06 
p-value .0595 .1525 
Fund and time effects .6940193872E..02 -.1213626396E..03 Var[u]= .233694E..OS 
Var(e]= .144813E-05 
Var[w]- .861158£--07 
p-value .0000 .0000 
36month .9675351512E-02 -.1544479229£--03 Var[u]- .328220£--05 12 59 
Var[e]a .499229E-06 
p-value .0000 .0000 
R=.155399 .9675351512E..02 -.1544479229E..03 Var[u]a .328220E-OS 
Var[e]a .499229E-06 
p-value .0000 .0000 
Fund and time effects .9486922199E-02 -.1554488557E-03 Var[u]a .900080E..06 
Var[c]a .428341£--06 
Var(w]= .152936E-06 
value .0000 .0000 
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Table A IV.19 Sharpe Ratio and Overall Q2 Product Rating Regressions - DSSB Subcategory - AU Funds 
Constant Q2 Product Rating AdjustedR2 • fund, Total Obs. ,.. 
Fixed Effects 12month -.3801833245E--02 .16930 .355055£-01 48 826 
p-wlue .0000(.0000) 
11=.693050 -.5939111038E-04 .136077E-Ol 
p-value .9289 
Fund and time effects .3238585836 -.3794039650E-02 .65610 .137009E-Ol 
p-valuc .0000 .0000 
24month -.73630223JIE--02 .55274 .187018E-01 22 278 
p-value .0000 
R=.709557 -.3135045279£.-02 .398368£--02 
p-value .0165 
Fund and time effects .36778)2019 -.487(.,779139E-02 .84001 .427243£-02 
p-wlue .0000 .0000 
36month 
-.4125022209E-02 .72427 .701457£-02 12 59 
p-wlue .0000 
Jl=.029073 -.4321099442£-02 .165842£-02 
p-value .0003 
Fund and time effects .3415651099 -.44226521 ISE-02 .95092 .191733£-02 
p-value .0000 .0000 
Random Effects 12month .2188520707 -. l 980070869E-02 Va,[u}a .601553E-02 48 826 
Va,[e]- .294900E-Ol 
p-value .0000 .0002 
R""'.693050 .7623217516E-Ol -.3016334321E-03 Va,[u]- .729S42E-03 
Va,[e]- .127484£-01 
wlue .0419 .5945 
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Fund and time effects .3181920421 -.3267531933£-02 VM[u) .143789E-01 
Va,fe]= .122084£-01 
VM[w]'" .169811E-01 
p-value .0000 .0000 
24month .4093602138 -.5605109279£-02 VM[u]'" .919426E-02 22 278 
VM[e]'" .772356£-02 
p-value .0000 .0000 
P. =.709557 .1966918865 -.1922928569E-02 Var[u]= .272072E-03 
VM[e]'" .396886£-02 
p-valuc: .0005 .0401 
Fund and time effects .3047057940 -.3682663348£-02 VM[u]: .865007£-03 
Var(e]= .276280£-02 
Var[w]= .802399£-04 
p-value 
36month .3031238276 -.3672426632£-02 VM[u]: .399960£-02 12 59 
VM[e]'" .164992£-02 
p-value .0000 .0000 
P. ==.029073 .3066229345 -.3597523878£-02 VM[u]- .381325£-02 
VM[e]: .142883£-02 
p-value .0000 .0005 
Fund and time effects .3255286048 -.4339757774£-02 Var[u]= .118483£-02 
Var(e}== .293698£-03 
Var(w}= .55550IE-03 
value .0000 .0000 
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Table A IV.20 Four-factor Alpha and Overall Q2 Product Rating Regressions-DSSB Subcategory- Excluding Finalised Funds 
Constant Q Product Rating AdjustedR 
' 
Funds Total Obs.. 
Fixed Effects 12month 
-.2185914199E-03 .46820 .216725£-04 39 672 p-v,Jue .0000 
,z=.814667 -.1232162691E-03 .364703E-05 
p-value .0000 
Fund and time effects .9629436146E-02 -.1379941733E-03 .55050 .103593E-04 
p-value .0000 
24month · 
-.1428613979£-03 .87813 .141743E-04 18 246 
p-value .0000 
P.=.601430 -.4483383922£-04 
.839982£-06 
p-value .0217 
Fund and time effects .9979302753E-02 
-.1565870246£-03 .89493 .209038£-05 
p-value .0000 .000.0 
36month 
-.1584904699E-03 .90235 .571723£-05 11 57 
p-value .0000 
,z=.160355 -.1557668576£-03 
.464201£-06 
p-value .0000 
Fund and time effects .9865086376E-02 -.1553880339E-03 .91510 .866563£-06 
p-value 
-Random Effects 12 month .1306677461E-Ol 
-.1886484760E-03 Var[u]= .101345E-04 39 672 
VM(e]- .I 15381E-04 
p-value .0000 .0000 
·,z=.814667. .6855199709E-02 -.8748876017£-04 Var[u]= .167244£-06 
VM(e]- .36361 IE-05 
p-value .0000 .0001 
Fund and time effects .8447898938£-02 . -.1239517578E-03 Var[u]= .9756100-05 
VM(e]- .9670130-05 
Var[w]= .3481920-05 
p-valu_e .0000 .0000 
24month .. 8628564006£~02 -.1315076676E-03 VM(u]- .124070£-04 18 246 
VM(e]- .171452E-05 
p-val.ue .0000· .0000 
,z=.601430 .3276911186£-02 -.33034i2379E-04 VM(u]- .141223£-05 
v e- .838498£-06 
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Constant Q Produr,t Rating AdjustedR- ,· Funds Total Obs. 
p-value .0081 .0638 
Fund and time effects .8725972657E-02 -.1449238131E-03 Vru-[u]a .2117940-04 
Var[e]= .1478240-05 
Var[w]= .177221D-05 
p-value 
36month .IOI5993774E-Ol -.1575330997E-03 Var[u]= .302968E-05 II 57 
Yru-[e]a .505598E-06 
p-value .0000 .0000 
R=.160355 .9751 IOl689E-02 -.1475216337E-03 Varfu]= .1879760-05 
Yru-[e]a .4623070-06 
p-value .0000 .0000 
Fund and time effe<:ts .9886239416E-02 -.1557037772£-03 Var[u]= .6741380-06 
Var[eJ= .4395650-06 
Var[wJ= .6936490-07 
value .0000 .0000 
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Table A IV.21 Overall Q2 Product Rating Regressions- DSSB Subcategory-All Funds-Rating Change Month Only 
Model Period Constant Q2 Product Rating AdjustedR2 Funds Total Obs. 
Raw Returns 
REM 12 month .6819192250E-02 -.89g5282045E-05 Var[u]= .366649£-05 47 443 
p-valuc .0000 .5712 Var[e]= .363390£-04 
a-=.722278 .5170987523£-02 -.2041868148£-04 Var[u]=.138030E-05 
p-value .0000 .0449 Var(e]= .149778£--04 
Fund and time effects .9049245359£-02 -.3120234084E.04 Var[u]"" .940221£-05 
Var[e]= .140208£-04 
p-value .0000 .0068 Var[w]= .279680£--04 
REM 24month .7763366056£-02 -.3 l03634601E-04 Var[u]= .624647£-05 22 142 
Var[e]= .690872E-05 
p-value .0000 .0106 
a=.347902 .6616450781£-02 -.9846976409£-05 Va,[u]a .182535E-05 
Var(e]= .536402£-05 
p-value .0000 .3466 
Fund and time effects .7672826308£-02 -.2999812722£-04 Var[ul'" .119832£-05 
Var[e]= .302312£-05 
p,,value .0000 .0001 Var[w]= .647122£-07 
POLS 36month .5286065403£-02 .1674717593£-04 .012862 .577472107283£-05 33 
value .0016 .5297 
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Model Period - Constant Q Product Rating AdjustcdR Funds Total Obs. 
Alpha One-Factor 
REM 12month .1643410827E-02 -.3035051747E-04 Vac[u]= .924484E-05 42 391 
VIU[e]= .232559E-04 
p-value .0852 .0330 
n=.s1ssss .6351506907E-03 -.2433443024E-04 VIU[u]= .891721E·06 
Vac[e]= .775717E-05 
p-value .6211 .0007 
Fund and time effects -.5758884774E-03 -.7044558938E-05 Vac[u]= .IOI370E-06 
Var{e]= .I29319E--04 
p-valuc .3034 .4599 Var[w]= .367815E--06 
REM 24month .9708177419E-03 -.4391621295E-04 Var(u]= .105877E-04 21 136 
Var[e]= .321740E-05 
p-value .2509 .0000 
R=.379562 -.29843041 ISE-03 -.1611657909E-04 Var[u]= .315937E-05 
Var[e]= .150059E-05 
p-value .6741 .0044 
Fund and time effects .6426892175E-03 -.3872694108£-04 Var[u]= .233034E-05 
VIU[e]= .303199E-05 
p-valuc .2631 .0000 Vac[w]= .234087E-06 
POLS 36month -.1267471064E-02 ·.3929685785E-05 .000744 .4099099400£-05 33 
value .4033 .8802 
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Model Period Constant Q Product Rating AdjustedR Fund, Total Obs. 
Alpha Four-Factor 
REM 12month .1572503319E-02 -.I J 15446829E-04 Var[u]= .130403E-04 42 391 
Var[e]= .206369E-04 
p-value .1048 .4119 
R=,820565 .9379055585£-03 -.1256062307E-04 Var[u]= .199275E-06 
Var[e]= .730250£-05 
p-value .3466 .0681 
Fund and time effects .2097222078E-02 -.2964483829E-04 Var[u]= .131356E-04 
Var(e]= .134267£-04 
Var[w]= .115537E-04 
p-value .0673 .0125 
REM 24month .2211392448E-02 -.4063270173E-04 Var[u]= .171375E-04 21 136 
Var[e]= .305590E-05 
p-value .0285 .0000 
R=.325931 .1124478179£-02 -.1460631398E-04 Var[uJ= .558010E-05 
Var[e]= .162306£-05 
p-value .1829 .\.:153 
Fund and time effects .1314723226E-02 -.2460336874£-04 Var[u]= .401369£-05 
Var[e]= .258697£-05 
Var[w]= .616083E-06 
p-value .0455 .0036 
POLS 36month .2275425508£-02 -.3975088150£-04 .02379 .561804583 IE-05 33 
value .1964 .1919 
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Model Period Constant Q Product Rating AdjustedR Funds Total Obs. 
Sharpe Ratio 
REM 12 month -.2009967800E-02 .19737 .3700572525E-01 47 443 
p-value .0001(.0001) 
R=.636056 -.1228258982E-02 .16912774618E-Ol 
p-va1ue .0008 
Fund and time effects .2172711779 -.2161343665E-02 .63324 .16736089087E-O I 
p-value .0000 .0000 
REM 24month .1571855096 -.1320594226E-02 Var[u]= .813496E-02 22 142 
Var[e]= .680483E-02 
p-value .0000 .0006 
n=.337959 .1122307996 -.5779363234E-03 Var[u]= .244672E-02 
Var[e]= .513177E-02 
p-value .0000 .0773 
Fund and time effects .1526606831 -.1251943898£--02 Var[u]= .153470E-02 
Var[e]= .306985E-02 
Var[w]= .541466£-04 
p-value .0000 .0000 
REM 36month .8206386669E-Ol -.2838522883E--03 .002716 .6106352164E-02 33 
value .1564 .7733 
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Table A IV.22 Model tests-<i' Product Rating and All Performance Measures -DSSB Subcategory. All Funds 
Dependent F-test p-value F-test FEM (group p-value LM-test p-wlue Hausm,n p-wlue 
FEM vs POLS and time effects vs REM vs POLS FEM vs REM 
FEM u effects 
RawRetwns 
12month 3.541 .0000 21.281 .0000 81.55 .0000 11.65 .0006 
24month 15.348 .0000 35.437 .0000 342.76 .0000 12.38 .0004 
36month 13.740 .0000 35.066 .0000 56.09 .0000 l.33 2495 
Alpha-one factor 
12month 10.147 .0000 16.339 .0000 520.16 .0000 9.60 .0019 
24month 55.086 .0000 30.476 .0000 607.31 .0000 7.78 .0052 
36month 44.817 .0000 46.439 .0000 86.17 .0000 4.77 .0289 
Alpha-four factor 
12month 16.242 .0000 16.764 .0000 1140.81 .0000 9.21 .0024 
24month 107.616 .0000 68.065 .0000 801.98 .0000 5.46 .0195 
36month 35.068 .0000 24.432 .0000 86.32 .0000 0.78 .3773 
Sharpe Ratio 
12month 4.576 .0000 20.892 .0000 134.83 .0000 20.07 .0000 
24month 16.645 .0000 35.465 .0000 317.88 .0000 16.61 .0000 
36month 13.561 .0000 55.655 .0000 53.06 .0000 1.55 .2126 
Table A IV .23 Model Tests - <i' Product Rating and All Performance Measures - DSSB All Funds • Rating Change Month Only 
Dependent F-test p-value F-test FEM (group p-wlue LM-test p-value Hausman p-value 
FEM vs POLS and time effects vs REM vs POLS FEM vs REM 
FEM u effects 
RawRetwns 
12month 1.967 .0003 11.465 .0000 16.91 .0000 2.06 .1509 
24month 7.028 .0000 12.420 .0000 117.58 .0000 0.40 .5288 
Alpha-one factor 
12month 4.772 .0000 9.050 .0000 164.96 .0000 1.88 .1702 
24month 23.048 .0000 12.878 .0000 211.94 .0000 0.61 .4352 
', Alpha-four factor 
12month 6.995 .0000 9.023 .0000 351.24 .0000 2.10 .1470 .. 
24month 38.574 .0000 23.775 .0000 264.46 .0000 0.07 .793'0 
Sharpe Ratio ,,..._, 
12month 3.34 .0000 10.726 ::'{}Oil 73% .0000 6.59 .0,102 
24month 8.97 .0000 14.179 .rlOOO 153.99 .0000 0.14 .1.no 
., 
/' 
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Table A IV.24 Raw Returns and Quantitative Component Rating Regressions- DSSB Subcategory-All Funds 
Fixed Effects 12month 
p-v.tue 
R=,74826 
p-value 
Fund and time effects 
24month 
p-value 
R=.829460 
p-value 
Fund and time effects 
p-value 
36month 
p-value 
R=.749076 
p-value 
Fund and time effects 
48month 
p-value· 
R"".483062 
p-value 
Fund and time effects 
p-value 
Random Effects 12month 
p-value 
R=.74826 
p-value 
Constant ARA ARRA ORRA RRA RRRA Adjusted R2 ? - Funds 
-6.85£-05 2.88E-04 -1.33E-04 1.99£-04 -5.40E-04 .09027 
.2790(.2831) .0088(.0046) .3213(.3421) .0805(.864) .0000(.0000) 
-1.61£-04 l.23E-04 1.12E-04 9.32£-05 -3.82E-04 
.1123 .0259 .0681 .1261 .0000 
1.42E-02 -8.03£-05 4.75£-04 1.02E-04 -7.96£-04 l.30E--04 .52599 
.0000 .2376 .0000 .2507 .0000 .0447 
2.43£-04 9.60£-06 1.32E-04 -4.83E-05 -6.26E-04 .30287 
.0001(.0000) .9015(.8919) .1664(.1460) .5515(.5139) .0000(.0000) 
-I.61£-04 1.23£-04 l.12E-04 9.32E-05 -3.826-04 
.1123 .0259 .0681 .1261 .0000 
1.69E-02 -2.05E-04 -5.06£-04 l.15E-04 -1.05£-03 I.35E-04 .55974 
.0000 .0006 .0000 .1114 .0000 .0128 
2.26E-04 l.lOE-04 -1.05£-04 -6.32£-05 -4.37£-04 .55016 
.0005(.0001) .0541(.0455) .1793(.1500) .3258(3198) .0000(.0000) 
2.60E--04 9.86E-05 -3.80£-05 -3.60£-05 -1.93£-04 
.0061 .0327 .4659 .5108 .0000 
1.49£-02 -1.62£-04 -2.21£-04 -I.70E-04 -6.33E-04 -1.31£-05 .76146 
.0000 .0058 .0000 .0021 .0000 .7449 
-I.llE-03 1.S4E-04 -1.42E-04 6.73E-05 -2.60£-04 .85909 
.0000(.0000) .0007(.0003) .0397(.0254) .1729(.1416) .0000(.0000) 
-5.72£-04 8.81E-05 -1.79E-04 3.46£-05 -2.16£-04 
.0000 .0177 .0001 .4305 .0000 
7.82£-03 5.22£-05 7.99E-05 -2.82E-05 -1.02E-04 -1.28£-04 .95205 
.0000 .2895 .0016 .4659 .0013 .0000 
5.90E-03 -6.34E-05 3.63E--04 -4.17E-05 2.78E--04 -4.69E--04 
.0000 .1536 .0001 .7090 .0043 .0000 
6.23£-03 8.55£-06 8.38£-05 1.82£-05 2.41E-04 -3.93£-04 
.0000 .9255 .3261 .8673 .0204 .0000 
.405471)..04 
.167200-04 
.179820-04 
.348550-05 
.107430-04 
.155870-05 
.552370-05 
.407040-06 
Va,(u]- .2646340-05 
Var[e]= .3790160-04 
Var[u]= .3046790-06 
Va,[e]= .1617210-04 
120 
98 
82 
68 
120 
Total 
Obs 
4086 
2870 
1797 
869 
4086 
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Constant ARA ARRA DRRA RRA RRRA AdjustedR s Funds Total 
Obs 
Fund and time effects 1.12E-02 7.21E-05 -3.36E-04 9.35E-05 -6.59E-04 8.98E-05 Vu[u] .1012990-04 
Var(e}= .1974870-04 
Vu[w]= .2198830-04 
.0000 .1002 .0000 .2826 .0000 .1592 
24month 8.48E-03 6.79E-05 l.31E-04 1.51E-04 1.28E-05 -6.08E-04 Vu[u]= .4113030-05 98 2870 
Vu[c]= .1209480-04 
p-value .0000 .1172 .0603 .0755 .8596 .0000 
f?=.829460 8.02E-03 -6.47E-05 l.46E-04 9.58E-05 I.13E-04 -3.83E-04 Vu[u]= .2912730--07 
Vu[e]= .3483950-05 
p-value .0000 .3378 .0040 .1089 .0548 .0000 
Fund and time effects l.32E-02 1.04E-04 4.IIE-04 1.28E-04 -8.78E-04 3.56E-05 Vu[u]= .1269400-04 
Var(e]= .7638340--05 
Vu[w]= .7230610-05 
.0000 .0169 .0000 .0710 .0000 .4974 
36month 9.43E-03 1.86£-05 1.99£-04 -9.06£-05 8.18£-06 4.56E-04 Vu[u]= .3907050-05 82 1797 
Vu[e]= .4077880--05 
p-value .0000 .6810 .0003 .2033 .8902 .0000 
f?=.749076 8.17E-03 1.96E--05 I.32E-04 -3.00E--05 2.0lE-06 -2.29E-04 Vu[u]= .2153610-06 
Vu[c]• .1552070--05 
p-value .0000 .7498 .0028 .5600 .9695 .0000 
Fund and time effects 1.27E--02 3.77E-05 -1.76£-04 -1.07£-04 -5.71E-04 -7.08E-05 Vu[u]= .6950120--05 
Vu[c]= .2162460-05 
Var(w]= .2860340-05 
.0000 .3658 .0001 .0487 .0000 .0733 
48month l.20E-02 -7.03E-04 2.61E-04 -1.0IE-04 1.58E-04 -3.49E-04 Vu[u]= .3443790--05 68 869 
Vu[e]= .8254190-06 
p-value .0000 .0000 .0000 .0924 .0013 .0000 
R=.483062 l.04E--02 -3.82£-04 l.34E-04 -1.47£-04 5.14E--05 -2.28E-04 Vu[u]= .892131D-06 
Vu[e]= .4022710--06 
p-value .0000 .0000 .0002 .0009 .2351 .0000 
Fund and time effects 7.90E--03 -2.17E-04· 2.63E-04 7.34E-05 4.llE--05 -2.70E-04 Vu[u]= .241%20-06 
Varfe]= .2808870-06 
Varfw}= .1062170-07 
.0000 .0000 .0000 .0186 .1634 .0000 
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Constant ARA ARRA DRRA RRA RRRA AdjustedR s Funds Total 
Obs 
Fund and time effects 7.15E-03 1.17E-04 -9.41E-04 2.IOE-04 -I.45E-03 9.91E-04 V,,Cu]= .142138E-04 
V,,Ce]• .230925E-04 
Var(w}= .102117E-04 
p-value .0000 .0993 .0000 .0972 .0000 .0000 
24month -1.0IE-03 4.02E-04 -1.83E-04 4.61E-04 -2.63E-04 -4.44E-04 V,,Cu]• .487628E-05 85 2587 
V,,Ce]• .111186E-04 
p-value .0630 .0000 .0206 .0000 .0005 .0000 
R=,924985 4.9IE-03 -2.93E-05 -4.94E-05 -2.32E-04 -2.92E-04 -1.13E-04 V,,Cu]• .175656E-07 
V,,Ce]= .105766E-05 
p-value .0000 .6503 .1619 .0000 .0000 .0017 
Fund and time effects 7.20E-03 l.51E-04 -7.08E--04 1.75E-04 -I.3IE-03 4.34E-04 Var(u}= .128026E-04 
V,,Ce]• .916642E-05 
Var[w]= .692366E-05 
p-value .0000 .0039 .0000 .0713 .0000 .0000 
36month 9.78E-04 2.37E-04 3.91E-05 -1.79E-04 5.73E-05 -3.54E-04 V,,Cu]• .486422E-05 82 1797 
V,,Ce]• .289410E-05 
p-value .0271 .0000 .4103 .0031 .2569 .0000 
R"".825908 2.31£-03 2.40£-05 -8.66E-05 -1.48E-04 -2.55£-05 -1.02£-04 V,,Cu]• .145348£-06 
Var[e]= .561303E-06 
p-value .0000 .6358 .0012 .0000 .4248 .0002 
Fund and time effects 4.37£-03 1.45E-04 -2.69E-04 -1.97£-04 -4.02£--04 -7.06£-05 Vo,(u]= .790518E-05 
Var[e]= .234275E-05 
Var[w]:> .150762£-05 
p-value .0000 .0008 .0000 .0005 .0000 .0855 
48 month l.39E-04 3.53E-05 8.47E-05 2.42E-05 -1.21E-04 -1.61£-04 V,,Cu]= .369627E-05 67 861 
V,,Cc]• .. 332483E-06 
p-value .7558 .3137 .0019 .5439 .0002 .0000 
R =.607716 3.57£-04 -5.02£-06 -l.77E-05 -I.83E-05 -9.45E-05 -4.73£-06 Vo,(u]= .588045£-06 
V,,Ce]• .139412E-06 
p-valuc .4082 .8992 .4118 .4787 .0003 .8554 
Fund and time effects 4.31E-04 2.16E-05 8.44£-05 -6.53£-07 -1.30£-04 -I.66E-04 Vo,[u]= .573245E-05 
Var[e}= .320581£-06 
Var[w]= .159154£--07 
value .3926 .6098 .0021 .9872 .0001 .0000 
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Table A IV .26 Alpha Four Factor and Quantitative Component Rating Regressions - DSSB Subcategory - All Funds 
Constant ARA ARRA DRRA RRA RRRA AdjustedR2 •' Funds Total 
Obs 
Fixed Effects 12month 7.57E-04 2.04E-04 -2.81E-04 -l.32E-04 2.49E-04 .28516 .25616E-04 85 3116 
p-value .0000(.0000) .0798(.0920) .0659(.0582) .2142(.2282) .0081(.0094) 
R=.882717 I.90E-04 -3.38E-06 -3.16E-04 -4.60E-04 2.54E-05 .38601E-05 
p-value .1477 .9612 .0000 .0000 .7121 
Fund and time effects 4.75E-03 1.07E-04 -4.26E-04 -2.24E-04 -9.62£-04 9.28E-04 .37979 .l75863E-04 
p-value .1689 .0001 .0419 .0000 .0000 
24month 7.27£-04 -2.49E-04 2.02E-04 -2.27E-04 -1.54£-04 .53787 .16457E-04 85 2587 
p-value .0000(.0000) .0012(.0005) .0387(.0293) .0018(.0009) .0023(.0035) 
P.=,924391 4.51E-05 -6.73E-05 -1.98E-04 -3.12E-04 
-5.82E-05 .92582E-06 
p-vaJue .4827 .0446 .0000 .0000 .0891 
Fund and time effects 8.89E-03 -3.90E-05 -6.95E-04 l.OlE-04 -l.21£-03 5.56E-04 .63787 .67623E-05 
p-value .5046 .0000 .2175 .0000 .0000 
36month 7.llE-04 -4.61£-05 1.40£-04 -1.55£-04 -2.58£-04 .759714 .92046E-05 82 1797 
p-value .0000(.0000) .2353(.2151) .0314(.0052) .0089(.0008) .0000(.0000) 
R =.815981 l.68E-04 -8.09E-05 -1.17£-04 -1.04E-05 -7.40£-05 .45064£-06 
p-value .0000 .0001 .0000 .6684 .0004 
Fund and time effects 6.37E-03 -1.21E-05 -2.77£-04 -1.93£-04 -5.30£-04 2.66£-05 .82016 .23842£-05 
p-value .0000 .8390 .0000 .0006 .0000 .5152 
48 month 1.99E-04 4.52£-05 -2.61£-05 -1.17£-04 -1.20£-04 .95600 .65866E-05 67 861 
p-value .0001(.0000) .2054(.1389) .5785(.5150) .0030(.0005) .0004(.0001) 
R=.610611 6.35£-05 -6.05£-05 -3.77£-05 -8.97£-05 6.39£-06 .16086£-06 
p-value .1925 .0097 .1772 .0014 .8201 
Fund and time effects 1.15£-03 9.22£-05 5.StE-05 -5.51£-05 -1.09£-04 -1.28£.-04 .95740 .36551£-06 
p-value .0210 .1011 .0646 .2154 .0030 .0003 
Random Effects 12month -5.29E-03 5.IOE-04 3.65£-04 -1.93E-04 -4.19£-05 l.50E-04 Vm[u]= .628590E-05 85 3116 
Vm[e]" .193302E-04 
p-value .0000 .0000 .0001 .0790 .6403 .0940 
P.=,882717 3.79E-03 2.33E-05 6.24E-05 -2.62£-04 -3.95E-04 5.68E-05 Vm[u]= .692893£-07 
Vm[e]= .385262£-05 
p-value .0046 .8485 .3526 .0006 .0000 .4041 
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Table A IV.27 Sharpe Ratio and Quantitative Component Rating Regressions-DSSB Subcategory- All Funds 
Constant ARA ARRA DRRA RRA RRRA AdjustedR2 ; Fund, Total 
Ob, 
Fixed Effects 12month 6.18E-04 -2.25E-03 -5.33E-03 l.69E-03 -2.19E-02 0.12295 .33117E-01 120 4086 
p-value .8656 .3899 .1006 .5790 .0000 
R=.707008 -8.99E-03 8.07E-03 6.llE-04 l.llE-02 -2.36E-02 .13346E--Ol 
p-value .0000(.0000) .0082(.0055) .8761(.8775) .0006(.0000) .0000(.0000) 
Fund and time effects 0.292626 -l.75E-03 -1.12E-02 7.75E-03 -2.08E-02 -3.48E--04 0.58732 .14370E--OI 
p-valuc .0000 .3368 .0000 .OOH .0000 .8414 
24month 2.61E-03 2.64E--03 2.88E--03 9.79E--03 -2.40E-02 0.3629 .1197IE--Ol 98 2870 
p-valuc .1302(.0799) .2162(.1770) .2646(.2360) .0000(.0000) .0000(.0000) 
a=.745346 -5.92E-03 -1.77£-03 -3.92E-04 5.9IE--03 -1.30E-02 .33250E-02 
p-value .0263 .3078 .8395 .0017 .0000 
Fund and time effects 0.322881 -4.07E--03 -9.78E-03 3.34E--03 -1.93E--02 -t.84E-03 0.66291 .46273E--02 
p-value .0000 .0049 .0000 .0547 .0000 .1602 
36month 1.74£--03 3.85E-03 -3.0SE--03 3.47E--03 -l.58E--02 0.62248 .62871E-02 82 1797 
p-value .3301(.2490) .0063( .. 058) .1262(.0938) .0270(.0240) .0000(.0000) 
R=.522795 I.09E-02 -1.29E-04 -3.73E--03 1.34£--03 -9.43£--03 .16114E-02 
p-value .0000 .9315 .0313 .4288 .0000 
Fund and time effects 0.279493 -1.0IE--03 -5.82£--03 -3.13£--03 -1.16£-02 -3.79£--03 0.82006 .15959£--02 
p-value .0000 .4659 .0000 .0162 .0000 .0001 
48 month -3.24£--02 2.36E-03 -1.40E--03 7.06£-04 -6.50E--03 0.86306 .36054£-02 68 869 
p-value .0000 .0644(.0341) .4252(.4079) .6275(.5640) .0000(.0000) 
R=.548712 -l.llE--02 -1.85£--03 2.77£-04 -2.99£--03 -8.54£--04 .25284£--03 
p-value .0000 .0450 .8032 .0063 .4396 
Fund and time effects 0.151607 8.15£--04 9.21£-04 -9.03£-04 -3.79£--03 -3.99£--03 0.9597 .21620E--03 
p-value .0000 .5166 .1540 .3594 .0000 .0000 
Random Effects 12month 0.130921 -4.45£-03 8.03E-03 l.24E--03 1.24£--02 -2.09£-02 Var[u]= .264634£--05 120 4086 
VlU[e]= .379016£-04 
p-value .0000 ,0009 .0022 .6982 .0000 .0000 
a=.101008 0.155168 8.20E--04 2.32E--03 -1.07E--03 5.26£--03 -1.79£--02 VlU[u]"' .304679£--06 
VlU[e]= .161721E-04 
p-value .0000 .7012 .3313 .7275 .0710 .0000 
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Constant ARA ·ARRA DRRA RRA RRRA AdjustedR 
' 
Funds Total 
Ob, 
Fund and time effects 0.228999 1.IIE-03 -8.63£-03 7.IOE-03 -I.75E-02 -1.06£-03 Var[u]= .940852£-02 
Var[eJ== .141627£-0I 
Var[w]= .187628£.Pl 
p-value .0000 .3565 .0001 .0024 .0000 .5367 
24month 0.147239 -2.46£-04 5.24£-03 2.79£-03 1.07£-02 -2.32£-02 Var[uJ== .411303£-05 98 2870 
Va,[e]= .120948£-04 
p-value .0000 . 8336 .0047 .2155 .0000 .0000 . 
n=.745346 0.179146 -2.25£-03 -1.94£-04 -l.04E-05 6.86£-03 -1.28£-02 Var[u]= .291273£-07 
Va,[e]= .348395£-05 
p-value .0000 .2149 .9036 .9956 .0002 .0000 
Fund and time effects 0.246994 2.18E-03_ -7.78£-03 3.15£-03 -l.56£-02 -3.62£-03 Va,[u]= .829864£-02 
Varfe]= .444239£-02 
Va,[w]= .564811£-02 
p-va1ue .0000 .0391 .0000 .0667 .0000 .0042 
36 month 0.184015 -1.23E-03 5.54E-03 -2.79E-03 4.54£-03 -l.58E-02 Var[u]= .390'705£-05 82 1797 
Var[e]= .407788£-05 
p-value .0000 3018 .0001 .1182 .0022 .0000 
11=.522795 0.159488 2.34E-03 2.20£-03 -3.04E-03 3.77£-03 -I.04£-02 Va,[u]= .215361£-06 
Va,[e]= .155207£-05 
p-value .0000 .1298 
-
.1214 .0756 _ .0199 .0000 
Fund and time effects 0.148382 -329£-03 9.87£-03 -1.97£-03 6.21£-03 -1.54£-02 Var[u]= .149432£-03 
Varfe]= .120379£-02 
. 
Var[w]= .166096£-06 
p-value .0000 .0000 .0000 .0748 .0000 .0000 
48month 0.255487 -2.06£-02 5.36£-03 -6.34£~04 3.42E-03 -9.06£-03 Var[u]:. _.344379£-05 _ 68 869 
Va,[e]= .825419£-06 
p-value .0000 .0000 .0000 .7013 .0116 .0000 
J?=.548712 0.178186 -7.66E-03 .•. -9.72£-04 7.34£-04 -2.80E-03 -l.18E-Ol Va,(u]= .892131E-06 
Var[e]= . .402271£-06 
_ p-value .0000 - .0000 .2808 .. 5002 -.0098 .2755 
. 
Fund arid time effects 0.141498 -5.29£-03 5.25£-03 2.45£-03 -2.16£-04 -6.52£-03 Var[uJ= .201328£--03 
. 
Var[e]= .182329£-03 
Var[w]= .961429£-05-
value .0000 .0000 .0000 .0029 .7772 .0000 
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Table A IV.28 QT Components and 60-Month Performance· AU Measures DSSB Subcategory· All Funds 
Constant . AR ARR DRR RR RRR Adjusted R· Total 
Observations 
Raw Returns 5404E-02 -.5610E-04 .4727E-03 .2933E-03 .1864E-03 -.5560E-03 .28228 .65 
p-value .0000 .2689 .0304 .1947 .5196 .0186 
A1pba-one factor -.3407£-02 -.7732E-04 .553IE-03 .4068E-03 .7244E-04 -.5224E-03 .33810 65 
p-value .0016 .1946 .0391 .1316 .8348 .0606 
Alpha-four factor -.2286E-03 -.2I07E-03 .1933E-03 .7282E-03 -.2348E-03 -.4113E-03 .29958 65 
p-value .8518 .0061 .8589 .0499 .5322 .2096 
Sharpe Ratio .2964E-Ol -.8128E-03 .1812E-01 .5520E-02 .l093E-O! -.1895E-01 .24347 65 
p-value .3504 .6089 .0155 .4676 .2331 .0097 
Table A IV .29 Model tests -QT Component Ratings and A1.J. Performance Measures - DSSB AU Funds 
Dependent F-test p-value F-test FEM (group and time p-value LM-lest p-value Hausman p-value 
FEM vs POLS effects vs FEM group REM vs POLS FEM vs REM 
effecls) 
Raw Returns 
12month 3.394 .0000 26.572 .0000 181.83 .0000 62.47 .0000 
24month 11.041 .0000 24.971 .0000 2407.80 .0000 46.15 .0000 
36month 22.185 .0000 46.484 .0000 4067.41 .0000 39.48 .0000 
48month 54.740 .0000 154.159 .0000 2678.90 .0000 115.99 .0000 
Alpha-one factor 
12month 6.568 .0000 9.170 .0000 563.ll .0000 48.65 .0000 
24month 14.476 .0000 16.882 .0000 264320 .0000 85.35 .0000 
36month 38.163 .0000 40.048 .0000 6877.84 .0000 6429 .0000 
48month 145.018 .0000 126.175 .0000 3806.57 .0000 38.61 .0000 
Alpha-four factor 
!2month 13.032 .0000 13.317 .0000 2440.28 .0000 75.82 .0000 
24month 32.566 .0000 34.843 .0000 8442.05 .0000 83.46 .0000 
36month 61.525 .0000 65.484 .0000 8965.63 .0000 86.89 .0000 
48month 214.211 .0000 185.666 .0000 4141.53 .0000 41.49 .0000 
Sharpe Ratio 
12month 4.437 .0000 33.497 .0000 300.77 .0000 70.84 .0000 
24month 12.763 .0000 36.107 .0000 3142.55 .0000 30.90 .0000 
36month 29.516 .0000 65.260 .0000 5355.18 .0000 29.29 .0000 
48monUt 60.229 .0000 195.410 .0000 273633 .0000 132.62 .0000 
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Table A IV.30 Alpha Four Factor and Quantitative Component Rating Regressions- DSSB Subcategory- Excluding Finalised Funds 
Constant AR ARR DRR RR RRR AdjustedR s Funds Total 
Obs 
Fixed Effects 12 month 6.0lE-04 l.90E-04 3.37E-04 -3.77E-04 -2.30E-05 .27646 .16517E-04 76 2756 
p-value .0000(.0000) .0597(.0554) .0157(.0057) .0002(.0000) .7800(.7864) 
R=.856611 2.08E-04 -3.95E-05 -2.IOE-04 -3.77E-04 3.31E-05 .29791£-05 
p-vaiue .0641 .5462 .0043 .0000 .6025 
Fund and time effects 4.17E-03 -5.34E-05 -l.77E-04 3.17E-04 -8.17E-04 l.94E-04 .37812 .II Il6E-04 
p-vaiue .0000 .4133 .0686 .0015 .0000 .0617 
24month 5.37E-04 -1.54E-04 4.21E-04 -t.45E-04 -3.22E-04 .52091 .96453E-05 76 2275 
p-value .0000(.0000) .0328(.0174) .0000(.0000) .0117(.0059) .0000(.0000) 
R=.890820 I.13E-04 -7.21E-05 -1.56E-04 -2.97E-04 -3.96E-05 .77663E-06 
p-value .0531 .0285 .0000 .0000 .2316 
Fund and time effects 6.0SE-03 -7.23E-05 -3.40E-04 4.57E-04 -7.00E-04 -2.24E-04 .61521 .42519E-05 
p-vaiue .0000 .1497 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0010 
36 month 4.88E-04 -9.63E-06 7.73E-05 -3.76E-05 -2.88E-04 .76171 .63173£-05 73 1577 
p-value .0000(.0000) .8025(.7973) .1889(.0932) .4439(.3370) .0000(.0000) 
P.=-772353 2.51E-04 -5.93E-05 -L13E-04 -I.93E-05 -8.92E-05 .40176£-06 
p-value .0000 .0151 .0000 .5033 .0003 
Fund and time effects 4.68E-03 3.09E-05 -2.03E-04 3.70E-05 -4.40E-04 -7.26£-05 .80755 .14580£-05 
p-value .0000 .5367 .0000 .4384 .0000 .0379 
48month 2.39E-04 5.69E-05 l.84E-06 -7.l lE-05 -1.27E-04 .93147 .44441E-05 59 757 
p-value .0000(.0000) .0805(.0556) .9658(.9608) .0319(.0214) .0002(.0000) 
P. =.577585 9.91E-05 -6.15£-05 -3.39E-05 -9.51E-05 5.39£-06 .16I03E-06 
p-value .0436 .0114 .2422 .0011 .8531 
Fund and time effects l.04E-03 1.14E-04 6.40E-05 -1.94E-05 -636£-05 -137£-04 .93460 
p-value .0337 .0444 .0316 .6649 .0821 .0001 
Random Effects 12month -4.SOE- 4.57E-04 1.62£-04 3.74E-04 -2.79£-04 -4.85£-05 VIU[u]- .411699E-05 76 2756 
03 VIU[e]- .12400IE-04 
p-vaJue .0000 .0000 .0664 .0002 .0004 .5331 
R=.856611 3.71E-03 4.67£-05 -2.99£-05 -I.75E-04 -3.09£-04 5.55E-05 VIU[u]'" .502706£-07 
VIU[e]- .297438E-05 
value .0009 - .6448 .6381 .0149 .0000 .3773 
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Table A IV.31 Raw Returns and Product Star Rating Dummy Variable Regressions- DSSB Subcategory- All Fun~ 
p, p, p, p, Constant Adjustcd.R s Funds Total 
Observations 
Fixed Effects 12month 6.629E--03 7.898£--03 4.549E--04 2.190E--03 0.18643 .32745E--04 48 855 
p-value .0000(.0000) .0000(.0000) .7257(.6751) .0002(.0000) 
A =.18643 2.878E-03 2.419£-03 -1.054£-03 -3.937£--04 .12786£-04 
p-value .0305 .0421 .2127 .3884 
Fund and time effects 8.503E·03 7.564£-03 6.275£-04 7.172£-04 5.003£..()3 .68566 .12052E--04 
p-valuc .0000 .0000 .2744 .0445 .0000 
24month -2.981£-02 6.930E-03 3.276£-03 3.202£-03 0.57741 .15415£-04 22 308 
p-value .0000(.0000) .0000(.0000) .0000(.0000) ,0000(.0000) 
P.=.57741 -4.179£-03 7.528£-04 -3.079£-04 2.581£-04 .38086£..()5 
p-value .0000 .6070 .6990 .6704 
36month 4.766£--03 1.596£-03 3.701£-04 0.62098 .56261£--05 14 73 
p-value .0012 .1401 .5318 
P. =.400785 2.168E--03 4.927£-04 -5.876£--04 .14257£--05 
p-value .1474 .6331 .2844 
Random Effects 12month 3.783E-03 5.900£-03 -9.293£-04 l.783£..()3 5.236£-03 Var(u}= .453548£--05 48 . 855 Va<[e]= .282102£--04 
p-value .0001 .0000 .2305 .0002 .0000 
P. =.18643 2.387£-03 2.456E--03 -1.057£--03 -3.620E-04 4.952£-03 Va<[u]= .566465£--06 
Va<[e]= .119592£-04 
p-value .0379 .0181 .1694 .3987 .0000 
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p, p, p, p, Conslml:t AdjustedR s- Funds Total 
Observations 
Fund and time effects 7.310£-03 6.579E..Q3 6.062E--05 1.035E-03 6.I91E--03 Var[u]- .128078E-04 
Var[eJ:= .108995£-04 
Var[w]"' .230581£--04 
p-value .0000 .0000 .9134 .0028 .0000 
24month· 4.716E--03 6.329£-03 2.798£-03 2.970£--03 4.019£-03 Vm-[u]- .865080£-05 22 308 
Vm-[e]- .676441£-05 
p-value .0430 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 
P. =.57741 t 5.139£-03 2.094£-04 -7.128£--04 -3.749£-05 5.952£-03 Vm-[u]- .538683E-06 
Vm-[e]: .380428£-05 
p-value .0312 .8800 .3194 .9464 .0000 
36month 4.287£-03 1.448£-03 4.829£-04 6.222£--03 Vm-[u]: .349319£-05 14 73 
Vm-[e]- .213300£-05 
p-value .0008 .1015 .3832 .0000 
P. =.400785 1.463£-03 3.988£--04 -7.052£--04 7.656£--03 Vm-[u]- .950817£-06 
Vm-[e]- .141518£-05 
p-value .2661 .6453 .1805 .0000 
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Table A IV .32 One Factor Alpha and Product Star Rating Dummy Variable Regressions - DSSB Subcategory- All Funds 
p, p, p, p, Constant AdjustedR s Funds Total 
Observations 
Fixed Effects 12month I.278E-02 7.685E-03 9.672E-04 l.344E--03 .44358 .27392E-04 42 762 
p-value .0000(.0000) .0000(.0000) .3169(.2741) .0029(.0005) 
P. =.828869 7.927E--03 4.124E-03 7.878E-04 1.740E--04 .55936E-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 .1781 .5923 
Fund and time effects l.410E-02 7.179£-03 2.307E-03 l.678E-03 -2.187E-03 .67119 .12279E--04 
p-value .0000 .0000 .0001 .0000 .0000 
24month -9.713E-03 4.587E--03 3.366E-03 2.898E-03 0.82148 .16737E-04 21 298 
p-value .0000(.0000) .0000(.0000) .0000(.0000) .0000(.0000) 
P. =.71788 l.538E--02 2.260E-03 9.264E-04 5.797E-04 .31579E--05 
p-v,Jue .0000 .0095 .0574 .1330 
36month 6.393E-03 3.506E-03 2.311E-03 .82800 .80548E-05 14 73 
p-value .0000 .0004 .0000 
A =.364591 4.625£--03 1.945£--03 I.453E--03 .43146£--06 
p-v,Jue .0000 .0010 .0000 
Random Effects 12 month l.172E-02 6.657E--03 2.498E-05 1.108£-03 -8.330E-04 Va,[u]- .101268E--04 42 762 
Va,(e]- .172659E--04 
p-value .0000 .0000 .9702 .0085 .1442 
P. =.828869 6.188£--03 3.179£-03 2.555£--04 4.339E--05 .-9.988E--04 Var[u]= .106340E--06 
Va,[e]- .557781E-05 
p-value .0000 .0001 .6446 .8907 .1221 
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p, p, p, p, Constant AdjustedR s Funds Total 
Observations 
Fund and time effects l.195E-02 5.904E-03 l.365E-03 l.889E-03 -l.198E-03 Var[u]- .146196E-04 
Var[e]= .102032E-04 
Var[w]= .827800£.-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 .0148 .0000 .1818 
24 month 5.904E-03 4360E-03 3.169E-03 2.81 IE-03 -3.501£-03 V,u(u]aa .135819£-04 21 298 
V,u(e]- .315570£-05 
p-value .0348 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0001 
P.=.71788 4.253E-03 2.0t7E--03 7.280E-04 4.540E-04 -1.895£-03 Var[uJ= .911796E-06 
V,u(e]- .126607£..05 
p-va1ue .1356 .0184 .1247 2283 .0278 
36month 6.187E-03 3.435£-03 2.401£-03 -3.646E-03 V,u(u]- .637400£-05 14 73 
Var[e]""" .168086£-05 
p-va1ue .0000 .0001 .0000 .0000 
A =.364591 4.437£-03 1.886£-03 1.419£-03 -3.646E-03 Var[u]= .182714£-05 
V,ufe]- .430864£-06 
p-value .0005 .0000 .0001 .0005 
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Table A IV.33 Four Factor Alpha and Product Star Rating Dummy Variable Regressions -DSSB Subcategory-All Funds 
p, p, p, p, Constant AdjustedR s Funds Total 
Obsenrations 
Fixed Effects 12month I.195E-02 6.I03E-03 6.530E-04 -I.856E-04 0.55627 .28820E-04 42 762 
p-value .0000(.0000) .0000(.0000) .4650(.4335) .6014(.5786) 
A =.816736 7.161£-03 3.578E-03 9.569E-04 -2.296£-05 .46189£-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 .0729 .9383 
Fund and time effects l.288E-02 5.433E-03 I.683E-03 3.407£-04 -4.08IE-04 .66749 
p-va1ue .0000 .0000 .0038 .3653 .1053 
24month -l.380E-03 3.556E-03 2.331£-03 l.720E-03 0.88556 .22696£-04 21 298 
p-value .3864(.2970) .0000(.0000) .0001(.0000) .0000(.0000) 
A =.649471 -3.164E-Ol 8.SISE-04 3.413E-04 l.127E-04 .ll623E-05 
p-value .0000 .2997 .4591 .7557 
36month 4.884E-03 3.744E-03 2.369E-03 .87817 14 73 
p-value .0000(.0000) .0000(.0000) .0001(.0000) .73353E-05 
A"".321584 3.446E-03 2.553E-03 1.759E-03 
p-value .0002 .0001 .0000 
Random Effects 12 month I.132E-02 5.401E-03 l.215E-04 -2.766E-04 6.l03E-04 Var[u]= .150440E-04 42 762 
Var!•F .l37760E-04 
p-value .0000 .0000 .8421 .4676 .3505 
A =.816736 5.87IE-03 2.845E-03 5.577E-04 -l.17IE-04 3.216E-04 Var(u]= .342110E-06 
Var(c]= .460999£-05 
p-value .0000 .0003 .2792 .6873 .6508 
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p, p, p, p, Constant AdjustedR s Funds Total 
Observations 
Fuii'Jiind time effects l.156E-02 4.634E-03 9.386E-04 3.435£-04 -2.864£-04 Va.[u]- .176686E-04 
Var(e]= .l03232E-04 
Var(w]= .477949£-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 .0959 .3454 .7386 
24month 1.677£-03 3.462£-03 2.243£-03 1.681£-03 -1.065£-03 Var(u]= .200857£-04 21 298 
Vat{e]: .261125£-05 
p-value .6189 .0000 .0000 .0000 .3109 
P. =.649471 1.884£-04 7.242£-04 2.209£-04 3.491£-05 2.572£-04 Vat{u]: .198357£-05 
Vat{e]: .116207£--05 
p-value .9525 .3735 .6261 .9221 .7920 
36month S.027E-03 3.973E-03 2.611E-03 -2.329E-03 Vat{u]- .S90814E-OS 14 73 
Vat{e]: .142723£-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 .0000 .0019 
A <=.321584 3.441£-03 2.623£-03 I.789£-03 -I.122£-03 Var[uJ= .232971£-05 
Vat{e]: .523826£-06 
p-value .0000 .0000 .0000 .0949 
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Table A IV.34 Sharpe Ratio and Product Star Rating Dummy Variable Regressions- DSSB Subcategory- All Funds 
P, . p, p, p, Constant AdjustedR s Funds Total 
Observations 
Fixed Effects 12month 2.380£-01 2.907E-Ol 9.282E-02 1.243£-01 0.24521 .33183E-Ol 48 SSS 
p-value .0000(.0000) .0000(.0000) .0034(.0017) .0000(.0000) 
R=,672594 l.639E-Ol l.527E-Ol 4.!S9E-02 4.376£-02 .13353£-01 
p-value .0001 .0001 .1261 .0032 
Fund and time effects 2.806E-Ol 2.739E-Ol 7.454£-02 5.993E-02 3.97SE-02 .68606 .12465£-01 
p-value .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 
24month1 -8.668£-01 2.855E-Ol l.467E-01 1.249£-01 0.59909 .17178E-01 22 308 
p-value .0000(.0000) .0000(.0000) .0000(.0000) .0000(.0000) 
36month 2.125E-01 9.379£-02 5.124E-02 0.70026 .58480£-02 14 59 
p-valuc .0000(.0000) .0004(.0002) .0013(.0009) 
A =.200648 l.991E-Ol 7.586£-02 5.31 lE-02 .14537£-02 
p-value .0000 .0217 .0026 
Random Effects 12month l.542E-OI 2.295E-Ol 4.415£-02 l.075E-Ol 3.91SE-02 Va,(u]= .647694£-02 48 SSS 
Va,[e]= .267061£-01 
p-value .0000 .0000 .0721 .0000 .0131 
- A=,672594 l.085E-01 l.209E-Ol l.636£-02 3.574E-02 3.843£-02 Va,(u]= .769712E-04 
Va,[e]= .133184£;.()1 
p-value .0020 .0001 .4978 .0108 .0155 
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p, p, p, p, Constant AdjustedR.2 s' Funds Total 
Observations 
Fund and time effects 2.424E-OI 2.388E--Ol S.516E-02 7.264E-02 8.022E--02 Vm[u] .1569I5E-OI 
Var[e]"" .11 l077E-OI 
Vm[w]0 .169105E--Ol 
.0000 .0000 .0020 .0000 .0163 
24month l.759E-Ot 2.620E--01 I.284E-Ol l.163E-OI 2.022£--03 Vm[u]0 .999677E-02 22 308 
Vm[e]a .71817lE--02 
p-value .0256 .0000 .0000 .0000 .9350 
P. =.683887 1.759E--01 2.620£--01 I.284E--Ol l.163E-Ol 2.022E-03 Vm[u]0 .999677£--02 
Vm[e]a .71817IE--02 
p-va1ue .0256 .0000 .0000 .0000 .9350 
36month l.9IOE--Ol 8.0I?E--02 5.248£-02 3.758£--02 Vm[u]0 .395027£--02 14 59 
Vm[e]a .189779E--02 
p-value .0000 .0032 .0017 .0788 
A =.200648 I.744E-Ol 6.279E--02 4.935E-02 5.S68E--02 Vm[u]a .266919£--02 
Vac[eJ= .I44227E--02 
p-value .0000 .0259 .0028 .0139 
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Table A IV .35 Performance and Product Star Rating Dummy Variable Regressions -DSSB All Funds-Rating change month only 
p, p, p, p, Constant AdjustedR s Funds Total 
Observations 
RawRetums 
POLS 12 month ·2.212E-03 t.809E.04 -3.771E-03 6.922E-04 8.009E-03 .05163 .280237E-04 162 
p-value .0901 .9027 .0161 .4414 .0000 
Fund and time effects 9.0I6E-03 5.663E-03 9.133E-04 l.589E.03 5.764E-03 .68257 .231072E-04 42 156 
p-value .0004 .0024 .5874 .1890 .0000 
POLS 24month 4.213E-03 4.859E-04 1.459E-03 4.799E-03 -.00290 .154961E-04 63 
p--value .0065 .7648 .2801 .0002 
36month -1.016£-04 ·1.349£.()6 8.764£-04 4.608£-03 -.04495 .211372£-04 59 
p--value .9663 .9994 .5824 .0009 
Alpha On~Factor 
Fixed Effects 12 month 9.834E.03 2.073E-03 -2.046E-03 -6.572E-05 .33805 .243107E-04 35 134 
p-value .0000(.0010) .2660(.2651) .1771(.1855) .8981(.9191) 
R-.371317 1.134£-02 3.967E-03 -1.099E-03 2.995£-04 .244808E-04 
p-value .0002 .1030 .5516 .7864 
Fund and time effects 8.359E-03 1.144£-03 -2.235£.()3 2.520£-05 l.402E-05 .59672 .223570E-04 
p--value .0124 .6123 .3051 .9880 .9913 
POLS 24month 2.124E-03 8.697E-04 1.545E-03 -3.274E-03 -.03459 .218104£-04 59 
.1695 .6653 .3619 .0344 
POLS . 36month -1.560E-03 ·8.139£-04 -2.513£-03 -5.938E-04 -.00970 .210346E-04 59 
p--value .1250 .7340 .1581 .6485 
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p, p, p, p, Constant AdjustedR s Funds Total 
Observations 
Alpha Four-Factor 
Fixed Effects 12month I.037E.02 2.250E-03 -2237E-03 -4,6G7E-04 .47737 .326837E-04 35 134 
p-value .0000(.0005) .2370(.2166) .1383(.1467) .3669(.4676) 
R=.386750 l.226E-02 4.SOOE-03 8.192E-06 -5.295£-05 .226832£-04 
p-value .0000 .0367 .9962 .9583 
Fund &lld time effects 8.700E-03 4.527E-04 -3.050E-03 1.870E-04 4.803E-04 .281198£-04 
p-value .0143 .8503 .1886 .9161 .7248 
24month 4.186E-03 1.757£-03 1.875E-03 -2.613E--03 .316717£-04 59 
p-value .0291 .4580 .3414 .1340 
36month -I.31SE-03 1.00SE..03 -1.343E-03 -2.756E-05 .29444 lE-04 59 
p-value .3201 .6353 .5213 .9867 
Sharpe Ratio 
Random Effects 12month 4.574£-02 6.892£-02 -2.203E-02 9.112E-02 1.232E-Ol Vu[u]- .553662£-02 42 156 
Vu[e]- .274808£-01 
p-valuc .4829 .2292 .6438 .0046 .0000 
A;=.105606 1.299£-01 3.985E-02 -6.319£-02 5.737E-02 l.277E-Ol Vu[u]- .966605£-02 
Vu[e]- .207840£-01 
p-value .0710 .4852 .2075 .0733 .0000 
Fund and time effects 2.872E-01 1.520£-01 1.938£-02 3.691£-02 l.158E--01 Vu[u]= .134953E-02 
Var[e]= .113681E-01 
Var[w]= .110254E-Ol 
p-value .0016 .0157 ,7345 .3682 .0004 
POLS 24month 1.513£.-01 4.300E-02 4.371£-02 5.030£-02 -.00389 .t69114E-Ol 46 
p-value .0054 .4199 .3329 .2130 
POLS 36month 2.544£-02 1.202£-02 2.099£-03 3.679£-02 -.03120 .17712SE-Ol 46 
p-value .7976 .8181 .9665 .3658 
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Table A IV .36 Model Tests - Star Rating Dummy Variable Regressions and All Performance Measure;.- DSSB Subcategory- All Funds 
Dependent F-test p-vaiue F-test FEM (grollp and time p-val= LM-test p.value Hausman p.value 
FEM vs POLS effects vs FEM group REM vs POLS FEM vs REM 
effects 
Raw Returns 
12rnonth 3.908 .0000 22.553 .0000 105.57 .0000 21.67 .0002 
24month 19.452 .0000 ,0000 508.71 .0000 8.15 .0863 
36month 9.692 .0000 45.59 4.61 .2030 
Alpha-one factor 
12month 11.829 .0000 18.457 .0000 747.11 .0000 31.21 .0000 
24month 10.794 .0000 .0000 974.30 .0000 7.55 .1095 
36month 21.127 .0000 .0000 59.75 .0000 3.25 .3551 
Alpha-four factor 
12month 21.163 .0000 19.567 .0000 1752.01 .0000 28.06 .0000 
24month 113.688 .0000 .0000 1303.54 .0000 3.56 .4694 
36month 22.972 .0000 .0000 50.73 .0000 7.30 .0628 
Sharpe Ratio 
12month 5.386 .0000 22.371 .0000 179.93 .0000 28.56 .0000 
24month 21.084 -.0000 .0000 446.64 .0000 11.71 .0196 
36month 12.048 .0000 .0000 53.66 .0000 -5.09 .1656 
Table A IV.37 Model tests -Star Ratings and An Performance Measures -DSSB Subcategory- All Funds-Rating Change Month Only 
Dependent F-test p-value F-test FEM (group and time p-value LM-test p-value Hausman p-value 
FEM vs POLS effects vs· FEM group REM vs POLS FEM vs REM 
effects 
Raw Returns 
12month 1.297 .1445 5.145 .0000 1.61 .2038 6.29 .1788 
Alpha-one factor 
12month 2.168 .0018 3.296 .0000 35.36 .0000 14.75. .0052 
Alpha-four factor 
12month 3.734 .0000 3.801 .0000 98.03 .0000 12.51 .0139 
Sharpe Ratio 
12month 1.742 .0120 4.98 .0000 6.39 .0114 6.33 .1757 
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Table A IV .38 Four Factor Alpha and Product Star Rating Dummy Variable Regressions - DSSB - Excluding Finalised Funds 
p, P, P, p, Constant Adjusted R· s- Funds Total 
ObScrValions 
Fixed Effects 12month l.28E·02 8.50E-03 2.64E·03 2.71E·04 .52461 .2083035E.04 39 678 
irvalue .0000(.0000) .0000(.0000) .. 0019(.0014) .3794(.3619) 
P.=.781193 6.16E-03 4.23E·03 l.25E·03 ·3.82E·05 .3632452£.05 
p·value .0000 .0000 .0259 .8874 
Fund and time effects l.34E·02 7.50E·03 2.70E·03 6.93E·04 2.l2E·04 .8568945E·05 
.0000 .0000 .0000 .0437 .3321 
·24month 4.85E·03 3.68E·03 l.99E·03 .87037 .1382465£.04 18 246 
irvalue .0000(.lXlOO) .0000(.0000) .0000(.0000) 
o~ 2.01£·03 l.30E·03 6.55E·04 .8831870E·06 
p--value .0000 .0000 .0000 
36 month 4.48E·03 3.34E·03 l.97E·03 .80310 .3334601E·05 11 57 
irvalue .0000(.0000) .0001(.0000) .0001(.0000) 
P. =.347306 3.40£.03 2.53E·03 1.80E·03 0.529619£.06 
irvalue .0004. .0003 .0000 
Random Effects 12month l.21E·02 7.58E-03 2.l7E·03 l.78IE-04 8.l lE-04 Var[u]= .120094£.04 39 678 
Var{e]= .793866£.05 
p--value .0000 .0000 .0000 .5941 .1539 
P. = 5.13E·03 3.62E·03 9.64E·04 ·6.73E·05 I.03E.03 Var[u]= .337751 E-06 
Ya,[e]~ .362754E·05 
p·value .0000 .0000 .0754 .7995 .0723 
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p, p, p, p, .Constant Adjusted R· s Funds Total 
Observations 
Fund and time effects l.29£-02 7.07£-03 2.46E-03 6.72£-04 7.86£-05 Va,(u]- -.120094£-04 
Va,(eJ- .793866£-05 
Var[w]= .320005£-05 
p-vahie .0000 .0000 .0000 .0402 .9145 
24month 4.74E-03 3.6IOE-03 1.94£-03 7.73£-06 Va,(u]- .120010£-04 18 246 
Va,(e]- .182367£-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 .0000 .9926 _ 
P.= 1.94£-03 1.26£-03 6.13£-04 9.68£--04 Var{u]= .218436£.-05 
Va,(eJ- .883099£-06 
p-value .0059 .0040 .0489 .2043 
36month 4.36£-03 - 3.43£-03 2.16E":'03 -8.37£-04 Va,(uJ- .231514£-05 II 51 
Vru[eJ- .101946£-05 
p-value .0000 .0000 .0000 .1535 
P. = 3.05£-03 2.45£-03 1.73£-03 -3.27£-05 Var{u]= .767332£-06 
Va,(e]- .526435£-06 
p-value ,0003. .0001 .0000 .9518 
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APPENDIXV 
MORNINGSTAR FUND CATEGORY BREAKDOWN 
This appendix provides a breakdown cir the second tier of classification used by 
Morningstar of its funds as at May 2002. The breakdown excludes finalised funds. 
Suppressed funds are those that were created in error by Morningstar or funds which 
"has outstandirig issues with data" (Morningstar, 2002a, n.d.). 
Fund Status ~~~~~~~--~~-~~~---c~~ ==c.~~~=--c-;--::-~-,--
Closed Open Suppressed Total Percent 
Super'n Funds Multisector 
Pensions Multisector 
Super'n Funds Aust Equity 
Super'n Funds International Equity 
Australian Equity Trusts 
Multisector Trusts 
Pensions Aust Equity 
Int'! Equity Trusts 
Wholesale NTP Australian Equity 
Wholesale NTP International Equity 
Insurance Bonds Multisector 
Super'n Funds Fixed Interest 
Wholesale NTP Multisector 
Super'n Funds Cash 
Pensions International Equity 
Wholesale PST Multisector 
Super'n Funds Reserve Backed 
Pensions Fixed Interest 
Super'n Funds Int'l & Aust Equity 
Wholesale NTP Aust Fixed Interest 
Pensions Cash 
Cash Funds 
Not Identified 
Wholesale PST Australian Eqliity 
Insurance Bonds Australian Equity 
Fixed Interest Trusts 
Insurance Bonds Reserve Backed 
Pensions lnt'l & Aust Equity 
Insurance Bonds Cash 
Wholesale NTP Cash 
Insurance Bonds Fixed Interest 
Friendly Society Bond., Fixed Interest 
Wholesale PST International Equity 
Misc Foreign Funds 
Wholesale NTP International Fixed 
Interest 
452 375 827 15.9 
141 259 400 7.7 
114 279 393 7.6 
60 185 245 4.7 
34 200 234 4.5 
22 193 215 4.1 
21 187 208 4.0 
18 182 200 3.8 
12 187 199 3.8 
3 178 181 3.5 
147 27 174 3.3 
R % IM 33 
IO 159 169 3.3 
105 55 160 3.1 
12 120 132 2.5 
21 81 102 2.0 
90 9 99 1.9 
23 51 74 1.4 
26 43 69 1.3 
4 59 63 1.2 
22 40 62 . 1.2 
3 48 51 1.0 
9 14 26 49 0.9 
5 43 48 0.9 
37 10 47 0.9 
11 30 41 0.8 
38 3 41 0.8 
4 29 33 0.6 
26 6 32 0.6 
I 31 32 0.6 
26 5 31 0.6 
16 13 29 0.6 
4 ~ W U 
28 28 0.5 
26 27 0.5 
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Immediate Annuities 8 18 26 0.5 
Master Funds Discretionary 3 22 25 0.5 
International & Australian Equity 1. 20 21 0.4 
Trusts 
Super'n Funds Property 18 3 21 0.4 
Int'l Fixed Interest Trusts 2 18 20 0.4 
Insurance Bonds International Equity 14 5 19 0.4 
Wholesale PST Aust Fixed Interest 2 16 18 0.3 
Friendly Society Bonds Non Taxed 10 7 17 0.3 
Super'n Funds International Fixed 1 16 17 0.3 
Interest 
Wholesale PST Cash 4 13 17 0.3 
Wholesale NTP Int'! & Aust Equity II II 0.2 
Friendly Society Bonds Multisector 4 6 10 0.2 
Pensions International Fixed Interest I 9 10 0.2 
Pensions Reserve Backed 5 4 9 0.2 
Friendly Society Bonds Misc 3 5 8 0.2 
Wholesale NTP Int'I & Aust Fixed 8 8 0.2 
Interest 
Wholesale PST Property Direct 6 2 8 0.2 
Wholesale PST Reserve Backed 4 4 8 0.2 
Wholesale NTP Property Direct 6 6 0.1 
Unlisted Property Trusts 3 2 5 0.1 
Wholesale PST International Fixed 5 5 0.1 
Interest 
Pensions Property 3 I 4 0.1 
Insurance Bonds Property I 2 3 0.1 
Misc Trusts 2 2 0.0 
Wholesa,e Insurance Bond 2 2 0.0 
Insurance Bonds International Fixed I I 0.0 
Interest 
SuE:erannuation Pensions I I 0.0 
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APPENDIX VI 
MORNINGSTAR FUND SUBCATEGORY BREAKDOWN 
This appendix provides a breakdown of the third tier of classification used by 
Morningstar of its funds as at May 2002. The breakdown excludes finalised funds. 
Suppressed funds are those that were Created in error by Morningstar or funds which 
"has outstanding issues with data11 (Morningstar, 2002a, n.d.). 
Fund Status 
Closed Open Suppressed Total Percent 
Super'n Funds Multisector - Growth 208 156 364 7.0 
Super'n Funds Aust Equity- General 88 191 279 5.4 
Super'n Funds Multisector - Moderate 137 97 234 4.5 
Pensions Fixed Interest - Misc 74 119 193 3.7 
Super'n Funds Int'l Equity - General 52 124 176 3.4 
Aus_t Equity Trusts - General 23 126 149 2.9 
Pensions Aust Equity - General 14 132 146 2.8 
Super'n Funds Multisector - Balanced 78 68 146 2.8 
Super'n Funds Fixed Interest - General 86 58 144 2.8 
Super'n Funds Cash - General 97 45 142 2.7 
Wholesale NTP Aust Equity - General 6 134 140 2.7 
Pensions Multisector - Moderate 42 62 104 2.0 
Super1n Funds - Reserve Backed 90 9 99 1.9 
Int'l Equity Trusts - General 10 88 98 1.9 
Pensions Int1l Equity - General 8 85 93 1.8 
Super'n Funds Aust Equity - Property 24 67 91 1.8 
M.ulti!;ector Trusts - Growth 10 79 89 1.7 
Wholesale NTP Int'! Equity - General 2 84 86 1.7 
Insurance Bonds Multisector - Growth 64 8 72 1.4 
Wholesale NTP Aust Fixed Interest - 5 66 71 1.4 
General 
Wholesale NTP Multisector - Growth 6 64 70 1.3 
Pensions Multisector - Balanced 20 49 69 1.3 
Super'n Funds Int'! & Aust Equity - 26 43 69 1.3 
General 
Super1n Funds Int1l Equity - Misc 8 61 69 1.3 
Pensions Fixed Interest - General 20 42 m 1.2 
Multisector Trusts - Moderate 5 so 55 1.1 
Pensions Cash-- General 19 35 54 1.0 
Aust Equity Trusts - Property 5 46 51 1.0 
Not Identified 9 14 26 49 0.9 
Pensions Aust Equity - Property 7 42 49 0.9 
Wholesale PST MultiSector - Growth 9 40 49 0.9 
Insurance Bonds Multisector - Moderate 38 8 46 0.9 
Wholesale NTP lnt1l Equity - Misc 46 46 0.9 
SuEer'n·Funds Multisector- A~essive 15 30 45 0.9 
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Wholesale NTP Multisector - Moderate 2 42 44 0.8 
Fixed Interest Trusts - General 11 30 41 0.8 
Insurance Bonds - Reserve Backed 38 3 41 0.8 
Cash Trusts & Common-Funds 1 39 40 0.8 
Pensions Int'l Equity - Misc 4 35 39 0.8 
Sllper'n Funds Multisector - Defensive 14 24 38 0.7 
Wholesale NTP Aust Equity - Property 2 36 38 0.7 
Insurance Bonds Aust Equity - General 28 7 35 0.7 
Wholesale PST Multisector - MOderate 8 27 35 0.7 
Insurance Bonds Multisector- Balallced 28 6 34 0.7 
Pensions Int'l & Aust Equity - General 4 29 33 0.6 
Insurance Bonds Cash - General 26 6 32 0.6 
Wholesale PST Aust Equity - General 4 28 32 0.6 
Multisector Trusts - Balanced 2 28 30 0.6 
Super'n Funds Fixed Interest - Misc 12 18 30 0.6 
Friendly Society Bonds F/1 - General 16 13 29 0.6 
Misc Foreign Funds 28 28 0.5 
Insurance Bonds Fixed Interest - General 22 5 27 0.5 
Pensions Multisector - Defellsive 7 20 27 0.5 
Immediate Annuities - Misc 8 18 26 0.5 
Super'n Funds Aust Equity- Misc 2 21 23 0.4 
Wholesale PST lnt1l Equity - General 4 19 23 0.4 
Aust Equity Trusts - Small Companies 2' 20 22 0.4 
Int'l Equity Trusts - North America 1 20 21 0.4 
International & Australian Equity Trllsts - 1 20 21 0.4 
General 
Super'n Funds Property - General 18 3 21 0.4 
Wholesale NTP C:iSh -Trusts & Common 1 20 21 0.4 
Funds 
Wholesale PST Aust Fixed Interest - 2 19 21 0.4 
General 
Insurance Bonds Int1l Equity - General 14 5 19 0.4 
Int'l Equity Trusts - Misc 19 19 0.4 
Pensions Multisector - Aggressive 1 18 19 0.4 
Wholesale NTP Aust Fixed Interest - Misc 19 19 0.4 
Super1n Funds Cash - Enhanced 8 10 18 0.3 
Wholesale NTP Aust Equity - Small 3 15 18 0.3 
Companies 
Int'I Equity Trusts - Asia Ex Japan 4 13 17 0.3 
Multisector Trusts - Aggressive 3 14 17 0.3 
Super'n Funds Int'l Fixed Interest - General 1 16 17 0.3 
Wholesale NTP Multisector - Balanced . 1 16 17 0.3 
Master Fds Discretionary - Superannuation 3 13 16 0.3 
Mu1tisector Trusts - Defensive 2 14 16 0.3 
Wholesale NTP lnt'l Equity - Asia 1 14 15 0.3 
Wholesale NTP Multisector - Misc 1 14 15 0.3 
Wholesale PST Cash - General 4 11 15 0.3 
Insurance Bonds Multisector - Aggressiv1~ 11 2 13 0.3 
lnt'l Equity Trusts - Western Europe 1 12 13 0.3 
Pensions Aust Equity- Misc 13 13 0.3 
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Wholesale NTP lnt'l Equity - Japan 13 j 0.3 
Wholesale NTP Multisector - Aggressive 13 13 0.3 
lnt'l Equity Trusts - Technology 12 12 0.2 
lnt1l Fixed Interest Trusts - General 2 IO 12 0.2 
Wholesale NTP Int'l Equity- Europe 12 12 0.2 
Cash Funds • Enhanced 2 9 II 0.2 
Int'l Equity Trusts - Japan I 10 11 0.2 
Wholesale NTP Cash • Enhanced 11 11 0.2 
Wholesale NTP Int'! & Aust Equity - 11 11 0.2 
General 
Wholesale PST Aust Equity - Property 11 11 0.2 
Pensions Int'l Fixed Interest - General 9 10 0.2 
Wholesale NTP Multisector - Defensive 10 10 0.2 
Friendly Society Bonds NT - Funeral 5 4 9 0.2 
Insurance Bonds Multisector - Defensive 6 3 9 0.2 
Pensions - Reserve Backed 5 4 9 0.2 
Wholesale NTP Int'! Equity - Emerging 9 9 0.2 
Markets 
Aust Equity Trusts - Resources 4 4 8 0.2 
Friendly Society Bonds - Misc 3 5 8 0.2 
Friendly Society Bonds NT. Other NT 5 3 8 0.2 
Insurance Bonds Aust Equity - Property 7 I 8 0.2 
Int'I Fixed Interest Trusts - Misc 8 8 0.2 
Multisector Trusts - Misc 8 8 0.2 
Pensions Cash - Enhanced 3 5 8 0.2 
Wholesale NTP Intl & Aust Fixed Interest 8 8 0.2 
- General 
Wholesale PST- Reserve Backed 4 4 8 0.2 
Wholesale PST Property - General 6 2 8 0.2 
Wholesale PST Multisector - Aggressive I 6 7 0.1 
Master Fds Discretionary - Pension 6 6 0.1 
Wholesale NTP Property - General 6 6 0.1 
Wholesale PST Int1l Equity - Misc ·6 6 0.1 
Friendly Society Bonds Multisector - 2 3 5 0.1 
Balanced 
Friendly Society Bonds Multisector - 2 3 5 0.1 
Moderate 
Int11 Equity Trusts - Emerging Markets I 4 5 0.1 
Unlisted Property Trusts - General 3 2 5 0.1 
Wholesale PST Aust Equity - Misc I 4 5 0.1 
Wholesale PST Multisector - Balanced I 4 5 0.1 
Wholesale PST Multisector - Defensive 2 3 5 0.1 
Aust Equity Trusts - Misc 4 4 0.1 
Insurance Bonds Aust Equity - MiSc 2 2 4 0.1 
Insurance Bonds Fixed Interest - Misc 4 4 0.1 
Int'I Equity Trusts - Asia Incl Japan 4 4 0.1 
Pensions Property - General 3 I 4 0.1 
Insurance Bonds Property - General I 2 3 0.1 
Master Fds Discretionary - Non 3 3 0.1 
Superannuation · 
489 
Wholesale NTP Aust Equity - Misc I 2 3 0.1 
Misc Trusts 2 2 0.0 
Wholesale - Insurance.Bond Misc 2 2 0.0 
Wholesale PST Aust Fixed Interest - Misc 2 2 0.0 
Wholesale PST Cash • Misc 2 2 0.0 
Insurance Bonds Int'l Fixed Interest - I I 0.0 
General 
Superannuations Pensions I I 0.0 
Wholesale PST Multisector - Misc I I 0.0 
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APPENDIX VII 
VANEYK RA TINGS ALPHA RA TING 
Table A VII.I Activity definitions 
Activitv Definition 
Indexed A mandate or product that is adopting an indexed style of management 
Style is considered a passive investor. Thus, there is no element of active risk. 
taken on using this strategy. 
Enhanced The investment manager uses a variety ofsma11 active strategies to add 
Index value without changing the risk profile from that of the benchmark 
Style index. Strategies used by Enhanced Index managers in the Australian 
equities sector include: Purchasing large blocks of stock and receiving a 
discount to the current market price, participating in new issues (floats), 
sub-underwriting and stock lending 
Low The investment manager uses a variety of active strategies to add value. 
Alpha The risk profile of the portfolio is moderately changed from the 
benchmark index. However, absolute return of this style will be highly 
correlated with the benchmark. Strategies used by Low Alpha managers 
in the Australian equities sector include: value screens to generate ideas, 
focus on large companies, modest shifts away from the benchmark 
sector allocation and some controlled concentration of portfolio 
holdings. 
. 
. 
High The investment manager uses a variety of active strategies to add value. 
Alpha However, in doing this the manager significantly changes the risk 
profile of the portfolio from that of the benchmark. Thus, correlations 
with the benchmark may be as low as 70-80%. Active risk is usually 
taken on by running a highly concentrated strategy, holding a large 
number of small companies, a significant over-weighting to a sector or a 
significant deviation in tenns of the portfolio valuation measured by the 
PER, PCF, PBV or dividend yield. 
. 
Specialist Specialist funds take on active risk that is very high when compared . 
with the benchmark. This is because they specialise in a certain part of 
the benchmark, such as smaller companies or banks. For this reason the 
active risk can lead to significantly different perfonnance relative to the 
benchmark perfonnance. 
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Table A Vll,2 Expected Returns for activity (before fees). 
Cash Australian International Listed Australian International 
Fixed Fixed Property Equities Equities 
Interest Interest 
Indexed 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Enhanced 1.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.50% 0.50% 
LowAlnha nla 0.00% 0.25% 0.25% . 1.50% 1.50% 
ffion Alnha nla 0.00% 0.50% 0.50% 4.00% 4.00% 
Snecialist nla 0.00% 0.50% 0.50% 6.00% 6.00% 
FEES 0.25% 0.40% 0.55% 0.65% 0.65% 0.90% 
Source. [vanEyk research, 2001 #536] . 
Table A VII.3 Absolute risk assessment and benchmark 
Sector Level of absolute risk Benchmark Index 
Cash Low WDR Bank Bills Index 
International Fixed Moderately Low JP Morgan Global Hedged 
Interest (hedeed) Index 
Australian Fixed Interest Moderate WDR Comoosite Index 
Listed Property Moderately Hi•h ASX Pronertv Trust Index 
International Equities Hieb MSCI World Index in $A 
Australian EC1uities Hieb All Ordinaries Index 
492 
